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THE MONGOL INVASIONS
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BY

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PREFACE

Events of the past decade have once again placed the Korean peninsula in the position of a buffer state where the wars of greater powers are focused. Historians will recall that Korea has had this role thrust upon her many times before. In recent times the peninsula was the battleground for the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 while the opening battle of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, a naval action, took place off the present port of Inch’ŏn. As a result, a number of studies of the various aspects of modern Korean society, particularly in its contacts with the West, have been undertaken but little attention has been given to the evolution of that society. Yet it is only when this is studied for each period in Korean history that studies of contemporary Korean society can be approached in other than a limited sense.

The Koryŏ (918-1392) period during which the Mongol invasions occurred was a great formative period in the history of the development of Korean society. The period encompassing the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century and the subsequent establishment of Mongol military-administrative organs on the Korean peninsula was one of the important phases of transition in Korean history.

The development of any society is, of course, continuous, but for the purposes of study I have found it convenient to treat the subject at hand in two natural divisions. The Mongol invasions of Korea in the thirteenth century as a development in Korean history form the subject of the present study. It is my intention to treat, in a separate work, the full extension of Mongol control in Korea which followed the period of conquest and with which I have dealt only summarily if at all in these pages. For the period covered I have, however, considered the question of the form and nature of Mongol demands upon Koryŏ as well as the implementation of these demands as an illustration of Mongol methods of establishing control in and extracting wealth from conquered nations. The reciprocal of this was the Koryŏ response to Mongol demands and pressures which was obviously limited and guided by her internal situation as well as her external relations.

The Mongol conquest and subsequent occupation of Koryŏ represent but one phase in the development of the Mongol empire and in many respects the least known phase. The Mongols, initially, did not set out to conquer Koryŏ
but were at the time fighting the Chin in North China. When a drive across South Manchuria led them into northern Koryŏ, they obtained Koryŏ's submission without fighting a battle against Koryŏ forces. There were many factors which contributed to Koryŏ's initial peaceful submission but the key factor was that the Mongols represented, or appeared to represent, the new power in Manchuria. And Koryŏ had always been tributary to the power which held North China and Manchuria. When it became apparent that the Mongols were not at the time strong enough to hold South Manchuria, Koryŏ severed the relationship. This led to a period of sporadic warfare lasting almost thirty years. When Koryŏ finally submitted to the Mongols it was due more to internal events than as a result of the conflict. It has been one of the purposes of this study to examine these events and, if possible, to discover some of the reasons behind what were often apparently contradictory actions by the Koryŏ authorities. My approach has been primarily philological and in this respect I have, in general, endeavored to 'let the records speak for themselves'.

Unfortunately studies of pre-modern Korean history by Western scholars have been extremely limited to say the least, while studies by Korean, Chinese, and Japanese scholars are often difficult to obtain. In consideration thereof, I have divided the present study into two parts. The first part is in the form of a descriptive and chronological narrative; the second part deals primarily with considerations and consequences of events described in the first part and is more analytical in nature. Thus, a 'feed-back' methodology is projected. The narrative of events places them in perspective so that an analysis of component parts may be undertaken without distortion; the analysis of component parts in turn allows modification of the narrative of events.

Since Homer Hulbert's two volume History of Korea, first published in 1905 has recently been reprinted, a word should be said about earlier accounts of Korean history which include J. Ross' History of Corea, first printed in 1880, W. E. Griffis', Corea, the Hermit Nation, first printed in 1882, and J. S. Gale's, A History of the Korean People, which appeared serially in the Korean Mission Field in the years 1925-1927. It would be too easy to subject the pertinent sections of these works to criticism but since I can see no purpose which would be served by so doing, I have refrained from commenting on what I consider to have been valiant pioneer efforts.

For the convenience of the non-specialist, I have added an introductory chapter which provides a brief background and I have endeavored, particularly in the narrative, to relegate technical matters to footnotes. However, for convenience, whenever a reference consists merely of the abbreviated
title of the work plus chüan and page numbers, I have simply placed such information in parentheses in the appropriate location.

In the romanization of Chinese (except for ke which I have romanized ke) I have followed the Wade-Giles system with the usual modifications; for Japanese the Hepburn system, again with the usual modifications. In the romanization of Korean I have followed the McCune-Reischauer system with the following exceptions:
1) utilized names or terms commonly known in another form, e.g., Seoul, li 市, etc.
2) spaced rather than linked both particles and auxiliary verbs; rendered as ་ in all cases; and omitted the diaeresis over ༁ when so called for by the MR system.

In the reconstruction of Mongolian names and terms, I have followed the works of Pelliot, Hambis, Shiratori, and Cleaves and, excluding the well-known term daruŋači or resident commissioner, references have been provided in footnotes. Where no reference is provided the reconstruction is my own. Since my knowledge of thirteenth century Mongolian is very limited, I have left the majority of these names in Chinese transcription, providing orthographic variants when such were encountered, excluding variations resulting from the well-known Ch'ien-lung language reforms of the mid-eighteenth century.

When the name of a location differs from its current designation, I have endeavored to identify or locate it by placing in parentheses following it the modern name it is known by or the area in which it is located; more detailed references are given in footnotes.

All bibliographical abbreviations are in capital letters and may be found in the bibliography; non-bibliographical abbreviations are listed separately preceding the bibliography.

All dates are lunar except where the western name of the month is given in which case they are solar.

In indicating the reign dates of monarchs, I have commenced with the wömyön 元年 and ended with the year preceding the wömyön of the next monarch; when a monarch reigned only during the year of his accession, I have accorded the monarch that year as his 'reign-year'. In indicating the birth dates of individuals when the age at death was known I have arrived at the birth date by subtracting the age plus two years since, as is well-known, in Korea like in China, a child is assumed to be one-year old upon his birth and adds one year to his age each successive (lunar) new year's day. It should be observed that even this method does not always produce the correct year of birth.
Translations of the titles of works in Chinese, Korean, and Japanese are provided in brackets following the title in the original language; when the author of such a work has himself supplied either a translation or an alternate title in a western language, it is so indicated by quotation marks.

A word of caution must be given regarding large numbers occurring in the text. The majority of figures of 10,000 or more should be viewed with some skepticism while the number three should always be suspect.

I gratefully acknowledge the aid given to me by The Rockefeller Foundation and The Ford Foundation whose generous assistance made it possible for me to work at Leiden which resulted in this study, the publication of which was aided by a grant from the Netherlands Ministerie van Onderwijs, Kunsten en Wetenschappen. Needless to say, the views expressed in this study are entirely my own. I wish particularly to thank Mr. and Mrs. Schepel-Verschoor of Leiden for their many kindnesses. Indeed, my indebtedness to all my Dutch friends can be only insufficiently expressed here; I owe a similar debt to Mr. Boyd Compton of New York City whose personal encouragement and warm friendship gave me the courage to continue. For their generous assistance in locating relevant materials I express my deep appreciation to Dr. Li Ogg (Yi Ok) 李玉 of the Université de Paris and Madame Meuvert of the Ecole Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes, Paris. It is a pleasure to acknowledge the cooperation and efforts of the firm of Brill & Co., Leiden, and Mr. F. B. Krips and Mr. J. F. Krips of Rijswijk (Z.H.) in the final printing and publication of this study.

To my wife T'aesun Henthorn, née Yi T'aesun 李泰順, more than to anyone else do I owe the undertaking and completion of this study. With gentle patience she endured endless toil leaving me free to continue this work, encouraged me through difficult periods when I would have given up, and set by her own efforts an example for perseverance which I have endeavored to follow. She typed the manuscript in all its drafts, offered me the guidance of her excellent knowledge of Korean, Sino-Korean, and Japanese, and it is, finally, her calligraphy which graces the pages of this work.

W.E. Henthorn
Leiden, August, 1963
INTRODUCTION

The state of Koryŏ which rose upon the fragments of a shattered Silla (Late Period 668-918), was influenced by early contacts with China's Five Dynasties and became in its formative years a haven for thousands of refugees from the Manchurian state of P'ohai (713-926) which had been crushed by the Ch'i-tan who swept across Manchuria on their way to establishing the Liao Dynasty (907-1125). Powerful conquerors continued to appear in the north as the cauldron of Manchuria repeatedly boiled over into Koryŏ until the peninsula was inundated in a deluge of Mongol invasions in the first half of the thirteenth century. Koryŏ, its coastal areas favorite targets of Japanese freebooters since time immemorial, found its territories repeatedly invaded by the Ch'i-tan (1115-1234) and the Mongol founders of the Yuan dynasty (1215-1368) empire. Acknowledged vassal of the Sung (960-1126), Liao, Chin, Yuan, and, finally, after a shifting initial relationship, of the Ming (1368-1644), Koryŏ received a steady stream of external pressures which altered and guided Korean society as it evolved.

The repeated invasions have led Yi Pyŏngdo, the dean of modern Korean historians, to write that "the history of the Koryŏ dynasty was, it may be said, chiefly a history of engagements with the peoples beyond the northern borders." While neither foreign invasions, a highly developed maritime trade, nor the gradual Koryŏ expansion northward into the upper reaches of the Yalu and the Tuman River valleys relate the entire history of Koryŏ, they did provide backdrop and stimulus for internal developments.

Within the limitations of such criteria, the history of the Koryŏ dynasty may be divided into three broad periods:

1) from 918 to 1170, the power of the government remained fairly centralized in the person of the monarch;
2) from 1170 to 1270, Koryŏ was under the control of the military government and the monarchs became figureheads;
3) from 1270 onward, power was restored to the monarch while events in Koryŏ tended to reflect, in pro- and anti-Mongol factions alike, the vicissitudes of the Yuan and the rise of the Ming until the end of the Koryŏ Dynasty in 1392.
At the time of the Mongol invasions, Koryŏ was under the firm control of a military government as indeed it had been for over fifty years. While there appears to have been no great socio-political and hence economic distinction between the civil and the military officials at the beginning of the Koryŏ Dynasty 6), by the reign of Úijong (r. 1147-1170) 7), a rigid class distinction existed between the civil and the military officials. The ranks of the literati, who held the government posts of importance, were closed to the military and their descendants and reserved for those of royal lineage or the descendants of the civil officials. It was not long before the dissipations of Úijong — if the records be believed — placed the actual control of the state in the hands of the literati and the eunuchs 8) who then endeavored to further strengthen their own power by making the military as a group as weak as possible while abusing them individually 9). This culminated in a coup d'état by Chŏng Chungbu 10) in 1170, and the military then began to compete among themselves for power 11). Chŏng deposed Úijong and placed Myŏngjong (r. 1171-1197) 12) on the throne after a wholesale purge of the civil officials. This was followed by many abortive attempts by members of Chŏng's own followers to wrest power from him and there were also several unsuccessful attempts to topple Chŏng by other military leaders 13) until, finally, he was overthrown and killed by General 14) Kyŏng Taešung 15) in 1179 16). The competition for power among the military had given rise to strong house armies and so, when General Kyŏng died suddenly in 1183, Yi Ùimin 17) became the new military ruler on the strength of his house army. Then in 1196, Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn 翟忠獻 established himself as the ruling power by assassinating Yi. In each case the house armies made up of household retainers were the deciding factor in the power struggle and it was on the strength of these private forces that power was retained 18).

The century of rule by military overlords 19) may be set forth in brief chronology as follows:

1170 - 1179  Chŏng Chungbu
1179 - 1183  Kyŏng Taešung
1183 - 1196  Yi Ùimin
1196 - 1258  Ch'oe clan

1196 - 1218  Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn 翟忠獻
1219 - 1249  Ch'oe U 埈
1250 - 1256  Ch'oe Hang 侃
1257 - 1258  Ch'oe Ùi 埻
1258 - 1268  Kim Chun 金俊 (= Kim Injun)
1268 - 1270  Im clan

1268 - 1270  Im Yŏn 林衍
- 1270 -  Im Yumu 林惟茂
Map of Korea and adjacent areas (ca. 1217)
During the period of the military government the monarchs were largely in the position of figureheads. There were, of course, attempts by the monarchs to alter this situation which normally led to their removal and exile or, upon occasion, their murder 20. Kojong (r. 1214-1259) 21, the monarch during whose long reign many of the events related in the subsequent pages occurred, immersed himself in Buddhist devotions and activities. Ceremonial activities accounted for the remainder of his time while the practical affairs of government were handled by the various government bureaus which were modeled, to a large extent, after Chinese counterparts. Distinct from, yet in actual operational control of all government organs, were the various organs organized and developed by the military rulers. Through this latter structure the military rulers guided the affairs of state 22.

Koryŏ's first recorded contact with the Mongols occurred in 1211, i.e., the seventh year of the reign of Koryŏ Hŭijong (r. 1205-1211) 23 when a Koryŏ envoy to the Chin court was killed by Mongol soldiers (KS21.25b). Although this was in time to prove a prophetic encounter, Koryŏ's first contacts with Mongol forces on a large scale began upon a much different note. The 'Record of Yüan-Koryŏ Affairs', Yüan Kao-li chi-shih 元高麗記事 opens with a concise statement of the initial phase of Yüan-Koryŏ relations:

"In the thirteenth year (1218) of T'ai-tsŭ 太祖 (Činggis, 1155 -1227), the troops of heaven (Mongol) reached Koryŏ. Their monarch submitted and [agreed to] the interchange of envoys and annual tribute. In the nineteenth year (1224) bandits killed our envoy and thereafter [envoys] did not come at all" (YKC1a).

As succinct as these few lines are they underscore the salient features of Koryŏ's initial relations with the Mongols. To begin with, the Mongol offensive which swept across the Yalu in 1218, was directed against the Ch'î-tan and not against Koryŏ, nor was there any particular penetration of other than the northern border region. Second, Koryŏ submitted to the extent of attempting to purchase autonomy by the submission of tribute. And, finally, relations were severed following the murder of a Mongol envoy in the first month of 1225 24), and were not resumed until 1231, when they were forcefully reopened by Mongol arms.

There were in the years that followed, three major turning points in Mongol-Koryŏ relations on the Koryŏ side:

a. the Koryŏ decision to transfer the seat of government from the central capital of Kaegyŏng 龍原 (mod. Kaesŏng; see Chapter I note 43) to Kanghwa Island in 1232;

b. the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan in 1258, and
c. the deposition and subsequent restoration of the monarch Wŏnjong (r. 1260-1274) 25 in 1269.
These may be briefly characterized as ushering in periods of resistance, begrudged cooperation, and active alliance.

On the Yuan side, the turning point began with the reign of Qubilai (Shih-tsung 世宗, r. 1260-1294) which can be described as the commencement of the organized enforcement of Mongol demands through the Mongol military-administrative organs established in Koryô.

When the Mongols commenced their drive in 1209 against the Chin empire which held sway over North China and Manchuria, and to which Koryô was tributary, it produced some unsettling effects. There were the expected revolts among the Ch'i-tan who had been conquered by the Chin and there were also deserters among the Jûrên themselves. Two cases are of particular interest to us here.

In 1211, the Ch'i-tan prince Yeh-lû Liu-ke 耶律留哥, who had been serving the Chin as chiliarch (i.e., Chief of One Thousand) ch'ien-hu 千戶, rebelled against the Chin and seized control of a portion of the Liaotung area. The following year, he submitted to Mongol forces pressing eastward across Liaotung and, in 1213, he proclaimed himself ruler of the Liao. This, like the establishment of the Qara-Khitay state in Central Asia following the fall of the Liao Dynasty in 1125 (26), was an attempt to revive the old Liao empire. Liu-ke was soon ousted from power by a certain Yeh-ssu-pu 耶酥普 and he requested support from Chinggis against the usurper.

In 1214, the Chin moved their capital south to Feng-ching 汴京 and appointed P'u-hsien Wan-nu 蒲鮮萬奴, a Jûrên, to be Pacification Commissioner, hsien-fu-shih 宣撫使, of the Hsien-p'ing-lu 27 area where the revolt centered. Wan-nu, with some forty thousand men under his command, was to check the rebellion initiated by Yeh-lû Liu-ke, but he was himself defeated in late 1214, and, using the opportunity provided by an attack directed against the Chin under the Mongol General Muqali 28 which resulted in the fall of Peking to the Mongol forces, Wan-nu rebelled against the Chin in the spring of 1215 (YS I. 19a). Basing himself in the Chin Eastern Capital, Tung-ching 東京 (Liaoyang), he established himself at the head of a state which he designated Ta-chen 大真 or Great Jûrên.

In the spring of 1216, the Ch'i-tan rebels fled south from Hsien-p'ing 咸平 before a Chin army mustered against them and overran the southern borders of Wan-nu's territory, seizing Teng-chou 澄州. Yeh-ssu-pu was murdered at this time by one of his ministers, a certain Ch'i-nu 乞奴, who then assumed the leadership. At this point the Ch'i-tan rebels held the area from Teng-chou (mod. Hai-chou 海州) to Poju 保州 (= Ùiju 義州) just across the Yalu River. In the autumn and winter of 1216, Mongol forces had been engaged in the Liaotung penisinsula and, accompanied by Yeh-lû
Liu-ke, had chased the Ch'i-tan rebels from Teng-chou to the Koryŏ borders. Then the Mongols launched an attack on the Ch'i-tan forces at Ta-fu-ying (located on an island in the lower course of the Yalu River, near mod. Uiju). Hard-pressed, the Ch'i-tan requested land and supplies from Koryŏ to continue the fight; when it was refused they crossed the Yalu with an estimated ninety thousand men and overran the Koryŏ frontier region (YS 154. 1a; IC 9A. 6b).

P'u-hsien Wan-nu had endeavored to retain his independence but was defeated by the Mongol forces pressing eastward and, submitting to Muqali, he sent his son T'ieh-ke as a hostage (YS 1. 19a). When the Mongol forces withdrew following the defeat of the Ch'i-tan rebels late in 1216, Wan-nu took his own forces further east toward the Yalu and, in early 1217, redesignated his nation the Tung-hsia or Eastern Hsia in 1217 (YS 1. 19a-b). The name of this state is probably better known as Tung-chen (¬-kuo) or (Land of) the Eastern Jürčen and for simplicity I will refer to them simply as the Eastern Jürčen 29).

The Ch'i-tan rebels had spent the year 1217 pillaging southward down the Korean peninsula, menacing the Koryŏ capital. Then, after a long drive to the southeast culminated in several defeats, they turned toward the land of the Eastern Jürčen in the northeast.

The Chin, in the meantime, had attempted to strengthen their hold on the Liaotung area where they still had strong garrisons and, at this time, controlled the P'o-su-lu administrative area which lay just west of the lower reaches of the Yalu. P'u-hsien Wan-nu, pressed by these Chin forces in Liaotung, moved further eastward into the Chin Ho-lan-lu administrative area and based himself along the lower reaches of the Tuman River. It was into this area that the Ch'i-tan rebels had fled from Koryŏ in the autumn of 1217, and here they were able to recruit reinforcements. The Ch'i-tan resumed their attack on Koryŏ in a drive directed toward Koryŏ's Western Capital, Sŏgyŏng (mod. P'yŏngyang), which overran Koryŏ's Northeast Frontier-District but fell short of the objective at the near-by walled-city of Kangdong 30). Koryŏ forces managed to contain them in this area and were slowly gaining the upper hand when, in the winter of 1218, unexpected allies appeared.

* Teke

Notes to the Introduction

1. For a general article on P'o-hai, see W. E. Henthorn, 'Some notes on Par-hae (P'ohai)', TKBRAS XXXVII (1961), pp. 65-82. Also see Ikeuchi Hiroshi...


3. Nū-chen or Jürčen; later written Nū-chih due to the taboo name of Liao Hsing-tsung. For an account of the Jürčen conquest of northern Koryŏ see Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Mansen-shi kenkyū, Vol. 2, pp. 199-264 and H.D. Martin, The Rise of Chingis Khan and His Conquest of North China, Baltimore, 1950, pp. 55-56; for the disastrous defeat of the Koryŏ army in the Jürčen incursions of 1104, see the biography of Yun Kwan (d. 1111) in KS 96.11b ff. Following this defeat Yun reorganized the Koryŏ army and erected nine walled-cities, sŏng, in the present North Hamgyŏng Province, during the reign of Yejong (r. 1106-1122). While the 'walled-cities' secured the eastern littoral, the reorganization of the army was apparently only a temporary expedient and it appears that no effort was made to retain an effective national army at this time. For the role of the walled-cities build by Yun see Yun Mubyŏng Tōkyō, 1918, and the following archaeological reports: Koseki chōsa hōkoku [Report on Investigation of Ancient Sites], and Koseki chōsa tokubetsu hōkoku [Special Report on Investigation of Ancient Sites], published in 1919 and 1929 respectively by the Chosŏn koseki kenkyūkai Tōkyō.

4. I use the word 'vassal' here merely to indicate an acknowledged subordinate status. Koryŏ's relations with Sung, Liao and Chin have been the subject of several articles by M.C. Rogers and are cited in full in the bibliography. The Confucian-based relationship which existed between Koryŏ and Sung and Ming has been described by F. Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in East Asia, Baton Rouge, La., 1946, while Koryŏ-Yüan relations are unique in Korean history. An excellent study for the period 962-1174 is Marugame Kinsaku Tōkyō, 1960, pp. 1-50; II, CG 18 (1961), pp. 58-82.


7. Wang Ch'ŏl 王徽, the 18th monarch, was born in 1127, ascended the throne in 1146, was deposed on the 13th of October 1170, died in 1173, and was canonized Ŭijong 殿宗. He also had the adult hwii諶 or taboo name of Hyŏn 現. For biographical information see KS 17. 19a, KS 19. 10a; see also BTKP 113. 1057.

The majority of Koryŏ monarchs had several hwii or taboo names which are detailed in the works of Courant, Hambis and Rogers, for which see the bibliography. I have listed only the taboo name used in the records during the period under consideration which is, in most cases, the adult taboo name. In those cases where two taboo names were used by the same individual during this period it has been so noted.

8. Although the subject has been generally overlooked, a short study of the eunuchs has been done by Yi Uch'ŏl 李愚喆, Koryŏ sidae ŭi hwang gwan e taehayŏ 高麗時代宦官門對外 [A Consideration of the Eunuch in the Koryŏ Dynasty], SY 1 (1958), pp. 18-45.

With the rise of the military overlords in 1170, and their subsequent purge from positions of power, the eunuchs appear to have played only a minor role until the reign of King Ch'ungmyŏl 忠烈王 (r. 1275-1308) when they again assumed a powerful role in the affairs of State. Cf. KS 122. 9b-27b.


10. Chŏng Chungbu 鄭仲夫 (fl. 1169-1179); for biographical information see KS 128. 1a-15a; BTKP13. 127.

11. Cf. KS 86. 9b. Chŏng Chungbu exiled Ŭijong to Kŏje Island 巨濟島 (S. Kyŏngsang Province), killed the crown prince and put the king’s younger brother, the Duke of Igyang 翼陽公, on the throne, viz., Myŏngjong 明宗 (KS 86. 29b). For a brief study of the rebellion see Yun Yonggyun 尹熔均, Kŏrai Kisŏ-cho ni okeru Tei Chū-fu ran no soin to sono eikyō 高麗毅宗朝における鄭仲夫亂の素因とその影響 [The Cause and Effect of the Rebellion of Chŏng Chungbu in the Reign of Koryŏ Ŭijong], SG 2 (1930), pp. 91-96. Pyŏn has made an excellent and detailed study of the socio-economic distinctions which gradually arose between the civil and military officials and which was an important factor in the coup d'état of 1170, for which see Pyŏn T'aesŏp, op. cit., pp. 1-92.
12. Wang Hün 王昕, the nineteenth monarch, was born in 1131, ascended the throne in 1171, was deposed in 1192, died in 1202, and was canonized Myŏngjong 明宗. For biographical information see KS 19. 11a-b and KS 20. 38a-b; also see BTKP 85. 794.

13. For example, the rebellion of Cho Wich'ong 趙位寵 (d. 1176; bio. KS 100. 7-11) which centered around the Western Capital, Sŏgyŏng (mod. P'yŏngyang), and which lasted from 1174 to 1176. Also, at the urging of Kim Podang 金甫當 (d. 1173), Ûijong returned to Kyerim (Kyŏngju) from exile on Kôje Island but this attempt was crushed by Chŏng's follower Yi Ùimin 李義敏 (fl. 1170-1196; bio. KS 128) who murdered the deposed monarch at Kyŏngju in 1173. cf. M.C. Rogers, 'Studies in Korean History', TP LCVII (1959) 1 & 2, pp. 30-62.

14. A study of Koryŏ civil and military titles is seriously needed. Needless to say the subject is a complex one. T'ang titles adopted in Silla times were retained in many cases and these were supplemented by the adoption of Yüan titles in the 13th century, not to mention previous influences from Liao, Chin, and Sung. To this must be added those titles and offices which were distinctly Korean in origin. Determining the function of the holders of these titles is, of course, the difficulty. In this paper I have given merely suggestive translations for titles, unless otherwise indicated. In his Han'guk-sa Vol. II (projected six vols. of which three have appeared, viz., Vol. I, by Yi Pyŏngdo and Kim Chaewŏn 金載源, Vol. 2, by Yi Pyŏngdo, and Vol. 5, Chronological Tables, by Yun Mubyŏng 尹武炳; published by the Chhindan Society, Seoul, 1959), Yi Pyŏngdo has appended as Table 4, 'A Table of the Central Bureaucratic Structure of the Koryŏ Period' (hereinafter cited Yi, Table 4), and has appended as Table 6, 'A Table of Stipends' (hereinafter cited Yi, Table 6), compiled, we are told in the 'Introduction', p. 1, by Yi Kibaek 李基白 and An Kyehyŏn 安啓賢 respectively; appended as Table 7 are charts of the amounts of paddy fields and forest land allotted (hereinafter cited, Yi, Table 7). Since these tables refer to the bureaucratic and military structure during the reign of Munjong 文宗 (r. 1047-1082), the information taken from them is given with that qualification in mind. In addition, to their annual rice stipends, Koryŏ officials received land allowances. Each official was granted the privilege of the use of paddy fields and forest lands, the latter particularly important considering the large amounts of firewood consumed in the Korean on dol 溫堵 system of radiant heating which, as it dates to neolithic times on the peninsula (cf. Kim Chaewŏn's 金載元 synopsis of Korean prehistory in Han'guk-sa, Vol. 1, pp. 8-64), was certainly in use during this period.
And, in theory, the land was supposed to revert to the state. For some rather general remarks on the Korean ondol system and comparisons with Roman methods of radiant heating, see Viesman, Warren, 'Ondol - Radiant Heat in Korea', TKBRAS XXXI (1948-9), pp. 9-22. For Silla (as well as Paekche, Koguryô) titles and the use of T'ang titles in Silla see: F. Vos, 'Kim Yusin, Persönlichkeit und Mythos - Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der altkoreanischen Geschichte', Oriens Extremus I (1954) 1, pp. 29-70, and II 1, pp. 210-236 and the works cited therein. In the Koryô army a General, changgan 中官, had the official grade of Fourth Class, primary (Yi, Table 4) which carried an annual stipend of 200 bushels (sok 石) of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 75 kyôl 結 of paddy fields and 39 kyôl of forest land (Yi, Table 7).

15. Kyông Taesûng 慶大升 was born in 1154 and died in 1183. He controlled the military government from 1179 to 1183. For biographical information see KS 100. 16a 3-20b7; also see BTKP 79. 747.

16. Cf. KS 87. 2a 3. It is interesting to note that following the death of General Kyông, his private guard unit, the tobang 都房, did not disband and was finally exiled to an island. Cf. bio. of Kyông Taesûng KS 100.

17. Yi Úmin 契敏 (fl. 1170-1196); for biographical information see KS 128. 19a-25b; also see BTKP 144. 1323.

18. House armies kabyông 家兵 of the military rulers were formed of their household retainers mun'gaek 家客. Upon at least one occasion cash inducements were offered for recruitment but this appears to have been a temporary measure in time of crisis and to what extent it characterized these private forces in general is unknown, cf. KS 129. The house army of Ch'oe Ch'ung-hôn increased to the extent that it was as strong as the national army. In the 1st month of the third year of Kojong (1216), Ch'oe sent his house army to aid the Koryô army then fighting the Ch'î-t'an invaders and we read that "when they sent [troops] to ward off the Ch'î-t'an, the skillful and brave soldiers were all the retainers mun'gaek 家客 of the Ch'oe's, [while] the government army was weak and unable to be used" (KS 129). In the 11th month of the same year, Ch'oe inspected his house army which stretched twenty-three li 里 while his son U also controlled a considerable force of his own (KS 129). By the 20th year of the reign of Kojong, the size of the Ch'oe clan's private army was still such that Ch'oe U could send his house force in lieu of the government army to attempt to crush the Koryô rebel Hong Pogwôn 火福源 at the Western Capital (TT 31, 50. 16).

The private character of Ch'oe's forces is well illustrated by two examples:
1. In the 7th year of the reign of Huijong (r. 1205-1211), the king plotted to assassinate Ch'oe Ch'unghŭn, but Ch'oe was saved by his guard unit the tobang.

2. When armies of monks being used against the Ch'i-tan forcee then nearing Kaegyŏng plotted to overthrow Ch'oe, he dispatched his house army to crush them (KS 129).

For a survey article see W. E. Henthorn, 'Some Notes on Koryŏ Military Units', TKBRAS XXXV (1959), pp. 66-75.

19. The biographies of the members of the Ch'oe and Im clans as well as that of Kim Chun are referred to in detail later in the text.

20. Since the Koryŏ monarchs received their patents of investiture from the rulers of China — more specifically from the state which controlled North China and Manchuria — this was often responsible for Koryŏ skull-duggery in reporting the succession of monarchs for investiture by China, especially during the period of the military government (1170-1270). See M. C. Rogers, 'Some Kings of Koryŏ as Registered in Chinese Works', JAOS 81 (1961) 4, pp. 415-422 for an early example of this; also see the other works by Rogers which are cited in full in the bibliography.

21. Wang Ch'öl (r. 1214-1259), the twenty-third monarch, was born in 1192, ascended the throne in 1213, died in 1259, and was canonized Kojong. For biographical information see KS 22a. 4-9 and KS 24. 44b-45a. BTKP 73. 701 has, I note, given Kojong's reign dates incorrectly as 1216-1259.

22. The extent to which the function of many departments in the central government was taken over by the offices created by the military is largely unknown and warrants a special study.

23. Wang Tŏk, the twenty-first monarch, was born in 1181, ascended the throne in 1204, was deposed and exiled in 1211, died in 1237, and was canonized Huijong. For biographical information see KS 21. 26a-b and KS 23. 33; also see BTKP 38. 357.

24. There are the expected discrepancies in dates between the Yüan and Koryŏ records reflecting different records of departure and arrivals, as well as receipt of reports of events. In this case, the envoy in question was killed in the first month of 1225, but, perhaps because he was the envoy for the tribute of 1224, or possibly because he was dispatched in 1224, YKC renders 1224. In referring back to the event some years later, Koryŏ also refers to him as the envoy of chia-shen year, i.e., 1224 (KS 23. 19b). However, the envoy did not leave Koryŏ until the first month of 1225 (cf. KS 22. 27a). For consistency, I have followed the KS in all dates unless otherwise indicated, and have noted discrepancies in dates when I have felt it to be germane.
25. Wang Ch‘on 王鎡 (adult taboo name Sik 薛 a.w.植), the twenty-fourth monarch, was born in 1219, ascended the throne in 1259, died in 1274, and was canonized Wonjong 元宗. For biographical information see KS 25. 1a 5-8 and KS 27. 46b 8-49b 2. Also see BTKP 122. 1146. The entry under father in BTKP is erroneously given as Huaijong; it should be corrected to read Kojong.


27. Hsien-p'ing-lu 咸平路 is the present Kai-yuan-hsien 賢原縣; see Chung-kuo ku-chin ti-ming la-tz'u-tien 中國古今地名大辭典 Commercial Press, Shanghai, 2nd ed., 1933, p. 603. Also see YS 59. 6a.


29. Yanai Watari 箭內瓦 (being the Chinese translation of three studies which originally appeared in Japanese), Commercial Press, 1944, pp. 85-91, maintains that the designation Tung-hsia 東夏 is a scribal error for Tung-chen 東真. Ikeuchi, Mansen-shi kenkyu, p. 581 note 1 and pp. 643-649, opposes this view. Yanai's view is based chiefly on the fact that the designation Tung-hsia does not appear in the Koryǒ records. However, as Ikeuchi points out, it does appear in the Tongmun-sǒn 東文選 compiled by Yu Sungdan 玉升旦 (1170-1232; bio. KS 102. 6a ff; BTKP 153. 1402) — regrettably unavailable to me — although its appearance there is in the heading of a letter and is admittedly controversial for it is the type of explanatory title which could well have been added at a later date. Yet, Yanai's argument is not totally convincing. The application Tung-hsia was probably coined after Hsi-hsia 西夏 (Tanqu). However, it is generally referred to in the Korean records (as pointed out by Yanai, loc. cit.) as the Tung-chen-kuo (Kor. Tongjin'guk) 東真國 since the peoples of the area in which Wan-nu settled had, at least as early as 1021, i.e., the twelfth year of the reign of Koryǒ Hyŏnjong 显宗 (r. 1010-1031), been known in Korean records as the Eastern Jürčen Tong yǒjin (C. Tung nü-chen) 東女真, cf. KS 4. 35-36. These designations and the area to which they pertained are clarified in ch'tien-pien 前編 4a of the Ming-Yüan-Ch'ing hsi-t'ung-chi 明元 清系通記, Commercial Press edition, 1934. I have retained the designation Eastern Jürčen in all references to these peoples for the sake of lucidity.
30. The leadership of the Ch'i-tan rebels changed several times during their stay in Koryō; according to the records as follows: Ch'i-nu was killed by a certain Chin-shan who was killed by a certain Chin-shih who was killed by a certain T'ung-ku-yü and he was, in turn, killed by a certain Han-she who commanded the Ch'i-tan forces at the time of the Kangdong battle. Ikeuchi, Mansen-shi kenkyū, Vol. 1, p. 602, says that Ch'i-nu may have been killed in battle and he maintains that Chin-shih is an error for Chin-shan and that no such person as Chin-shan existed. While I shall not attempt to give a complete bibliography for the events described in the Introduction, I have drawn material from the following sources: YKC 1b; KS 22; KS 103; HY 22. 8a-9a; CHSL 4. 22; YS 1. 19a-20a; YS 149. 1a-5b; Yanai, loc. cit., Ikeuchi, loc. cit., and the succinct accounts contained in Yi Pyŏngdo, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, pp. 538-540, and Tōyō rekishi daijiten, published by the Heibonsha, Tōkyō, 1937-39, Vol. 2, p. 273. Additional information is also contained in the Koryō-sa biographies contained in KS 102, and KS 129. For a description of events in North China at this time see H.D. Martin, The Rise of Chingis Khan . . ., O. Franke, Geschichte des chinesischen Reiches, Berlin, 1952, Bd IV and V; and R. Grousset, L'Empire mongol, Paris, 1941, T. I.
Chapter I

THE INITIAL PHASE

In the winter of 1218\(^1\), ten thousand Mongol troops under the command of Marshal\(^2\) Ha-chên\(^3\) (? Qaçîn) and Deputy Marshal Cha-la\(^4\) (? * Jala) supported by a force of twenty thousand Eastern Jürčen troops sent by P’u-hsien \(\text{阮子淵}\) \(\text{wan-nu}\) (cf. \(\text{KS} 23.19b-20b\)) and commanded by \(\text{wan-yen Tzu-yüan}\) \(\text{完顏宗弼}\) swiftly swept unto Koryŏ (\(\text{KS} 103.4b; \text{KS} 22.16a\)) from the northeast\(^5\). Quickly crushing the Ch'i-tan occupied cities of Hwaju, Maengju, Sunju, and Tŏkchu\(^6\), they were making directly\(^7\) for the walled-city \(\text{sŏng}\) \(\text{朶京}\), of Kangdong\(^9\), the last major Ch'i-tan strongpoint in Koryŏ, when a heavy snowfall rendered the roads impassable. The Ch'i-tan were holding out in an attempt to exhaust their pursuers and with their supply route cut, the Mongol commanders turned to Koryŏ for assistance\(^10\). Ha-chên sent Interpreter\(^11\) Chao Chung-hsiang \(\text{趙仲祥}\) leading a party of twelve persons (cf. \(\text{IC} 6.13b\)) to the headquarters\(^12\) of Cho Ch'ung\(^13\), Marshal of the Northwest Frontier-District\(^14\) and senior Koryŏ commander, with a severely worded dispatch which proclaimed that they had been sent by Činggis to subdue the Ch'i-tan who had been ravaging Koryŏ for the past three years. Requesting troops and provisions, the dispatch also stated that the Emperor had commanded them to pledge the two nations in a Elder (Mongols) - Younger (Koryŏ) Brother relationship following the subjugation of the Ch'i-tan (\(\text{KS} 103.4b\))\(^15\).

Marshal Cho kept the Koryŏ Court informed of the situation by endless dispatches and was one of the few to favor meeting the Mongol demands (\(\text{KS} 103.5a\)). Although Ha-chên repeatedly charged them to bring reinforcements (\(\text{IC} 6.13b\)), Cho's generals were hesitant to act on the Mongol demands and only Commissioner of Men and Horse\(^16\) Kim Ch'wiryŏ\(^17\) spoke out: "Precisely on this day will the nation gain or lose. If we disregard them, I believe we will regret it later." "This is my own opinion," Marshal Cho agreed (\(\text{KS} 103.16b\)). But the Koryŏ Court was alarmed by the appearance of the Mongol forces and highly suspect of their motives — "The Mongols are the most inhuman of the northern barbarians. Moreover, they have never previously been on good terms with us," it was pointed out. Lost in discussions of
whether to meet the Mongol demands or not, the Court delayed which merely angered the Mongols. Finally, in a dispatch prepared by the Secretariat 18 they agreed to fulfill all the instructions proposed, chiefly it would appear, at the urging of Marshal Cho (KS 103. 4b-5a).

As a military man, Marshal Cho wanted to choose someone to transport the provisions and reinforcements to the Mongols who would be able to spy on them as well, but was having difficulty choosing the right man. Kim In'gyǒng19), a subordinate official begged to be allowed to go.

"Your plans," Cho told him curtly, "[are] simply those which your superiors direct. You are not accustomed to go spying recklessly. How can you presume to ask to do so [now]?"

"I have heard," Kim said, "that the Mongols have taken up battle positions; [we should] take example from [the ancient militarists] Sun20) [When I was young I read the Six Books 21] and am well acquainted with them. Thus do I presume to ask." When the Court allowed it, Cho sent Kim with one thousand picked troops 22) and one thousand bushels 23) of rice to assist the Mongols (KS 102. 7b).

In'gyǒng arrived at the Mongol camp just in time to take his men to watch the Mongol-­Jùrc))/( troops attack the Ch'i-tan in the walled-city of Taeju 24). Ha-chan and Tzu-yúan welcomed Kim with a feast and music at their camp at Tǒk Mountain to the west of the city. Then both commanders had their soldiers provide some entertainment. In'gyǒng formed his men into a military square outside the west gate of the Ch'i-tan held city, and the two Marshals climbed a height to watch while the Ch'i-tan themselves looked on from the city walls. Forty-six Mongols dressed in armor and with swords belted on opposed each other (in mock combat). Kim had some of his men perform various tricks with a great clamor in front of the army and then, selecting twenty skilled archers, he had them discharge their arrows into the city in a single volley. The Ch'i-tan spectators deserted the walls hurriedly. The two Marshals, not to be outdone, invited Kim to a second feast and gave him the seat of honor (KS 102. 7b-8a). At the feast he was told by Ha-chan:

"[Our] nations [should] join to be Elder-­Younger Brothers. If you inform [your] King and return with a letter [of agreement], then I will also return and present it to the Emperor" (KS 103. 5a).

In early 1219 25), preparations were made to take the last Ch'i-tan stronghold at Kangdong. Kim Ch'wiryǒ and Director of Affairs for the Commissioner of Men and Horse 26), Han Kwangyón, in command of a large force which included cavalry sinɡi, a crossbow unit taegak, and a unit identified as naesang 27) went to join the Mongol-­Jùrc))/( forces for the assault on Kangdong (KS 103. 17a).
In the group marching toward Kangdong was young Kim Chidae, a conscript from Ch'ŏngdo, who had filled his father's place in the levy of men made for the Kangdong campaign in 1217. He would later rise in the Koryŏ military but the only thing that distinguished him from his fellow soldiers at the moment was his shield decoration. While all the other soldiers of his unit had strange beasts decorating the top of their shields, Chidae had written a simple poem on his shield expressing the idea that loyalty to the nation and filial piety could both be cultivated by an action such as his own (KS 102. 21a-b). Also in the Koryŏ forces converging on Kangdong was a cavalry unit under Commissioner of Men and Horse Yi Chŏk, who had already distinguished himself in battles against the Ch'i-tan during the two preceding years (KS 103. 21b-22b).

During a welcoming feast, Ha-chen had the interpreter Chao Chung-hsiang tell Kim Ch'wiryŏ, "[If] you would be joined in friendship with us then you must first revere ye the Mongol Emperor and then revere Emperor Mannon." Ch'wiryŏ replied, "The heavens do not have two suns and the people do not have two rulers. How can there be two Emperors under Heaven? I salute pae only the Mongol Emperor." When Ha-chen first saw Ch'wiryŏ he was impressed by his appearance. Ch'wiryŏ was six feet five inches (Koryŏ measure) tall and had a long flowing beard - it is said that when he put on full dress that two maid servants would lift up his beard so he could don his girdle. Ha-chen had Ch'wiryŏ seated with him and asked: "How old are you?"

"I'm approaching sixty," Ch'wiryŏ replied. "I am not yet fifty," Ha-chen said. "Since we are already of one house, you are the elder brother and I am the younger brother."

Then he made Ch'wiryŏ take the seat (of honor) facing east. The next day when Ch'wiryŏ again visited Ha-chen's garrison, Ha-chen informed him, "I have attacked six nations which has given me much experience with noble men. [Then] I saw your appearance. How is it so remarkable? [This is] the reason I trust you. I look at the troops under [your] command and they too are like [members] of the same house [as my men]."

Then, taking Ch'wiryŏ's hand, Ha-chen led him out of the gate and helped him on his horse.

Several days later, when Marshal Cho arrived, Ha-chen asked Ch'wiryŏ, "Is the Marshal older than [you], Elder Brother?"
"He is older," Ch'wiryǒ lied — Cho was 49 at the time. Marshal Cho was then given the upper seat at the feast which followed. It was now time for the Koreans to be surprised. Cho and Kim discovered, as was John of Plano Carpini (Pian de Carpine) to note later (32), that according to the Mongol custom, the meat was stabbed with a sharp knife and then swiftly passed back and forth between the diners each taking a bit then passing it back. Of the Koryǒ soldiers, it is related, there were none who were not reluctant to eat in this fashion (KS 103. 17a-18a). It was probably at this time that the Mongol and Koryǒ commanders 'Cha-la and [Cho] Ch'ung agreed to be Elder and Younger Brothers. [Cho] inquired of annual remission of levies and taxes. Cha-la said, "As the way to your country is distant and it is difficult to come and go, each year we will send ten envoys (33) to bring [back] tribute" (YS 208. 2b) (34).

Battle Positions at Kangdong

In the morning the commanders rode to a meeting outside of the walled-city of Kangdong. Dismounting they walked to within three hundred paces of the walls and stopped. Ha-chen then had a trench ten 'feet' ch'ǒk (8) wide and ten 'feet' deep dug from the south gate of the city to the east gate. The section northward from the west gate was controlled by Tzu-yüan and the section from the east gate to the north was given to Ch'wiryǒ. They used the ditch that had been dug to prevent escape. No mention is made of the Mongol troops which participated in the battle; undoubtedly they covered the southwest sec-
tor which otherwise would have been unguarded and they probably also backed up the ditch in the southeast sector.

As the end grew near, forty Ch'i-tan came over the walls to submit and their chiefs pleaded in front of the Mongol army. Abandoned, their leader Han-she hung himself. Then the functionaries, soldiers, and women—an estimated fifty thousand—opened the city gates and came out and submitted. Ha-chen and Cho Ch'ung went to watch the submission. Hsi , the wife of the prince, as well as one hundred of the Ch'i-tan officials were beheaded immediately. The remainder of the prisoners were given to the army to keep.

Ha-chen then told the Koryo commanders:
"We have come 10,000 li and combined our strength with you to smash the bandits. This is the fortune of a thousand years. Ceremony warrants going to salute the King [but] my army is rather large and it is difficult to travel a long way. Therefore I shall simply send an envoy to offer my thanks."

After the battle, the Mongol commanders pledged:
"[Our] two nations shall eternally be brothers and the descendants of 10,000 generations will not forget this day" (KS 103. 18a-19a) 35).

A feast to reward the army was given by Marshal Cho. Ha-chen gave the Koryo forces seven hundred women and young boys and returned some 200 Koreans who had been captives of the Ch'i-tan. Then Ha-chen selected girls who were about fifteen years of age and gave Cho and Kim each nine; he also gave them each nine fine horses 36). The remainder of the prisoners he had accompany him (KS 103. 19a) 37). We are told that "[Cho] Ch'ung took [Koryo's] Ch'i-tan prisoners and distributed them in the chu districts [where] they selected unoccupied wasteland, settled it, and engaged in agriculture. It became the custom of the people to call them 'Ch'i-tan sites'" (HY 27. 10a-b; also see KS 103. 19a; CHSL 4. 23a).

Following the fall of Kangdong, a Koryo delegation was sent to Cha-la's Mobile Garrison 38) with a proposal for peace 39).

Koryo also sent gifts to the Mongol field commanders and a missive, of interest as the first recorded communication with the Mongols, which makes the claim that Koryo had already beaten the Ch'i-tan, undoubtedly a diplomatic tactic to play down the importance of the Mongol military action 40).

"[At this time of] Early Spring, we beg to consider how you are, looking eagerly forward. Our nation has since long been invaded by the Ch'i-tan, and this sickness in our very midst we were unable to drive out ourselves. How would we have expected that Your Excellency the Marshal would clear out the filth for the benefit of our insignificant state, coming from afar with righteous
troops, exposing yourself to sun and dew in the open field! As regards our small nation, it behooves us as quickly as possible to bring presents to reward the troops, as a small consolation for their hardships.

Initially, we did not know the day that [Your] Great Army would enter the borders; moreover, the [Ch'i-tan] bandits were blocking the roads. So we delayed and did not in time inquire in the neighbourhood. We beg to consider this most obnoxious and we are therefore tremulously ashamed, and hope that you will magnanimously forgive us.

We had only just heard that the [Ch'i-tan] bandits had moved into the walled-city of Kangdong to defend themselves and so we believed that they were merely people already in jail, not worth worrying about. Then we sent people to bring thanks and at the same time inquire about your health. These emissaries had not yet been able to start on their journey when again there were emergency reports, and so we actually heard that the band had left the fort and submitted, all being executed or made prisoner 41, to the joy of the whole nation who clap their hands in unison. This is truly [an example of] the righteous [behaviour] of a large State helping a weak one and having pity on its neighbor, whereas for [our] small state it is the good fortune one encounters but once in 10000 generations! We are moved by your great kindness and do not know how to require this. Now, in obedience to the King's decree, we have roughly prepared some meagre wine and fruit and other gifts, and especially dispatched certain officials to bring them to you under escort; their quantities are fully entered on a separate list. Please do not refuse them as being [too] negligible nor punish us for being too late.

In fear and trembling [we submit this petition]."

An immediate reply for the sake of courtesy was sent to Koryo (YKC 2a) but not until some days later was a full reply made when the Mongol commander sent P'u-li-tai-yeh 42 with a dispatch to the Koryo capital of Kaegyŏng 43 (YKC 2a; YS 208. 2a). This was undoubtedly in the way of official confirmation of the agreement made by the Koryo and Mongol commanders earlier. The reception given the Mongol delegation provides an interesting view of the times and of the Mongol disregard for formal ceremony which the Koreans found distasteful.

"Ha-chen sent P'u-li-tai-wan (i.e., P'u-li-tai-yeh) and others to present a missive. They came seeking to discuss peace. The King sent Attendant Censor 44 Pak Siyun 李時允 (fl. 1220's) to welcome them, and ordered the civil and military officials to array themselves in their hats and girdles and stand separately to the right and left [of the road] from Sonūi Gate 45 to the crossroad. [When] P'u-li-tai-wan and the others arrived outside the hostel, they slowed, stopped and [dismounting] did not enter. They
said, 'The King must come out to welcome us.' Thereupon, an interpreter was made to appeal to them two or three times. At last, they mounted their horses and entered the hostel gate" (KS 22. 16b). Finally, the moment of presentation arrived:

"[When] the King had appeared in the Taegwan Hall 46) [the Mongols] all in fur clothing, hats and girdles, and with bows and arrows, marched straight into the hall. [One] took a document from his bosom and, seizing the King's hand, gave it to him. The King changed color. Those in attendance were shocked, but they did not dare approach. The attending official, Ch'oe Söndan (fl. 1220's), said tearfully, 'How can we allow this bunch of barbarians to approach the Most Venerable? Suppose there should be the calamity of an assassin? We surely would not be able to prevent it.' Then he suggested that P'u-li-tai-wan be taken outside to change into Korean clothing 47): They were taken into the palace hall for private homage, only bowing [with raised hands clasped] but without prostrating themselves. They were given utensils of gold and silver, silks, and otter pelts, [according to] their difference [in rank]" (KS 22. 16b-17a).

Marshal Cho Ch'ung accompanied the Mongol and Jürčen commanders northward 48) as far as the border city of Úiju 49) on the Yalu. As they prepared to leave, the Mongol army seized many Koryŏ army horses. Protest- ing, Marshal Cho told them: "These are all government horses. Even if they die we must bring in the hides; they must not be taken." The Mongols believed Cho until one Koryŏ general accepted some silver in exchange for horses. Then, believing Cho had lied, they seized many horses and left (KS 103. 5a-b).

Despite the surface appearance of tranquil relations, Koryŏ's outward amity was a gesture designed to gain time. In the autumn of 1219, the Koryŏ authorities, "sent the Vice-Minister of the Bureau of Finance 50) Ch'oe Ch'ong-bun (fl. 1220's) et al., eight persons, on an inspection trip of all the walled-cities of the H önghwa [postal relay] circuit 51) to inspect the arms and to accumulate military supplies. Moreover, [the people of] all the minor walled-cities entered the major walled-cities for protection. At that time, spies reported that the Mongols would use the autumn to return. Therefore, preparations were made" (KS 22. 17b).

This action reflected the Koryŏ awareness that they could not purchase their autonomy with tribute and minor military contributions. Within two years the King himself was advocating resistance and cessation of the payment of annual tribute but he was cautioned against it by his ministers (KS 22. 20b). An indication of Mongol intentions was manifested when Ha-chen and his delegation, at the time of their departure from Koryŏ left 41 subordinates at
the border city of Úiju instructing them to "practice the language of Koryŏ and wait for our return" (KS 22. 17a) 52).

The first mission sent to receive Koryŏ\'s annual tribute was not long in coming. In the eighth month (September 11 - October 9) of 1219, \"the Northeast Commissioner of Men and Horse sent a report saying, \'Troops sent by the Mongols and the Eastern Jürčen nation have come and camped outside Chin-myŏng-sŏng 53\' to supervise the receipt of annual tribute\" (KS 22. 17b 6-7). Their arrival in the Koryŏ capital is noted in the next month (KS 22. 17b) but other than the general statement that regional products, pangmul, were presented (YS 208. 2a; YKC 2a), no enumeration is given of the first annual tribute nor for the annual tribute which was presented until 1224.

Koryŏ\'s relations with the Mongols were but one of many concerns. Ch\'oe Ch'unghŏn 54 the military strongman who ruled Koryŏ, was growing old. He passed his sixty-ninth birthday in the dark days of 1217 when the Ch\'i-tan reached the gates of the capital (KS 129. 25a) and, although both he and his son Ch\'oe U 55 commanded considerable house armies (KS 129. 23a-b) which they used to reinforce their position, there was an increase in assassination attempts (e.g., KS 129. 24a-24b) which continued until Ch\'oe U managed to consolidate the transfer of power following his father\'s retirement in 1218 (KS 129. 25b). Some eight hundred Buddhist monks 56 who had been pressed into the army were killed by Ch\'oe\'s house troops when they stormed the capital in an attempt to overthrow the Ch\'oe clan in 1217 (KS 129. 24a-b). There was also a great deal of unrest in the army following the victory at Kangdong due to a general absence of rewards for merit. Even the welcoming celebration for Marshal Cho was cancelled by Ch\'oe - out of jealousy we are told but it is also probable that Ch\'oe Ch'unghŏn was feeling vulnerable in his old age and was afraid of anyone becoming too popular. Marshal Cho wanted to remain in the Western Capital after that but Ch\'oe summoned him to the capital where he gave a private feast for the commanders of the northern expedition in the palace - paying for it by making a levy of silver on all the officials (KSC 15. 20a).

One group of Junior officers were foolhardy enough to voice their complaints while on a drinking spree in the market place, an act which led to the arrest of over a hundred persons who were beheaded by Ch\'oe\'s house forces (KS 129. 26a-b). While the disorders of the times were probably responsible to some extent 57, general unrest among those in positions of power and especially among army officers, was without doubt stimulated from within the Ch\'oe clan itself and related directly to the question of Ch\'unghŏn\'s successor. A brief glance at the composition of the Ch\'oe clan at this time makes this apparent.

22
Ch'unghôn had taken three wives, viz., the daughter of Supreme General Song Ch'öng, who bore U; a girl of the Im clan, who bore Sŏng; and a girl of the Wang clan, who bore Kujông (KS 129. 26b-27a) 1). He also had a son, Ch'oe Chun, by his slave girl Tonghwa (KS 129. 27b). Ch'oe U then exiled a host of people who had formerly served Ch'unghôn — notably commanders and officials, many in important posts in the provinces (KSC 15. 22b-23a) — including his younger brother Hyang, Hyang's wife's father Han the Marquis of Such'un; the latter's son Chong; the minister Sin Sŏnwi, and several of Ch'unghôn's household retainers, including the slave girl Tonghwa, to various islands. The Marquis of Such'un and his son were allowed to return later. Hyang was moved to Hongju where he led an unsuccessful rebellion in 1230 which required 10,000 troops, simnyŏng (KS 129. 28a-30a).

Little is known of Ch'oe Ku except that he was given a patent of nobility as su-sagong and the honorary title of chuguk. Ch'oe Sŏng, however, was honored Princess Tŏkch'ang, one of the five daughters of the exiled Hŭijong in marriage and was made Earl — later Marquis — of Yongga (KS 91. 26a; KS 129. 26b-27a). Kojong, the reigning monarch, also married one of Hŭijong's daughters in 1218, who became Queen Anhye, Anhye T'aehu (KS 22. 15a; KS 88. 35b). This linked the Ch'oe clan to the royal family in marriage.

Just at this time — in the autumn of 1219 — a revolt under the Hŭiju Junior Colonel Han Sun and Colonel Ta Chi swept like wildfire through the cities of the Northern Frontier-District with only the Northern Defense Command holding out (KS 22. 18a). The rebel leaders marked their boundary at the Ch'ongch'ŏn River and submitted to P'u-hsien Wan-nu who gave them 10,000 Eastern Jürčen troops for their assault on Koryŏ border cities. They then attempted to secure their northwestern flank by allying with the Chin Marshal Yü-ke-hsia. Yü-ke-hsia, however, invited them to a feast where he ambushed them. Their heads were then boxed and forwarded to Kaegyŏng in early 1220 (KS 130. 1-3; KSC 15. 24a-b). This action was greatly appreciated by the Koryŏ authorities who, we can be sure, were looking toward the future when they rewarded Yü-ke-hsia with a goblet, a bowl, and
a basin of silver, two silver wine-cups, fifty bolts (p’il 靴) of fine grass cloth 76), fifty bolts of fine silk cloth, five hundred bolts of Kuang-p’ing cloth 廣平布 77), and one thousand bushels (sŏk) of rice (KS 22. 18b), for the Chin garrisons across the Yalu were the last bolts on the door to the Koryŏ northwest.

The northwest was in poor condition following the Ch’i-tan raids and the revolt (cf. KSC 15. 24b). Army officers sent to restore peace in the Ülju area following the revolt slaughtered so many that the revolt arose anew in the fourth month (May 4 - June 2) of 1220, requiring 5,000 troops to put down (KSC 15. 25a-b). To this were added the foraging of bands of Ch’i-tan remnants who had fled into the mountains and formed bandit groups (KSC 15. 25b) raiding Koryŏ garrisons (KS 22. 18b). The revolt in the northwest was finally quelled in the third month (March 26 - April 23) of 1221 when the rebel leaders were captured and, after several days display in cangues in the marketplace, were beheaded (KSC 15. 26b) 78).

Following the Koryŏ submission to the Mongols, delegations of Mongols and Eastern Jürčen became frequent visitors in the Koryŏ capital during the next few years as the following simplified chart covering the years 1221-1224 indicates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Mongols</th>
<th>Eastern Jürčen</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1221</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1 or more</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>YKC 2b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1221</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>KS 22. 19b-20a; YKC 2b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1221</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>KS 22. 20b-21a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1221</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>KS 22. 21a; YKC 2b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1221</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>KS 22. 21a-b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1222</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>KS 22. 22b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1222</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>YKC 2b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1223</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>KS 22. 23b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1223</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1 or more</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>YKC 2b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1224</td>
<td>1 - 2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>KS 22. 25a; YKC 2b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1224</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 or more</td>
<td>KS 22. 25a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1224</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 or more</td>
<td>KS 22. 25b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1224</td>
<td>11 - 12</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>KS 22. 26b; YKC 2b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A delegation led by Chu-ku-yü 79) which arrived in the eighth month (August 19 - September 17) of 1221 brought a lengthy list of demands (see Part II) from Temüge-otčigin 80) the youngest brother of Činggis, Cha-la and P’u-li-tai-yeh (KS 22. 20b). This delegation was still in the capital (cf. KSC
KSC 15. 27a-b) when the Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northeastern Frontier-District reported that a party led by the Mongol envoy Che-k'o 這可  which had been sent by the Mongol Queen An-chih 安只 had arrived outside of the Defense Command toho-pu (KS 22. 20b; KS 129. 30b; KSC 15. 27a). Angered by the frequency of the envoys Ch'oe 許 exclaimed:

"We have still not had time to attend to the envoys who came before. If we attend to [these] how many will come later! We should have the Commissioner of Men and Horse comfort them and send them back" (KS 129. 30b) 82).

In a matter of days the Ŭiju District Commandant, pundo changgun, sent a report that six to seven thousand Mongol troops had arrived and camped near Shih-cheng, in P'o-su-lu (KS 22. 20b). Subsequently, the second group of Mongol envoys arrived to supervise the national gifts (KS 22. 20b-21a).

Let us turn for a moment to examine Koryô's relations with other countries and their hearing, if any, on Mongol-Koryô relations. At this time, Koryô's relations with the Chin were coming to an end. The Chin court had attempted to send an envoy in early 1219, but he failed to get through as the roads were blocked (Chin-shih 15. 19a; Chin-shih 135. 8a-b) 84), however, Koryô did not stop using the Chin year periods, nien-hao, 年号 until 1224, when Chin power had collapsed in Manchuria (KS 87. 7a). One of the Chin's final contacts with Koryô was an order to subjugate the Chin rebel Wan-chia-nu 萬家奴 in mid-1226 (Chin-shih 17. 5a) 85), while the Mongol had earlier ordered Koryô to subjugate the Jürčen (i.e., Chin) in 1221! (YKC 2b). Yet, despite the fact that the Chin court had moved south to Kai-feng, Chin power was still formidable in the Liaotung area until it was swept away by the Mongol drive eastward across Liaotung in 1230. A last attempt was made by Koryô to contact the Chin court in the spring of 1233, but the envoy was unable to get through and returned with the missive undelivered (TYSC 28. 23a-24a; KSC 16. 18a).

Sung Merchant Vessels Arriving in Koryô 1011-1278 86)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of ships</th>
<th>35</th>
<th>30</th>
<th>25</th>
<th>20</th>
<th>15</th>
<th>10</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>0</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25-year intervals</td>
<td>1011</td>
<td>1025</td>
<td>1050</td>
<td>1075</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>1125</td>
<td>1150</td>
<td>1175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1200</td>
<td>1225</td>
<td>1250</td>
<td>1275</td>
<td>1278</td>
<td>1275</td>
<td>1275</td>
<td>1275</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
An occasional merchant ship arrived from the Southern Sung but, as the chart shows, this was the dying trickle of such trade. The great era of Sung-Koryŏ maritime trade was past and, like some of the trade between Koryŏ and Japan, especially the island of T'amna, was partially a consequence of Koryŏ ports serving as way-stations between Japan and the Southern Sung. Official Koryŏ-Japan trade at this time was a direct outgrowth of the raids of Japanese freebooters, who recommended their raids on Korean coastal settlements in 1223 after a century of silence. The Koryŏ-sa references show this clearly:

1) Raids of Japanese freebooters:

1223 (KS 22. 23b), 1224 (KS 22. 27a-b), 1226 (KS 22. 29a-b), and in the fourth (April 18 - May 16) and fifth month (May 17 - June 15) of 1227 (KS 22. 30a-b) then;

2) 1227, fifth month: A Korean delegation was sent to Japan to request that the raids be stopped (KS 22. 33a; TT 31. 39) and Japan sent a letter apologizing for the raids on the Korean coast and requested that trade relations, hu-shih, be established (KS 22. 30b).

The raids of the Japanese freebooters recommenced, however, and it was not until 1263, following a Koryŏ mission to Japan to request that the raids cease that a trade agreement was reached. Japan was allowed to send one ship, but never more than two ships, annually (CHSL 4. 36a-b; TK 11B. 228). This also clearly shows that the impetus to establish trade relations was on the Japanese, not the Koryŏ side.

On the northwest border, there was a continuous struggle with the Chin Marshal Yü-ke-hsia whose forces repeatedly sacked Koryŏ border cities. The District Commandant, pundo changgan, of Üiju at this time was Kim Hŭije. In 1223, he led a raiding party across the Yalu against Yü-ke-hsia whose forces had been hitting Koryŏ border cities in sneak attacks. It was probably this daring which led to his abrupt appointment as Deputy Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northwest Frontier-District. Later, in 1226, Kim led another small raiding party across the Yalu against Yü-ke-hsia after the latter's forces had made attacks on Koryŏ border cities. Not content with this, Kim evidently decided to bring the matter to an end by defeating Yü-ke-hsia's main forces. With other officials of his district, Kim raised a force of 10,000 men and with twenty days supply of food crossed the Yalu to attack Yü-ke-hsia's stronghold of Shih-cheng. Although Yü-ke-hsia sent a force of troops to reinforce the garrison, Kim's attack carried the city. Upon his return, in the true tradition of the Koryŏ military, he wrote a lengthy poem expressing his belief that the general's halberts had not yet wiped out the shame inflicted by Yü-ke-hsia. Although Kim had secretly informed Ch'oe U of his intention
to go after Yü-ke-hsia, his action in levying such a large force of men on his own authority, brought official charges against him. Ch'oe U stopped the charges from being put into effect but considered that, under the circumstances, a reward for merit was out of the question.

Yet, by and large, Koryo's greatest concern now that relations with the Mongols had been momentarily stabilized, were the Eastern Jürčen who held sway over portions of eastern Manchuria and northeastern Korea. Through repeated military encounters, notably through the campaigns of Yun Kwan (d. 1111) a century earlier, Koryo had pushed her eastern borders northward toward the Tuman River at the expense of the Eastern Jürčen whose holdings were often incorporated into Koryo's domains (KS 96. 11-25). Equally as ancient as the Koryo-Jürčen enmity in the mountainous uplands of the northeast were their trade relations, especially those which centered in the eastern seaboard cities 95).

Koryo on her own part had pursued a policy of placating the Mongols until an opportunity presented itself to throw off the Mongol yoke. In 1220, Ch'oe U had assembled the Chief Ministers 96) at his residence, and suggested that a levy be made on the ch'ongyong and pos'ung (militia?) units 97) of the chu and kun administrations of the southern provinces to wall Úiju, Hwaju, Ch'öl-kwan (a fortified pass) 98), and similar places in the northeast which were certain to be attacked if the Mongols invaded. One officials, a certain Kim Chung-gu , objected and reminded Ch'oe that "in recent years the chu and kun administrations have suffered from the pillaging incursions of the Ch'i-tan and all the people have fled. Now, if we suddenly make another levy on their labor without warning, then the primary [agricultural] pursuits, pon 99), of the state will not be maintained." Ch'oe, however, did not take his advice (KS 129. 30b-31a) and the walling was begun, being completed in 1228 (KS 82. 35a).

The following year (1221), when Ch'oe U boldly suggested turning back the delegation of Mongols led by Che-k'o (KS 129. 30b), the King assembled the officials of the fourth rank and above to ask their opinions on whether or not to receive the second Mongol delegation and we are told that "the King wanted to make preparations to resist and not present [the annual tribute]. The ministers unanimously said: 'They are many and we are few. If you do not welcome these, they will surely come to invade. Can we withstand many with few; withstand strength with weakness?'" (KS 22. 20b). And, "because the demands of the Mongols were endless, the King wanted to give them those things which they were obstinately determined to have. [It became] therefore [a matter of] slaking their thirst for valuables or of making bloody sacrifice of the living." Discussions left the matter unsettled even after a
prognostication had been taken at the Great Shrine, taemyo, where the ancestral tablets of the Koryo monarchs were as yet enshrined (KS 103. 32a-b) 100). This stiffening of Koryo's attitude toward the Mongols was no doubt accelerated as much by the conduct of the Mongol envoys as by their ubiquity. In 1221, a delegation led by Chu-ku-yü — whose murder in 1225 led to the severance of Koryo-Mongol relations — had shot up the hostel where they were lodged until they were locked inside by the hostel officer. A later delegation led by Che-k'o had also proved troublesome. After being delayed at the frontier they found a cold reception awaiting them in the Koryo capital. "We have never heard of this before! Queen An-chih sends envoys and they are not entertained!" Che-k'o exclaimed, "What is the reason?" The Koryo officer in charge of the group, Kim Huije, answered, "In past years the Great Nation of the Mongols [has been] gracious. Now, the envoys are useless men who abuse their prerogatives if we welcome and entertain them. As regards the ceremonies, national gifts, and other matters, we certainly cannot put forth our best efforts. [When] you Sir, were in the Defense Command, toho-pu, you yourself shot a man. Whether he is alive or dead we have not yet ascertained. If he lives then it will be a blessing for you Sir [but], if he dies then your party must be detained" (KS 103. 32b-33a).

However, it was not until the death, in early 1223, of Muqali (YS 1. 22a), the Mongol commander that Cinggis had placed in charge of the east, that both Koryo and the Eastern Jurchen again gave serious thought to throwing off the Mongol yoke. With Muqali dead and Cinggis occupied in the west, there was presented an opportunity which might never reoccur. P'u-hsien Wan-nu realized this and promptly declared his own independence and, in early 1224 101), sent envoys to Koryo. An interesting problem in protocol was presented when they arrived with urgent dispatches while Mongol envoys were being entertained in the Koryo capital (KS 22. 25a). The dispatches made the point briefly:

"The armies of Cinggis are always in distant lands 102). We do not know where they are. Temüge-otçigin E-ch'ih-hsin is grasping and cruel and they have already dissolved our old friendship."

The second dispatch offered an incentive for the alliance, suggesting:

"Let us each establish as before monopoly markets, chio-ch'ang 103) 定州, our nation at Ch'ongju 青州 and your nation at Chongju 104) 定州, to buy and sell" (KS 22. 25a). Measures to resist the Mongols had not been lacking on the Koryo side. In 1223, Ch'oe had used his own house troops in the corvee to put the moats and walls of the capital in order and doled out 300 silver pyöng 105) 県 coins and over 2000 bushels (sok) of rice to meet the expenses of the undertaking. He also appealed to the gods by
donating 200 kän 106) of yellow-gold 107) for the construction of a 13-story stupa and a kunḍika 108) at Hūng-wang Temple (KS 129. 30-31a). Despite these preparations Koryŏ had no intention of joining with the Eastern Jürčen at this point. Eastern Jürčen raids on Koryŏ's northern border from Sakchu 109) to Hwaju recommenced in 1225 and lasted over the next four years (KS 22. 31a-b; KS 22. 31b-32a; KS 22. 34a-b).

In the spring of 1229, an Eastern Jürčen delegation arrived at Hamju 110) on Koryŏ's northeastern frontier requesting a treaty of peace and friendship (KS 22. 36a). The first Koryŏ envoy sent to conclude the treaty was unsuccessful — for which he was imprisoned by Ch'oe U — and a second envoy, a certain Chin Yonggap 鄭龍甲 was then dispatched to effect a treaty of peace (KS 22. 36b). Although he was instrumental in regaining people and livestock captured by the Eastern Jürčen in a raid on Hwaju (KS 22. 36b), a treaty of peace was never made. So once again the officials of the civil and military offices, yangbu 111), met at Ch'oe U's residence to discuss a strategy to beat the mounted raiders (KS 22. 37a) 112).

As these events were transpiring, Koryŏ-Mongol relations were suddenly ruptured. In the fall of 1224, a Mongol delegation led by Chu-ku-yü arrived to supervise the annual tribute and then "in the first month [of 1225 = February 9 - March 10], the Mongol envoys left [our] Western Capital and crossed the Yalu. Of the national gifts which had been presented, they kept only the otter pelts and, as regards the remainder, viz., the silks, etc., [this] they abandoned in the fields 113). On the way they were killed by bandits. The Mongols suspected us. Therefore, relations were severed" (KS 22. 27a) 114).

Due to this incident all relations between Koryŏ and the Mongols stopped in early 1225.

The Mongols were preoccupied with campaigns elsewhere, notably in Central Asia, and troubled by succession disputes so that Koryŏ momentarily escaped their attention. They turned their attention once more eastward only to suffer setbacks in 1228 in North China. Then, after his accession, Ögödei (T'ai-tsung 太宗 , r. 1229-1241), made an agreement with the Sung, who were to get the Honan area, for a joint attack against the Chin. The campaign, which was to last until the final fall of the Chin to a joint Mongol-Sung force in 1234, was led by Tului (Jui-Tsung ; regent 1228) who had assumed the regency following the death of Činggis in 1227 during the Tanqut campaign and the election of Ögödei by the Quriltai of 1229. When the Mongol forces advanced across Manchuria with the intention of subjugating P'u-hsien Wan-nu, they ordered Koryŏ to field an army against Wan-nu 115), probably envisaging a pincer attack with Mongol forces pressing down north of the lofty Paektu-san range and Korea pressing upward from the south of the range toward the
Tuman River. Koryŏ, at any rate, did not comply and it is precisely at this time that, as we have seen, Koryŏ finally endeavored to make a peace treaty with the Eastern Jürčen (116). The Korean records are unusually silent on these events, but they took no action attempting as it were to watch from the sidelines. Whatever their reasons, their inaction had disastrous consequences, for the Mongols postponed their attack on Wan-nu (who was finally defeated in 1233) to deal with Koryŏ. And, in the winter of 1231, a large Mongol force crossed the Yalu (KS 23. 1a) to begin what was to be an on-again off-again conflict lasting some thirty years.
Notes to Chapter I

1. Contradictory dates for the events surrounding the entry of Mongol-Jürčen forces into Koryŏ and their subsequent alliance against the Ch'ı-tan at Kangdong render other than general dating impossible. This, plus the number of undated passages which begin vaguely with 'formerly' have made it difficult to place some events in other than probable sequence. The main sources for these events, YKC, KS, KSC, and the Kim-gong haenggun'gi 金公行軍記 in IC 6. 7b-17b agree in general and date the arrival of the first envoy from the Mongols on the first or second day of the twelfth month of 1218. They also agree that the Mongol forces left Koryŏ in the second month of 1219. The dating of events between these two dates differs between the rather detailed Kim-gong haenggun'gi and the KS, KSC versions; the YKC account is unfortunately too brief to be of value in this respect. An example of these discrepancies is found in dating the fall of Kangdong: KS 22. 16b has the fourteenth day of the first month (Jan. 31) of 1219; KS 87. 6b gives the third month of 1219; KSC 15. 16b dates this in the first month of 1219, while IC 6. 15a places it on the chi-mao ちまょう day of the second month of 1219, which is impossible as there was no chi-mao day in the second lunar month of 1219. The YS 1. 20a account is a simple statement and follows the YKC account. The useful reference work CS, vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 549-551 places this event in the first month of 1219. Martin, The Rise of Chingis ..., p. 217 note 54, gives "February 1219" for the fall of Kangdong, citing the biography of Yeh-lü Liu-ke in T'u Chi's Meng-wu-erb shih-chi, a work which is regrettably unavailable to me. Martin also states that "Yanai Wateru, Ken dai kyo ryako tohoko" (sic), "is at pains to show that it really took place in February, 1218". Let me correct this error. Yanai Watari, op. cit., p. 96 ff, clearly discusses the dating of these events and he places the fall of Kangdong on the 14th day of the first month of 1219 (= Jan. 31), thus following the KS account. The argument is rather involved, but Yanai does not argue for "February 1218" by any means. The IC 6. 14a-15a account contains several dates but they are irreconcilable with the KS account. Ikeuchi, Mansen-shi kenkyū, p. 607 note 1, suggests that the IC entry 甲 ちまょう (day) be amended to read 乙 ちまょう (12th day = January 29). This is probably as close as we'll get, i.e., Kangdong fell between January 29 and January 31, 1219.

In general, I have not attempted precise dating in reconstructing these events, but merely to arrange the events in proper sequence in so far as that was at all possible.

There are one or two other points which can be mentioned at this time,
rather than discussed piecemeal later. Martin says that Yeh-lü Liu-ke was the principal commander of the Mongol forces which entered Koryo at this time. This is in accord with the biography of Yeh-lü Liu-ke in YS 149. 1a-5b. The errors in this biography and other errors involving Yeh-lü Liu-ke at this time have been discussed at length by both Ikeuchi, loc. cit., and Yanai, loc. cit., and I will not here repeat arguments to problems which have been solved decades ago, but simply point out that:

1) Yeh-lü Liu-ke was not outside Kangdong with the attacking forces as his biography erroneously states.

2) Yeh-lü Liu-ke was not inside Kangdong with the defending Ch'i-tan forces as is erroneously stated in YKC, YS, YSCSPM, HYS, etc. This, incidentally, is a wide-spread error and appears to have originated in the Ching-shih ta-tien.

3) Koryo did not supply 400 000 troops at this time as the biography of Yeh-lü Liu-ke (YS 149. 3b) erroneously states.


2. yüan-shuai 元帥 or Marshal; for this title see P. Ratchnevsky, Un Code des Yuan, Paris, 1937, pp. 140, 238.

3. Ha-ch'en 哈真. The name also occurs in the orthographic variants: Ha-chih-chi 哈只吉 (YS 208. 1b-2a; YKC 1b); Ha-chih-chi 哈赤吉 (YS 154. 1a); Ho-ch'en 合臣 (YKC 2a); Ho-ch'e 合車 (YKC 8b; YKC 6b), and Ho-ch'eng 河清 (TYSC 28. 4a-5a; TYSC 28. 14b-17b). H.H. Howorth, History of the Mongols, 3 vols., London, 1876, Vol. 1, p. 711, says that Chinggis sent his general Kha jen dza la against Koryo, but two persons were involved. Cf. YKC 8b and YKC 6. 13b. YKC 2a clarifies their ranks: Ho-ch'en was Marshal, yüan-shuai, and Cha-la was Deputy Marshal, fu yüan-shuai. L. Hambis, Le Chapitre CVII du Yuan Che, Leiden, 1945, p. 16 note 11, discusses the name Qačin 合赤温 and on p. 33 he discusses the name Qači'un 合赤溫, both of which are suggestive. Yanai, op. cit., p. 144, has suggested that the chi 吉 of the variant Ha-chih-chi is a superfluous character yen-tsu 衍字; if Yanai is correct, then the reconstruction Qačin would seem to be suggested.

4. Cha-la 札剌. Throughout the text (KS & YKC) tz'u 刺 occurs; I have emended it to read la 刺. The orthographic variations Cha-la 剃剌 (YKC 2a; YS 208. 2b) and Cha-la 札剌 (KS 23. 16 ff; TYSC 28. 14b-17b) also occur. In his Hsin Yüan Shih K'o shao-min 柯劭忞 writes Cha-la-i-erh-tai 扎剌亦兒台, i.e., Jalairtai (cf. HYS 249. 1b). Cha-la would suggest a name based on the Jalair tribe and the name Jalairtai was quite common. However, I hesitate to follow K'o for two reasons: 1) the

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general confusion which is evident throughout HYS 249 which is the Kao-li chüan of the Hsin Yüan Shih, cf. e.g., HYS 249. 4b, and 2) I have found the name written only as Cha-la. Yanai, op. cit., pp. 139-144, has noted much of the confusion surrounding Jalairtai which I have discussed at length at a later point. Yanai has suggested the reconstruction ?Jala.

5. In the biographies of Hong Pogwôn 洪福源, it is related that Hong's father, Hong Taesun 洪大純, a commander, toryông 都領, of Inju (35 li 里 south of the old Úij 义州 cf. TYS 53. 13b-14a) in Koryô's northwest near the mouth of the Yalu River, submitted to the Mongol forces and joined them in the attack on Kangdong (cf. KS 130. 3 and YS 154. 1a; also cf. YKC 1b — the latter writes Hong Taesôn 官). This would put the Mongol-Jüircen advance into Koryô in the northwest rather than the northeast. Martin, op. cit., pp. 216-217, postulated a crossing near Úij 义州 in the northeast. Yet, this appears to be in error and the Mongol forces seem to have come down to the Tuman River area where they obtained reinforcements from P'u-hsien Wan-nu and then, this joint force entered Koryô from the northeast. The cities of Hwaju, Maengju, Sunju, and Tôkchu are, moreover, all located in the northeast. I believe that it is simply a confusion of father and son, for Hong Pogwôn, the son of Hong Taesun, did submit to Mongol forces at Inju in 1231 (see Chapter II). Yanai, op. cit., p. 99 note 1, believes that Hong Taesun was with the Koryô forces at Kangdong and submitted to them there. For a similar opinion see Ikeuchi, op. cit., p. 610 and p. 611 note 2; also see Yi Pyŏngdo, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, pp. 546-547.

6. Hwaju 和州, Maengju 猛州, Sunju 順州, and Tôkchu 德州 are identified respectively by HY 27. 8a, as the present (i.e., Yi Dynasty) Yönghung 永興 in S. Hamgyŏng Province and Maengsan 益山, Sunch'ŏn 順川, and Tôkch'ŏn 德川 all located in S. P'yŏngan Province. For topographical and historical information see TYS 48. 16b ff, TYS 55. 9b ff, TYS 55. 1a ff, and TYS 54. 21a ff for Hwaju, Maengju, Sunju, and Tôkchu, respectively. Precise locations are given in the maps appended to Tsuda Sōkichi 津田左右吉, Chosén rekishi chiri 朝鮮歷史地理, Vol. 2, published (in 2 vols.) by the former South Manchurian Railway Corp., Tôkyô, 1918.

7. The text reads 直指江東; in lieu of read 詮.

8. Some caution is necessary in rendering the term sŏng 城. In Korea there were sansŏng 山城 or mountain citadels of refuge located near every major settlement, including the walled-cities. There was also at this time a changsŏng 長城 or long-wall which extended in an undulating arch across northern Koryô, beginning in the west near the mouth of
the Yalu, bisecting the peninsula, with its eastern terminus near the present Ch'ongp'yōng. In general, when sŏng clearly refers to a place of permanent settlement I have translated 'walled-city'; when it refers to a temporary refuge, I have rendered 'citadel of refuge' and where I have been in doubt I have rendered 'stronghold' or simply said sŏng. For a survey of the remnants of the various sŏng of the present Kyŏnggi Province which includes some utilized during this period, see W. D. Bacon, 'Fortresses of Kyŏnggi-do', TKBAS XXXVII (1961), pp. 1-64. For the location of the walled-cities in the northwest and the identification of the garrisons chin in the area as well as a description of the Koryŏ long-wall behind which they were located, see Yun Mubyŏng [Geographical Notes on Koryŏ's Northern Frontier], part I, YH 1 (1953) 4, pp. 37-70, and part II, YH 2 (1953) 1, pp. 37-89. For a general survey of the subject, see T. Shidehara, Chosen no sanjō. 9. The walled-city of Kangdong was not large. The city walls were of earthen construction (as opposed to stone) and the circumference was 5,759 feet (ch'ok). Inside the city were only two wells. For topographical and historical information see TYS 55. 11a ff, from which the above information has been taken.

10. YKC 2a dates this on the second day of the second month of 1219.

11. t'ung-shih (Kor. t'ong-sa) The Sino-Korean Dictionary Sinjawŏn, Ch'ulp'an-sa, Seoul, 1950, 854. 3 cites the Kuei-hsin tsa-chih : "In the northern regions an interpreter is called t'ung-shih." As the person concerned does not appear to have been Korean, I have romanized his name in Chinese, however, his identity is not established.

12. While it is not stated that the headquarters wŏnsu-pu was that of Cho Ch'ung, it could have been none other. KS 103. 5a calls Cho a Deputy Marshal but this is in error. He had been promoted to Marshal in the seventh month of 1218, cf. KS 22. 15b. At this time he was the senior Koryŏ commander in the field. The operational commanders beneath him were the Commissioners of Men and Horse Kim Ch'wiryŏ in the northwest (cf. KS 103. 16a-b) and Yi Chŏk in the northeast (cf. KS 103. 21b-22b). I note that CS Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 546 interprets this in the same sense and would place Cho in the Koryŏ Western Capital (P'yŏngyang) at this time, which seems reasonable.

13. Cho Ch'ung (1172-1220) was a man of Hoengch'ŏn, his
style cha字 was Tamyak湛若. He was the son of sijung侍中 Cho Yôngin趙永仁 (1133-1202) and he was given a position in government service, pogwan補官 (i.e., without resort to exams), by means of the Yin蔭 privilege. He entered the academy and passed the exams in the reign of Myǒngjong明宗 (r. 1171-1197). In the reign of Húijjong熙宗 (r. 1205-1211) he was appointed to the National Academy, kukchagam國子監, due to his literary skills in drafting institutions, chŏn典. He was taken out of the academy to serve as Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northeast Frontier District but later returned to civil office in the Department of Rites, yebu禮部. In 1216, he was advanced to Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, ch'umir(ウォン)pusa樞密院副使, and simultaneously held the rank of Supreme General, sangjianggun上將軍. He first saw action as Deputy, pu副, to Marshal Chong Sukch'ŏm鄭叔瞻 against the Ch'i-tan invasion of 1216-1217. The Koryǒ government army at this time was extremely weak and even monks were drafted to fill up the ranks. Only the retainers, mungaeck門家, of the ruling Ch'oe clan showed any valor. This resulted in the terrible defeats of 1216-1217 when the Ch'i-tan forces reached the capital and occasioned the Censorate, òsadae御史臺, to call for Cho's dismissal. He was recalled shortly after being relieved and appointed Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northwestern Frontier District. A subsequent promotion to the post of Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs was opposed by the Department of Civil Officials, ibu吏部, and he was retained in his original position.

After several victories against the Jürčen Yellow Banner troops that had crossed the Yalu in 1217, Cho was given back his full official duties and, in 1218, he was made Marshal of the Northwest Frontier District. His success in the campaign at Kangdong angered Koryǒ's military ruler Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn and he was given no welcoming return to the capital nor other rewards — the general lack of rewards to the soldiers occasioned great resentment resulting in at least one attempt on Ch'oe's life (KSC 15. 20a-b) — although he was entertained privately by the Ch'oe clan. He was awarded the posthumous appellation Munjŏng文正 (cf. KSC 15. 26a). He had two sons: Sukch'ang叔昌 (d. 1234) whose biography is contained in KS 130. 9 ff and Kyesun季珣. Cho Ch'ung died on the third day of the ninth month of 1220 at the age of fifty due, it is said, to illness caused by grief, probably over his failure to advance after a successful campaign.

For biographical information see KS 103. 1a-6b and the eulogy by Yi Kyubo李奎報 (1168-1241) contained in TYSC 36. 14a-17b from which the in-
14. The Koryŏ administrative system at this time contained eight to 道 or provinces, which included the Northwestern Frontier-District, sŏbukkye 西北界 , also referred to as pukkye 北界 and as sŏbunmyŏn 北面. It comprised, at this time, the present South P'yŏngan Province and the northwestern portion of North P'yŏngan Province. This is clarified by TYS 51. 1b which relates that in the fourteenth year of the reign of Koryŏ Sŏngjong 成宗 (995), the nation was divided into ten provinces to 道. The area under the jurisdiction of the Western Capital was made P'aesŏ-do 頭面道. Later it was called pukkye 北界. In the seventh year of the reign of Koryŏ Sukjong 肅宗 (1102), they called it pugmyŏn 北面. The Northwestern Frontier-District at this time contained: 1 capital, kyŏng 京 , 1 Defense Command, toho-pu 都護府, 25 pangŏ-chu 防禦州 administrations, 12 garrisons, chin 鎮 , 10 hyŏn 縣 administrative areas. Cf. Tsuda Sŏkichi, Chōsen rekishi chiri, Vol. 2, p. 182.

15. What is meant in this case is Koryŏ acceptance of Mongol suzerainty phrased in the traditional reference to the obedience of the younger brother (Koryŏ) to the elder brother (Mongols) as represented by their respective commanders. HY 27. 8a-9a inserts a pertinent character and reads "pledged their nations to be Elder Brother and Younger Brother" (italics mine). For a discussion of fraternal terms used in Korea's international relations see F. Nelson, Korea ..., and Pow-key Sohn (Son Pogi) 孫寶基, 'The Opening of Korea; A Conflict of Traditions,' TKBRAS XXXVI (1960), pp. 101-128. Sohn takes issue with Nelson's use of 'Confucian order' and 'Confucian internationalism' to describe relations between China, Korea, and Japan. Sohn (p. 103, note 5) says, 'The word 'Pan-Confucianistic' better explains the situation in the East Asiatic order, as the philosophy was more or less Confucianistic.'

16. In the Koryŏ system there were two pyŏngmasa 兵馬使 or Commissioners of Men and Horse, one in the Northeast Frontier-District and one in the Northwest Frontier-District. The post called for one of the Third Grade in rank and thus was filled by at least a Grand General. Symbols of the post were a jade (ornamented) girdle and purple collar, while the King himself presented the battle-axe and halbert in dispatching the Commissioner to his post. The post was first established in 989, i.e., the eighth year of the reign of Koryŏ Sŏngjong 成宗 (r. 982-997). Cf. KS 77. 33b.

17. Kim Ch'wiryŏ 金就礿 (d. 1234) was of Ōnyang 彦陽; his father
was a ranking official in the Department of Rites. Appointed without resort to the exams, po

via the Yin privilege to a post as a subordinate officer in the army, he rose to the rank of Grand General, taejang-gun, and was for a time garrisoned in the Northwest Frontier-District. In the reorganization of the Koryŏ army which followed their defeats by the Ch'i-tan, he was appointed Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northwest Frontier-District under Marshal Cho Ch'ung. His army career after that was exemplary with victories against the Ch'i-tan and against various Koryŏ rebels. He died in 1234 and while his exact age is not given, he must have been about seventy-five since he remarked in 1218 that he was approaching sixty. He was given the posthumous appellation of Wiryŏl 威烈. For biographical information see KS 103. 7a-20b and the Kim-gong haenggun'gi 金公行軍記 in IC 6. 7b-16b; also see Kuk Ch'ung'hŏn Wang Segā 國忠惠王世家 in IC 9A.1a-20a, and BTKP 56. 540.

18. sango sŏng 尚書省 = sango t osŏng 尚書都省 . Koryŏ T'aejo had established in the system of the state of T'aebong 泰封 (later redesignated Koryŏ), the Kwangpyŏngsŏng 廣評省 which was completely in charge of all officials. In 982, i.e., the first year of the reign of Koryŏ Sŏngjong 成宗 (r. 982-997) it was redesignated osa t osŏng 御事都省; in 995 it was redesignated sango t osŏng. In the reign of Koryŏ Munjong 文宗 (r. 1047-1082) the number of posts in the Secretariat was increased considerably. Cf. KS 76. 9a-b.

19. Kim In'gyŏng 金仁鏡 (d. 1235), whose former name was Yanggyŏng 良鏡, was of Kyŏngju 慶州. A descendant in the fourth generation of Kim Úijin 金義珍 (d. 1070), he had a precarious childhood when his father Kim Yŏnggo 金永囉 the Commissioner of Hostels and Post Stations of the Hŭnggyo circuit, hŭnggyo-do kwanyŏksa 興交道館驛使, fell into disgrace and was jailed during the rebellion of Kim Podang 金甫當 (d. 1173) when forces under his command were defeated. Yŏnggo had been sentenced to death despite the pleas of the people of the area. Sent to the capital for execution he obtained his release thru the intervention of a government minister. His residence had already been confiscated by the government and his wife and children were starving when the officials of the Hŭnggyo circuit levied rice and silks and gave it to them. Yŏnggo was subsequently taken back into government service. His son, Kim In'gyŏng, passed the second grade exams in second place during the reign of Myŏngjong and was placed in the Historiographical Bureau, sagwan 史館. He rose to prominence during the reign of Kojong for his role at Kangdong. Transferred to the Depart-
ment of Rites, he was subsequently promoted to Councillor of the Right of the Bureau of Military Affairs, ch'umirwôn usàngsôn 福密院右承宣, for his merit at Kangdong. Defeated in 1227 in a battle with Eastern Jürân raiders on the northeast coast, he was slandered and subsequently demoted to Governor of Sangju, sangju moksa 尚州牧使. As he left the capital for his post at Sangju, ignored by his friends, some of his pupils accompanied him to the outskirts of the city. Kim composed the following poem to meet the occasion:

"Can a single whip be expected to sweep away the Tartar dust completely?"

The southern wastes of 10,000 li [await] an ousted servant.

[My] students with elegant hands have come to bid farewell.

Moved, it is difficult to stop the tears from wetting my handkerchief." Later at Sangju he composed a poem concerning his demotion which he put on the city wall. He was recalled to the capital after a short while and went on to become President, sangsô 尚書, of the Department of Justice, hyôngbu 刑部, and later, of the Department of Civil Officials, ibu 史部. He died in 1235 and was given the posthumous appellation of Chöngsuk 貞肅. For biographical information see KS 102. 7a-9a from which the above information has been drawn; also see BTKP 59. 562.

20. Reference is being made to Sun Wu 孫武 and Wu Ch'i 吳起, great military strategists of China's Ch'ü-Ch'iu period, and their works, known as Sun-tzu 孫子 and Wu-tzu 吳子. There are several western language translations, e.g., L. Nachin, Sun Tse et les Anciens Chinois Ou Tse et Se Ma Fa, Paris, 1948.

21. While the term yuksô 六書 usually refers to the six styles of writing or to the six categories into which Chinese characters are divided by form, here it could only refer to the Six Classics more commonly referred to as yuksôg 六經, viz., The Book of Changes 易經, The Book of History 書經, The Book of Poetry 詩經, The Spring and Autumn Annals 春秋, The Record of Rites 禮記, and The Record of Music 樂記. It is usual to refer to the Five Classics since the remains of The Record of Music form one of the sections of The Record of Rites, however, it is sometimes counted separately to make the Six Classics. For a discussion and explanation see Vol. 6, p. 2 of the Prolegomena, J. Legge, The Chinese Classics, 7 vols., Hongkong, 1861.

22. KS 102. 7b calls them chôngbyông 精兵; IC 6. 13b calls them chin-yang kapchôl 晉陽押卒. Perhaps by the latter, assuming to be an error for 晉陽, we can identify them as the retainers of the Duke of Chinyang 晉陽, viz., the private forces of the Ch'oe clan.
23. I have used the term 'bushel' to indicate the large bags of rice identified as そく そく or こく こく.  
   1 こく = 10 た た (colq. mat)  
   1 た = 10 すう すう (colq. toe)  
   1 すう = 10 はつ はつ (colq. はつ)  
I am not certain of the capacity of a Koryo こく but I note that according to a gloss in the Jih-pen ch'uan 日本傳 of HY that one Japanese こく こく was equal to 25 Korean た た, that is, the Japanese こく こく was 2.5 times as large as the corresponding Koryo measure (cf. HY 48. 7a). The reference work Keizaigaku jiten 經濟學辭典 published by Iwanami shoten 岩波書店 in six volumes, Tōkyō, 1931, Vol. IV, entry 1964 ff pertaining to Japanese weights and measures and their historical basis mentions some Kōrai (Koryo) measures, e.g., a Kōrai shaku 尺, etc. However, I hesitate to accept their account as pertaining to Koryo measures and weights since the ancient Korean state of Koguryo was often called simply Koryo in historical accounts and it is possible these "Kōrai" measures entered Japan from that state. I also hesitate to accept the HY account since I believe it pertains not to a Koryo measure but to the measure in use in Korea during the Yi Dynasty when HY was compiled. A study of Korean weights and measures would be most welcome. An unsigned article dealing with late Yi period measures appeared under the title 'Korean Weights and Measures', The Korea Review, Seoul, 1901, pp. 304-306.

24. CS Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 547 postulates an identification of Taeju 大州 with T'aeju 泰州; the latter is the present T'aech'on 泰川 in North P'yŏngan Province.

25. IC 6. 14a dates this in the second month (Feb. 17 - March 17) of 1219. CS interprets all preceding events as occurring between the first and sixteenth day of the twelfth month of 1218 (Dec. 30, 1218 - Jan. 14, 1219).

26. The office of Director of Affairs for the Commissioner of Men and Horse, chibyŏngmasa 知兵馬使, was established in 989, the eighth year of the reign of Sŏngjong. There was one such office in each of the two northern frontier-districts and as its holder was to be of the third grade in rank, he was at least a Grand General, taejanggun. His immediate superior was the Commissioner of Men and Horse. Cf. KS 77. 33b.

27. しんぎ 神騎 was a general term used to designate the Koryo cavalry; the taegak 大角 was a crossbow unit (cf. KS 129); I do not know what type of unit is meant by naesang 内營 (guards?).

28. Kim Chidae 金之岱 (1191 - 1266) was of Ch'ŏngdo 清道; his former name was Chungyong 仲龍. Marshal Cho, surprised by the poem
on his shield, had him put in the naesang 内厢 (guards?) to test his capabilities. Proving himself, Kim was given a position without resort to the exams, po 補, as Office Recorders, sarok 司錄, of Ch'ŏnju 全州. He rose to be Chŏlla Province Circuit Inspector, anch'alsa 按察使, and gained fame as a suppresser of bandit groups in the area. Ch'ŏe Hang, the son of the military ruler Ch'ŏe U, was then living at a Buddhist temple on Chin Island 珍島 as the priest Manjŏn 萬全 and Chidae, in apprehending one of his unruly disciples, forced Manjŏn to send the fellow — a certain Chit'ong 知通 — to him. Chidae "ordered him bound, enumerated his illegal [actions] and threw him in the river." Prudence and the lack of other than minor excesses protected him in later days when Ch'ŏe Hang succeeded to power as military ruler. In the beginning of the reign of Wŏnjong 元宗 (r. 1260-1274) he was promoted to President of the Department of Civil Officials, ibu sangsŏ 史部 尚書, and shortly thereafter he retired from government service because of age. He died in 1266 at the age of seventy-seven and was given the posthumous appellation of Yŏnghŏn 英憲. For biographical information see KS 102. 21a-22b from which the above information has been taken; also see BTKP 53. 507.

29. Ch'ŏngdo 清道 is in the southern part of the modern N. Kyŏngsang Province. For historical information see Han'guk-sa sajŏn, 韓國史 辭典, Seoul, 1959, p. 368.

30. Yi Chŏk 邱槊 (1163-1225) of Chip'yŏng-hyŏn 稚平縣 was the son of Grand General Yi Chun 李俊. He gradually worked his way up to Councillor, nangjung 郎中, in the Department of War, pyŏngbu 兵部, and there rose to prominence fighting the Ch'i-tan invaders in 1216-1217. Appointed Commissioner of Men and Horse after the Ch'i-tan forces had entered Kangdong, he was offered a selected infantry force chŏngye 精銳 (called yŏnje 鍊銳 in his grave record). A veteran of two years fighting against the mounted Ch'i-tan, he refused the infantry soldiers and took only a cavalry force. Following the battle at Kangdong he remained in the north as Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northeast Frontier-District and, following this, he entered the Bureau of Military Affairs. He died in 1225 at the age of 64 and left no sons. For biographical information see KS 103. 21b-22b and his grave record contained in TYSC 36. 9b-12a. In the latter his name is given as Chŏk 繹. Also see the Yi Ch'umil Chŏk Yanggwanp'yo 李樞密勒讓官表 contained in TYSC 29. 18b-19a.

31. In lieu of 'Mongol Emperor' IC 6. 14a has Sheng-wu 聖武 (both of which refer to Činggis) and adds the line "I will not salute Wan-nu."
32. My interest here is not so much with Mongol customs as it is with the Korean reaction to them. For Mongol customs mentioned, see the accounts of William of Rubruck, John of Pian de Carpine, Odoric, et al., translated and annotated by W. W. Rockhill, H. H. Yule, P. Pelliot, C. Dawson et al., which are listed in the bibliography.

33. The terms of the agreement are verified in a Koryo letter sent to the Mongols in 1232; envoys were not to exceed ten persons annually in the Koryo interpretation. Cf. KS 23. 19a-b. This particular agreement was often cited by the Koryo authorities as one of the foundation stones of Yüan-Koryo relations in later days, especially when it was useful to counter Yüan demands. See, for example, the petitions submitted to the Yüan authorities by Yi Chehyön in 1323. (IC 6. 1b-2a)

34. YKC 2 and YS 208 place this agreement as occurring prior to the dispatch of provisions and soldiers. However, the detailed record in IC 6. 1b ff and in the biography of Cho Ch'ung relate the sequence. Subsequent events confirm that this was a binding agreement between the two nations of which the Koryo authorities were well aware. Also see YC Vol. 2, pp. 112-113 for the sequence of events.

35. IC 6. 15a dates this on the twentieth day of the second month (March 8) of 1219.

36. The number nine since ancient times had mystic connotations to the peoples of North Asia.

37. YS 149. 3b relates that Ha-ch'en's Ch'i-tan prisoners were taken to Ssu-lou 巴林, which is identified by CS Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 551, as Pa-lin in Inner Mongolia. Martin, op. cit., p. 217, remarks that "... they were moved to the country immediately west of Lin-huang." Lin-huang-fu, to the northeast of the present Pa-lin, and Ssu-lou to the southeast of Lin-huang, was the area of the old Liao capital. The Ch'i-tan captives were re-settled there under Yeh-lü Liu-ke. Following Liu-ke's death in 1220, this area and the people there were inherited by Liu-ke's eldest son Hsieh-tu 他. In 1230, Hsieh-tu, after considerable merit in the field against the Chin in the south, was ordered by Ögödei to accompany Sartaq on the campaign eastward across Liaotung. He then moved these people to Huang-ning-fu 黄宁府 where he was active in the administration of Huang-ning-lu 隆宁路. Hsieh-tu participated in the 1231-1232, and 1235 campaigns in Korea and in the 1234 campaign against P'u-hsien Wan-nu. See YS 149. 3b-5b and Ikeuchi, Mansen-shi kenyû, Vol. 1, pp. 611, 627, and 629.

38. The Mobile Garrison hsing-ying 行營 was the field headquarters of the Mongol commander.
39. Cf. YKC 2a which dates this on the 13th day of the first month (Jan. 30) of 1219.

40. The missive which is contained in TYSC 28. 1a-b, contains the heading "Letter Accompanying Ceremonial Gifts (lit. fruit and wine) Sent to the Tent (i.e., Hq.) of the Mongol Marshal of Men and Horse" and a notation that it represents correspondence of the tosŏng which is an abridgement of sangsŏ tosŏng 尚書都省, the Koryŏ Secretariat.

41. The text reads hsiao-fu 處士 which I have rendered "executed or made prisoner." Hsiao should probably be understood in the sense of 稚首 "to behead and hang the head in a tree as a warning to others."

42. P’u-li-tai-yeh 蒲里泰也. In KS 22. 16b the name occurs in the form P’u-li-tai-wan 哆里泰完 in KS 22. 20b it occurs as P’u-hei-tai 蒲黑帶; hei being a common replacement or misrendering for li in Mongol names transcribed in Chinese.

43. The Koryŏ administrative system had as many as four capitals, kyŏng 京, viz., the main capital at Kaegyŏng 開京, the present Kaesŏng; the Western Capital, Sŏgyŏng 西京, the present P’yŏngyang; the Eastern Capital, Tonggyŏng 東京, the present Kyŏngju; and the Southern Capital, Namgyŏng 南京, the present Seoul. Kaegyŏng and Sŏgyŏng date from the reign of Koryŏ T’aejo 太祖 (r. 918-943); Tonggyŏng dates from the reign of Sŏngjong 成宗 (r. 982-997); and Namgyŏng dates from the reign of Munjong 文宗 (r. 1047-1082). This is, of course, vastly oversimplified. The designation Tonggyŏng had been used for the former Silla capital even during the Later Silla period (668-917). The history of the Southern Capital is particularly interesting, involving the interpretation of several prophecies, based upon which its site was occasionally changed. These are discussed at length by Yi Pyŏngdo, Han’guk-sa Vol. 2, passim. The general context of the various predictions involving the Southern Capital was the extension or elimination of the ruling dynasty by the construction of a Southern Capital which is well illustrated by the prediction of a monk who, in the seventh month of 1224, prophesied: "Asadal 伊斯達 was in antiquity on the site of Yangju 阿思達楊州. If palaces are constructed on this site and protected, then the nation’s span will last 800 years." Therefore, it was so ordered" (TT 32. 52). And, indeed, a new palace was completed there in the spring of 1235. Cf. KS 23. 28b-29a. Asadal 伊思達 is, of course, the 'capital' found by the legendary Tan’gun 檀君, for which see Sam-guk yusa 三國遺史 33. 9, Ch’oe Namsŏn 崔南善 ed., Keijō (Seoul), 1946. Also see F. Vos, ‘La letteratura coreana,’ La Civilta dell’ Oriente I, Rome, 1957, pp. 1025-1042, esp. pp. 1030 ff.
The Koryŏ main capital of Kaegyŏng was divided into five districts, viz., northern, southern, eastern, western, and central. The northern district contained ten wards, with forty-seven residential-blocks; the southern district contained five wards with seventy-one residential-blocks; the eastern district contained seven wards with seventy residential-blocks; the western district contained five wards with eighty-one residential-blocks; the central district contained the Royal palaces, etc. Cf. T. Shigeda, 重田定一, 高麗の舊都, Rekishi chirī, Vol. 16, No. 6 (1910), p. 615 ff. Also see T. Sekino, 関野貞, 高麗的舊都 (開城) 及王宮遺趾, Rekishi chirī, Vol. 6, No. 6 (1904), pp. 585-591. The most detailed study is that by the late Maema Kyōsaku, 関東宮殿簿 ["A Study on Gaegyong Palaces of Goryeo"], CG 26 (1963), pp. 1-55.

44. There were two sādo 侍御史 or Attendant Censors in the Censorate, 朝格, at this time, both posts carrying the official grade of Fifth Class, secondary. Cf. KS 76. 21b.

45. Sŏnŭi Gate 宣義門 was the principal outer gate of the Koryŏ capital of Kaegyŏng. It was located in the southwest of the city and was often used figuratively to indicate the capital. Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, carries a sketch map of the Koryŏ capital. The Sŏnŭi Gate was one of the twenty-five gates in the city. Cf. T. Shigeda, op. cit., p. 617.

46. The Taegwan Hall 大觀殿 was the main audience chamber at this time and so remained until the transfer of the capital to Kanghwa Island in 1232; it was here that the King received all envoys. Cf. KS 22 and KS 23.

47. The type of clothing was undoubtedly that described for a Mongol delegation from the camp of Sartaq in the winter of 1231. Similarly attired in fur clothing and hats, and with their bows and swords, they too shocked the Korean court attendants who "...presented [them] tzu-lo-shan 紫羅衫 (a not-full-length, unlined uppergarment made of purple silk gauze) and girdles and ordered them to change clothing. The Mongol envoys did not obey but simply put them on over [their own clothing]" (KS 23. 4a). For another example of such behavior see KS 103. 32a-36a. The shan was worn as the official costume by the highest Koryŏ officials and various colors were assigned according to rank (KS 72. 9b-14b).

Friar William of Rubruck has described the dress and head-dress of
envoys from Solanga (Korea) he saw at the court of Môngke in 1253:
"... they wear tunics like the chasuble (supertunicate) of a deacon, ex-
cept with narrower sleeves. On their heads ... a mitre like a bishop's
... in front it is slightly lower than behind ... square on top ... of stiff
buckram, and so polished that it shines ... like a mirror. ... And at the
temples are long strips of the same stuff ... fastened to the mitre ...
which stand out in the wind like two horns ... When the wind strikes it
too violently, they fold them up across the mitre over the head; and a
right handsome ornament it is." Cf. Rockhill, William of Rubruck ..., 
p. 153; in an explanatory note, Rockhill says the cap was described as of
stamina rigidata per coloram nigrum. Rockhill mentions the black, pol-
ished horsehair hats of the Koreans and that the 'wings' project from in
front, not behind. Yet in the portraits of Yi Saek 李projectId (1328-1396) and
of Yi Chehyön 李齊賢 (1287-1367) of unknown date contained in Yi, 
Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, following p. 644, the caps worn are exactly as de-
scribed by Rubruck and differ from the late Yi Dynasty headgear de-
scribed by Rockhill. For Korean costumes of the Koryô period see KS 72.

48. According to IC 6. 15b, Kim Ch'wiryô went with Cha-la as far as Choyang
but as there were sacrifices in the Western Capital at that time, Kim
was replaced by O Sugi 吳壽祺 who accompanied Cha-la. KS
and KSC have nothing like this. A KS entry dated the tenth month of 1219
merely lists O as being substituted for Kim Kunsu 金君縵 (fl. 1216-
1220; BTKP 60. 574) to be Northwest Commissioner of Men and Horse;
KSC 15. 22 reads the same. It would appear that Ch'wiryô was replaced
by Kunsu who was, in turn, replaced by Sugi. The sacrifices referred to
would have been the Buddhist Festival of Lanterns, yongdang 燈燭, cel-
ebrated in Koryô at this time on the fourteenth day (the day before the full
moon) of the second lunar month; since it was a festival with feasting,
singing, and dancing, we cannot blame Kim for going.

49. The old city of Úiju was located somewhat southwest of the present city
of Úiju. Like its modern namesake, it too warranted the description,
"die berühmte alte Eingangsorte Koreas". H. Lutensach, Korea, Eine
For historical and topographical information on the border city of Úiju
義州 see TYS 53. 1a ff.

50. houm sirang 户部侍郎 or Vice-Minister of the Bureau of Finance;
there were two such posts, each carrying the official grade of Fourth
Class, primary. Cf. KS 76, 15b-17b.

51. The Húnghwa postal relay circuit Húnghua-do 吳化道 had twenty-
ine stations and serviced an area between the capital of Kaegyôngg and
the Western Capital. There were in the Koryŏ system twenty-two postal relay circuits with a total of 525 post stations. Cf. KS 82.

52. In the early period there were undoubtedly many difficulties in communication between the Mongols and peoples they conquered, which made interpreters and translators especially valued. One of the Mongol demands upon Koryŏ in the period 1219-1224 had been for men with a knowledge of the Chinese written and spoken language (cf. TYS 28. 1b-3a) while in later days a Korean, one Cho I, became one of Qubilai's chief interpreters (KS 130). The atrocious Chinese of many Yuan edicts may have also occasioned misunderstanding. Mongolian written in the Uiyur script was also used, playing an important part in Yuan-Koryŏ relations and we read that "in many of the letters which were exchanged, the Uiyur script was used" (KS 89. 13b; also see KS 125. 15a; KS 121. 7a ff). In 1225, the Koreans began the study of a script described only as a 'smaller script' when a certain Chou-han submitted to a Koryŏ border garrison. When it was discovered that he knew the smaller script he was forthwith sent to the capital and studies commenced (KS 22. 26b). I note that CS Vol. 4, p. 14 interprets this to be the 'smaller' Jürčen script, a script which had been introduced in 1138 (cf. K. Wittfogel and Chia-sheng Feng, History of Chinese Society: Liao (907-1127), 'General Introduction', undated reprint from the Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 36, pp. 1-35). This script was widely used (cf. pp. 344 and 347, Yi Kimun 李基文, Chungse yǒjin-ǒ unnon yǒn'gu, 中世女真語韻論研究, Nonmun-chip (Seoul University Journal, Humanities and Social Sciences), 7 (1958), pp. 343-395. In fact, we find, as late as 1403, the opening days of the Yi Dynasty (1392-1910), that a Jürčen script was used in instructions sent to the Yi Court [cf. Wada Sei 和田清, Tōashi kenkyū (Manshu-hen) 东亚史研究 (滿洲篇)] "Studies on the History of the Far East" (Manchuria), Tōyō bunko ronsō 東洋文庫, Series A, No. 37, p. 384]. Yet it seems improbable that the Koreans who had been in close contact with the Jürčen for centuries would have been unaware of their script. While events of the times may have given the Jürčen script an importance, I would suggest that the 'smaller script' was not the Jürčen script at all but the Uiyur script.

53. For topographical and historical information on Chinmyŏng-sŏng 鎭冥城 which was located near the modern Wŏnsan 元山 in S. Hamgyŏng Province, see TYS 49. 13a.

54. Ch'oe Ch'ung'hŏn 崔忠獻 (1149-1219) of Ubong 牛禁 entered military service at an early age. He rose to power in the struggles which
erupted in the military government in the later 12th century and seized the power of the military government in 1196 by assassinating Yi Ŭimin 李義旼 (d. 1196). The military government in Koryŏ commenced with the rebellion of Ch'ŏng Chunghuhn 鄭仲夫 (d. 1179) in 1170, but not until the Ch'oe clan assumed power - which it held for four generations until 1258 - did the military government manage to gather the full administrative regalia of government, although the earlier efforts of General Kyŏng Taesŭng 慶大升 (1154-1183) had already pointed the way. M. C. Rogers has dealt with Ch'oe at some length in his 'Studies in Korean History', TP XLVII (1959), pp. 30-62. For biographical information see KS 129. A thorough biographical résumé is contained in Chŏsen jimmei jisho 朝鮮人名辭書, Chŏsen Sōtoku fu 朝鮮總督府, Keijō (Seoul), 1937-39, 1379A ff; also see BTKP 23. 226.

55. Ch'oe U 崔瑀 (d. 1249), who later changed his name to I 怡, was the eldest son of Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn the military ruler. His mother, Ch'unghŏn's first wife, was the daughter of Supreme General Song Chŏng 宋清. He assumed control of the government following his father's death but was compelled to fight to retain his power which he did by exiling or killing his opposition, including his younger brother Hyang 瑏. Like most of the Koryŏ aristocracy, he favored Buddhism - although he did not hesitate to ruthlessly eliminate priests when they opposed him. He encouraged and financially aided learning as had his father Ch'unghŏn, yet he was not above confiscating the dwellings of commoners in the city and razing them to build a private polo field.

He was enfeoffed as the Marquis of Chinyang 晉陽侯 in 1234 (after declining the title in 1221; the patent of investiture which is contained in TYS C 33, 17b-19a mentions his merit in protecting the altars of earth and grain (i.e., the fatherland), and crushing the rebellious and the refractory) and in 1242 was made Duke of Chinyang. He had two sons - neither by his first wife - who entered the Buddhist priesthood with the Buddhist names of Manjôn 萬全 and Manjŏng 萬宗; the former he recalled to secular life to succeed him, viz., Ch'oe Hang 崔沆. The judgement of his contemporaries provides a criterion by which to appraise his life: following the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan, Ch'oe U was made a Meritorious Minister, kongsin 功臣, posthumously (cf. KS 25. 26a). He died in 1249 and was awarded the posthumous appellation of Kwangnyŏl 廣烈. His biography is contained in KS 129 following that of his father Ch'unghŏn and valuable information on his life and times is contained in TYS C; BTKP 25. 242, I note, fails to mention his second son Manjŏng.
56. The monks were from temples in and near the capital and included monks from the temples H"ungwang 興王, Ky"ongbok 景福, Wangnyun 王輪, and Hongw"on 弘園 in the Kaegy"ong area and the near-by temples of Anyang 安養 and Suri 修理 (KS 129. 24a-b). The latter two are identified by CS Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 519 as being in the present Ky"onggi Province at Sih"ung 始興 and Kwangju respectively. The construction of the most famous of these, H"ungwangsa, commenced in the tenth year of the reign of Koryo Munjong 文宗 (r. 1047-1082) and took some 12 years; its site remains at H"ungwangni 興旺里, Kaep'ung-kun 賢郡, Ky"onggi Province. It was here that 'National Preceptor' tae-gak kuksa 大覺國師, the brother of Koryo S"on-jong 宣宗 (r. 1084-1094) supervised the first carving and printing of the Tripitaka or Buddhist Canon, following his return from Sung China; it was this work that was destroyed in the Mongol invasions of 1232.

Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 548 and p. 549, note 2, traces the uprising of monks to Ch'oe's disregard of government forces and retention of his private soldiers for his own use which resulted in the need to levy monks into the army.

57. Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, pp. 552-553, in pointing out the rash of uprisings - he lists seven in the period 1219 to 1230 - remarks that they were attributable as much to a quest for power on the part of the leaders as to chaotic conditions. Of the seven revolts that Yi lists, two were direct attempts to overthrow the Ch'oe clan, two were revolts of provincial officials, one a revolt by a bandit chief, and two revolts arose in the Western Capital which had been a hotbed of rebellion since the revolt of Myoch'ong 妙清 (d. 1135; BTKP 84. 791) in the reign of Injong 仁宗 (r. 1123-1146).

58. The rank of Supreme General, sangjanggun 上將軍, had the official grade of Third Class, primary (Yi Table 4) and carried an annual stipend of 300 bushels (sŏk) of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 85 kyŏl of paddy fields and 40 kyŏl of forest (Yi, Table 7).

59. She had been the wife of General Son Hongyun 孫洪胤 whom Ch'oe had killed; hearing of her beauty, Ch'oe took her himself and put her in a house in the capital. Cf. KSC 15. 20b.

60. There were two popular methods of selecting generation-names in Koryo. All clan members of the same generation would use the same radical in their given names. The 'jade' radical, okpu 玉部, was undoubtedly popular, because in radical form it resembles the character Wang 王, meaning 'king' and which was also the surname of the Koryo royal family. A second method, which prevails widely today, was to choose a generation
character. An example of this may be seen in the first generation of the descendants of Kim Kyŏngson (金慶孫), who used the generation character cha 子 and bore the names Chahung 子興, Chach'ang 子昌, and Chayŏn 子延. Kim's descendants in the 2nd generation (sons of Chahung) combined the two methods and bore the names Sanggi 上琦, Sangyo 上瑩, Sangyŏng 上瑛, and Sangnin 上璘 (KS 103. 30b). BTKP carries many such examples.

61. The title of Marquis, hu 候, was an honorary title which carried an annual stipend of 400 bushels (sŏk) of rice (Yi, Table 6).

62. The title of Count, paek 伯, was an honorary title which carried an annual stipend of 240 bushels (sŏk) of rice (Yi, Table 6).

63. Posŏng 寶城 was a kun 郡 in Ch'olla 全羅 Province with four subordinate hyŏn 县. Cf. Han'guk-sa sajŏn, 138A.

64. The rank of Grand General, taejanggan 大將軍, had the official grade of Third Class, secondary (Yi, Table 4) and carried an annual stipend of 233 bushels (sŏk) 5 tu 斗 of rice (Yi, Table 6) and an allotment of 80 kyŏl of paddy fields and 35 kyŏl of forest land (Yi, Table 7).

65. The term yŏng 幽 is clarified in KS 81. 1a where we read, "Each yŏng had about 1 000 men ..."

66. The honorary title of sagong 司空 was the third (and lowest) of the Three Dukes, samgong 三公, honorary titles bestowed on members of the royal household (KS 76. 2b) and carried an annual stipend of 240 bushels (sŏk) of rice (Yi, Table 6). The honorary title of chuguk 柱國 was the second of two such titles bestowed for merit and carried the grade of Second Class, primary (cf. Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 133). The prefix su 爻 'guardian', 'protector', was apparently used to differentiate this title from the titles of nobility sado 司徒 and sagong 司空 which were bestowed upon the male children of the royal relatives (cf. HY 20. 24b).

67. Hŭljong 旭宗 (r. 1205-1211) was deposed by Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn and died in exile in 1237. Cf. CHSL 4. 28.

68. The rank of pyŏlchang 利將 or Junior Colonel, had the official grade of Seventh Class, primary (Yi, Table 4) and carried an annual stipend of 46 bushels (sŏk) 10 tu 斗 of rice (Yi, Table 6) and an allotment of 45 kyŏl of paddy fields and 12 kyŏl of forest land (Yi, Table 7).

69. The biographies of Han Sun 韓恂 and Ta Chi 也智 which are found together in KS 130. 1-3 relate chiefly the details of the rebellion without giving any further particulars of their lives.

70. The rank of nangjang 六將 or Senior Colonel, had the official grade of Sixth Class, primary (Yi, Table 4) and carried an annual stipend of 86
bushels (sŏk) 10 tu of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 60 kyŏl of paddy fields and 21 kyŏl of forest land (Yi, Table 7).

71. The term toho (C. tu-hu) 都護, usually rendered 'protector general', occurs in Chinese history as early as Han times (cf. Hou Han-shu 118. 14b). The toho was in charge of the toho-pu 府. In Korean history the usage of the term dates to Silla times and traces to T'ang. After crushing the Koguryŏ capital of P'yŏngyang in 668, T'ang established the An-tang tu-hu-fu 安東都護府 in P'yŏngyang with Hsieh Jen-kuei 薛仁貴 as Protector General; in 676 they were forced out of the peninsula and the tu-hu-fu was moved to Liaoyang; it was finally abolished in 758 (cf. Han'gak-sa sajŏn, p. 218).

I have chosen to render the term toho-pu as Defense Command. The Yün 'Monography on Geography', in describing the Koryŏ toho-pu, remarks that the term was taken from T'ang and that "Koryŏ established [as] pu 府, chu 州, hyŏn 縣, and chin 城, some sixty walled-cities. This was the toho-pu." And it notes that although Koryŏ retained the old T'ang designation, nevertheless, they were without a real toho-pu (YS 59. 4a-b). The YS account correctly traces the introduction of the toho-pu to T'ang but describes, not the Koryŏ toho-pu but rather the Northwestern Defense Command plus Sŏhae Province, i.e., the area submitted by the Koryŏ rebel Ch'oe Tan 翟坦 (which is discussed in detail later). A clearer picture is given by TYS 52. 16a which relates that the designation of Chung-ban-kun 重磐郡 of late Silla times was changed by Koryŏ T'aejo to P'aengwŏn-kun 彭原郡 and in his fourteenth year (931), T'aejo established there the Anbuk-pu 安北府. In the reign of Sŏngjong it was called Yŏngju anbuk taedoho-pu 安州安北大都護府; in the reign of Hyŏnjong it was called Anbuk taedoho-pu.

The Koryŏ toho-pu or Defense Command, then referred primarily to a city, i.e., the city in which it was located and subordinate administrative units. Thus, the Northern Defense Command, anbuk toho-pu 安北都護府, while it was responsible for the peace in the northwest portion of Korea, as a term, referred to the city in which it was located, viz., the walled-city of Ansŏng 安城 (also called Anbuk; the modern Anju 安州) on the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River. There were in the Koryŏ system the following Defense Commands.

Northern (anbuk 安北) Defense Command;
Southern (annam 安南) Defense Command; the location shifted to various cities throughout the southwest;
Eastern (anbyŏn 阿爾) Defense Command; the location shifted in the modern S. Hamgyŏng Province ending at Anbyŏn, the city which presently bears its name.
Western ( annihilated ) Defense Command; it was located at the modern Haeju 海州.


72. The city of Kuju 龜州, the present Kusŏng 城域 in N. P'yŏngan Province, had walls of stone construction seven feet (ch'ŏk 尺) in height and a circumference of 12,335 feet (ch'ŏk); inside the city were fifty wells and springs. For topographical and historical information see TYS 53. 31a ff.

73. For topographical and historical information on the city of Yŏnju 延州 which is in the modern N. P'yŏngan Province, see TYS 54. 1a ff; for such information on the city of Sŏngju 岑州, the present Sŏngch'ŏn in S. P'yŏngan Province, see TYS 54. 16a ff.


75. Yü-ke-hsia 于哥牙 was a Chin Marshal who garrisoned Ta-fu-ying 大豐營 (which was located on an island in the Yalu River). In the fourth month of 1217, he had fought an unsuccessful night battle with the Jürčen Yellow Banner forces of P'u-hsien Wan-nu and then with ninety men, had slipped across the Yalu to Úiju where they were held by the Koryô District Commandant, pundo changgan. At the time Yü-ke-hsia was in possession of a tiger-head gold plaque chin-pai 金牌 as symbol of his authority. Cf. Ikeuchi, Mansen-shi kenkyû, Vol. 1, p. 581.

76. Chu 4) 薯 interchangeable with chu 4) 筆. A grass cloth produced from the fibres of the ramie [Boerheria nivea, cf. E.H. Schafer and B.E. Wallacker, 'Local Tribute Products of the T'ang Dynasty', Tung-fan wen-hua (Journal of Oriental Studies of Hongkong University), 4 (1957-58) 1 & 2, p. 236], called mosi 毛施 in Korean and often written mosi 毛施. It was a regular tribute product of T'amna Island to the Koryô Court, cf. p. 141 note 2, Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Gen Seiso to Tanra-to 元世祖與耽羅島, [Yuan Shih-tsü and T'amna Island], TG 16 (1926), pp. 136-142. The term mosi was in use in Koryô times, cf. F. Hirth and W.W. Rockhill, Chau Ju-kua ( 趙州人 ): His work on the Chinese and Arab Trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries, entitled Chu-fan-chî 趙蕃志, St Petersburg, 1911, p. 168 and p. 169 note 9; they have stated that mau-shi (i.e., mosi) is usually rendered "serge". There is no doubt that ramie cloth is meant. Serge is usually called kal 福.
77. Kiang-p'ing is the name of a prefecture in modern Hopei; it is also the name of a location in Korea. The Kiang-p'ing cloth may have derived its name from one of these locations (i.e., from the site of manufacture).

78. Information on the revolt is also contained in the biography of Kim Ch'wi-ryǒ KS 103 and it is summarized in CHSL 4. 23b.

79. *Chu-ku-yiü 著古與*. In YS 208 and YKC the name occurs as *Chu-ku-yiü 著古與*; it occurs as Cha-ku-yeh 扎古也 in KS 22. 25a. In KS 23. 4a-5b it is found in the form *Kua-ku-yiü 瓜古與*, *kua 瓜* being a mistake for *chao 瓜* which is also seen in *Kua-wa 瓜瓜* for *Chao-wa 瓜瓜* (= Java).

80. KS 22. 29b reads 皇大弟; YKC 2 & 2b read 皇大弟國王. In an answer to other demands, a Koryǒ missive in TYSC 28. 1b-3a refers to him as 皇大弟大王. *Kuo-wang 國王* or Viceroy was a title of nobility instituted by Činggis in 1217 and bestowed as a special mark of respect; it held the official grade of First Class, primary. Cf. Ratchnevsky, *Un Code . . .*, p. 186, note 2. The individual concerned was Temüge-otçigen, the fourth brother of Činggis. P. Pelliot, *Notes on Marco Polo*, Paris 1959, p. 307, citing T'u Chi (i.e., *Meng-wu-erh chi-shih*) 75. 1a, says that prior to the downfall of P'u-hsien Wan-nu, Činggis had allotted the whole of his territory as a part of the appandage of his youngest brother Temüge-otçigen. This was inherited by his direct descendants reaching his great-great-grandson Nayan as stated by Marco Polo.

81. The text reads 安貝女大王, however, I cannot but wonder if 安 is not a scribal error for 女; if so then in lieu of *Queen An-chih* we would read *Grand Prince Alčitai* (or *Elčidei*). Juvalini remarks that after the death of Činggis in 1227, there was an assembly convoked and "from the east came Otegin, Belgütei Noyan, Elchitei Noyan, Yekü, and Ye-süngei." Boyle identifies Elchitei Noyan as the son of Činggis' brother Qach'ïun. See Vol. I, p. 185, J.A. Boyle (translator), *The History of the World-Conqueror* of 'Ala-ad-Din 'Ata-Malik Juvalini, 2 vols., London, 1958.

82. The records inform us that "at the time, the people believed that the quarrel with the Mongols began with this [incident]" (KS 129. 30b).

83. P'o-su-lu 婆速路 was the lu路 administration in Liaoitung which bordered Koryǒ on the Yalu; it was the Liao-yang-lu 陽陽路 of the Yüan. There is a *shih-cheng 石城* mentioned in Chung-kuo ku-chien ti-ming ta-t'zu-tien 中國古今地名大辭典, pp. 269-270, which was located in Liao-yang-hsien 縣 on top of Mt. Shih-cheng 石城山 and which is identified as the old Koryǒ (read Koguryǒ)
Paegûi-sông 白崖城 (read Paegam-sông 白岩城). Cf. KS 103. 32a-36a. Ikeuchi, Mansen-shi kenkyû, pp. 624-625 note 2, says that Yanai Watari would locate it 18 Chinese li north of the present Chiu-lien-sheng 九連城

84. According to Chông Tagyong 丁若鏞 (1762-1836), the Chin established mutual trade relations, hu-shih, with Koryô in 1218. Chông also notes that prior to that, the majority of trade had been via the sealanes rather than by overland routes or the establishment of markets on the border. See chip 集 1, kûn巻 15. 9a-b, Chông Tasan chônjip 丁茶山全集, 3 vols., Seoul, 1960.

85. In the sixth month of 1226, the Chin court had sent orders to Ke-pu-ai 葛不離 the head of their Liaotung Mobile Bureau, and to Koryô to subjugate the Chin rebel Wan-chia-nu who had been appointed by the Chin as military commander of the P'ô-su-lu administration under Wan-yen A-li-pu-sun 完顏阿里不孫. Wan-chia-nu subsequently killed A-li-pu-sun (which led to the appointment of Ke-pu-ai in 1217), rebelled against the Chin, crossed the Koryô borders and apparently based himself along the upper reaches of the Yalu. See Chin-shih 103. 17a-b. He then submitted to the Mongols for, as Ikeuchi, Mansen-shi kenkyû, p. 621 has noted, according to YS 4, in 1261 he was appointed as daru-âči to govern Koryô in the post created by the Yüan that year in Shen-yang-îu (see YS 59).

86. This chart is based upon material contained in Kim Sanggi's excellent study, Yŏ-song muyôk-ko [Résumé of Sung-Koryô Trade], incorporated in Tongbang munhwa kyoryu-sa nonggo 文化交流史論叢書, No. 8 of Han'guk munhwa ch'ongsô 韓國文化交流叢書, Seoul, 2nd ed., 1954, pp. 47-88.

87. Merchant vessels were often a source of intelligence and it is possible that some such motive lay behind the visits of the Sung vessels. However, at least one of the vessels arrived (at Cheju Island) after being blown off course by a storm. The Koryô-sa references to the Sung trade at this time are KS 22. 21a, KS 23. 36a, KS 25. 20a, and KS 28. 45a corresponding to the years 1221, 1229, 1260, and 1278 respectively. The most detailed study is that by Kim Sanggi, loc. cit.; a more recent but less thorough work is Mori Katsumi 森克己, Nissô to Kôrai to no shiken bôeki 日宋與高麗的貿易 ["Private Tributary Trade of Japan and Koryô with Sung"], CG 14 (1956) pp. 545-556. Mori expresses some interesting opinions among which is that Koryô and Japan were outlets for surplus goods the Sung Chinese obtained in S.E. Asia and the Arab trade, an opinion he reiterates in his 'Interna-

88. By T'amna 聖羅 is meant the present Cheju Island 齊州島. At this time Cheju referred only to the present Cheju City. The distinction may be seen clearly in a passage in YS 7. 17a when an attack was ordered on "... T'amna as well as Cheju ...", i.e., to take the entire island as well as the city. The island was formerly an independent Kingdom but by this time it had been effectively incorporated into the Koryō administrative structure. For a study of the names of the island see Takahashi Tōru 高橋添, Saishu-tō meiko 齊州島名考, CG 9 (1950), pp. 393-412. For a general history of the island see Kim Ponghyŏn 金泰鎬, Cheju-do yŏksa-ji 齊州島歷史誌, Seoul, 1960. For topographical and historical information see TYS 38. 1a ff.

89. See Mori Katsumi, Nissŏ-tsū to Tanra, 朝日通と耽羅 ("Quel-part Island and Marine Transportation between Japan and Sung China"), CG 21 & 22 (1961), pp. 522-531; pp. 528-531 pertain to this period. As Mori has pointed out in his 'International Relations ...', op. cit., p. 85, the reason for the decline in the direct trade between Japan and Koryŏ was that in the 12th century Japanese merchant ships began going directly to Sung China.

90. The raids of the Wakō or Japanese freebooters who had plagued Korea since Silla times, recommenced in 1223 after over a century of silence. During the late 13th and early 14th centuries they were a major disaster and they raided absolutely every major city and town in Koryŏ. Cf. Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 602 ff. The Wakō raids continued until the Hideyoshi invasions in the late 16th century. (Actually the cessation resulted from Hideyoshi's conquest of Kyūshū, the chief Wakō base, cf. Brown, p. 31). Brown says that "Wakō is most commonly translated as 'Japanese pirates' but that translation leads to considerable misunderstanding for Wakō did not always limit their activities to piracy and not all Wakō were Japanese. They carried on a considerable amount of peaceful trade. ... Contemporary Chinese accounts reveal that many Wakō bands contained as many as twenty, or even thirty per cent Chinese." Cf. D. M. Brown, Money Economy in Mediaeval Japan, Far Eastern Association, New Haven, Conn., 1951. The Wakō raids on Koryŏ for the period 1375-1388 are tabulated in Brown, op. cit., pp. 18-19; the total of 376 raids during the period on Koryŏ alone is an indication of the intensity of their sorties. For an account of Wakō activities during the period see Sin
Kisōk 天基頌, Koryō malgi úi tae-II kwan'gye 高麗末期의 對日關係 [Relations with Japan at the End of the Koryō Dynasty], SK 1 (1957), pp. 3-31; English résumé pp. 168-173. For their disruptive effect on the Koryō fishing industry see pp. 226-227 of K. Yoshida 吉田敬史, Chōsen suisangyō no kaihatsu katei 朝鮮水産業の 開發過程 ["The Process of the Development of Fisheries in Corea in the Middle of the Li Dynasty"], Tōhō gakuhō of Kyōtō Univ., 10 (1951), pp. 223-246. For Korean prisoners taken to Japan and their ultimate repatriation see M. Ishihara 名原進博, Wakō to Chōsenjin furyo no sōkan mondai 倭寇と朝鮮人俘虜の移送問題 ["Woegu, Japanese Marauders and the Problem of Repatriation of Korean Captives"], CG 9 (1955) and 10 (1956), pp. 47-82. A recent study of the Wakō which I have been unable to see is the unpublished M.A. thesis of B.H. Hazard Jr., Japanese Marauders and Medieval Korea: A Study of the Genesis of the Wakō, University of California at Berkeley, June 1958; this should be a rather definitive study of the subject. Also see Y. Takegoshi, The Story of the Wako, Japanese Pioneers in the Southern Regions (translated by H. Watanabe), Tōkyō, 1940, and Y. S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Mainland, 2 vols., Berkeley, 1937 and 1940; and Vol. 2, pp. 387-393, Tsuda Sōkichi, Chōsen rekishi chiri. O. Karow of the Universität Frankfurt is currently preparing a comprehensive study of the Wakō and their activities.

91. Their arrival in Japan is noted in the Azuma kagami 吉備鏡, incorporated in Vol. 4 and Vol. 5 of the 15 volume Zokukokushi taisei 高次 史大系, published by the Keizai zasshi-sha 經済雑誌社, Tōkyō, 1902-1904; see Vol. 4, p. 882. For bibliographical information on the Azuma kagami, see Vol. I, pp. 31-32 of the Kokusho kaidai 国書 開題, published in 2 vols. by the Kuni-kan 六分館, Tōkyō, 3rd printing, 1926.

92. The term hu-shih 互市 is said by the Tzu-hai 紅海 to mean reciprocal trade with other nations; the Hou Han-shu section pertaining to the Wu Huan 乌桓 people is cited as a precedent. Cf. Tzu-hai 紅海, Chung-hua shu-chü yin-hang 中華書局印行 ed., p. 64 A.

93. Sansom, Vol. I, p. 438, notes the requests by the Koreans to the Hōjō Regents to stop the Wakō raids, and says that the Regent Yasutoki put the pirates to death because he wanted to avoid enmowment with Korea over such a trifling affair at this point. See G. Sansom, A History of Japan to 1334, 2 vols., London, 1958. My own interpretation is that the Hōjō Regents were anxious for trade with Koryō, so much so that they would undertake a punitive expedition to quell the Kyūshū freebooters (if the
prisoners executed were really freebooters). Yet the recommencement of the Wakō raids shows their repressive measures were only partially successful. Which is to say that the Hōjō Regents used the raids of the freebooters over whom they could have had only partial control, as a means to establish trade relations with Koryŏ. The Koryŏ envoy of 1227 was a certain Pak In (KSC 15. 41b). According to the Hyakurensō 百鈍鈴, incorporated in Vol. 14 of the 17 vol. Kokushi taikei 國史大系, Tōkyō, 1906 (Vol. 14, p. 216), ninety men of a band operating from Tsushima 對馬國 which had raided Cholla Province, had been captured by the Japanese authorities and were beheaded due to the Koryŏ request. Pak remained in Japan about a year, returning to Koryŏ in the eleventh month of 1228, and was richly rewarded by Ch'oe U (KSC 15. 43b). For bibliographical information on the Hyakurensō, see Kokusho kaidai, Vol. 2, 1703A.

94. Kim Hŭije 金希烈 (d. 1227) was of Kunsan Island 都山島 and followed the merchant vessels which brought him to Kaegyŏng where he left the sea and made his home. He entered the army and gradually rose to the rank of general. He was appointed to handle the frequent Mongol and Eastern Jürĉen envoys who arrived in the Koryŏ capital due to his acquaintance with poetry and rites. Serving with the resourcefulness and bravery which led to his appointment, he was subsequently made District Commandant, pando changgun 分道將軍, of Ūiju 義州. After his raid against Yü-ke-hsia in 1226, Hŭije was relieved of his post and made Civil Governor, sunmunsa 巡問使, of Cholla Province and in this post misfortune overtook him. At a time when Ch'oe U was ill, Hŭije believed that Ch'oe would not recover and was rash enough to forecast the death of Ch'oe to a Buddhist priest, one Yŏnji 演之 who promptly informed Ch'oe U that Kim was plotting against him. When the officers came to Naju 羅州 to arrest him, Kim met them without fear. Then, asking for permission to speak - "I wish only a word and then I will die" - he lamented in verse fashion:

"I beg to say that the clear river has 100 streams of benevolence,
And east, west, north, and south forget themselves.
What shall I do,
Now that I have suddenly encountered Heaven's ire?
Thus, a man of the Imperial Path
Becomes a man of the blue-green sea."

And he threw himself into the sea. At the same time, his son Hong Sa 福巳 et al., three persons, also perished. The tragedy is summed up by two lines which occur in his biography and which would make a fitting
epitaph: Kim Hŭije was wise and brave and given to books and histories. Those who were envious vilified him and he died.

His biography is contained in KS 103. 32a-36a from which the above information has been taken. BTKP 57. 546 gives his name as Kim Hide which is unfortunately impossible as there is no character in Sino-Korean with the reading te - de (ticker). It should be mentioned that modern Korean (initial) ch-j (middle Korean t-d) but although such a reconstruction is linguistically sound, it is a questionable practice in this case; perhaps the BTKP entry is merely a typographical error. I have found the final character of Kim's name in three variants, viz., in KS 103. 32a, etc. Ch. ti Kor. che-je following Yen Shih-ku's 頷師古 (581-645) well-known explanatory comment on the name of general Chin Jih-ti 金日壁 in Han-shu 68. 20b (壁音丁奚反); KS 103. 34a gives 壁 Hui; KS 103. 35a gives 壁 T'an. I have found only one example of each of the latter two variants and so consider them simply scribal errors.

95. Rogers in an illuminating article remarks (p. 56) that although Koryŏ joined with the Jürčen against the Ch'i-tan when the latter invaded Koryŏ in 1010-1011, that Koryŏ regarded the Jürčen as culturally inferior. He also notes (p. 56 note 27) that with the rise of Chin, Koryŏ urged Sung not to ally with them against Liao but insisted that Chin was the real threat and (p. 57 note 28) that the Chinese accused Koryŏ of desiring to monopolize trade with Jürčen as the reason behind the Koryŏ suggestion to support Liao; one issue was Koryŏ's refusal to grant the Jürčen permission to cross Koryŏ with horses for Sung. Cf. M.C. Rogers, 'The Regularization of Koryŏ-Chin Relations (1116-1131)', CAJ 6 (1961), pp. 51 ff. The Jürčen who accompanied the Mongol missions to Koryŏ were as rapacious as their Mongol overlords but were in no position to enforce their desire for goods. One such Jürčen who desired rewards, approached the matter in diplomatic fashion and informed General Kim Hŭije 金希壁 of his desires in a line of verse:

"The Lord of the East (Koryŏ) has formerly indicated his warmth."

Hŭije countered with:

"The Emperor of the North (Činggis) has already dispelled the cold."

Although the implications were plain, the envoy persisted:

"What was I thinking of to have composed this line "

Hŭije, feigning ignorance, replied,

"Sir, you were thinking of spring [when] you recited. And, because it is spring, I rhymed it"

(KS 103. 32a-36a; KSC 15. 28b-29a).
96. chaech’u 宰樞 was a term which referred to the civil and military officials of the First and Second grades (cf. KS 79. 22) in the Royal Chancellory, munhasōng 門下省, and the Bureau of Military Affairs, ch’umirwŏn 樞密院 (the latter is confirmed by KS 26. 36b), that is, Chief Ministers. They were also known as yangbu 雨府 or the Two Ministries.

97. The Koryŏ military forces have been calculated at from forty-two to forty-eight thousand which included twenty-two thousand posŏng 保勝 and sixteen thousand chŏngyŏng 精勇. They provided in brief, the bulk of the Koryŏ army. It is only in recent years that attention has been directed to the study of the Koryŏ military system and the subject is still far from being clarified. Perhaps the clearest outline is that presented by Yi Pyŏngdo, Han’guk-sa, Vol. 2, pp. 123 ff, although I note that in the appended Chart 5B contained in Yi, Han’guk-sa, Vol. 2, different figures are given, viz., posŏng 8601 and chŏngyŏng 19754 than in the text p. 127, which gives 22,000 and 16,000 respectively. Y. Suematsu 末松保和, Kórai yonjyūni tofu kōryaku, 高麗四十二都府考略 [A Brief Note on the Forty-two tobu of Koryŏ], CG 14 (1959), pp. 577-585 suggests that the recruiting of these forces was done through the tobu, each being responsible for recruiting 1000 men. The subject is much too involved to pursue at any length here and those interested are referred to Suematsu, loc. cit., who gives most of the pertinent references including the important studies done by Yi Kibaek 李基白.

98. Ŭiju 宜州 is the present Tŏgwŏn 德源 in S. Hamgyŏng Province; for topographical and historical information see TYS 49. 10b ff. There are several mountain passes with defensive structures which are called Ch’ŏl-kwan. The one referred to here was in the northeast at Ch’ŏllyŏng 鐵嶺 on the border of the modern Kangwŏn and S. Hamgyŏng Provinces. See TYS 49. 3a ff under the entry Ch’ŏllyŏng.


100. The ancestral tablets of the deceased Koryŏ monarchs which were decorated with white gold and which were kept in the seven chambers of the Koryŏ Great Shrine taemyo, were stolen by thieves who broke into the sanctuary in the fifth month of 1230. Cf. KSC 16. 2a:
101. Eight Eastern Jürčen envoys are recorded in the Koryô capital in 1223, but few details are given (KS 22. 23b).

102. For the Mongol campaigns in Central Asia at this time see W. Barthold, Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasions (H. A. R. Gibbs, translator), 2nd ed., London, 1958, pp. 441 ff.

103. The term chio-ch'ang 銀仗 as used in the Sung and Chin periods denoted government controlled commerce with other states in North Asia. Cf. Vol. 5, p. 300b-c, Tôyô rekishi daijiten. Chio in the sense of monopoly occurs as early as Han times; for this usage see N. L. Swann, op. cit., p. 20 and pp. 61-64. TMP 164. 2a adds the words "it was not permitted". Chin-shih 50. 1a gives the definition: "Monopoly markets are sites where reciprocal trade, hu-shih, is conducted with bordering states."

104. The city of Ch'ôngju 青州 was on the southeastern border of the land of the Eastern Jürčen and thus in the northwest; for a discussion of its possible location see Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, pp. 368-369; also see Tsuda Sôkichi, op. cit., Vol. 2, pp. 196-197. The city of Ch'ôngju 定州 is the modern Ch'ôngp'yông 定平 in S. Hamgyông Province; for topographical and historical information see TYS 48. 23b ff; it had marked Koryô's northeastern boundary since the reign of Koryô Yejong (r. 1106-1122). Cf. Tsuda Sôkichi, op. cit., p. 199.

105. Silver had long been in comparatively wide circulation in Koryô. Iron coins were first cast in 996, i.e., the 15th year of the reign of Koryô Sôngjong 成宗 (r. 982-997) (cf. KS 3. 29b), but not until the reign of Koryô Sukch'ông 肅宗 (r. 1096-1105) was a mint established and coins cast on a large scale. The silver pyông coins were first cast in the 12th month of 1102. They were made of one kün 京 (160 grams) of silver and we are told in KS 79. 11 that they were "fashioned in the shape of the nation" (??). They were cast to combat counterfeiting of copper coinage and to this end were stamped with a seal. In the colloquial they were referred to as hwealgaj 銀畫 or 'rich ones'. The silver pyông coins were the last important issue of currency to circulate in Koryô until the Yüan paper notes chih-yüan pao-ch'ao 至元寶鈔 and chung-t'ung pao-ch'ao 中統寶鈔 came into circulation in Koryô in the 1260's. The pyông coins were prohibited in 1331, i.e., the first year of the initial reign of King Ch'ung horrible 忠惠王 (r. 1331-1332 and 1340-1344) when a new issue of small pyông coins were issued (cf. KS 79. 11). Ming coins also circulated in Koryô with the rise of that dynasty. Specimens of Koryô coinage, including the pyông coins, are said to be in the possession of The Bank of Korea and The National Museum in Seoul, and
the Research Department of the Bank of Korea has done a study Money of Korea while a lengthy article with illustrations appeared in TKBRAS, and an article 'The Coinage of Corea', by C. T. Gardner appeared in JNBRAS Vol. XXVII, pp. 71 ff; but these works are unavailable to me and I have never seen them.

106. The Koryô kân 釜 was 157.5 grams although it is usual to calculate it at 160 grams for convenience. This was ascertained through an inscription on a Koryô bell which stated that the bell contained 40 kân of metal; the bell was found to weigh 6 kilos 330 grams. See p. 220, Fujita Ryôsaku 藤田亮策 ['Inscriptions on Koryô Bells'], Kôrai kane no meibun 高麗筑の銘文, CG 14 (1959) 187-232.

107. In the Koryô period they distinguished the quality and type of gold and silver. Terminologies included gold kûm 金, yellow-gold hwanggûm 黃金 and white-gold paekkûm 白金; silver ân 銀 and white-silver hwanggûm 花銀.

108. hwabyông 花瓶 ～華瓶; literally 'flower-vase', designates the narrow-necked vase called a kundikâ - similar to a kalaôa, an open-necked vase - holding water or any number of other things and associated with Avalokiteôvara who is often depicted holding one in the left hand. See S. Mochizuki 望月信亨, Bukkyô daijiten 佛教大辭典, 7 vols., Tokyo, 1931, entry 4356B-C. Kalaôa are not common in Korean museums today but I have seen many excellent kundikâ, some of them listed as National Treasures.

109. The northwest border city of Sakchu 朔州 is in the modern N. P'yông-an province. For topographical and historical information see TYS 53. 28 ff.

110. The northeast border city of Hamju 咸興 is the present Hamhûng 咸興 in S. Hamgyông Province. For topographical and historical information see TYS 48. 5a ff.

111. yangbu 晉府; see note 96 above.

112. This is an interesting illustration of the remark of the philosopher George Santayana (b. 1863) to the effect that people who do not learn from the past will be forever condemned to repeat it. Koryô had been plagued by mounted raiders for centuries, each exhibiting what Wittfogel (p. 669) describes as "machine-like organization plus high mobility", cf. K.A. Wittfogel and Chia-sheng Feng, History of Chinese Society: Liao (907-1125), Appendix V, 'Qarâ-Khitây', undated reprint from the Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, Vol. 36, pp. 619-674.

113. This story of discarding the gifts parallels that of Chu-ku-yû's visit the
previous spring. Cf. *KS* 22. 25a. Yet according to *YKC* he was sent twice and thus no duplication of the entries is involved.


115. The *KS* is silent on when the demand was made and we learn of the matter via later Yüan edicts and subsequent Koryŏ answers regarding Koryŏ's failure to comply (*YKC* 3b-5a; *TYSC* 28; both incorporated in *KS* 23). The Mongols did order Koryŏ to subjugate the Jürčen in 1221 (*YKC* 2b) but this antedates Wan-nu's break with the Mongols and refers to aid requested against Chin forces in Manchuria. One Mongol request to attack Wan-nu was made in 1232, cf. *YKC* 8b.

116. The Eastern Jürčen raids on Koryŏ's Northeast Frontier-District had continued as noted in the text. Koryŏ had failed completely to cope with them and the Koryŏ forces had suffered a severe defeat at Ŭiju in the northeast in 1227 (*KS* 102. 7a-9a). At any rate, they did not field an army against P'u-hsien Wan-nu.
Chapter II

THE INVASIONS OF SARTAQ

On the 29th day of the eighth month (August 26) of 1231, a large Mongol force under the command of Marshal Sartaq (d. 1232) crossed the Yalu and surrounded Hamsin-chin (KS 23. 1a) which quickly surrendered under the Mongol threats to slaughter the inhabitants if they did not speedily submit (KS 130. 9b; KSC 16. 4a). Instrumental in the surrender of Hamsin-chin was Defense General, pangsu changgun, Cho Sukch'ang, the son of Cho Ch'ung, who reminded the Mongols of the previous pledge of his father. Sukch'ang with a certain Chon Kan (d. 1231. 10), the Deputy Commissioner, pus, of Hamsin-chin, opened the granary for the Mongol troops and then wrote letters instructing Sakchu and Sonndok-chin 3) to submit to the Mongols (KS 130. 9b; KSC 16. 4a-b). Sukch'ang subsequently served Sartaq and brought his demands to the Koryô authorities (KSC 16. 10a).

The Mongol forces seem to have divided. One group apparently going north to attack Sakchu and the other following the course of the Yalu downstream 4). When the first detachments of this second force arrived at Chôngju 5), the District Commandant 6) Kim Kyŏnson 7) led a twelve-man death squad out to meet them. But as fresh Mongol troops continued to pour in, the people abandoned the city and scattered to hide. When Kyŏnson and his men returned, they found the city completely deserted. Taking his men into the mountains, Kyŏnson struck out for the centrally located stronghold of Kuju where forces from Sakchu, Wiju, and T'aeju 8) were later to rendezvous. Travelling at night and eating without a fire, they managed to reach Kuju in seven days (KS 130. 23a-26a).

From Chǒngju the Mongol forces appear to have proceeded to Inju where the commander, toryŏng 9), Hong Pogwŏn 10), submitted the area (KS 130. 3b; YKC 3a) with 1,500 registered households (YKC 5a). Pogwŏn, one of the more infamous of Koryô's many deserters, joined the Mongol forces and acted as a guide for subsequent Mongol attacks (KS 130. 4a-b). Arriving at Ch'ŏlchu 11), the Mongols took Mun Tae 12) a military officer of the rank of Colonel, nanjang, who was captured in Sŏch'ang-nyŏn 瑞昌縣, and led him beneath
the city walls where he was instructed to call out to the people that genuine Mongol forces had arrived and that the city should speedily submit. Mun defiantly shouted: "[They are] not really Mongol troops." The Mongols were going to behead him but as the city did not submit, they tried again, and once more Mun shouted that they were not really Mongol troops, for which he was beheaded. The Mongols quickly launched an attack on the city but it was to prove an empty victory. As the provisions ran out and the city appeared doomed, the Administrator, a certain Yi Huijok, assembled all the women and children of the city, put them in the granary and then set fire to it. Then he led the male adults in cutting their own throats (KS 23. 1a; KS 121. 11b-12a; KS 130. 10a; KSC 16. 4b).

Appraised of events, the ministers of the second rank and above, chesa-sang, met at Ch'oe U's residence four days later to call up Koryo's Three Armies and to make levies on the provinces for troops (KS 23. 1a-b), although they were uncertain whether or not the invaders were really Mongol soldiers or simply Jürčen forces disguised in Mongolian clothing.

One Mongol force remained in the northwest, making an initial and unsuccessful attempt to take the walled-city of Kuju (KS 23. 1b) and then turning on cities they had by-passed like Yongju which fell on the 20th day (October 17) and Sonju and Kwakchu both of which fell on (October 29) the 29th day of the ninth month (KS 23. 1b; KSC 16. 6b; KSC 16. 7a). A second force advanced rapidly down the peninsula attacking, then bypassing Chaju (KS 103. 30a) and the Western Capital (KS 23. 1b) after encountering stiff resistance. Continuing southward they easily overran Hwangju and Pontju whose inhabitants fled to coastal islands (KS 23. 1b). At Pontju they had arrived at the first of the great natural barriers, namely, Chabi Pass east of Pontju, the gateway to central Korea, to Kaegyong and the valley of the Han.

In calling out her own forces, Koryo had received some unexpected assistance from Yü-ke-hsia, whom they referred to as the 'petty brigand of Masan' (cf. KS 103. 32a-36a; Masan was in the Yalu River area, near Üiju). He offered Ch'oe U five thousand picked soldiers (KS 129. 37a; KSC 16. 6a-b) and these were incorporated into the Koryo army (cf. KS 103. 36a-b). Encouraged, Ch'oe U even sent men to a bandit camp at Mt. Kwanak for near Kwangju for men. Five bandit leaders came forward with fifty picked men who were also put into the Koryo army (KS 129. 37a-b). In brief, the forces being sent against the Mongols included Chin and Koryo soldiers; P'u-hsien Wan-nu's forces were also fighting the Mongols but I have found no evidence that he lent a hand at this time.

Koryo's Three Armies, under the command of General Yi Chasöng, 20)
departed the Koryŏ capital on the ninth day of the ninth month (October 6, 1231) (KS 23. 1b). Their progress was slow and after twelve days, they had arrived at the Tongsŏn poststation 21) (KS 103. 36a-39a). At sunset a dispatch bearer arrived and reported no signs of the enemy and so Chasŏng allowed his men to relax. They removed their saddles and were resting when some men who had climbed a height shouted: "The Mongols are arriving!" A force of some eight thousand Mongol soldiers suddenly appeared. Chasŏng with a certain General No T'an and a few others fought valiantly to save the situation. Chasŏng was hit by an arrow and General No was plucked from his horse by a long lance in the fighting and both barely managed to escape with the aid of some of their men. Slowly the Koryŏ forces assembled and began to repulse the surprise attack. When the Mongols launched an attack on the right flank, they met stubborn resistance. Two crack archers of the petty brigand of Masan (= Yü-ke-hsia) proved their worth — at each pull of the bowstring a Mongol soldier fell. The Mongol forces then withdrew (KS 103. 36a-39a).

As the Koryŏ army continued northward toward the walled-city of Anbuk where the Northern Defense Command was headquartered, the Mongol advance force sent two envoys with a dispatch to P'yŏngju (KS 23. 1b-2a), a city about equi-distant from the Koryŏ capital of Kaegyŏng and Chabi Pass. The envoys were imprisoned at P'yŏngju and then forwarded to the capital. One was a Mongol and the other a Jürčen, and from this, the Koryŏ records inform us, "our nation first believed that they were Mongol forces" (KS 23. 2a).

The missive delivered by the envoys informed the Koryŏ authorities: "Of those who submitted when we arrived at Hamsin-chin, none were slain. If your nation does not submit we will, in the end, not go back. If you submit then we will turn and go toward the Eastern Jürčen" (KS 23. 1b-2a; KSC 16. 7a).

In the northwest, a second assault with catapults was made on Kuju and although, we are told, the city walls were smashed in over two hundred places, they were speedily repaired and the attack did not carry (KS 23. 2a). A week later as a third assault on Kuju was in progress, the Koryŏ army arrived to camp at the walled-city of Anbuk where a pitched battle ended in the complete defeat of the Koryŏ forces (KS 23. 2a-b; KSC 16. 7b-8a) who then sent Min Hŭi 22), an officer of the Regional Censorate, pundae ðsa 23), of the North(western) Frontier-District to the Mongol camp (cf. KS 23. 3a; KSC 16. 8a). Sartaq received him, seated in a felt tent decorated with multi-colored silk damask and embroidery and with women lined up on each side and told him the Mongol attitude precisely and bluntly: "If your country is going to
fight defensively, then defend yourselves; if you are going to submit, then submit; if you are going to face us in battle, then face us in battle. Let it be decided quickly!" (KS 23. 3a; also see YKC 3a. 7).

Min returned to the Koryŏ capital on the fifth day of the eleventh month (Nov. 30) with Sartaq's message. The Koryŏ answer was to increase their forces (KS 23. 3a). With this, the Mongols opened their second drive south by taking the city of P'yŏngju whose inhabitants were slaughtered and the city razed in revenge for imprisoning the Mongol envoys sent previously (KS 23. 3a-b). Then they advanced on Kaegyŏng. On the 29th day of the eleventh month (Dec. 23) the capital feared the worst. Marshal P'u-t'ao 蒲桃 was encamped at Kūmgyo, Marshal Ti-chū 迪巨 had camped at Osan and Marshal Tanqut 唐古 had camped at P'ori 24), while the Mongol advance force had reached the Yesŏng River a few miles from the capital, burning dwellings and slaughtering the people in the surrounding countryside (KS 23. 3a-b; YKC 3a). Ch'oe U immediately gathered his house troops for his own protection, leaving the defense of the capital to the old and weak, it is said (KS 129. 37a-b; KSC 16. 9a). But the onslaught of the preceding months had been too much. Now, in the last of the eleventh month (late December) of 1231, the capital itself was surrounded and defeat was too near. A respite was desperately needed and so a second mission led by Min Hŭi and Senior Palace Attendant 25), Song Kukch'ŏm 26) were sent to sue for peace and console the Mongol troops with gifts (KS 23. 3b-4a; KS 129. 37a-b; KSC 16. 9a-b). Sartaq, who was then garrisoned at the Northern Defense Command's headquarters in the walled-city of Anbuk, also sent messengers to the Koryŏ capital with a dispatch which upbraided Koryŏ and reminded them that following the defeat of the Black Ch'i-tan 27) who invaded Koryŏ in the Year of the Rat (1216), Koryŏ had submitted. The basic charges set forth were the killing of the Mongol envoy Chu-ku-yū in 1225 28) and the treatment meted out to the envoy A-t'u 蒼 who had been imprisoned at P'yŏngju. Submission was demanded under threat of seizing the capital and with a promise to spare those who submitted and slay those who did not (KS 23. 3b-5b; TYS 28. 4a-5a).

As an opening move, Koryŏ sent gifts to the three Mongol Marshals camped near the capital (KS 23. 5b). Sartaq had sent Hong Pogwŏn to the Koryŏ capital with instructions for the King (YKC 3a) and Koryŏ, in turn, sent Chŏng 29), the Duke 30) of Hoean, to effect the peace and convey gifts to Sartaq (KS 23. 5b; YKC 3a). This was to be the official submission and marked the de jure surrender of Koryŏ's Three Armies as well (cf. KS 103. 30a-b).

The opening of negotiations in the last month of 1231 (Dec. 25, 1231 - Jan. 23, 1232), however, did not mean an end to the fighting. The Mongol forces again turned to cities they had by-passed and successively attacked

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Kwangju, Ch'ungju 忠州, and Ch'ongju 清州 (KS 23. 5b; KSC 16. 9b). In the northwest, Ch'on Kan, the Deputy Commissioner of Hamsin-chin, had hatched a plot to kill a certain Hsiao-wei-sheng 小尾生 and other Mongols who had been left in charge of the city, and then to flee in boats to the capital. The plan miscarried and Hsiao-wei-sheng fled, but the other Mongols in the city were killed. Then Ch'on led the functionaries and people of the city to Sin Island 新島 (KSC 16. 7a-b). Although Chaju also held out, the fiercest fighting took place at Ch'ungju in the south (KS 103. 36a-39a) and Kuju in the northwest. The story of the defense of Kuju, which has become a classic in Korean histories, is told in the biographies of Pak Sŏ 31) and Kim Kyŏngson.

The city of Kuju was under the command of Pak Sŏ, the Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northwest Frontier-District. Forces from many of the surrounding cities had fled to Kuju to make a stand, possibly remembering the city as the location where a decisive victory had been won over the Liao armies in 1018 32). These forces were quickly employed in the defense of the city. A certain Kim Chungon 金仲溫, the District Commandant 33) of Sakchu, who had abandoned his city and gone to Kuju, was given the task of defending the eastern and western walls of the city and Kim Kyŏngson was to defend the southern section. The Defense Command patrol, pyŏlch'o 34), Wiju patrol, and the T'aeju patrol provided an additional 250 men who were divided to help defend three sides of the city 35).

"[When] the Mongols arrived [with a] large [force] at the south gate of the city, Kyŏngson leading [his] twelve soldiers as well as the patrols of all the cities, ordered the soldiers as they were going out of the city gate: 'Do not think of your own lives; if fate decrees, die, but do not fall back'. The patrols all threw themselves on the ground and [would] not obey. Kyŏngson ordered them all to go back into the city and [then] with only his twelve soldiers he advanced into battle. [Kim] himself shot an arrow and knocked down one mounted soldier [who rode] with a black flag in the vanguard [of the Mongol force]. Consequently, [Kim's] twelve soldiers [were encouraged] and fought strenuously. Hit by an arrow, Kyŏngson's arm was dripping wet with blood. Still he pressed his men forward without stopping. [Battle] was joined four or five times and the Mongols [finally] withdrew. Kyŏngson then formed his lines and called his small group to return 36). [Pak] Sŏ met him and saluted, crying. Kyŏngson also saluted with tears in his eyes. From this [episode], [Pak] Sŏ commissioned Kyŏngson [to handle] matters [pertaining to] the defense of the city" (KS 103. 26a-29a).

"The Mongol forces surrounded the city attacking the west, south, and north gates of the city repeatedly and heavily. The [defending] Army of the
Center suddenly went out and attacked them. The Mongol soldiers captured Pak Munch'ang, the Deputy Commissioner, pusa, of Wiju, and ordered him to go [back] into the city and instruct them to submit. [Pak] Sŏ beheaded him. [Then] the Mongols selected three hundred of their finest cavalry and attacked the north gate. [Pak] Sŏ [counter]attacked and drove them off. The Mongols besieged the city, attacking day and night. They loaded carts with grass and wood to turn over [by the gates] as they advanced to the attack. Kyŏngson used catapults [hurling] molten iron to get rid of them. The Mongols [next] constructed towers as well as a great platform which they wrapped with cowhide and hid soldiers inside to undermine the base of the city walls by excavating a tunnel. [Pak] Sŏ bored [thru] the city wall and poured molten iron [on them] to set fire to the tower. The ground also collapsed, crushing more than thirty of the Mongol soldiers to death. [Pak] Sŏ also burnt useless [bundles] of thatch in order to set fire to the wooden platform. The Mongols were bewildered and scattered" (KS 103. 23a-26a).

"The Mongols then attacked the south wall of the city with fifteen large catapults very quickly. [Pak] Sŏ also constructed platforms on the city walls and mounting catapults [on them] he hurled stones and drove [the attackers] off. The Mongols soaked faggots with human fat 37, accumulated many of them, [then] attacked the city with fire. [When Pak] Sŏ [tried] to put them out with water, the fire burned more [fiercely]. He had [his men] mix mud of earth and water and throwing it [on the fires] extinguished them. The Mongols also set fire to carts loaded with grass and attacked the towers over the city gates. [Pak] Sŏ had stored water on top of the towers beforehand and [they] poured it on [the fire-carts]. The flames were then extinguished" (KS 103. 23a-26a).

"[After] firing accumulated brush [near the wooden gates], the Mongol troops retired, [then] returned to the assault. Kyŏngson leaned against a 'light chair', husang 床 (lit. 'foreign bed'), to direct the fighting. A [Mongol] catapult [slung a missile] across [the wall] and it hit directly behind Kyŏngson, smashing and breaking the heads and bodies of the guards, ajol 術卒. Everyone begged [Kyŏngson] to move the chair. Kyŏngson told them: 'That would not be proper. If I am moving, then the hearts of all the soldiers will move [also]'. The expression on his face was quite normal and, in the end, he did not move" (KS 103. 26a-29a).

"For thirty days 38 the Mongols besieged the city, attacking it hundreds of times. [But] whenever [they attacked], [Pak] Sŏ would adapt himself to the occasion in order to defend the city. Unsuccessful, the Mongols withdrew [but] bringing soldiers from the cities of the Northern Frontier-District, they returned to the assault. They set up thirty catapults in a line and attacked,
breaching the wall in fifty places. [Pak] Sŏ, as soon as [the walls] were smashed, chained iron bands [across the holes] and repaired them. The Mongols did not dare renew the assault. [Pak] Sŏ came out to do battle and won a great victory.

"[In the twelfth month], the Mongols attacked with large catapults again. [Pak] Sŏ also fired catapults, flinging rocks and killing them in endless numbers. The Mongols withdrew and camped in a wooden pallisade in order to defend [themselves]. Sartaq sent the Koryŏ interpreter Chi Ûisim and the Recorder of the Academy, hang nok 39), Kang Uch'ang with a dispatch from Chŏng, the Duke of Hoean, to instruct them to submit. [Pak] persevered and did not submit.

"The Mongols then built scaling ladders, unje 雲梯, and assaulted the city. [Pak] Sŏ met and attacked them with 'large implements for slashing', tae up'o 40) 大於浦. There were none which were not smashed and the ladders could not approach. During the siege, an old Mongol general of seventy years of age toured beneath the city walls to look over the city ramparts and equipment. He sighed and said: 'I have followed the army since I bound my hair [into plaits as a youth] and so I am accustomed to seeing the cities of the earth attacked and fought over. Still I have never seen [a city] undergo an attack like this which did not, in the end, submit!'" (KS 103. 23a-26a).

"The Mongols said: 'This city has withstood many with few. Heaven protects it, not the strength of men.' Then they lifted the siege and left" (KS 103. 26a-29a).

Although Koryŏ had formally submitted, the garrisons at Kuju and Chaju still held out. Song Kukch'ŏm had been sent to instruct the garrison at Chaju, which was commanded by the Deputy Commissioner, pusa, of Chaju, Ch'oe Ch'unmyŏng 41), to surrender but Ch'unmyŏng simply closed the city gates in his face. Kukch'ŏm could only curse him and return to the capital. In 1232, following the submission of Koryŏ's Three Armies, Sartaq brought this to the attention of Chŏng, the Duke of Hoean, who sent General Tae Chipsŏng 42) with a Mongol official to bring about the submission of the city. Arriving beneath the city-walls they informed them that 'The Court as well as the Three Armies have already submitted. You should speedily come out and submit.' Ch'unmyŏng, sitting in the gate-tower, had men answer them saying, "[Since] an edict from the Court has not yet arrived, how can we trust you and submit?" Chipsŏng replied, "The Duke of Hoean has already come to request that you submit. Since the Three Armies have also submitted is this [order] unbelievable?"

Ch'unmyŏng's men answered, "The people in the city do not [even] know that a Duke of Hoean exists!"
The Mongol functionary then charged Chipsŏng to enter the city but they were driven off by a hail of arrows (KS 103. 30a-32a).

At about this same time, Min Hŭi was sent with some Mongol functionaries to bring about the submission of Kuju. This group also stopped outside the city and informed the defenders that Koryŏ's Three Armies had already submitted and that the Duke of Hoean had been sent to negotiate peace. Despite endless argument, Pak Sŏ, the commander of Kuju, refused to submit. Min Hŭi became so exasperated that he wanted to draw his sword and kill Pak himself. Finally, after he was convinced that further resistance would be going contrary to the King's commands, Pak gave in and the city submitted (KS 103. 23a-26a).

While Kuju and Chaju finally submitted following the surrender of the Koryŏ authorities, their defenders, Pak Sŏ and Ch'oe Ch'unmyŏng were almost executed for their stubborn resistance as both the Court and Ch'oe U feared the Mongols' anger. Yet they were spared by the Mongols who admired their courage and subsequently, they were lauded by both Mongols and the Koryŏ authorities. The Mongol attitude was stated eloquently by a Mongol functionary at the Western Capital where Ch'oe Ch'unmyŏng was being held for execution. "Although he went contrary to our orders," the Mongol functionary said, "he is a loyal subject of yours. We are not going to kill him now that you have already pledged peace with us. Would it be proper [for you] to kill the loyal subjects of all [your] cities?" (KS 103. 30a-32a; also see KS 103. 23a-26a).

Despite the isolated fighting, Koryŏ had in fact submitted. Sartaq had sent Koryŏ General Cho Sukch'ang with nine Mongols to transmit a missive to Koryŏ which demanded enormous amounts of goods. Alluding to goods previously sent by Ch'oe U whom they referred to as yŏnggong ᆀ hoặc Great Minister 43), they demanded good gold and silver, pearls, and otter skins. Then, telling Koryŏ that their army was many days from home, they demanded 10,000 small horses, 10,000 large horses, 10,000 bolts (†'il) of purple gauze, 20,000 otter skins and clothing for an army of one million men! As hostages, they demanded the King's sons and grandsons, his daughters, and the offspring of the provincial lords; five hundred boys and five hundred girls were demanded for presentation to the emperor. In addition, each high official was to present a daughter, a thousand girls and a thousand boys were demanded. The Koryŏ Crown Prince was ordered to lead this retinue (KS 23. 5b-7b).

Koryŏ then presented an enormous amount of tribute, including gifts to the Mongol field commanders, but had no intention of sending hostages at this point (KS 23. 7b-8a). Cho Sukch'ang, the Koryŏ rebel, was appointed Grand General to head the tribute mission and given a petition to present to the Emp-
peror, in which Koryô disclaimed responsibility for the slaying of the Mongol envoy in 1225, blaming it instead on the Chin commanders in Liaotung whom they said had often dressed their men in Mongolian clothing and raided the Koryô border towns. The manacing of the Mongol envoy A-t'u at P'yôngju was explained as resulting from ignorance; they could not believe that Mongol forces would attack them since the two nations had been on good terms (KS 23. 8b-9b).

While the Duke of Hoean continued his diplomatic manoeuvres and Mongol delegations continued to appear at the capital (KS 23. 9b-10a; YKC 3b), the Koryô ministers were meeting under Ch'oe U's direction and the first mention of moving the capital was made (KS 23. 10b). At this point, the course to take was still undecided and negotiations continued (KS 23. 11a-b).

During the previous year (i.e., 1231), Ch'oe U had been advised to transfer the capital to Kanghwa Island by a certain Yun In [ ], the Deputy Commissioner of Sûngch'on-pu [天府], who had, with a colleague, secretly sent his family and servants to the island when the Mongol forces threatened the capital. Ch'oe sent men to inspect the island but enroute they were seized by the Mongols (KS 129. 37a-b). Ch'oe however retained the idea; he even considered the feasibility of going to distant Ullûng Island in the Sea of Japan (KS 129. 40a). In the fifth month (May 22 - June 19) of 1232, a meeting of the chief ministers, chaech'u, to discuss resistance to the Mongols was held 44 and shortly thereafter, Ch'oe assembled all the officials of the fourth rank and above (KS 23. 13b) at his residence to suggest that the capital be transferred to Kanghwa (KS 129. 37a-b). While many of the officials favored defending the capital (KS 23. 13b), suggesting that refuge on Kanghwa was not feasible as a long-range plan (KS 102. 6a ff), "...yet they were afraid of [Ch'oe] U and no one dared utter a word [in opposition] ... Commander, chiyû 45, Kim Sech'ung 46 of the Night Patrol, ya pyôlch'o 47, pushed open the door [to the council meeting] and entering, told U sharply, 'The successive generations have held Songgyông ¹》，(i.e., Kaegyông) since T'aedo 48 for all of two hundred years (sic). The walls of the city are strong and the soldiers' provisions are sufficient. Assuredly we should combine [all] our forces and defend it in order to protect the fatherland, sajik 社稷 (lit. altars of the earth and grain). How can we abandon the capital?'" (KSC 16. 15a-b; also see KS 129. 37a-b; TT 31. 48. 15-49. 3) Ch'oe then asked Kim for his plans to defend the city but Kim, who had apparently spoken in a moment of rash bravado, was unable to reply. General Tae Chipsông, Ch'oe U's father-in-law 49, told Ch'oe that Kim's advice was the prattle of a young girl and he wanted to take Kim out and behead him. Others at the council meeting supported the idea and Kim was executed (KSC 16. 15b-16a).
Supported by General Tae, who also favored moving the capital (KSC 16. 15a), Ch'oe U was able to push through his plan to transfer the capital to Kanghwa Island (KS 23. 13b-14a) 50). Ch'oe U then advised the King to leave the palace quickly and go to Kanghwa. Hundreds of carts and wagons were seized to transport Ch'oe's household goods to Kanghwa. Notices were posted in the city setting the date for the people of the city's five wards to move to the island and threatening those who did not meet the schedule with judgement by military law 51). Commissioners were then sent to each province to evacuate the people to mountain citadels of refuge, sansŏng, and coastal islands. An army of two thousand men, iryŏnggun, was levied to begin construction of palaces on Kanghwa (KSC 16. 16a) 52).

In the spring of 1232, the bulk of the Mongol troops had departed (KS 23. 9b) 53). Martial law was lifted in the Koryŏ capital (KS 23. 10a) and, excluding a quickly quelled slave rebellion at Ch'ungju 54) (KSC 16. 11a-12a), a measure of peace was seen on the peninsula.

While by the third month (March 24 - April 21) of 1232, the Mongol army had withdrawn — a small detachment returned to get provisions from the Sŏnju granary (KS 23. 11b-12a) — the Mongols did not simply abandon their gains but endeavored to put them on a more permanent basis by establishing dara’yachi or residence commissioners, chiefly in the northwest (YKC 3a; YS 154. 1b).

Care was maintained during this time to remain on good terms with the Mongols while meeting as few of their demands as possible. Cho Sukch'ang had been sent in the fourth month (April 22 - May 19) of 1232 with a petition pledging Koryŏ's vassalage and with a variety of gifts for the throne, for Sartaq and for the sixteen functionaries under Sartaq's command. The petition stated, in brief, that they were able to present only 977 otter skins (of the 1000 demanded), since they had previously had no experienced trappers. Unfortunately, the petition declared, hostages could not, for a variety of reasons, be produced (KS 23. 12a-13b; TYSC 28. 7b-9a).

Although Koryŏ was familiar enough with the ancient system of tribute and hostages, the Mongols were a new experience and their demands were of a different character than Koryŏ had previously encountered. For the Mongols regarded everything and everyone in a conquered nation as absolute chattels, a concept which differs considerably from the Chinese-oriented system with which Koryŏ was accustomed. The demands seemed endless: goods, hostages, 'transplanting' of farming families, armies of men, ships, etc. (KS 23; TYSC 28) 55). The hand-writing was on the wall, but preparations had been made.

On the first day of the seventh month (July 20) of 1232, Kim In'gyŏng was appointed to garrison and defend Kaegyŏng with 8000 soldiers, p'allyŏng, un-
der his command (KS 23. 14a-b). The transfer was then implemented; the King proceeded to Sungch’ŏn-pu, a major departure point on the mainland opposite Kanghwa, and then to the island where he was lodged in a hostel, kaekkwun, mute testimony to the abruptness with which the decision to move was implemented 56).

With the move to Kanghwa, an attempt to eliminate Mongol control on the mainland was made; the daruyacı or resident commissioners set up by the Mongols were killed (YKC 3b; YS 208. 3a; KS 23. 14b-15a).

A particular pertinent matter at this point is the question of the establishment of Mongol control on the peninsula and the attempts by Koryŏ to eliminate this control. The Yiuan Kao-li chi-shih remarks briefly: "In the third year of T’ai-tsong 太宗 (= 1231) we conquered them and Wang Ch’ol (= Kojong) again submitted. Seventy-two daruyacı or resident commissioners were placed in the hyŏn of the capital prefecture to supervise them and the army was withdrawn. The following year they killed all [of the officials] of the offices which the Court had established and rebelled [seeking] refuge on islands in the sea" (YKC 1a; see also YS 154. 1b; YS 59. 5a). In another entry dated in late 1231, we read that following Sartaq’s first attack and the Koryŏ submission, "subsequently, they established seventy-two daruyacı or resident commissioners in the capital as well as all the chu and hyŏn administrations to remain and govern [them], then they withdrew the army" (YKC 3a). A further entry reads, "In the sixth month (June 20 - July 19, 1232), the nation (= Koryŏ) rebelled, killed the daruyacı of each hyŏn and led the people of the capital as well as all the chu and hyŏn administrations and fled to the islands of the sea to offer resistance" (YKC 3b; also see YS 2. 3a; YS 154. 1b).

There has been some hesitation in accepting this account due to a brief commentary written by the Koryŏ historian-statesman-poet Yi Chehyŏn 李華賢 (1288-1367) 57 on the Kao-li section of the 880 + 14 ch’iian Ching-shih ta-tien 經世大典 of 1329-31. Now, according to the notice by Wang Kuo-wei 王國維 (1877-1927), the Yiuan Kao-li chi-shih was extracted by Wen Yen-shih 文廷式 (1856-1904) 58 from the Yung-lo ta-tien 永樂大典 of 1403-07, into which it had been copied from the Ching-shih ta-tien. It should also be mentioned that, as has already been pointed out by H. Franke 59; the Kao-li ch’uan 高麗傳 of the Yiuan shih (YS 208) is little more than a summary of the material contained in the Yiuan Kao-li chi-shih, which is to say that both were based on the Kao-li section of the Ching-shih ta-tien. Thus, Yi Chehyŏn’s critical remarks apply equally to all pertinent portions of the three works. The major points Yi makes may be briefly set forth as follows: Were these daruyacı established in their posts by order of the Yiuan Court or were they established by the military commanders? The
area concerned, viz., the capital prefecture, is small for such a large number of officials. And, as the daruṣači are not unimportant persons why were their names not recorded? Further, no details are given of the establishment of these posts nor of the subsequent slaying of the officials. The national history of Koryŏ does not mention them and so, Yi informs us, he asked surviving elders about the matter but there were none who knew. Yi's belief is that it was a false accusation used as a pretext for an invasion, i.e., they were not established and they were, consequently, not slain (IC sólchón 说 1.6b-8a). 60

Unfortunately, the evidence, drawn from the Koryŏ-sa itself goes against Yi Chehyŏn's views. The Korean historian Yi Pyŏngdo has drawn the conclusion that "... while there is no doubt that daruṣači were stationed in the Western Capital and its subordinate districts, it is unclear whether the number was seventy-two". It is known that in the fifth month (May 22 - June 19) of 1232, four daruṣači were stationed in the Koryŏ northwest (KS 23. 13b-14a). And, at the time of the transfer of the capital, the Koryŏ authorities sent a man to seize the weapons of the daruṣači in the various cities of the Northern Frontier-District (KS 23. 14b). It is also known that there was a daruṣači stationed in the Western Capital in the eighth month (August 18 - Sept. 15) of 1232, and that an attempt was made to kill him (KS 23. 14b-15a). Further, a Koryŏ missive dated the second month (Feb. 23 - March 23) of 1232 refers to daruṣači being stationed 萬 萬 (=? 萬 万) in the border cities and in the capital where they were being well treated (TYSC 28. 5b-6a). Again, another Koryŏ missive answers the Mongol charge of killing and detaining them in the ninth month (Sept. 16 - Oct. 15) of 1232 (TYSC 28. 10b-12a). Further, in the second month (Feb. 23 - March 23) of 1232, the Mongol envoy Tu-tan 都旦, a Ch'ŏl-tan who had been with the Mongol forces at Kangdong in 1218, himself told the Koryŏ monarch that he was in complete charge of Koryŏ's affairs (KS 23. 10b). It is also known that in the last months of 1231, the people of the following cities fled to islands to escape the Mongol attack in the northwest: Sŏnju (TYS 53. 34a-b), Ch'angju (TYS 53. 25a), Unju (TYS 54. 8a), Pakch'ŏ (TYS 54. 12a), Kaju (TYS 52. 32b), Kwakch'ŏ (TYS 53. 37b), Maengch'ŏ (TYS 55. 9b), T'aeju (TYS 54. 14a), and Ŭnju (TYS 55. 13b), all cities located in the northwest. There were, further, at least two Koreans of importance serving the Mongols, namely, Hong Pogwon (who submitted the city of Inju) and Cho Sukch'ang (who submitted the city of Hamsin-chin = Êiju) as has already been pointed out. The evidence from the Koryŏ records alone is overwhelming and we must reject Yi Chehyŏn's view.

There is one other consideration which seems to support the Ching-shih ta-tien account. During the late Koryŏ period, as a result of a demand from
the Yüan to submit an account of each reign, abbreviated chronological ac-
counts of the history of Koryo were compiled. For example, the *Ponjo p'yón-
nyon kangmok* 本朝編年綱目 in 42 kwôn compiled by Min Chi 閔
(1248-1326; BTKP 80. 755) and the *Sedaе p'yónnyon chöryo* 世代編年
事業 in 7 kwôn compiled by Min Chi and Kwón Pu 樑溥 (1262-1346; 
BTKP 77. 732). The original demand dates to 1278 (KS 29. 36b) and, in 1307, 
the entire Koryo Veritable Records, *silkok* 實錄, in 185 kwôn were sent to 
the Yüan court in Ta-tu 大都 (KS 32. 32b-33a); five years later, in 1312, 
they were returned. It would certainly seem then, that the Yüan historiograph-
ical bureau was well informed on matters pertaining to Koryo just prior to the 
compilation of the *Ching-shih ta-tien* while Yi Chehyǒn would not have had access 
to the Yüan records 62).

Thus, I believe we may not only accept the account of the *Ching-shih ta-
tien* (viz., as incorporated in the *Yüan Kao-li chi-shih* but may further clarify 
the area which these officials controlled, namely, from the Western Capital 
north to the Yalu comprising all of the present North P'yǒngan Province and 
a large portion of the present South P'yǒngan Province.

The establishment of officials by the Mongols in the cities of the north-
west was not to go without opposition by Koryo. The Koryo rebels serving the 
Mongols whom the Koryo authorities had been forced to accept and often to 
reward were not to be ignored either. The most important Koryo city the 
Mongols held was the Western Capital which had been left under the control of 
Hong Pogwǒn with the withdrawal of the Mongol army in late 1232. Shortly 
after the transfer of the capital from Kaegyǒng to Kanghwa Island, in the 
eighth month (Aug. 18 - Sept. 15) of 1232, the Civil Governor, *sunmusa* 巡 
撫使, Grand General Min Hǔi and Office Recorder, *sarok* 司録, Ch'oe 
Chaon 翟滋溫 and others intrigued to kill the daruʒǎi. The people of the 
Western Capital learned of this and said: "If they do so, then [the people of] 
our Capital will certainly be exterminated by the Mongols like P'yǒngju."

Thereupon, they revolted. Ch'oe Chaon was seized and imprisoned while the 
members of all other government offices in the Western Capital fled to Chǒ 
Island  expectedResult (KS 23. 14b-15a).

With this, Hong Pogwǒn, the Koryo rebel serving the Mongols, assembled 
the lost and scattered people of some forty chu and hyǒn districts and awaited 
the arrival of Mongol forces (YKS 3b; YS 154. 1b). The Koryo authorities had, 
in accordance with the theories in which natural phenomena were linked with 
the destinies of the nation (i.e., *ohaeng*五行 or the theory of the five ele-
ments), made careful note of unusual natural phenomena. Among the more 
foreboding signs, in the fourth month of 1232, it was reported from the nor-
thern districts, that many of the bears were leaving the mountains and fleeing 
to the coastal islands! (KS 54. 36a)
Sartaq's second attack which opened in the eighth month (Aug. 18 - Sept. 15) of 1232 (YKC 3b; YS 154. 1b), swept southward into the valley of the Han with comparative ease. Then a deus ex machina solution was provided. In an attack on Ch'öin-söng 63), Sartaq was struck and killed by a chance arrow from the bow of Kim Yunhu 64), a Buddhist monk who had fled to the stronghold and who, if we may believe his own story, was unarmed when the fighting began (KS 23. 25b; KS 103. 39b-40a) 65). With the death of Sartaq, T'ieh-ke huo-erh-ch'ih 66) 鉄哥火里赤 led the army in withdrawing from Koryô, leaving Hong Pogwôn at the Western Capital (KS 130. 3-4) to supervise those locations whose submission had already been obtained (YKC 3b; YS 208. 3a; YS 154. 1b).

The first Koryô effort to eliminate Mongol control in the northwest had failed.

While the Mongol forces rode over the peninsula in 1231-32, a steady stream of correspondence was maintained, and continued even after the flight of the Koryô authorities to the safety of Kanghwa island. The documents (YKC; KS 23; YSC 28; KSC 16) are too lengthy and too repetitive to be given in full, yet a brief summary of the main points is in order.

An early Mongol charge was the slaying of the envoy Chu-ku-yü (KS 23. 4a-5b); in a reply dated the 29th day of the twelfth month of 1231 (= 29 Jan., 1232), Koryô blamed this on the raids of neighboring peoples, saying that Ke-pu-ai 66) 高不鬼 had been disguising men in Mongolian clothing and raiding Koryô border cities and implying that they suspected him of killing the Mongol (TYSC 28. 4a-5a = KS 23. 8b-9b). In a later reply dated the eleventh month (Nov. 21 - Dec. 20) of 1232, Koryô explained that the envoy had come by way of P'o-su-lu 速路 and not through the territory controlled by P'u-hsien Wan-nu 67); on the return trip he was slain by Yü-chia-hsia 加 (= Yü-ke-hsia). Yü-chia-hsia, they said, had his men dress in Mongolian clothing and smashed three cities on the Koryô northern border (TYSC 28. 14b-17b = KS 23. 18b-22b).

To this charge the Mongols were in the tenth month of 1232, to add the shooting of the hung-lu-shih 东路使 or 'commissioner of the eastern lu-administration' (KS 23. 20b). Koryô accused P'u-hsien Wan-nu of dressing men in Koryô clothing, arming them with Koryô bows and arrows and of then ambushing a second group of Mongol envoys sent to Koryô in the mountains between the two nations. A certain Wang Hao-fei 王非, they said, had fled from Wan-nu to Koryô and told of the incident in detail. Wan-nu, Koryô said, had also smashed two Koryô cities in the northeast. The Mongols, Koryô maintained, were laying the crimes of Yü-ke-hsia and Wan-nu on Koryô's doorstep (TYSC 28. 14b-17b = KS 23. 18b-22b).

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The Mongols also demanded that Koryó explain the sudden 'about-face', the killing and detention of Mongol resident commissioners, and the transfer of the Koryó capital to Kanghwa. Among the reasons Koryó gave for transferring the capital was that a certain Song Ipchang had fled from the party of Chi Úisim and returned with the news that the Mongols were raising a large force to attack Koryó cities. When the people heard this they were alarmed and fled from the cities. This in turn caused Koryó to fear that they could not produce the annual tribute since the cities were being deserted (TYSC 28.10b-12a = KS 23.15a-16b; TYSC 28.14b-17b = KS 23.18b-22b). Song had been exiled to a distant island for his false statements, they explained (TYSC 28.12a-13a = KS 23.16b-17b) and although they had sent for him following a Mongol demand that he be produced, it was feared that he was lost at sea on the return journey for nothing had been heard of the party (TYSC 28.19a-20b = KS 23.23b-24b).

The Koryó general Cho Sukch'ang who had submitted to the Mongols at Úiju in 1231, had been detained by the Koryó authorities and to Mongol demands to produce him, they explained that, unfortunately, General Cho had fallen ill after returning from the Mongols and was still sick in bed (TYSC 28.12a-13a = KS 23.16b-17b; TYSC 28.19a-20b = KS 23.23b-24b).

A census had also been demanded, as well as fielding an army against P'u-hsien Wan-nu, neither of which was done by Koryó (TYSC 28.13b-14b = KS 23.17b-18b) although Koryó had furnished ships and seamen (KS 23.11b; KSC 16.13b) in response to Mongol requests to aid in the pacification of Liaotung (TYSC 28.9a) but no action was taken to send either troops or settlers (farming families) into the Liaotung area (TYSC 28.7a-b = KS 23.11a-b).

Nor were hostages forthcoming (TYSC 28.7b-9a = KS 23.12a-b). Mongol instructions for the King, the high officials, and Ch'o'e U to come out were ignored (TYSC 28.12a-13a = KS 23.16b-17b) as were demands for a list of the names and positions of civil and military officials (TYSC 28.9a-10a). Koryó did produce some tribute and, just prior to the killing of Sartaq, begged that the Mongol army be withdrawn with the promise to forever after submit tribute (TYSC 28.14b-17b = KS 23.18b-22b).

Yet in a reply (dated the twelfth month of 1232 = Jan. 12 - Feb. 11, 1233) to an Eastern Jürčen letter, which in effect drew the two nations together in cooperating against the Mongols, Koryó pointed out that they didn't trust the Mongols and that it had not been their original intention to have close relations with the Mongols. Perhaps Koryó was encouraged by the killing of Sartaq, for the letter points out that many Mongol prisoners had been taken at that time (TYSC 28.21b-22b = KS 23.25b-26b). Early in 1233, an effort had also been made to send an envoy to the Chin court, but the envoy was unsuc-
cessful as the roads were blocked and he returned (TYSC 28. 23a-24a; KSC 16. 18a).

This, at any rate, was the general situation when, in the spring of 1233, a Mongol envoy arrived with an edict listing Koryŏ's 'crimes', and we read that:

"On the twenty-fourth day of the fourth month (June 3) of the kuei-ssu 金乙, fifth, year (of the reign of T'ai-tsunง = Ögödei, r. 1229-1245), instructions were given to Wang Ch'ŏl 王敵 (i.e., Koryŏ Kojong) to repent his transgressions and come to Court, in an Imperial Edict which said:"

Your memorial reporting the facts involved was drawn up entirely in false statements and phrases of excuse. How difficult it is to know one from the other. If you were not false, you would come for an audience. From the previous pacification of the Ch'i-tan until the slaying of Cha-la 70) 燕剌 you have not sent a single soul to [Our] gates 71). You have never acted in compliance with the laws and statues of [Our] Great Nation. This is your first offense. And when those who were sent to offer the precepts and instructions of Immortal Heaven summoned you, then you dared to kill [them] 72). This is your second offense. Moreover, with regard to Chu-ku-yü, you plotted to harm him and claimed Wan-nu's people killed him. If you had seized [and turned over to us] the man (Wang Hao-fei) who made the original report, then it would be clear. If Wan-nu had really tried to cause the downfall of your country, [then when] we ordered you to attack Wan-nu, why did you hang back without advancing? This is your third offense. We commanded you 73) to raise an army and, as before, we ordered you to present yourself at Court, but these clear instructions you dared to resist. You did not appear at Court [but] sneaked away to the islands of the sea. This is your fourth offense. Furthermore, [when] we ordered your households to come together and be counted 74), you claimed that if the people left the cities to be counted, they would fear being killed and flee to [the islands of] the sea and that, when you once cooperated in an expedition with the troops of Heaven, your people were enticed to leave the cities under the pretense of being counted and then were wantonly slain 75). Now, you dare to submit false statements to this effect. This is your fifth offense 76). In addition to these offenses, you have been deceitful and evil innumerable times. When we sent you the precepts and instructions of Immortal Heaven, you were not attentive and wished to do battle. But when we, trusting to the powers of Supreme Heaven, attack and smash your cities and villages, there are cases that those who are blind and will not submit are exterminated; yet there are also those who submit and work hard and, whether man or woman, they have never been wantonly slain ..."

The edict continued in pointing out that the officials of ten Koryŏ cities 77),

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including the Western Capital, had already taken a census of their households and were remitting taxes and that all were living peacefully as before. The edict called upon Koryŏ to field an army against P'u-hsien Wan-nu 78) or suffer the consequences, and it called upon the Koryŏ Court to obey the 'precepts and instructions of Immortal Heaven'.

The Koryŏ answer was to be a renewed offensive aimed particularly at ousting Hong Pogwŏn from the Western Capital which, as the edict quoted above indicates, was still under Mongol control in the fourth month (May 11 - June 9) of 1233 (YKC 4a).

The following month 79), what the Koryŏ records term a 'revolt' broke out in the Western Capital. P'il Hyŏnbo 80), Hong Pogwŏn and others killed the Pacification Commissioners 81), Grand Generals Chŏng Ûi 82) and Pak Nokchŏn 83) and rebelled with the whole city (KS 23. 27a; KS 121. 11; KSC 16. 19a-b; CHSL 4. 27b). As the Koryŏ army was in the southeast quelling a revolt in the Eastern Capital, Ch'oe U in the twelfth month of 1233 (= Jan. 2 - Jan. 30, 1234), sent three thousand 84) of his house troops with Min Hŭi who was now Commissioner of Men and Horse of the North(western) Frontier-District to subjugate them. They captured P'il Hyŏnbo and escorted him to the capital where he was cut in two at the waist in the market place. Hong Pogwŏn escaped but they managed to capture his father Hong Taesun, his younger brother Hong Paeksu 洪白壽 as well as his children. The remaining people of the Western Capital were then moved to islands and subsequently, it is related, the Western Capital became a desolate site (KS 23. 27a-b; KSC 16. 19a-b; YS 154. 1b). Two months preceding this attack, Hong Pogwŏn had petitioned the Mongol authorities requesting permission to bring his people into Liaoyang because of attacks first by Koryŏ and later by Ḏurčen and Ch'i-tan forces (YKC 5a). In the spring of 1234, rewards were passed out to the Koryŏ soldiers who had retaken the Western Capital and one Hong Kyun 喜田, a Vice-Minister of the Department of War, was sent to govern the city (KS 23. 27b). The Koryŏ rebel Cho Sukch'ang was beheaded in the marketplace (KS 23. 28a) because, we are told, of something P'il Hyŏnbo had said (KSC 16. 20a), but in reality, he had been held by the Koryŏ authorities since late 1232 on the pretext of illness (cf. TYSC 28. 12a-13a; TYSC 28. 19a-20b).

Hong Pogwŏn had fled northward to Liaotung where he and his people were settled between Liaoyang 遼陽 and Shenyang 畿陽. In 1234, he was placed in command of the army and people of Koryŏ and ordered to subjugate those of Koryŏ who had not yet submitted (KS 130. 3b-5a; YS 154. 2a).

After settling at Tung-ching, Hong Pogwŏn was given control of the north-western portion of Koryŏ (KS 130. 3b-5a; CHSL 4. 27b) 85). At this time a Mongol edict came down instructing the people of Koryŏ that anyone who would
capture and bring to court the Koryô monarch and the instigators of the resistance (i.e., Ch'oe U, et al.), would be placed on an equal footing with Hong Pogwôn and settled in the Tung-ching area. Those who resist will die; those who submit will live, the edict warned (YS 154. 2a; YKC 5b).

This situation concerned the Koryô authorities who, as we have seen, were holding Hong's relatives whom they had captured in the Western Capital earlier. Ch'oe U, in an apparent attempt to placate Hong and win him over, elevated his father to the rank of Grand General and his younger brother to the rank of Colonel, nangjang (KSC 16. 19b), however, they were still held as hostages and were not to obtain their freedom for many years.
Notes to Chapter II

1. The name occurs in several orthographic variants including: sa-li-\textit{t'a} 撒禮塔 (KS 23. 1a; KS 23. 5b; YS 208. 2b); sa-li-\textit{t'a} 撒禮答 (YS 208); sa-li-\textit{t'a} 撒禮打 (KS 23. 4a; TYSC 33. 17b-19a); sa-erh-\textit{t'a-erh} 撒兒塔 (YKC 8b); sha-la 沙打 (KS 23. 16b). In YKC 3a, KS 23. 4a, and YS 120. 15a we find sa-li-\textit{t'a huo-li-ch'ih 火里赤 (YKC writes huo-erh-ch'ih 火兒赤) ).

Yanai Watari 箭内亙, Yüan-tai ching-lüeh tung-pei k'ao, p. 139, suggests Sartai, Sarita, or Saritai. BTKP 99. 935 suggests ?Sarta. I suggest Sarta[q]-qorči. How many persons of note bore the name Sartaq, I do not know. Probably the most famous bearer of the name was Sartaq, the son of Batu. For the reconstruction of his name see L. Hambis, Le Chapitre CVII du Yuan Che, with supplementary notes by P. Pelliot, issued as a supplement to TP XXXVIII, 1945, p. 52 and p. 53 note 2. Also see Huang Ta-hua 黃太華, Yüan fen-fan chu-wang shih-piao 元分藩譜 (Ta-ch'u, No. 3), incorporated in Vol. 6, pp. 8243-8250 of the Erh-shih-wu-shih pu-pien. As W. Barthold, Four Studies on the History of Central Asia (translated by V. and T. Minorsky), 2 vols., Leiden, 1956, Vol. 1, p. 31, has already noted, in Mongolian the word Sartaqtai refers to a "representative of Muslim culture"; -tai is, of course, simply an adjectival ending.

The word qorči means 'archer, quiver-bearer' in Mongolian.

Yet, in the so-called 'Secret History' perhaps better known under its Chinese title Yüan-ch'ao pi-shih 元朝秘史, it is said that Ogödei sent Cha-la-erh-t'ai huo-erh-ch'ih 軍剌亦兒台豁兒赤 (Jalair-tai-qorči) to conquer the Jürčen and the Solongyud. Then a certain Ye-h-su-\textit{tieh-erh huo-erh-ch'ih 也速迭兒豁兒赤 (Yesüder-qorči) was sent to assist him. See (1) 2. 28a-b, Shiratori Kurakichi 白鳥庫吉 Onyaku mōbun genchō hishi 音譯蒙又元朝秘史, Tōyō Bunko, Series C, Vol. VIII, Tōkyō, 1942; for a translation of this brief passage, also see E. Haenisch, Die geheime Geschichte der Mongolen, Leipzig, 1948, p. 139. The Solongyud refer to the Koreans; it is usually said to refer to parts of Manchuria and northern Korea.


Further, CS Vol. 3, No. 3, p. 69, identifies the son of Sa-li-ta as T'a-ch'u 塔出 (Taču), while HYS 249. 2b writes Jalairtai 札剌亦兒台
in lieu of Sa-li-ta. The Ch’ing scholar Ch’ien Ta-hsien (1728-1804; see A. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese . . .*, Vol. 1, pp. 152-4) mentions Jalairtai as "[A man] of the reigns of T’ai-tsu (Jinggis) [through] Hsien-tsung (Mongka); he was a Marshal who conquered Koryo (lit. a conquering-Koryo-marshat)". Cf. Ch’ien Ta-hsien, *Yüan-shih shih-tsu-piao* (元史氏族表, completed in 3 *chian* in 1791), incorporated in Vol. 6, pp. 8297-8392, of the *Erh-shih-wu-shih pu-pien* (二十五史補編), a work in six volumes, K’ai-ming shu-tien (間明書店 ed., 1935; reference is to p. 8301. Ch’ien correctly recorded the brief notice which appears in *YS* 133. 1a, the biography of Tače, Jalairtai’s son. There it is related that Jalairtai served T’ai-tsu. In the *chia-yin* (甲寅) year of the reign of Mongke (1254) he was sent to conquer Koryo. This is supported by *YKC* 9b where his name is given as Cha-la-ta (察剌葛) (I have emended the *tsu* (刺) of the text to read *la*). The Koryo records where his name is usually rendered Ch’e-lo-ta (車羅達), also confirm this and his appearance in Koryo is dealt with at length later.

Juvinai mentions that Ögödei sent an army against the Solongyos (Koreans) twice, but does not mention their commander. Cf. J. A. Boyle, *The History of the World-Conquerer*, Vol. 1, p. 194, and p. 195-196; Boyle also calls attention to the passage from the Secret History cited above and suggests that perhaps it is the expedition to which Juvinai refers.

The account given by the Secret History is then in conflict with the other Yüan and the Koryo records. William Hung, ‘The Transmission of the Book Known as *The Secret History of the Mongols*,’ *HJAS* 14 (1951), pp. 433-492, has noted (p. 450 note 43) that the compilers of the *Ching-shih ta-tien* were not permitted access to the Secret History and, consequently, *YKC* which was drawn from the former could incorporate nothing from the latter.

Yanai, op. cit., pp. 139-144 has discussed at some length the confusion in T’u Chi’s *Meng-wu-erh shih-chi* (蒙元兒史記) biography of Jalairtai and has pointed out that T’u Chi erred because he followed Shen Tseng-chih’s (沈曾植) (1850-1922) explanation in the *Ch’ing-cheng-lu-chu* (親征錄記) to the effect that Jalairtai and Sartaq were the same.

The *CS* identification of Tače as Sartaq’s son is a similar confusion. Yanai, op. cit., p. 141, further suggests that the Jalairtai-qorči mentioned in the Secret History is an error for Sartaq; Yanai also maintains that the Yesuder-qorči mentioned in the Secret History is not mentioned in the Yüan or Koryo records dealing with events in Koryo. In this latter point Yanai is in error and I also disagree with him on the point that for Jalairtai in the Secret History, we should read Sartaq.

The matter of the account in the Secret History is more important than
Yanai suspected. The two events mentioned are related and do not refer to two isolated events separated in time. They refer specifically to events which occurred in Koryó in the reign of Môngke and not of Ögödei. The error in the Secret History is in the 'dating' of the passage, not in the events themselves nor in scribal error in writing a name.

In 1254, the chia-yin 甲寅 year of the reign of Môngke, Jalairtai-qorči was sent to conquer Koryó. He was murdered (lit. 'died violently') in 1259 (cf. KS 24. 42b). In 1259, shortly after this, a certain Yesüder, Yeh-su-ta 也速達 was in charge of affairs in Koryó. Cf. KS 25. 3a-b. He was previously Jalairtai's deputy, viz., Yü-ch'ou-ta 余愁達. Cf. KS 24. 35b.

Before returning to the matter of the Secret History, let me summarize concerning the several individuals who have been confused with each other:

1) in 1218-19, an unidentified Mongol named Cha-la was Deputy Commander of Mongol forces in Koryó and he died sometime prior to 1233;
2) in 1231-32, Sartaq-qorči commanded the Mongol forces in Koryó and he was hit by an arrow in battle and died in the twelfth month of 1232;
3) Jalairtai-qorči commanded the Mongol forces in Koryó in the invasions of the mid-1250's and he was murdered in 1259;
4) Yesüder-qorči was ordered to replace the last named.

With regard to the Secret History, while it is generally believed to have been compiled in 1240, Hung, loc. cit., has suggested that it was compiled in 1264. If we follow Hung's assumption that the Rat year dating of the Secret History applies to the entire ms. (10 + hsü-chi 續集 2 chüan), then the next Rat year following Môngke's 甲寅 year is indeed 1264 and precisely the date Hung postulated. At any rate, one thing is certain, and that is the passage cited above cannot have been written prior to 1254, and was almost certainly written after that date.

After completing this, I learned that Gari Ledyard of Berkeley has also studied the problem and reached the same general conclusions; a bit later I discovered A. Waley's 'Notes on the Yüan-ch'ao pi-shih', B.S.O.S. 23 (1960) which deals with the same problem and reaches a similar conclusion. Both Waley and Ledyard would date the Secret History after 1258.

2. Cho Sukch'ang 趙叔昌 (d. 1234) was the eldest son of Marshal Cho Ch'ung 趙冲 (cf. KS 103. 6b). He submitted to the Mongols in 1231 and subsequently served their forces. Although the Koryó authorities promoted him, clearly as a result of his position with the Mongols, they regarded him as a rebel. Consequently, when Koryó opened a drive to retake their northwest area in 1233, Sukch'ang was taken along with P'il Hyŏnbo 卒賢甫 and, the following year he was beheaded in the market-place (KS
23. 28a). His biography is contained in KS 130. 9b-10a from which the above information has been taken except as indicated. Also see BTKP 9. 39 which, I note, gives his 'highest office' as Grand General, taejanggun, while his biography says that in official office he reached the rank of Supreme General, sangjanggun. Despite this, I believe that BTKP is correct in giving his rank as Grand General. YKC 3b which notes his dispatch to the Mongol court and which gives his name as Cho Sukchang, 趙叔瑋, gives his rank as General, changgun. Yet KS 23. 28a — which BTKP appears to have followed — says simply that in the third month of 1234, Grand General Cho Sukch’ang was beheaded in the market-place. The KSC 16. 10b; 16. 14b; and 16. 20a accounts follow the corresponding KS accounts. It appears that KS 23. 12a is a scribal error which was transmitted to his biography in KS 130. 9b-10a and perpetuated in KSC 16. 14b.

3. Sondok-chin 宣德鎮, also known as Koju 高州, is the present Kowon 高原 in S. Hamgyo Province. For topographical and historical information see TYS 48. 27a-29a.

4. There may have been two forces advancing separately into Korea, one at Uiju and one at Sakchu, but this is conjectural. We know that the Mongol forces attacked Hamsin-chin (= Uiju) (KS 23. 1a); Sakchu, Wiju, T’aeju, and Chongju (KS 103. 23a-26a); Inju (KS 130. 3b); Ch’61chu (KS 23. 1a; KS 121. 11b-12a) and we know by KS 103. 23a-26b, etc., that Mongol forces were still fighting at various border cities while the attack on Kuju was in progress. The evidence suggests the reconstruction I have outlined in this chapter.

5. The city of Chongju 靜州 was located 25 li south of Uiju, 10 li north of Inju and was in the modern N. P’y6ngan Province. For topographical and historical information see TYS 53. 13b.

6. Pundo changgun 分道將軍 or District Commandants were stationed in the northern border cities, but I am unsure of their function.

7. Kim Kyongson 金慶孫 (d. 1251), whose name was formerly Unnae 來, was the son of Kim Taeso 金台瑞 (d. 1257; bio. KS 104; BTKP 67. 651). He entered government service by means of the Yin privilege and rose to prominence in the defense of Kuju with Pak So. Promoted to the rank of Grand General with the post of Director of Affairs of the Censorate, chi-6sadae-sa 知御史事, following the siege of Kuju, he was subsequently, in 1237, appointed to the post of Special Commander, chihwisa 指揮使, of Cholla Province where he was instrumental in crushing a large bandit group led by a certain Yi Yonnyon (Yoll-y6n) 李延年 (d. 1237; BTKP 146. 1341) and his brothers which had been plaguing the Naju 盛州 area. For this feat Kim was appointed
Director of Memorials in the Bureau of Military Affairs, ch'umirwŏn chijusa 極密院 知奏事, and then, after being cleared of plotting to poison Ch'ŏe U, he was transferred to be Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, ch'umirwŏn pusa, 副使. Exiled to Paeg-nyŏng Island 自翎島 when Ch'ŏe Hang took over the government in 1249, he was drowned in 1251 on Ch'oe's orders due to his relationship by marriage to O Sungjok 吴承綸 (d. 1251; BTKP 88. 826) the son by a former husband, of Ch'oe Hang's stepmother who was exterminated by Ch'oe in an act of revenge. Kim had one son Hon 紘 (1239-1311; see KS 103. 29a-30b) who was the paternal first cousin of Queen Kyŏngsun 敬順王后. Kim Kyŏngson's biography is contained in KS 103. 26a-29a and in HY 27. 17b-18a from which the above information has been taken except as noted; also see BTKP 61. 591.

8. The city of T'aeju 泰州 is the present T'aech'on 泰州 in N. P'yŏngan Province. The city of Wiju 汾州 was located in the modern N. P'yŏngan Province about half-way between the modern Pakch'ŏn 北川 and T'aech'on. For topographical and historical information see TYS 54. 14ff and TYS 54. 6a ff for T'aeju and Wiju respectively.

9. I understand the term toryŏng 都領 in the sense of 'commanding officer, officer-in-charge', etc., and have generally rendered it 'commander'. Yet several other possibilities immediately suggest themselves. It may have also been used in the sense of district magistrate analogous with hyŏllyŏng 副領 or Magistrate of a hyŏn. It could refer to a 'commander of one thousand' as a yŏng 領 was a unit of 1,000 men in the Koryŏ military system (cf. KS 81. 1a), and we see that Hong Pogwŏn was a cavalry commander, singi toryŏng (YKC 5a). This would not be inconsistent with the decimal organization of the Koryŏ military which had chiefs of fifty, chiefs of one hundred, and chiefs of one thousand, each of whom were issued a plaque, p'ae 牌, of authority (cf. YKC 15a). Further, in the tenth month of 1172, i.e., the third year of the reign of Myŏngjong, military men were placed in charge "...from the three capitals, kyŏng 京, the four Defense Commands, toho (-pu) 都護 (府), the eight mok 牧 administrations, reaching down to the kun 坑, hyŏn 領, hostels, kwan 宮, and post stations, yŏk 祐..." (KS 19. 22b).

It is interesting to note that a certain Chi Kwangsu is called the chief of the Ch'ungju slave army in KS 129. 37a-b while he is called the toryŏng of this same force in KSC 16. 12a.

Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, appended Chart 5 which deals with the regional military forces, lists one "Senior Colonel In Charge", toryŏng chung-nangjang 都領中郎將, as the chief military officer at the cities
of Anbuk-pu 安北府, Kuju, Sŏngju, Yongju, Ch'ŏngju 静州, and Sukchung 肃州 in the Koryŏ northwest, and a total of 16 toryŏng as the chief officers of various cities in the northeast.

10. Hong Pogwŏn 洪福源 (1206-1258) of Tangsŏng 唐城, had the former name of Pongnyang 弘良. He had gone to live in Inju where his father Hong Taesun 洪大純 was commander, toryŏng. Due to his father's position Pogwŏn was made a cavalry commander, singi toryŏng. In 1218, his father had submitted to the Mongols when the latter were attacking the Ch'i-tan at Kangdongsu. Pogwŏn submitted to the Mongols in 1231, and joined Sartaq in his attack on Koryŏ. After being driven from Koryŏ by Koryŏ forces in 1233, he assembled 1,500 registered households and went north into Liaotung where they were settled between Liaoyang and Shenyang 濱陽. In the summer of 1234 he was bestowed with a golden tally, chin-fu 金符, and given charge of all Koreans who had submitted. He subsequently accompanied the invasions of Koryŏ under Tanqut and A-mo-k'àn. In 1250, he was awarded the tiger tally, hu-fu 虎符, and placed in charge of the people and army of Koryŏ. He subsequently accompanied the invasions of Koryŏ under Yeokу and Jalairtai. Later he sent his son, Hong Tagu 洪茶土, with Jalairtai's forces into Koryŏ. In 1258, he engaged in a bit of black magic which ended in a name-calling bout with Sun, the Duke of Yongnyong, after the latter had been sent to the Mongols as a Koryŏ hostage. Since Sun had joined the Mongols and had married a Mongol princess, it proved disastrous for Hong Pogwŏn when the Emperor (Mongke) heard his daughter's story. When Pogwŏn learned that they were going to inform the Emperor, he converted his goods into money in order to 'bribe' prince Sun and then went to seek the latter, but in the wrong direction. At that moment, he encountered an Imperial messenger — apparently sent by the Emperor — and the Imperial Messenger then ordered several tens of strong men to kick Pogwŏn to death. This was in 1258 and he was then fifty-three. He had seven sons of whom his second son, Hong Tagu, is most well-known. Pogwŏn was later posthumously given the title of Ch'ia-i tai-fu 太夫, Marquis of Shen-yang 靜陽侯, and awarded the posthumous appellation of Ch'ung-hsien 忠憲. For biographical information see YKC; YS 154. 1a-9a; KS 130. 3a-5a; CHSL 4. 33a-b from which the above information has been taken. Succinct accounts are also given in Han'guk-sa sajŏn 韓國史辭典, published by the Tonga ch'ul-p'anusa 東亞出版社, Seoul, 1960, p. 421 and the Togyŏ rekishi daijiten, Vol. 3, 143; also see BTKP 40. 371.

11. The city of Ch'ŏlchu 鐵州 is the modern Ch'ŏlsan 鐵山 in N. P'yŏngan
Province. For topographical and historical information see TYS 53. 18a ff.

12. Mun Tae 大 (d. 1231) has a brief 'biography' in KS 121. 11b-12a which simply relates the incident described in the text without giving any further particulars of his life.

13. The reasons for the Mongols emphasizing their identity is that the Koryo cities had been raided by non-Mongol troops, chiefly Jürčen, who wore Mongol uniforms and claimed to be Mongol soldiers. Cf. KSC 15. 36a; KS 103. 32a-36a. Also see Yanai, op. cit., p. 108 note 1.

14. While there were three Administrators, 朴'ang'wan 朴官 , assigned to each of the two Northern Frontier-Districts who were to be of the fifth or sixth grades (cf. KS 77. 33b), I am unsure of either their grade or number at the town-level.

15. chaesang 宰相 = chaech'u 宰相 , i.e., ministers of the second rank and above. The term itself is a rather ancient one in Chinese history and occurs in texts from the third century B.C.; it became the regular official term for the Premier in the late Chou period. Cf. p. 4, Sven Broman, 'Studies on the Chou Li', BMFEA No. 33, 1961, pp. 1-90. HY 20. 27b states that Ch'oe I (= Ch'oe U) held the post of chaesang, i.e., prime minister, however, they are using the term in a literary sense.

16. The term Three Armies refers to the organization of the Koryo army into three divisions each commanded by a Battle Commander, chinju 令主 , who held the rank of General or above. According to the encyclopedia TMP 109. 5b, in the third year of the reign of Úijong 韓宗 (1148) one of the army commanders submitted a petition requesting that Koryo's Five Armies be reduced to Three Armies and it was approved. A division into five armies was tried at least once after that, viz., against the Ch'ị-tan invasions of 1216-18 but was quickly scrapped in favor of the traditional (cf. KS 1) system of three divisions after a series of defeats (cf. KS 103. 15b-16a). Yet, in view of the repeated use of the number three as a pseudo-number throughout the KS, I cannot but wonder if the number three in 'Three Armies' did not carry some 'magical' flavor at the time.

17. The city of Kwakchu 郭州 is the present Kwaksan 郭山 in N. P'yon'gan Province. For topographical and historical information see TYS 53. 37a ff. The city of Sŏnju 宋州 is the present Sŏnch'on 宋州 in N. Hamgyŏng Province; for topographical and historical information see TYS 53. 34a ff.

18. The city of Chaju 慈州 is the present Chasan 慈山 in S. P'yon'gan Province. For topographical and historical information see TYS 54. 25b ff.

19. Pongju 風州 is the present Pongsan 風山 in Hwanghae Province. For topographical and historical information see TYS 41. 27a ff.

20. Yi Chasŏng 亜子晟 (d. 1251) was of Ubong 牛峯 which was also
the ancestral home of the powerful Ch'oe clan who ruled Koryó at this time. His father was President, sango 尚書, of the Department of War, pyôngbu. His biography characterizes him as a man who was brave and strong, and good at archery; he followed the army and gradually rose to the rank of Supreme General. In the year following the Mongol onslaught of 1231, Chasông, as Battle Commander, chinju 陣主, of one of Koryó's Three Armies, assisted in quelling the slave-monk uprising which occurred in Kaegyông following the transfer of the capital to Kanghwa Island. He subsequently was in command of forces which quelled a slave revolt at Ch'ungju in 1232 and, in 1233, he led an army on a two-day forced ride to put down a large bandit rebellion emanating from the area of the Eastern Capital. He died in 1251 and was awarded the posthumous appellation of Ŭiryől 义烈. For further biographical information see KS 103. 3a-39a from which the above information has been drawn; also see BTKP 126. 1175.

21. The Tongsón postal relay station 回仙驛 was on the eleven station Piryǒng circuit 陵道. It was the Pongju station. Cf. KS 82. 9b.

22. Min Hŭi閉曦 (fl. 1230-1249). Little is known of Min other than his active role in resisting the Mongols. He ultimately reached the post of Supreme General but was exiled in 1249 when Ch'oe Hang came into power.

23. pundae ᵇsa 分臺御史 or Regional Censorate; I do not know how many Regional Censorates there were nor their administrative structure.

24. I note that according to YS 149, which contains the biographies of Wang Ying-tsu 工榮祖, I-la-mai-nu 엄刺貢奴 and Hsieh-tu 謝, that each of these persons was in Koryó. Wang was deputy to Sartaq; I-la-mai-nu was one of Sartaq's principal commanders; and Hsieh-tu, the son of Yeh-lŭ Liu-ke was another commander. Yet I have not seen these persons mentioned in the Koryó records.

25. naesi nangjung 内侍郎中. Song's position was that of naesi or Palace Attendant and his rank was that of nangjung.

26. Song Kukch'ŏm 李國垣 (d. 1250) of Chinju 鏡州, was good in literature, passed the exams, and was placed directly in the Historiographical Bureau, sagwan. From this post he entered the service of Ch'oe U, later serving his son Ch'oe Hang, and was active in the Chŏng-bang 政房 or Civil Council. For biographical information see KS 102. 14a-b; also see BTKP 104. 980.

27. Hei 黝, or Black Ch'i-tan, is the Chinese rendering of Qarā-Khitāy, cf. Wittfogel and Feng, 'Qarā-Khitāy', pp. 619-674. They have also noted this and remark that the Mongols tended to identify the 'Chin' Ch'i-tan
with the Black Ch't'an of Central Asia and cite this incident as an example of mistaken identity. Cf. Wittfogel and Feng, op. cit., p. 625, note 69.

28. There is little doubt that the killing of the Mongol envoy was in part responsible for the return of the Mongol forces to Koryô. G. Vernadsky, 'The Scope and Contents of Chingis Khan's Yasa', HIJAS 3 (1958) 1, pp. 337-360, mentions (p. 346) the apparently unwritten inviolability of ambassadors and points out that "... it was by murdering the Mongol envoys that the Russian princes brought down the Mongol wrath upon their heads in 1223". W. Barthold, Four Studies ..., Vol. 1, p. 37, remarks that the expedition against Turkestan in 1219 was due to the killing of Mongol envoys by the Khorezm shah. The charge was often repeated in Mongol missives to Koryô. Cf. TYSC 28; KS 23. 20b ff.

It should also be noted that the slaying of a Mongol envoy provided a reasonable pretext both for invasion and for subsequent demands. The opinion that the Mongols simply used the slaying of the envoy as a pretext for invasion has been expressed by most Japanese and Korean scholars; see, for example, Yanai Watari, Meng-ku-shih yen-chiu 蒙古史研究 (being the Chinese translation of articles published in Japanese in TG), Commercial Press, 1932, p. 11, and Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Mansen-shi kenyô 玄蕃史研究, Vol. 1, p. 626.

29. Chông 慎 (d. 1234) was the son of Chin 仁 (d. 1220; BTKP 113. 1064). His mother was Princess Yôn-hui 延禧宮主, the daughter of Myôngjong 明宗. Chông himself married Princess Kyôngnyông 敬寧宮主, the daughter of Sinjong 神宗. He was first enfeoffed as Count of Shihûng 始興伯, later advanced to Marquis of Shihûng, and then, still later, made Duke of Hoean 順安公. He died in 1234. Biographical information is contained in KS 90. 9b-10a; also see BTKP 114. 1072.

YKC 3a and YS 2. 2b identify him (incorrectly) as the younger brother of Kojong, then the reigning monarch. The Mongols were demanding hostages from the royal family among whom the Crown Prince was particularly desired (cf. YS 120. 15a). Koryô later showed no hesitation in sending the Duke of Yôngnyông, falsely labelled as the Crown Prince to the Mongols as a hostage. Therefore, I regard this as a Koryô tactic, i.e., the Koryô authorities were simply passing Chông off as the King's younger brother with the intention of submitting as their hostage if no alternative was offered; I do not believe this is a case of scribal or other error in YKC. Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 555, note 1, is also of the opinion that the Koryô authorities misled the Mongols.

30. The title of Duke, kong 公, was an honorary title and except for occa-
sional awards which were often posthumous, was customarily reserved for members of the royal family, especially the cadet branches. It carried with it an annual stipend of 400 sŏk 10 tu of rice (Yi, Table 6). HY 20. 24b informs us that the enfeoffed members of the royal relatives were charged with no affairs, and "those that were, by their relationship, venerated, were the Dukes, kong; the next were the Marquis, huin; the distant [relatives] were made Counts, paek [while] the young were made sado 司徒 and sagong 司空. In general they were called Princes, chewang 諸王.

The titles sado and sagong were the second and third of the Three Dukes samgong 三公; the first was taewi 大衛. While all of these honorary titles held the official grade of First Class primary, their stipends and allotments varied considerably. See KS 76. 2b.

31. Pak Sŏ 朴奉 (fl. 1230's) of Chukchü 朴州 first rose to prominence as defender of Kuju against the Mongol invasion of Sartaq in 1231-32. For his valiant defense of Kuju he was appointed Senior Councillor, b'yŏng-jangsa 平章事 of the Royal Chancellory munha (sŏng) 門下 (省), and even the military ruler Ch'oe U told him: "Sir, in the nation [your] fidelity is really incomparable." We are told that he retired to his native village following the battle at Kuju but his biography in KS 103. 23a-26a tells us little other than his role as defender of Kuju; BTKP does not list him.

32. The Koryŏ victory over the Liao forces at Kuju in 1018 resulted in the Liao dropping their demands for six Korean cities and for the Koryŏ monarch to visit the Liao capital. Cf. Kim Sanggi 金桑基, T'an'gu wa 甕州hangjaeng 甕州 之行營, [The Ch'i-tan Incursions and Resistance Offered], Kuksaang 甕州 四塔將 ["The Problems of Korean History"], 2 (1960), pp. 101-175.

33. KS 103. 23a-26a reads pundo changgun; KS 103. 26a-29a reads simply sujang 戍將 or military officer.

34. toho(pu) pyŏlch'o 都護 (府)別抄. The pyŏlch'o 別抄 or 'those especially selected' were elite teams of infantry. I have chosen to render pyŏlch'o as 'patrol'. A more detailed discussion of the pyŏlch'o is given later. This particular pyŏlch'o was probably from the Northern Defense Command, ambuk toho-pu, located at the walled-city of Anbuk (mod. Anju 安州) to the South of Kuju.

35. In reconstructing the battle at Kuju, I have followed the sequence of events as set forth in KSC 16. 5a-6a; KSC 16. 7a-b and KSC 16. 8b which differ in minor respects with the accounts in the biographies of Pak and Kim.
36. Where I have rendered 'called his small group' the text reads 咏雙 and I am unsure of the meaning. ??"blew twice on a bamboo [whistle]".

37. This is the earliest of four such instances of the Mongols using human fat that I have seen. While naphtha was widely used in making fire missiles in the middle eastern campaigns (cf. the works of Barthold and of Bretschneider), yet John of Plano Carpini (cited H. Yule and H. Cordier, The Book of Ser Marco Polo, 2 Vols., 3rd ed. London, 1929, Vol. 2, pp. 180-181) noted the mixing of human fat with Greek fire and remarked that "this caused the fire to rage inextinguishably."
P. Pelliot, Notes on Marco Polo, Paris, 1959 (a posthumous publication, see the foreword by L. Hambis), p. 22, cites the Hsü tung-chien kang-mu account of Bayan's siege of Ch'ang-chou in 1275, which relates that Bayan killed and burnt captives and "used the boiling fat of the corpses to manufacture fire-missiles which were thrown to set alight the wooden 'chevaux-de-frise' of the wall battlements ..." It was used again in Koryó in 1236, in an assault on Chukchu cf. KS 103. 25b-26a.

38. KS 103. 26a-29a gives twenty days for this attack.

39. There were two Recorders of the Academy, hangnok 학록, assigned to the National Academy, kukchagam; they were of the official grade of Ninth Class primary (Yi, Table 4) which carried an annual stipend of 10 bushels (sŏk) of rice (Yi, Table 6).

40. tae up'o 大于浦 is defined following its appearance as: "Tae up'o signifies a large blade, a large weapon" 大于浦者大刀大兵也. The usual interpretation of the word is taken from this definition and is simply k'un k'al  큰칼 or 'large knife', e.g., Yi, Han'guk-sa p. 555. Tae 大 is without doubt to be read k'un 'large', i.e., the adjectival or modifier form of the qualitative verb k'ala. I read u in the sense of 'to go', i.e., kal + u 大 + 把 and po 浦 in the meaning of 'stream, rivelet' = ke ~ kae 대 ~ 개. Ke in the sense of 'implement, devise' is commonly added to verb bases to form substantives and it survives, for example, in ji- 'to carry on the back', plus ke, = jige 'packboard'. S.E. Martin, Korean Morphophonemics, Baltimore, 1954, pp. 51-52 gives several examples and G. J. Ramstedt has discussed ke at length in his "Koreanisch kgs 'Ding, Stück', Journal de la Société Finno-ougrienne, LXVIII, 1945.

The reason for interpreting 大 as 'knife' k'al is probably due both to the definition following its appearance and the fact that kal (i.e., u + kal) is an older form of k'al 'knife'. The latter is attested in the Yi Dynasty work Hunmin ch'ôngum haeryebon 訓民正音解例本 (cf. p. 28,
Tonga Saegugǒ sajǒn 동아세가어사전, Seoul, 1959). Yet, if we accept the premise that \( \text{nap} = \text{ke} = \text{'implement'} \), as I believe is correct, then, as \text{ke} adds to \text{verb} bases it follows that \text{kal} in \text{noun} form must be rejected. This immediately suggests \text{kal} \text{~ \text{Kal}} as an older \text{verb} form. One immediately thinks of the modern \text{kalkita चौकी }'\text{to slash, to beat}' . From the \text{verb} \text{kalkta, kakta} Ramstedt has postulated; \text{n, kalgo (Ek ? * kalgay) and its derivatives kalgori 'a hook, a curved stick'}. See G. J. Ramstedt, Studies in Korean Etymology, Mémoires de la Société Finno-Ougrienne, XCV, Helsinki, 1949; also cf. \text{karida, p. 98; kalda, p. 87, and kalda, p. 88.}

While it is tempting to postulate the incorporation of a Chinese loan morph here (? चौकी as a \text{verb} 'to cut, to cut through' mod. \text{Ch. ch'ieh 4)}, T'ang \text{Ch. k'iel, mod. Kor. kyôl – as a \text{noun} read kye in mod. Kor.}, it would seem that in this word we have a form of the *kalgay postulated by Ramstedt. Therefore I reconstruct up'o as *kalge चौकी ~ *kalkke चौकी and translate \text{tae up'o or k'tin kalgey as 'large implement} for slashing, large implement for smashing'. For the T'ang pronunciation of k'iel see B. Kangren, 'Grammata Serica ...', 87. 279 f. The above reconstruction is of course tentative; a great deal of work remains to be done in Korean palaeographic studies before firm conclusions are reached.

41. Ch'oe Ch'unmyǒng 崇春命 (d. 1250), a descendant of Ch'oe Ch'ung 翼冲 (d. 1068; bio. KS 95. 1a ff; BTKP 23. 224), was of Haeju 海州 For his merit in the defense of Chaju he was appointed Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, \text{ch'umirwǒn pusa}. He had one son, Chom 恪, who became an officer of the guards. His biography in KS 103. 30a-32a is principally an account of his defense of Chaju; also see BTKP 25. 229.

42. Tae Chipsǒng 大集成 (d. 1236) was one of the military officers surrounding Ch'oe U. He secured his position by marrying his daughter to the military overlord. KS carries no biography for Tae but his activities are mentioned in KS 23 and KS 129; also see BTKP 110. 1030.

43. This document and the preceding dispatch from Sartaq contained in KS 23. 4a-5b, have been studied and 'translated' by Murakami Shôji 村上正二 Mōkō raichō no honyaku 蒙古采譯 の翻譯 [''Translation of Mongolian Credentials in the Goryeo-sa''], CG 17 (1960), pp. 81-86. After completing this, I learned that Gari Ledyard of Berkeley has translated and annotated these documents and that his study, unavailable to me, will appear in a future issue of JAOS; this should be a definitive work. Murakami suggests (p. 86 note 1) that the term योग्गोंग is simply being used as 'Your Excellency', kakha កक>No. According to Kim Sanggi, to the Koreans the term, which was used in Silla times, meant a member of the
royal family who held the rank of Duke, Marquis, or Count. Cf. pp. 220-
221 and p. 240 note 7, Kim Sanggi, Koryó muin ch'ongch'i kigu ko incorporated in Tongbang munghwa..., pp. 207-243. Yet the Koreans themselves referred to Ch'oe Úi as yŏng-
gong (cf. KS 129. 54b; KSC 17. 35a-b), and I note that Ch'oe Hang's posi-
tion in the entry recording his death in KS 24 is given as chungsŏ-yŏng 中書令. According to Tzu-hai, 87B, the term yŏnggong was first used by Emperor Hsiao-Wen 李文帝 of the Northern Wei as a title of respect for Kao Yuan 高允 (390-487; see H.A.Giles, A Chinese Biog-
ographical Dictionary, London, 1898, p. 369, entry 970) who held the post of 'Chancellor of the Secretariat' 中書令. I believe Murakami's suggestion is closer to the mark.

In 1232, the Mongol Marshal Ho-hsi 河西 sent an envoy to the Koryó authorities with two bolts (p'il 匹) of gold damask 金錦 and a missive addressed to the yŏnggong 令公. Ch'oe Úi refused to receive it and the envoys then tried, unsuccessfully, to give the missive to Ch'ŏng, the Duke of Hoean. Ch'oe finally had Yi Kyubo write an answer for Chŏng to take back (cf. KS 129. 37a-b; KSC 16. 14b). The letter written by Yi is proba-
bly that contained in TYSC 28. 9a-10a and addressed to Marshal Ho-hsi and dated in the fifth month of 1232; a reply from the Duke of Hoean also addressed to Marshal Ho-hsi follows in TYSC 28. 9a, both referring to Mongol demands for Koryó military assistance in the Liaotung area. Perhaps the Ho-hsi mentioned is the individual whose name occurs com-
monly as Tanqu[t] 贡古. As is well known, Ho-hsi was a common Chinese name for the Tanqu or Hsi-hsia country during this period and from this derived the Mo. Qaši, a name tabooed from 1236. Cf. P.Pelliott, Notes on Marco Polo, pp. 115 and 126. The affairs of Koryó at this time were in the hands of Ch'oe Úi and the Koryó correspondence with the Mon-
gols was largely prepared by Yi Kyubo (1168-1241; BTKP 137. 1268) who acted as a sort of Secretary of State for Ch'oe Úi until his (Yi's) death in 1241, as may be seen in the genealogical record attached to the front of his collected works.TYSC.

44. The stimulus was probably a second Mongol missive sent to the Koryó court in the fifth month of 1232. Cf. YKC 3a. 3.

45. chiyu 指諭; KS 129. 37a-b reads chihwi 指揮; I have rendered simply 'Commander' since I am unsure of the function of a chiyu. The chihwi-sa, appear to have been especially dispatched to troubled areas and it appears to have been a temporary post. For example, a Supreme General was appointed Special Commander, chihwi-sa 指揮使, of the southeastern provinces and a Circuit Commissioner was appointed as his deputy. Cf. KS 23. 30a.
46. Kim Sech'ung 金世沖 died on the sixteenth day of the sixth month of 1232, cf. BTKP 64. 621. Other than his brief appearance before Ch'oe at this time, little is known of him.

47. According to KS 81. 15b, the *Ya pyŏlch'o 夜別抄* or Night Patrol was organized by Ch'oe U to patrol the capital area at night to prevent violence. The organization of the *Ya pyŏlch'o* is discussed in detail later.

48. Wang Kŏn 王建, the founder of the Koryŏ dynasty, was born in 877, reigned 918-943, died in 943, and was canonized T'aejo 太祖. For biographical information see KS 1. 1a5-b8 and KS 2. 16a1-8; also see BTKP 112. 1047.

49. Ch'oe's first wife, who was of the Ch'ŏng 全 clan, died in the fifth month of 1231 and was given the funeral of a queen (KSC 16. 3b-4a). Ch'oe subsequently married the daughter of Tae Chipsŏng (KS 129. 37a-b; KSC 16. 12a-b).

50. The Koryŏ capital was transferred to Kanghwa Island in the seventh month of 1232 (KS 23. 14a-b; TT 33. 359a-b) where it remained until the fifth month of 1270 (KS 26. 34b). The wisdom of Ch'oe's move is apparent. Koryŏ forces had proved no match against the Mongol forces on the mainland despite stubborn and often heroic resistance. In shifting to Kanghwa Island, Koryŏ's one remaining asset, her maritime tradition could be utilized. Government storage granaries were located at coastal harbors—the two exceptions were located on the Han River—and maritime transport of grain was already the normal mode employed (cf. KS 79. 35a-37b).

Kanghwa, a large island off the coast of the modern Inch'on 仁川, is separated from the mainland by a strait "... infested with rocks and rapids and with a tide rushing like a mill-race ..." (cf. M. M. Trollope, 'Kanghwa', TKBRAS, 2 (1901) 1-36, p. 1). Since the Mongols had never been noted for their skill in amphibious warfare, Kanghwa Island made an excellent refuge. The move also set a precedent and the island was used as a refuge by the Koryŏ court from the Qadān 哈丹 rebels in 1290 (For a general account see K.Susa 笠佐嘉橋, *Gen no ni-daishiseki 元の二大史蹟*, Tōkyō, 1937, p. 65 ff) and later by the Yi Dynasty court from the Manchu invasions in the early 17th century, see W.W. Rockhill, *China's Intercourse with Korea from the XVth Century to 1895*, London, 1905. For topographical and historical information on Kanghwa Island see TYS 12. 215-221.

51. We are told that the population of Kaegyŏng had reached 100 000 households *ho* 滷 (cf. KS 102. 6a; KSC 16. 15a) which, at the usual m.p.h. (mounds per household) rate of 5-1 would give a population of 500 000
persons. Yi, Han'guk-sa Vol. 2, p. 563, note 2, would read 'mouths' ku in lieu of 'households', ho, making 100,000 persons and a more believable figure.

52. Kim Sanggi, Tongbong munhwâ . . . , pp. 127-128, gives an account of the various palaces, Buddhist temples, and the like which were constructed on Kanghwa in the period 1232-1270 when it was the capital of Koryô.


54. The slave rebellion at Ch'ungju was a rather interesting development and is reflective of the disorder of the times. The story begins just prior to the Mongol attack on Ch'ungju in the winter of 1231 (KSC 16. 9b). A certain U Chongju 于宗柱, the Deputy Commissioner, pusa, of the city and the Administrator, p'ok'gan, one Yu Hongik 庾洪翼, who quarrelled continually, had a falling out when they discussed the defense of the city after hearing of the approach of Mongol troops. Chongju assumed command of a 'Selected Force of the Upper Classes' Yangban pyöldko 電班別抄 and Hongik took command of the slave army, nogun 奴軍, and a selected force, chamryu pyöldko 杂類別抄. They were mutually suspicious of each other and when the Mongol troops arrived they fled leaving the defense of the city to the slave army and the selected force who routed the Mongols. Returning they checked the government and private silver utensils and the slave army offered the pretext that the Mongol troops had stolen them. Some local officials secretly plotted to kill the head of the slave army. Learning of this, the slave army accused the officials for deserting the city and then wanting to charge the slaves with the Mongols' crime. Gathering under the pretense of a burial party, they assembled their followers with blasts on a conch shell and then took over the city, threatening the families of any who dared to flee, setting fire to the homes of the plotters, and then hunting down and killing those against whom they held grudges (KS 103. 36a-39a; KSC 16. 11a-12a).

In the first month of 1232, upon the request of U and Yu, Ch'oe U appointed two administrators, one Pak Munsu 半文秀 and a certain Kim Chông 金鼎, as Temporary Military Governors, anmu pyölgam 安撫別營 (KSC 16. 11a8-b9). Pak and Kim returned in the same month escorting the commander, toryông, of the slave army, the yôngsa Chi Kwangsu 池光守, and the Buddhist priest Ubon 半本 (KSC 16. 12a) who had apparently both been conspicuous in the defense of Ch'ungju. Ch'oe U rewarded them and appointed, po 補, Kwangsu a military officer with the rank of captain, kyowi 校尉, and made Ubon head of the important temples, laewônsa-cho 大院寺, of Ch'ungju and elevated him
to the rank of samjung (samtung taesa); for an explanation of which see Yi, Han'guk-sa Vol. 2, p. 143) cf. KS 129, 37a; KSC 16, 12a.

After returning to Ch'ungju, Ubon stirred up a revolt and, in the eighth month of 1232, Koryo's Three Armies commanded by Yi Chasŏng were sent to suppress the uprising (KSC 16, 17a). As they were building a bridge to cross a deep river near Ch'ungju, the army was contacted by several rebel leaders who desired to kill Ubon and surrender. This was accepted by the government forces and enabled them to enter the city. Those of the gang who were bold and robust fled and those supporters who remained were captured and executed. The valuables, and livestock seized by the gang were brought back and presented to the authorities in the capital (KS 103, 36a-39a; KSC 16, 17a-b).

55. Mongol demands are discussed in detail later.

56. The removal of the capital from Kaegyŏng stimulated a rebellion in the city. A certain Yi T'ong, a servant, chorye, of the Censorate, 6sadae, assembled the petty bandits in the capital area and the slaves in the city and drove out the military commander left to garrison the city. Then, pretending to represent Koryo's Three Armies, he sent dispatches to Buddhist monasteries in the area to assemble bands of monks to strengthen his group. When Koryo's Three Armies were sent against them, the rebels advanced a force to meet the government army near Sŭngch'ŏn-pu, the landing point from Kanghwa. As this was taking place, the Koryo Night Patrol, ya pyŏlch'o, reached the city and gained entrance by pretending to be a part of the rebel band then fighting at Sŭngch'ŏn-pu. The government forces arrived shortly thereafter and the rebellion was crushed (KS 103, 36a-39a).

57. Yi Chehyon, one of the foremost historiographers of the Koryo period, was born in 1288 and died in 1367, the sixteenth year of the reign of King Kongmin (r. 1352-1374) at the age of eighty-one. For biographical information see KS 110, 21a-42a and the genealogical information contained in Ikchae-chip, his collected works. His home was a well-known gathering place for historians, and perhaps the national history he is mentioned as working on (KS 110, 39a) — he was an official historian — may partially remain in his surviving works. Viz., the Kuk Ch'unghŏn Wang Sega (i.e., annals of Kojong) contained in IC 9A, 1a-20a. I note that the birth-death dates for Yi in Han'guk-sa sajŏn, Seoul, 1960, are correctly given on p. 280 but are erroneously given as 1386-1397 on p. 314, undoubtedly a printing error to which such works are regrettably prone. BTKP
125. 1166 reads the name as Yi Chaehyon. This brings up a problem which, as does romanization, confronts all students of Korean history and literature. His name is written 駱. The character 駱 has the three readings of chae, che, and cha, only the latter two having common identity slogans, viz., nara · che and sungsiraehul · cha, while the reading chae is so uncommon as to lack an identity slogan. I can see no reason to deviate from the practice of modern Korean and Japanese historians in using the most common modern reading until it is historically proven that a less common reading is applicable. The most common reading of the character 駱 is che; therefore I read Yi Chehyon and consider BTKP to be incorrect.


59. See p. 25, H. Franke, *Geld und Wirtschaft in China unter der Mongolenherrschaft*, Leipzig, 1949. Franke also discusses at length the surviving portions of the Ching-shih ta-tien. Franke was not, of course, the first to notice this. Some 20 years earlier Yanai Watari, *Meng-ku-shih yenchiu*, pp. 104-126 discussed the relationships of the Yuan Veritable Records, shih-lu, with the Ching-shih ta-tien and (p. 121) pointed out that YS 208 (he calls it the Jih-pen chuan) was based on the Ching-shih ta-tien.

60. I believe we can answer some of Yi Chehyon's questions. First, these officials were established by Sartaq who was, of course, acting under Imperial Orders (cf. YS 154. 1b; YS 2. 2b; YS 59. 4b-6b; YKC 3a). And this was in keeping with Mongol custom at the time. Bretschneider, *Mediaeval Researches*, Vol. 1, p. 293, notes that when Chinggis captured a western country he placed a darunyači in every city. In later days, as Yi Chehyon remarks, the darunyači were indeed important persons. Bretschneider, op. cit., p. 190, has already pointed out that in the biographical section of the Yüan shih all the distinguished Mongols, with few exceptions, were either with the army or were provincial resident commissioners. Yet it is also well known that the period prior to 1260, i.e., the ascension of Qubilai, is not covered in detail in the Yüan records and perhaps this is the reason that their names have not been transmitted. In later days, i.e., after 1270, there was only one darunyači and one vice-darunyači in the Koryo capital and it was probably this system with which Yi was familiar. Yi's remark on the small size of the capital prefecture where he understood the seventy-two darunyači to have been stationed does not apply since the area concerned was the
entire Koryŏ northwest and not merely the capital prefecture. And, as we have seen, the Koryŏ records do indeed mention them.


62. There was an earlier Korean participation in Yüan records by Kim Pyŏng 金聃 (d. 1301; *BTKP* 64. 613) and Im Ik 任翼 (d. 1301; *BTKP* 46. 436) who accompanied Prince Sim 任織 when the latter went to the Yüan court as a hostage in 1271, and they assisted in the compilation of the records, *shih-chi 試跡*, of Shih-ts'u (Qubilai).

63. *KS* 23. 25 identifies the location as "a small stronghold, sŏng, of the village of Chŏn 處仁, a hamlet subordinate to Suju 水州." *TYS* 10. 16b remarks that it was of earthen construction and had a military granary 甲倉. The story of the shooting of Sartaq is also given as well as mention of Sartaq's attack on the citadel of refuge at Hanyang 漢陽 (mod. Seoul). Also see W. Bacon, *Fortresses ...*, p. 12 and p. 16.

64. Kim Yunhu 金允侯 (fl. 1230's) of Kyŏngju was a Buddhist priest who was living at Paekhyŏn-wŏn 白岘院 when the Mongol forces arrived in the area in 1232. He declined an appointment as Supreme General, sangjanggan, as a reward for shooting the Mongol commander Sartaq, saying, "At the time of the battle I was without bow and arrows. How can I presume to falsely receive an important reward?" He was then given a temporary appointment as Colonel, nanjang, and, subsequently, was appointed Special Supervisor of Defense, pangho pyŏlgam of Ch'ungju's citadel of refuge where he played a major role in the seventy-day siege of Ch'ungju. He was promoted to Supreme General for his feats at Ch'ungju and given the post of Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northeastern Frontier-District but, as the Eastern Frontier-District had already fallen to the Mongols at that time, he did not go to his post. No other particulars of his life are given in his *KS* 103. 39b-40 biography; see also *CHSL* 4. 27; *BTKP* carries no entry.

65. According to *YS* 208. 3a this occurred in the eighth month of 1232. However, in a Koryŏ answer to an Eastern Jürčén dispatch contained in *TYSC* 28. 21b-22b = *KS* 23. 25b-26b, we learn that Sartaq died on the sixteenth day of the twelfth month of 1232 = January 27, 1233.

67. Mongol envoys came and went through Wan-nu's territory because of the Chin garrisons in the south, viz., in P'o-su-lu. The Koryo letter is simply saying that despite Korean protests, the envoy insisted on returning via P'o-su-lu and thus, the whole matter was taken out of Korean hands. Whether the Koreans were connected with the killing of the envoy is unknown. Yanai, *Yüan-t'ai* ..., pp. 135-138 believes that it is unlikely that the Koryo authorities were not connected with the incident.

68. A certain Song Tukch'ang 宋 得昌, a military officer of the rank of Captain, *kyowi* 校尉 who had been in the mission headed by Chi Üisim, escaped and returned to the Koryo capital to report that Chi had been sent under escort to the Mongol Emperor and that the rest of the party had been detained by Sartaq. Cf. *KS* 23. 14a; *YKC* 3b. He is our Song Ipch'ang and the Koryo authorities were protecting him. Kim Sanggi, Sam pyö'lch'o wa úi ku úi nan e tae hayo 三別抄와 고의亂以對為 [Concerning the *Sam pyö'lch'o* and their Rebellion], incorporated in pp. 92-204, *Tongbang munhwa kyoryu-sa non'go 東方文化交流史論叢 (Vol. 8 of the Han'guk munhwa ch'ongsö 韓國文化交流史叢)] Seoul, 1948, pp. 124-125, and pp. 155-156 note 24, points out that he is probably also the Song Üi 宋義 who was Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Office in the court of Wônjong in 1270 at the time of the transfer of the capital back to Kaegyong and who is described as a subordinate officer who was promoted for just such an action as is described for Song Tukch'ang. A certain Hô Kongjae 許公才 is also mentioned in the Koryo missive but I have been unable to identify him (*YKC* 3b; *KS* 23. 14).

69. The last cited Koryo missive is dated the third month of 1232 and corresponds to the withdrawal of Mongol forces from Koryo. These forces were subsequently sent against P'u-hsien Wan-nu in the Liaotung area, hence the request for troops from Koryo. (Cf. *YKC* 8b - the request was made in 1232). Portions of the Liaotung area had been repeatedly scorched by warfare (cf. *YS* 59. 5a), in 1216, for example, the Mongols had defeated 30,000 Chin troops at Kai-chou-kuan 开州館, driving them eastward to Ta-fu-ying 大夫營 (cf. *KS* 103. 7b-8a). Hence the requests for farming families to be sent to Kai-chou-kuan. *Chung-kuo ku-chien ti-ming ta-lzu'-tien*, p. 954A identifies Kai-chou as the present Feng-ch'eng 首城. Ta-fu-ying was on an island in the Yalu River, near the modern Üiju.

70. As accused, Koryo had not sent envoys to the Mongol court prior to 1232, and this was in accordance with the original agreement. Because the roads were blocked, the Mongols were to send envoys to collect the tribute. According to *YKC*, the first Koryo embassy went to the Mongol Court
in the fourth month of 1232, and a second embassy went in the tenth month of 1232 (YKC 3b). There were, of course, many envoys sent to the garri-
sons of the Mongol field commanders in Koryó.
The Cha-la mentioned here, however, presents a problem. CS Vol. 3,
No. 4, p. 104, postulates an identification with the envoy Chu-ku-yü.
Yanai, op. cit., p. 143 note 2, suggests a textual lacuna and believes
that the Cha-la mentioned here is an error for Han-she 喝拾, the
Ch'i-tan leader at Kangdong in 1218-19. Yanai's supposition of an omis-
sion in the text is based on what he terms the faulty grammatical struc-
ture, but this could be said for the entire missive which is written in a
colloquial style and Yanai is rather quick to solve problems by suggest-
ing lacunae or textual corruption — although he is quite often correct. If
it is assumed that as far as the name is concerned we are dealing with
a certain Cha-la, then both the CS and Yanai's suggestions must be dis-
carded on linguistic grounds, as must the equation of Cha-la with Sa-li-ta
(Sartaq). Who then is this Cha-la?
According to the documents in TYSC 28, following the slaying of the en-
voy Chu-ku-yü, P'Lu-hsien Wan-nu informed a Mongol representative in
his territory that Koryó had turned away from the Mongols. In order to
learn the truth of the matter, the envoy set out for Koryó but was am-
bushed by Wan-nu's men who dressed in Korean clothing and killed the
envoy in the mountainous border area between the two nations — ac-
cording to the Koryó explanations (cf. TYSC 28. 14b-17b). This envoy
must have been the Commissioner of the Eastern Lu-administration,
tung-lu-shih, Koryó was accused of killing (cf. KS 23. 20b). This I would
suggest is our Cha-la — again, assuming no textual error — and he is
possibly the same Cha-la who was with the Mongol forces at Kangdong in
1218-19. I note that a later Yüan missive, dated in 1249, mentions that
Ho-ch'e 合車 and Cha-la 劉剌 were already dead and treats Cha-
la, Chu-ku-yü and Sartaq as separate individuals.
71. For kuan 關 read ch'üeh 闕, an abbreviation of kung-ch'üeh 宮闕, 'palace gates', an expression which was often used to designate the Em-
peror.
72. Where I have rendered "to kill [them]" the text reads 射回. While it
may be an abridgement of a phrase like 射得回去, I believe it is
a simple compound but I am unsure of the meaning.
73. 羅弼 = 羅辈, i.e., 羅輩; similar to the often used 你每 for
在 Mongol documents contained in KS 23 and TYSC 28.
74. The reasons for demanding a census were practical ones: taxation, cor-
vée, and military service. In 1235-36, an extensive census of North
China was carried out and on the basis of this, social status and obligations were fixed. Cf. Schurmann, *Economic Structure* ..., p. 7. While it remained an often repeated Yuan demand (cf. Qubilai's instructions to Koryo Wonjong in *YKC* 9b-10), Koryo avoided it as long as possible.

75. Koryo had said that the refractory peoples (perhaps a reference to Hong Pogwon) of one or two cities in the north, in order to rebel, had wantonly instructed the daruyači of the city to slay the people and the daruyači had also killed the envoy sent by the Koryo authorities (*KS* 23. 21a-b). Yet, Pian de Carpine remarked that when the Mongols held a city in siege that they would endeavor to entice the inhabitants to surrender and then, if they surrendered, would say to them "come out, so that we may count you according to our custom". When the people came out, the Mongols separated the artisans and those they desired as slaves and the rest they killed. Cf. pp. 37-38, C. Dawson, *The Mongol Mission*, London, 1955. Barthold, *Turkestan* ..., p. 435-436, mentions that at the fall of Gurganj in 1220, the artisans were separated from the rest of the population and "The children of tender years and young women were made prisoners; the remainder of the inhabitants were killed."

In one instance, when the Mongol took a Koryo city, all males over the age of ten were killed and the girls, women, and young boys were divided among the soldiers. Cf. p. 29, Yu Hongnyol, Koryo ui Won e taehan kungnyo ["Presentation of Women from Koryo to the Yuan Court"], *The Chintan Hakpo* (published by the Chintan Society, Seoul), 18 (1957), pp. 25-46.

76. Howorth, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 135, summarizes this edict but mentions a different fifth offense, viz., "... fifthly of having killed his prefects."

The majority of Yuan edicts contained in *YKC* end with the phrase 我朝 (e.g., *YKC* 6a, 6b, 8a, 9b) a closing formula of which Vernadsky says, "... the Great Yasa of Chingis Khan recommended the following formula: "If ye resist — as for us what do we know? The everlasting God knoweth what will happen to you."

See p. 96, G. Vernadsky and M. Karpovich, *The Mongols and Russia* (a history of Russia, 3 vols. published to date ?), New Haven, 1953; W. Kotwicz' articles in *Collectanea Orientalia* 4 (1933) and 10 (1936) are cited but neither are available to me. In *KS* 23. 4a we find the initial formula often used in Mongol correspondence employed. For a discussion of these formulae see Vernadsky and Karpovich, loc. cit., and the works cited therein; also see G. Vernadsky, 'The Great Yasa of Chingis Khan', p. 345. A discussion of the initial formula may be found on pp. 135-139 of Wladyslaw Kotowicz, *Formules initiales des documents Mongols aux
XIIIe et XIVe ss', *Rocznik Orientalistycny*, 10 (1934), pp. 129-157, the only article of W. Kotowicz I have been able to see. Lien-sheng Yang, 'Marginalia to the Yuan Tien-chang', *HJAS* 19 (1956), pp. 42-51 has pointed out (p. 44) that imperial decrees normally used in North China were translated from Mongolian into colloquial Chinese and designated *sheng-chih* 聖旨, a term often found in Mongolian edicts sent to Koryŏ. Yang also discusses opening and closing phrases in Chinese which appear in these documents.

77. The text (*YKC* 4b) mentions "Within your borders, the ten walled-cities [subordinate to] the Western Capital which are under the jurisdiction of Kim Sinhyo, et al...." 王之境內西京金信孝等所管十數城. I find this passage a bit strange since there is no mention of Kim Sinhyo in the Koryŏ records. There is also the possibility that the text is corrupt and that the two characters 所管 should come between the characters 京 and 金. In such case we would read, "Within your borders, the ten-walled cities of Kŭmsǒng, Sinǒng, Hyoǒng, etc., which are subordinate to the Western Capital..." *YKC* 5b mentions the capture of a Sinsǒng 信城, a Kŭmsansǒng 金山城 and a Kŭmdong- 金洞城. 金洞城.

78. P‘u-hsien Wan-nu’s state fell in the ninth month of 1233 and Wan-nu was beheaded (cf. *YS* 11; *YS* 59. 5b).

79. Yanai, op. cit., p. 114, p. 116 note 8 and p. 117 note 1, argues that this occurred in the tenth month of 1233 and not in the fifth month as recorded in the *KS*. Hong Pogwŏn’s petition to move to the Liaotung area due to Jūrčen, Ch’i-tan and Koryŏ attacks in the tenth month would seem to support this. Yet, one would think that Koryŏ would have endeavored to re-take the lost territory in the northwest while the Mongols were attacking P‘u-hsien Wan-nu, whose state fell in the ninth month of 1233. The Mongols were also busy with a final drive upon the Chin capital which fell in the first month of 1234. Therefore, I have followed *KS*. Hong’s petition, incidentally, is evidence that it was the entire northwest and not merely the area of the Western Capital which Hong held, for the Jūrčen and Ch’i-tan attacks would have been much further north than the Western Capital and probably reference is made to border cities.

80. P’il Hyŏnbo 畢賢甫 (d. 1234), see *BTKP* 99. 930. *BTKP* incorrectly renders the last character as po 輔; it should read po 甫.

81. Sŏnyusa 宣諭使 is simply a rather lofty way of saying Pacification Commissioner. In *KSC* 15. 22b5 we find a sŏnyusa who was a general appointed earlier (*KSC* 16. 22a8-9) to pacify the rebellion of Han Sun at Ùiju.

82. Chŏng Ûi 鄭毅 (d. 1233), see *BTKP* 17. 164 and *BTKP* 17. 165.
BTKP's Chŏng Ûi 鄭顚 is the same person as their Chŏng Ûi 鄭顚, which a simple cross-check of their references indicates. There is a brief biography in KS 121. 10 ff.

83. Pak Nokchŏn 朴祿金 (d. 1233), see BTKP 94. 878. Little is known of him beyond his unsuccessful trip to the Western Capital.

84. The number 3 000 is consistently used for the number of men in the house army of the Ch'oe clan and I suspect that it is a pseudo-number and should read 'several' rather than 'three' thousand. For such usage see p. 218, Yang Lien-sheng, 'Numbers and Units in Chinese Economic History', HJAS 12 (1949) 1, pp. 217-225.

85. The phrase 'the forty walled-cities' occurs repeatedly in the Koryŏ records and it is simply a reference to the northwest section of the country, i.e., the Northwestern Frontier-District.
Chapter III

THE INVASIONS OF TANQUT-BÂTUR
AND OF PRINCE YEKÜ

By late 1233, Mongol armies led by Prince Gûyük and Prince Alçitai had completed the conquest of P'u-hsien Wan-nu's Eastern Jûrân; in the first month of 1234, the Mongol forces, supported by Sung troops who were to get the Honan area for their participation, seized the Chin capital at Feng-ching and completed their conquest of North China. Then, at the Quriltai held by Ögödei in 1235, it was decided to field armies against Koryô, the Southern Sung, and the nations west of the Volga, while a fourth group was sent to the borders of Cashmir.

In the seventh month (July 17 - August 15) of 1235, Mongol troops raided the Eastern Defense Command, anbyôn toho-pu. Coastal defenses were hurriedly begun on Kanghwa and the inhabitants of the Southern Capital and nearby Kwangju were ordered to evacuate their cities and come to the island. The next month the Mongol offensive, under the command of Tanqut-bâtur and Hong Pogwôn opened with the capture of Yonggang, Ham-jong, and Samdung, major cities in Sôhae Province. Later that year the Mongols began throwing Eastern Jûrân troops into the battle in the northeast. During late 1235, Mongol and Eastern Jûrân forces had pushed down Korea's rough eastern littoral as far as Haep'yông (mod. Sangju, Yôngsi) and Kaeju (KS 23. 30a). But these forces were only an advance group; in the tenth month (Nov. 12 - Dec. 11) of 1235, reports sent in by the military commissioners in the northeast and northwest all told the same story: many Mongol soldiers crossing the frontier.

In the spring of 1236, Mongol forces which had been camped in some seventeen places in the north (KS 23. 31a-b), began moving south. Hwangju, Sinju, and Anju fell in the third month (April 8 - May 6) of 1236 (KS 23. 31b); in the eighth month (Sep. 2 - Oct. 1), Mongol forces had reached Kaeju (KS 23. 31b); the following month encounters were reported at the Southern Capital, and south of the Han River at P'yôngt'aek, Aju, and Hayang-chang. By the
onset of winter (November), Mongol forces had penetrated to Chŏnju (KS 23. 32a), some 470 kilometers south of the Yalu.

During this period, Koryŏ did not once attempt to field an army against the Mongols, nor was there any Mongol attempt to storm the island of Kanghwa, either at this time or later 5). Koryŏ offensive action was limited to the guerrilla-like raids of small patrols, pyŏlch'ŏ, which harassed the Mongols with surprise night-raids and ambushes in Korea's many mountains (e.g., KS 23. 29b). Population centers which had strong defensive installations and capable garrisons like Chŏnju, Ch'ungju, etc., were left to defend themselves. The people of the small towns, unprotected cities, and scattered settlements in the valleys were evacuated to coastal islands and mountain citadels of refuge (e.g., KS 23. 29b); this latter defensive measure was once again to assume large proportions as it had previously in 1231-32.

On Kanghwa Island an elaborate set of defensive works was erected (e.g., KS 23. 29b; KS 23. 33b). Koryŏ also attempted to stimulate the northern Chinese and the Jürčen to continue resistance to the Mongols at this time but little is known of the outcome of their efforts (cf. TYSC 28. 24a-25b).

There were also actions of a spiritual or religious nature of which the greatest were Buddhist activities although the astrologers and diverse diviners were not overlooked. One astrologer submitted the suggestion that the sun be worshipped during the morning hours from 7 AM to 11 AM in order to exorcise the Mongol troops from the peninsula (KS 23. 29b) 6).

But undoubtedly the greatest religious activity directed toward the removal of the invaders was the monumental task of recarving the Buddhist Tripitaka, Taejanggyŏng 大藏經. Begun in 1237, the 81,137 woodblocks comprising the Tripitaka were completed some sixteen years later in 1251 (cf. KS 24. 2b-3a; KS 129. 50b) 7). A similar Buddhist activity was the chaehoe 藏經 designed to cleanse or purify the nation in which Buddhist monks were feasted. There are many records of '30,000 monks' being feasted (e.g., 1225 - KS 22. 28b; 1231 - KS 23. 2b; 1238 - KS 23. 35a, etc.) and this is often interpreted to show the strength of Buddhism in Koryŏ. Such an interpretation misses the mark. First, 30,000 is a pseudo-number and refers to all the monks in the nation 8). Second, the ceremony which dates to Silla times was, of course, religious in origin and concept but it was, like the carving and recarving of the eighty-one thousand xylographs of the Buddhist Tripitaka, a religious act designed to exorcise or scourge invaders from the land 9). Further, it was largely the Court and not the military government which devoted themselves to these activities. In fact, the frequent Buddhist ceremonies in which the King participated is evidence that his power was symbolic rather than actual at this time. And in this respect there is a striking analogy be-
tween the Koryŏ court under the military government and the Japanese Court under the Hōjō Regents 10).

The Mongol onslaught brought with it a renewal of desertions from the Koryŏ ranks which continued the build-up of a strong Korean settlement in Liaotung. In the fifth month (June 14 - July 12) of 1238, a certain Cho Hyŏnsúp 趙玄宙 and one Yi Wŏn 李元祐 submitted to the Mongols with 2000 men. Cho was given a Silver Plaque or authority of a Chiliarch, ch'ien-hu, and he and his people were placed under the command of Hong Pogwŏn in Liaotung. A certain Yi Kunsik 李君弼 also submitted with twelve people at this time (YKC 5b; YS 208. 3a-4b).

Despite Koryŏ efforts to resist, the Mongols were too much. Another re-spite was desperately needed and peace negotiations were opened in the winter 11) of 1238 (YKC 6a) with Koryŏ pledging eternal submission (KS 23. 33b-34b; KSC 16. 27a-b). The Koryŏ envoys returned with the Yüan reply in the spring of 1239 (YKC 6a), accompanied by twenty Mongols (KS 23. 34b). With the opening of negotiations and the Koryŏ submission, the Mongol troops withdrew (KS 23. 34a).

One of the demands brought by the first delegation of Mongol envoys was for the King to present himself at the Mongol Court; a second delegation of 137 Mongols brought a similar demand a few months later (KS 23. 34b; KSC 16. 28a). As the Koryŏ Queen Dowager, t'ae hu 太后, had died just at this time (KS 23. 34b), the King used the three-year mourning period (cf. KS 64. 22b) to avoid the demand (YKC 1a; YKC 6b). It was still to be many years before the Mongols would be able to coax the King even across the straits to the mainland. Koryŏ used many excuses: the King was ill (KS 24. 7b-8a), mourning for his mother (YKC 1a; YS 208. 4a), later he was too old (KS 24. 3a-b; KS 24. 7a-8a), etc. Yet the Mongol demands, particularly their demand for a hostage, could not be ignored. Koryŏ's first effort was to dispatch Chŏn 12), the Duke of Sinan (KS 23. 34b), whom they passed off as the King's younger brother (cf. YKC 8a), to the Mongol Court with a retinue of 148 men to present a petition and tribute (YS 208. 4a). For the next several years he scurried back and forth conveying Mongol demands and Koryŏ's evasive replies.

At this point the Mongols repeated some of their demands in a forcefully worded edict which called for Koryŏ to endeavor to fulfil several specific instructions: to leave the islands, to take a census of the people and submit household registers, to produce hostages, to submit annual tribute, and to produce those who had transgressed (by advocating resistance, i.e., Ch'oe U, et al.) (YKC 6b-8a).

The pressure for the King to visit the Mongol Court and the demands for hostages resulted in a bit of fakery. "In the summer, the fourth month of the

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twenty-eighth year of the reign (of Kojong = May 13 - June 10, 1241), they took a royal relative, Sun 13), the Duke of Yongnyeong, and proclaimed him to be the [Crown] Prince. Leading ten officials and male relatives, he entered the Mongol [Court] as a hostage" 14) (KS 23. 35a-b; also see KS 87. 9a; YS 2. 7a; YS 208. 4b; HY 20. 25a). The substitution was not discovered until some fourteen years later and it is easy to imagine a look of disbelief on Mongke's face when he asked Wang Sun, "Why did you call yourself the Prince before?"

Sun replied: "[When] I, [Your] Servant, was small, I was brought up in the palace and I believed that the King was my father and I regarded the Queen as my mother. I didn't realize that I was not [their] hostage son" (TT 32. 56. 4-5; also see KS 99. 5a).

Wang Sun was of royal blood, but his family had branched from the 'main stem', taejong 大宗, several generations back and, moreover, Ch'6n 持, the Crown Prince, was then twenty-two years of age and qualified as a hostage. Thus, Sun was, in this case, unacceptable. Yet Sun, the Kory6 sacrificial goat, was to serve the Mongols loyally and even to marry a Mongol Princess, one of the daughters of Mongke; the first link by marriage between the Mongol and Kory6 royal families.

And so, in 1241, the thirteenth year of the reign of Ögödei, the great Mongol General Ûyer 15) led seventeen-year old prince Sun, and the relatives 16) of Hong Pogwôn, whose release Tanqut-bâetur had been instructed to obtain two years earlier (cf. YKC 5b), to the Mongol Court at Qara-qorum. Ögödei was so pleased, it is related, that he awarded Ûyer with the office of supreme military commander over seven lu 滑 ('province') administrations (YS 120. 15a; KS 130. 4b; YKC 6a. 10).

This engendered a truce which was to last, after a fashion, until 124717). Kory6 tribute missions, which recommenced as a preliminary effort in late 1239, once again trekked toward the Mongol Court (KS 23. 36a; YKC 6b; YKC 8a) and buildings began to spring up at Sungch'6n-pu, the jumping-off point for Kanghwa on the mainland, for the lodging and entertainment of the frequent Mongol envoys. The question on Kanghwa was how long they would be able to avoid the frequently repeated Mongol demand for the removal of the court and officials back to the former capital (e.g., YKC 7a). While the Mongols were, some years later, able to get the King to cross to the mainland for short periods to meet Mongol envoys, Ch'oe U and his successors, were to remain on the island the rest of their lives. For it was principally Ch'oe U and the military faction surrounding him who were responsible for Kory6's continued resistance. The breathing spell was used to recover and re-equip. One measure taken was to send the active Min Hui, et al., 37 men to the southern provinces in 1243; "they were called Special Supervisors for the Encouragement of
Agriculture, kwŏnnong pyŏlgam 18) 勸農別鹽, but really they were to prepare the defenses" (KS 79. 7b-8a; KS 23. 36a-b).

The Mongol reaction to the continued Koryŏ stalling was as expected 19). It was decided at the Quriltai which elected Gûyük (Ting-tsong 定宗, r. 1246-1248) in August of 1246 20), to launch an attack on Koryŏ and, in the autumn of 1247, a Mongol force, commanded by Marshal A-mu-k' an 阿母 and supported by Hong Pogwŏn, arrived to camp in the Yŏmjū (mod. Yŏn'an 延安) area (KS 23. 39a-b; YKC 8a). In early 1248, the Koryŏ authorities issued an order to the Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northern Frontier-District to lead the inhabitants of all the walled-cities in the northern district to seek safety on the coastal islands (KS 23. 39b-40a).

Frequent groups of mounted Mongols appeared who said they were hunting but whom the Koryŏ authorities suspected of being reconnaissance groups (e.g., KS 23. 39b) and we read that "the Sŏhae Province 西海道 Circuit Commissioner, anch'al-sa, reported that forty mounted barbarians forded the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River 清川江 and entered the borders saying they were hunting marmots. Due to this, all the yangban (i.e., military and civil officials) 21) who had gone to Songdo 松都 (= Kaegyŏng) returned to Kanghwa." At the time, they had sent the yangban to go in shifts to guard Songdo (KS 23. 40a). This passage would imply Mongol control north of the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River which is not unbelievable as some cities in the northwest are recorded in the Yüan records as having been retaken at this time (cf. YKC 8a). There was, moreover, no real offensive launched southward from this area. Further, Chŏn, the Duke of Sinan, who had been sent to the Mongol Court in the tenth month (Oct. 22 - Nov. 20) of 1245 (KS 23. 38a), returned in early 1249 (KS 23. 40b) just after news had come in of the death of Gûyük, the Mongol Emperor (KS 23. 40b), which implies relations had not been severed. The Mongols did, at any rate, control the area north of the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River but it should probably be viewed as a fait accompli which the Koryŏ authorities had no alternative but to accept. In support of this, we see that from the third month (April 4 - May 3) of 1250, all the people of the North(western) Frontier-District, pukkye, were moved southward to the Western Capital, Kaegyŏng, and Sŏhae Province area (cf. KS 23. 42a; KSC 16. 41a).

There was, however, no lull in the arrival of Mongol delegations in Koryŏ nor the dispatch of envoys to the Mongols by Koryŏ (e.g., KS 23. 24a). Koryŏ's relations with the Eastern Jürčen were as bad as ever despite the fact that both nations were nominally under the Mongol cloak. In answer to a dispatch from an Eastern Jürčen Chiliarch received in the spring of 1247, which informed Koryŏ that they would send some fifty men into Koryŏ territory to search for fugitives who had fled into Koryŏ, Koryŏ replied that between the
two nations, the mountains were formidable and the roads perilous and therefore empty of travellers. The reply went on to accuse the Eastern Jürčen of raiding Koryó under the pretext of hunting or tracking down fugitives and suggested that the matter be submitted to the Mongol Emperor; the frontier, Koryó said, was to be considered closed (KSC 16. 36a). Hostilities flared briefly with raiding Eastern Jürčen troops in late 1249 and extended into late 1250 (KS 23. 41a-43a).

In the interim, additional fortifications were erected on Kanghwa Island (KS 23. 43a) which now consisted of coastal defenses along the side of the island facing the straits (KS 23. 29b), an outer defensive wall on the island (KS 23. 33b), and a middle defensive wall around the city of Kangdo (KS 23. 43a). To the queries of the Mongol envoys who pointed out that they had already submitted, Koryó replied that the installations were for the protection of the people from Sung 'pirates' 22) (KS 23. 1b). While there was a germ of truth in the statement, the additional fortifications were erected just after Ch'oe Hang 23), the son of Ch'oe U, took over control of the Koryó military government upon his father's death in 1249 (KS 23. 41a-b).

Defensive installations did not, of course, constitute the sole construction on Kanghwa Island. In the city of Kangdo 24. 107 which served as the capital on the island, palaces and governmental buildings were slowly build through the years. The King who had first been lodged in a hostel, was moved into the home of a general (KS 23. 28a). Shortly thereafter, mention is made of an audience chamber, naejón 内殿 (KS 23. 27a), but not until 1243, is the main palace, pon'gwol 本關, mentioned (KS 23. 37a). After the transfer to the island, it is related, the designations of the ball fields, the palaces, temples, and shrines all resembled those of the former capital, while the many Buddhist festivals and assemblies were all performed according to the old ceremonies (KS 23. 28a). One manner in which this was done was the utilization of private dwellings already on the island. An example of this is the confiscation of a private residence which was designated Pongŏn Temple 奉恩寺 after its famous namesake on the mainland (KS 23. 27a). Among the buildings of interest were the National Academy, Kukchagam 國子監 built in 1251 and located in Hwasan-dong 花山洞 (KS 24. 2b) and the Office for Xylographs of the Tripitaka, Taejanggyông p'andang 大藏經板堂 located outside of the west gate of the city (KS 24. 2b-3a), where in 1251, as related above, the recarving of the Tripitaka was completed 24).

Of interest also are the buildings belonging to the ruling Ch'oe clan which included the Household Bureau of the Ch'oe Clan, Chinyang-pu 晉陽府 (KS 23. 33a). But more spectacular were the Ch'oe mansion and grounds. In 1234, Ch'oe U had used the Guard Corps, tobang 都房, and 4000 soldiers
to transport lumber by ship from the old capital, in the process of which it is said many were drowned. They also brought back enough pine and juniper trees to make a park 'several tens of li' in area by the Ch'oe mansion (KSC 16. 22a). One of the sights of the new capital was Ch'oe U's 'winged pavilion', *sipcha-gak* 十字閣, so-called because it was built in the form of a cross and which, a contemporary assures us, "Truly it is that which has never been seen among men" (TYSC 24. 1a). It was located to the west of Ch'oe's residence — to the south was an enormous tower, said to be capable of seating 1,000 persons, which overlooked the Ch'oe polo field (TYSC 24. 3b-4b). Both Ch'oe U and his successor Ch'oe Hang were fond of polo, *kyokku* 25), which was chiefly a military sport in Koryô and often played by the Koryô cavalry units, *sin'gi* (e.g., KS 81. 13b). At times the matches sponsored by the Ch'oe clan had the appearance of festivals. The King and Chief Ministers were invited and often featured javelin throwing and mounted archery; competition was flavored by awarding prizes while at times the meets continued for five or six days (KS 129. 35; KS 129. 45b).

The death of Ch'oe U in the winter of 1249, brought with it the expected repercussions. The Guard Corps, *tobang*, immediately assembled at Ch'oe Hang's residence (KSC 16. 39a), although Ch'oe U had thoughtfully given his son five hundred men of his own house army the previous year (KSC 16. 38a). Two of the first casualties were Director of Affairs for the Bureau of Military Affairs, *chich'umiruônsa*, Min Hui and Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, Kim Kyôngson, who were exiled to islands. Several other military and civil officials, and thirty of Ch'oe U's concubines suffered the same fate (KSC 16. 39a). Reassured of his position, Ch'oe Hang, in an attempt to gain popularity among the people, remitted the special regional tribute and the fishing boat and fish-pond taxes of several regions (KSC 16. 39b). But these measures were to small avail. The first attempt to overthrow Ch'oe and to restore power to the monarch occurred in the third month (April 4 - May 3) of 1250, when Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, one Chu Suk 千局 (d. 1250; BTKP 19. 180), attempted to use the Guard Corps, *tobang*, the Night Patrol, *ya pyôlch'o*, and some soldiers to this end. Chu's indecision led to the failure of the plot and resulted in a wide-spread purge (KS 129. 43a; KSC 16. 40a-41a; TT 32. 60) which lasted into the following year when Ch'oe Hang used the Night Patrol, *ya pyôlch'o*, to eliminate his stepmother of the Tae clan, her family, including a son by a former husband, and her slaves (KS 129. 45b-46a; KSC 17. 1a-2b; TT 32. 63).

In addition to his Chinyang fief 26) and large land holdings in the Kaegyông area, Ch'oe Hang also inherited control of the organs of the military government.
Let us pause at this point for a brief consideration of these mechanisms and their development 27.

The Chungbang 重房 or Military Council was one of the earliest organs to be utilized and traces its origins to the reign of Mokchong 宗宗 (r. 998-1009) when it was established as a central headquarters for the high military generals of the army and the royal guard units (KS 77. 30a).

The early military rulers, i.e., before the rise of the Ch'oe clan, ruled through the Military Council (see HY 17. 3a) and control of the Military Council, i.e., the military men who comprised it, was essential to the retention of power since these military men commanded the various units of the government army 28). During the reigns of Úijong and Myöngjong, the Military Council grew in importance (KS 77. 30a) until it not only handled military affairs but also handled criminal cases; regulated trade to the extent of setting market prices and standardizing the bushel (kok) and peck (tu) measures (KSC 12. 51b-52a). Military officials were placed in charge in all the provincial posts in 1172 (KS 19. 22b), a necessity in the capital as well due to the purge of the literati. An exception were the Administrators, ptron'gwann, of the chu and chin administrations in the two Frontier-Districts who were not allowed military appointments (KSC 12. 30a). Following the rise of the Ch'oe clan, the Military Council lost its importance as a central governing authority and many of its functions were shifted to other organs. After the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan in 1258, the Military Council was retained. It was abolished briefly in the reign of King Ch'ungs6n 忠宣王 (r. 1309-1313) but was reestablished and continued in use until the end of the Koryö period (KS 77. 30a) 29).

In 1209, Ch'oe Ch'unghon established the Kyojöng togam 敕定都監 or Supreme Directorate as an emergency measure to put down an attempt to overthrow him (KSC 14. 25a-b). During the rule of Ch'oe U it assumed many of the functions previously handled by the Military Council and became the chief governing body of the military rulers who were appointed to head it as Supervisor, pyölgam. The Supervisor of the Supreme Directorate was, in brief, the military overlord and the appointment as Supervisor was always made by the King 30), following which all the officials would make their appearance to present congratulations, etc. The Supreme Directorate, which lasted until the overthrow of the Im clan in 1270, supervised the various departments of government and it is said that "in general, all that which was implemented emanated from the Supreme Directorate" (KSC 15. 38a). Collection (and remission) of special regional taxes and tribute was also handled by tax-collectors, suhwagwön 收穫員 (lit. harvest-men) placed in the various provinces by the Supreme Directorate; these officials were recalled when Ch'oe Hang assumed power and their duties were turned over to the Circuit Inspectors, anch'al-sa (KSC 16. 39b).
In the sixth month (July 7 - Aug. 5) of 1225, Ch'oe U established the *Chöngbang* or Civil Council in his residence. The officials of the Civil Council who were appointed government officials had private designations, as opposed to the official title of their posts, viz., those who became ministers were called *Chöngsaek sëngsôn* or Ministers who were members of the Civil Council; those of the official grade of Third Class were called *Chöngsaek sangsô* or Presidents of Departments who were members of the Civil Council; those of the official grade of Fourth Class and below were called *Chöngsaek sogyông* or Secretaries who were members of the Civil Council. Beneath the latter were selected literati called *Chöngsaek sôje* or Scribes, who were also known as *p'il-to-ji* (Mo. biçigeči) 32, who carried writing materials and made notes on matters brought up for Ch'oe's decision by the officials of the Civil Council. It is related that at the time the Civil Council was established, all the officials had gone to Ch'oe U's residence to present the Annual Résumé of Government *chöngnyŏn tomok* 33. As Ch'oe U sat and heard the reports, officials below the Sixth Class in official grade bowed twice, while those outside the hall prostrated themselves on the ground (KSC 15. 34b). The Annual Résumé of Government undoubtedly included the personal record sheet, generally known as *chöngan* 政案, which listed the merits and demerits of each official and which formed the basis for advancement. The decisions reached in the Civil Council were passed on to the King who "simply handed them down and that was all." The Civil Council, at any rate, outlasted the military overlords. Following the fall of the Ch'oe clan it was established in an appropriate palace at the suggestion of the Confucianist Yu Kyong (KS 105. 2a). It was abolished in 1298, reestablished in 1320, abolished and immediately reestablished in 1345, abolished and reestablished once more in 1352, and, during the reign of King Chang昌 (r. 1389), the designation was changed to *Sangsô-sa* (KS 75. 2b–7a; KSC 15. 34b; IC sôlch'ôn 1. 8b–9a; IC 9A; CHSL 4. 25a).

In addition to the above there were other organs and units associated closely with the Ch'oe clan. The Ch'oe holdings, for example, were handled by the Household Bureau of the Ch'oe clan, known first as *Hŭngnyŏng-*pu 興寧府 and later as *ChinYang-*pu 晋陽府. But far more important were the various military units which grew powerful during the rule of the Ch'oe clan, and which included the *tobang* or Guard Corps. The term *tobang* was originally used by the military overlord General Kyŏng Taesŭng for a select unit of 110 bodyguards he organized in 1179 and which was disbanded following his death in 1183. Shortly after Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn rose to power, a sudden crisis developed when his brother Ch'oe Ch'ungsu 崔忠粹 (d. 1197; BTKP
24. 228) rebelled with 1 000 soldiers. Ch’oe Ch'ungh6n subsequently formed a private guard unit, selecting those that were brave and strong from among the civil and military functionaries, and the soldiers. They were divided into six units, p6n (34), to do guard duty on alternate days at the Ch’oe residence and were called the tobang or Guard Corps; they also acted as an escort when Ch’oe left his home. Originally composed of six units, by 1257 their strength had increased to thirty-six units. During the rule of Ch’oe U, the designations Inner Guard Corps, nac-tobang (35), and Outer Guard Corps, oe-tobang (36), appear which indicates a division of this large group although the reason for the division or its significance is unknown (35). The Guard Corps, although originally the private guard of Ch’oe Ch’ungh6n, assumed an important role as a power instrument and the later military ruler: Im Y6n utilized a six unit Guard Corps. The Guard Corps was finally disbanded in 1270 following the fall of the Im clan (KS 100. 18a; KS 129; HY 17. 36; TT 29. 4; TT 34. 74; TUK 6. 36b-37a).

Other military units included the S6bang or Civil Guards established by Ch’oe U. It is related that among Ch’oe U’s retainers, mun’gaek (37), there were many learned scholars and so, in 1227, they were divided into three units. While their duties are not entirely clear and it is difficult to see a distinction between the Civil Guards and the Guard Corps, they did act as a guard unit. It has been suggested that they were scribes who also did guard duty (37). The Civil Guards were disbanded in 1270 following the downfall of the Im clan (KS 129; KS 130. 26b).

A discussion of other military units associated with the military rulers and the Ch’oe clan in particular, is contained in the Appendix 'Patrols', py6ilch’6.

As Ch’oe Hang was consolidating his own power, Mongol-Kory6 relations which had been relatively calm during the interlude following the death of Gǔyük in 1248, once again became turbulent. When Mongke (Hsien-tsung, r. 1251-1259) ascended the throne, he repeated the two strong Mongol demands that the King visit the Mongol Court and that the Kory6 authorities leave Kanghwa Island and return to the old capital on the mainland (KS 24. 3a; KSC 17. 4a). The Chief Ministers and those of the official grade of the fourth rank and above discussed a reply to the edict. While it was suggested that the Crown Prince be sent to the Mongol Court, a second proposal was made that they could offer the excuse that the King was too old and ill to visit the Mongol Court and that there was still time to re-examine the proposition of sending the Crown Prince (KS 24. 3a-b).

Some two thousand Eastern Jürčen troops were reported crossing the frontier in mid-1252 (KS 24. 4a), just prior to the arrival of a delegation of
Mongol envoys who again endeavored to get the King to cross the straits and receive them. The Korean refusal to follow the Emperor's instructions infuriated the Mongols (KS 24. 4b). By the autumn of 1252, Koryŏ quietly began to prepare for the worst and Special Supervisors of Defense 38) were sent to all the mountain citadels of refuge (KS 24. 5a). In early 1253, three hundred Eastern Jürčen cavalry surrounded Tungju 39) in the northwest (KS 24. 5), a small raiding party was reported in the summer and then, a few days later, the gravity of the situation was revealed. Some inhabitants of Wŏnju 魏州 who had been taken captive by the Mongols, returned to inform the Koryŏ authorities that A-mu-k' an and Hong Pogwŏn had told the Emperor that Koryŏ was building heavy fortifications and had no intention of returning to the mainland. The Emperor, they said, had ordered the Imperial Brother Sung- chu 40) to take a force of 10,000, go through the nation of the Eastern Jürčen and enter from the Eastern Frontier-District. At the same time, he had ordered A-mu-k' an and Hong Pogwŏn to proceed to the Northern Frontier-District. These forces, the informants said, were then encamped at Ta-i- chou 大伊州 (KS 24. 6a).

Actual operations were under Prince Yekü 41) who sent a delegation of sixteen men to the Koryŏ court in the fifth month of 1253 (KS 24. 6a), but apparently there was no change in the Korean position, for on August 3 (chia- shen 甲申 day of the seventh month) of 1253, Mongol troops crossed the Yalu. Dispatches were immediately sent to the Circuit Inspectors, anch'alsa, and the Civil Governors, summunsa, to lead the people to seek refuge in the mountain citadels and coastal islands (KS 24. 6b). By August 10 (hsin-mao 辛卯 day of the same month) Mongol forces had forced the Taedong River 杞江 (KS 24. 7a).

An attack on Kanghwa was evidently anticipated, for the Koreans practiced naval warfare in the straits, but far more active were the regional patrols, pyodich'o (KS 24. 7a).

The Koryŏ Chief Ministers had debated whether or not the Crown Prince, tonggung 東宮, or his younger brother Ch'ang 42) 慶公, the Duke of An'-gyŏng 安慶公, should be sent to lead the officials of the third rank and below out to submit (KS 24. 7; KS 130. 48b-49b). In a previous discussion regarding submission, Ch'oe Hang told the ministers, all of whom advised submission, that they had submitted the spring and autumn tribute continuously and they had sent three hundred persons (as envoys) who had not yet returned. Even though they submitted, Ch'oe said, he feared it would be profitless (KSC 17. 8a-b).

Even as they met, one Mongol force rode through the northeast pillaging and a second force was active in Sŏhae Province. Prince Yekū had sent mis-
sives repeating the Mongol demands, informing the Koryó authorities that he had been sent to find out if the King were really too old and sick to go to the Mongol Court, and he had set a limit of six days for the King to appear on the mainland (KS 24. 7b-8b).

After sending gifts to the Mongol commanders, the Koryó Chief Ministers finally decided upon a reply: if the Mongol armies would withdraw, they would leave the islands and return to a peaceful life on the mainland (KS 24. 8b). Yekü replied that the troops could be withdrawn when the King came out and submitted; the alternative was to continue the fighting (KS 24. 9a).

On the mainland the Mongol forces rode unchecked in groups numbering from ten to three thousand. As before, Koryó maintained a defensive position with the exception of the raids of the patrols, pyŏlc'h'o, which were, in the main, limited to small-scale ambushes and surprise attacks (KS 24. 8-14).

Fierce fighting surrounded many of the cities whose garrisons could count on little save their own efforts to withstand the Mongol troops. Ch'ungju managed to hold out through a seventy-day siege which began in the ninth month (Sept. 25 - Oct. 23) of 1253 (KS 24. 9a; KSC 17. 10b-11a) chiefly through the efforts of Special Defense Supervisor Kim Yunhu. When provisions ran out, Yunhu advised his men to forget their class differences and then by way of encouragement, burned the government slave registers and divided up the livestock which had been captured. Yunhu also promised that all who put forth their best efforts would be given official rank. In this way, the soldiers were encouraged and Ch'ungju held (KS 24. 12a; KS 103. 39b-40a; KS 130. 9a; KSC 17. 14a). The Koryó authorities kept Kim's pledge early the following year. Kim himself was made Supervisor of the Gate Guards, kammunwi 監門衛, with the temporary rank of Supreme General, while those of his force, including the government slaves and the paekch'ŏng 白丁 class, were given rank in accordance with their station (KS 103. 40a; KSC 17. 16b).

Other cities were not so fortunate. At Ch'unju the Mongols erected a double barricade of wood around the city to prevent escape. Inside the city the wells ran dry and so the blood of the livestock was drunk. Some, in their hopelessness, burnt themselves and their families to death. An attempt was made by a dare-death squad to break through the palisade but it was unsuccessful. In the end the Mongols slaughtered the inhabitants of the city (KS 24. 9a; KS 121. 12a-b; KS 130. 9a).

In the winter of 1253, Yekü fell ill at Ch'ungju — which was then under siege — and was told by a diviner that he should not remain long at that spot if he wished to recover. And so, leaving A-mu-k'an and Hong Pogwŏn to carry on, he rode north with 1000 picked cavalry. Koryó sent Hŭi 45), the Count
of Yongan, to convey gifts to him at Kaegyong and to request the withdrawal of the Mongol forces. Yekü told them accusingly, "The troops can be withdrawn only when the King crosses the river to welcome my envoys." Then he sent Mangyudai, meng-ku-ta, 10 men to Kanghwa (KS 24. 10a-b).

There had been a great deal of discussion on Kanghwa about the appropriate policy to follow in order to bring about the withdrawal of Mongol forces (KS 24. 8a; KS 24. 9b-10a) and they tried to win some respite by sending gifts to Yekü and his commanders, notably A-mu-k'an (KS 24. 8a-b; KS 24. 10a).

These measures had proven ineffective and so when the delegation led by Mangyudai arrived at the new palace at Sungch'ón-pu, the King, who had formerly received envoys at Chep'o, the entry point on Kanghwa (e.g., KS 24. 6a-b), crossed to the mainland escorted by 80 men of the Night Patrol, ya pyöič'ö, to meet them. Mangyudai accused the King of killing thousands to save himself and charged him to submit. At this point (1235.11 = Nov. 23 - Dec. 21), Yekü sent an envoy to tell them to establish daruyc'í or resident commissioners and to dismantle the fortifications on Kanghwa. There was also a letter from one of his officials demanding gold, silver, otter pelts, ramie cloth, and other items (KS 24. 11a). Answering the letters, Koryo replied that it was not their custom to live exposed and pointed out the tragic truth that they had been the target of plundering pirates since time immemorial. They also reminded Yekü that he had promised to withdraw his forces if the King crossed to the mainland to welcome his envoys but that the promise was not kept. On the contrary, they complained, his letter clearly indicated that the Mongols intended to establish daruyc'í and to station 10,000 troops in Koryo. How, they asked, could they be expected to return to the old capital on the mainland if this was the result of Yekü's promise (KS 24. 11a-b). To the demands for goods they pleaded insolvency but they did send articles as evidence of their good faith (KS 24. 11b).

In the twelfth month (Dec. 22, 1253 - Jan. 20, 1254), the siege at Ch'ungju was finally lifted and, in the first month of 1254, Ch'ang, the Duke of An'gyông, who was destined to play an important role in later events, was dispatched to the Mongol garrison (KS 24. 12a; KSC 17. 15a) 47).

Although the Mongols tried their hand at amphibious warfare, landing seven troopships on Kal Island in the second month (Feb. 19 - Mar. 20) of 1254, and taking captive thirty households (KS 24. 13a), the situation was relatively calm from the winter of 1253 when the siege of Ch'ungju was lifted. This is attributable to the withdrawal of Mongol forces following the dismissal of Prince Yekü due, not to illness, but to his resentment at being attached to the forces of Prince T'a-la-erh. The forces under A-mu-k'an
began their withdrawal in the spring of 1254 after the arrival of Ch'ang, the Duke of An'gyŏng, at their camp (KS 24. 12b).

As the Koryŏ monarch was getting into the habit of crossing to Sŭngch'ŏn-pu, which by this time had grown to a small walled-city, to entertain Mongol delegations in a new Korean move toward reconciliation and, as a pestilence racked the capital (KS 24. 14a), a Master of Divination, chŏnch'ŏm 典箴, of An'gyŏng-pu 安慶府 or Household Bureau of the Duke of An'gyŏng, returned from the Mongols with the news that the Emperor had commissioned Jalairtai, Che-lo-ta 49) 車羅大, to govern Tongguk 50) 東國, i.e., Koryŏ (KS 24. 14a; KSC 17. 16a-17b). Shortly thereafter, a Mongol envoy arrived with a dispatch 51) which said that although the King had come to the mainland, Ch'oe Hang, Yi Ûngnyöl 李應烈, Chu Yonggyu 周永珪, and Yu Kyŏng 52) 柳璥 had not come over. "Was this truly submission?" the note asked (KS 24. 14a-b) 53).
Notes to Chapter III


3. Tanqut-batur 唐古拔都鲁. Tanqut refers, of course, to the nation of that name, also known as Hsi-hsia. Batur, a contraction of Ba'atur (< Bayatur), means 'hero' in Mongolian.

4. The city of Ch'ónju 金州 is in the modern N. Cholla Province. For topographical and historical information see TYS 32. 548b-557b.

5. It is generally said that the Mongols, unskilled in amphibious warfare, and with only a comparatively weak force in Koryŏ, were unable to take Kanghwa Island and so they tried to force the Koryŏ authorities off the island and attempted to bring about their submission by ravaging the mainland. See Yi, *Haeinsa*, Vol. 2, pp. 567-568, and Yanai, *Yüan-tai* ..., p. 127-128. Yanai, op. cit., p. 118, has also noted that the Mongols seldom concentrated their forces during this period but scattered in small groups to pillage. Yet, the Mongols certainly considered the idea of attacking Kanghwa and, in 1232, had even built ships for that purpose. A certain Pyŏn Yŏ who had been captured at T'aeju, persuaded them that it was too dangerous to try and so they burnt the boats. Pyŏn managed to escape and was given the rank of Supreme General for his deed. Cf. TYS 54. 15b-16a.

6. For the role of the astrologers, whose religious function is often overlooked, also see KS 24. 5b. For an example of monks as prophets see KS 23. 28a. A thorough study of the subject has been made by Yi Pyŏngdo, *Koryŏ sidae úi yŏn'gu* 高麗時代の研究 [Research on the Koryŏ Period], Seoul, 1954; another excellent source is Part II of Hyŏn Sangyun's 玄相允, *Chosŏn sasang-sa* 朝鮮思想史 (Part I published in AY 3 (1960) 1, pp. 261-312 and Part II in AY 4 (1961) 1, pp. 299-355; presumably the other sections will also be published in future issues of AY.


The most detailed studies are Ikeuchi Hiroshi, *Mansen-shi kenkyū*, Vol. 2,
pp. 483–642, Tōkyō, 1937, and P. Demiéville, 'Les Versions Chinoises du Milidapañha', Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extrem-Orient XXIV (1924), pp. 1-301; see pp. 190-207. Also see L.G. Paik (Paek Nakhun 白樂睿) 'Tripitaka Koreana', TKBRAS XXXII (1951), pp. 62-78. The carving of the Tripitaka was done by the Bureau for the Tripitaka, Taejiang togam 大藏都監, located outside the west gate of the city of Kangdo. It is interesting to note that this bureau also published the Hyangyak kugap pang 鄉藥救急方, the oldest surviving Korean medical text; a reprint was made in the reign of Yi T'aejong 大宗 (r. 1401–1418), and a second reprint in 1427. The sole surviving copy is at present in the Archives of the Imperial Household Bureau of Japan, cf. Doo Jong Kim (Kim Tujong), 'Hyang Yak Ku Kup Pang', Bulletin No. 12, (1960) of The Korean Research Center, Seoul, pp. 35-36.


9. The intent of the carving and recarving of the Tripitaka has been well summarized by Lee who says that "The intention of this enterprise was to repel the invading Tartars and Mongols by meritorious deeds to Buddha." Cf. P.H. Lee, 'Introduction to the Chang'ga: The Long Poem', Oriens Extremus, 3 (1956), pp. 94-115; also see TYSC 41 and note 7 above.

10. See Sansom, op. cit., p. 441 for the situation in Japan at this time.

11. Winter was normally an ideal time for negotiations. The repeated withdrawal of Mongol forces north to the Yalu region during the winter was not a matter of weather alone but formed an important institution of nomadic life, the hunt. During the frequent periods of respite, Mongol forces in Koryô often occupied themselves in hunting (e.g., KS 23. 40a). This was evidently a common practice and Bar Hebraeus (viz., Gregory Abu'l Faradj, 1225-1286) in his Chronography cites the Mongol Hunting Statue, "When (the Mongols) are unoccupied after a war with enemies, they shall devote themselves to the chase." Cited Vernadsky, 'The Scope ...', p. 351.

12. Chôn 俊, the Duke of Sinan 新安公 (d. 1261), was a descendant in the eighth generation of Hyônjong 顯宗, but he was not Kojong's brother. Kojong had no brothers, as I have pointed out previously. This was simply a Koryô ruse which they had used before and were to use again. Chôn was the son of Wang Ch'um 王椿, the Duke of Hawn 河源公 (cf. KS 90. 9a-b), while Kojong was the son of Kangjong 康宗 (cf. KS 22. 1a; KS 24. 44a-b). Chôn's daughter later married the
Crown Prince (= Wŏnjong) after the latter's first wife had died. For biographical information see KS 90. 9a-b; also see BTKP 114. 1068.

13. Wang Sun 王 disple (1224-1283), the Duke of Yöngnyöng 永寧公, was a descendant in the eighth generation of Koryŏ Hyŏnjong. He later married a Mongol Princess, one of the daughters of Mŏngke, and after the death of Hong Pogwon succeeded to the latter's position as supreme commander of the Korean community in the Liaoyang-Shenyang area. He returned to Koryŏ with Yekŭ's forces (cf., KSC 17. 7b-8a) and then with Jalairtai's forces and, in 1262, he led troops against the rebel Li Tan 李檀 in the Chi-nan 濟南 area. In 1270, he led a contingent of troops to Koryŏ to aid in suppressing the rebellion of the Three Patrols, sam pyŏlch'o. He visited the Koryŏ royal family at this time, but fell ill in the eleventh month of 1270 and returned to Liaoyang. He died in 1283 at the age of 61. He had several sons: Im 琉, Hwa 稀, Che 商, Hŭi 惠, and Ong雍. His YS 166 biography also mentions a son under the Mongol name of Wu-ai 元愛 who went on to a rather successful career as a soldier.

Yanai, Yūan-tai ..., p. 119, says that Sun was sent as a hostage, never to return to his native land. Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 569, says the same. This is incorrect. He returned with his family in 1270, as I have said above. Cf, KS 26. 34a. For biographical and historical information see KS 90. 7a-9a and YS 166. 1a-b; also see BTKP 119. 1114.

14. The term T'u-lu-hua 秉 藤花, Mo. turqaq, 'guards', is defined following its appearance in KS 23. 35b: "T'u-lu-hua, in Chinese they say hostage son, chih-tzu 節子." P. Pelliot, Notes sur l'histoire de la Horde d'Or, pp. 15-16, defines the term as "garde du corps"; they were so called, because they often performed guard duty at court. Also see p. 518, Lien-sheng Yang, 'Hostages in Chinese History', HJAS 15 (1952), pp. 507-521; this study is also incorporated in Studies in Chinese Institutional History, Cambridge, 1961. Reference to this substitution is mentioned in a decree issued in 1268, cf. YKC 13a-b.

15. Üyer, Wu-yeh-erh 吳 也而, had accompanied Sartaq's forces in the conquest of Liaotung in 1230 and subsequently followed him into Koryŏ in 1231-1232. His activities in North China have been detailed by Martin, op. cit., passim. His biography in the Yūan shih makes it plain that a royal hostage had been demanded as a prerequisite for the withdrawal of Sartaq's forces earlier. According to this account, "Koryŏ was afraid and requested peace. Wu-yeh-erh (Üyer) instructed them saying, 'If we can take the Heir Apparent as a hostage, then we will withdraw the troops.'" (YS 120. 15a). For the reconstruction of the name Üyer see p. 43, P. Pelliot, 'Notes sur le "Turkestan" de M. W. Barthold', TP XVII (1930), pp. 12-56.
16. Hong Pogwŏn's father, Hong Taesun 共大純 (fl. 1218-1250) was not among those released. He was apparently freed in 1250. Cf. KS 23, 41b-42a; KS 130, 4b (YKC and YS 154, 1a write Hong Taesŏn 共大儒).

17. Contributing to the peace was the death of Ŭgŏdei in late 1241; the Empress handled affairs until the election of Güyük in 1246.

18. "Pyŏlgam 奴將 were special supervisors in charge of temporary bureaus; logam 奴將 designated a supervisory bureau; kam 奴将 designated a supervisor of a permanent bureau.

19. Yanai, Yūan-tai ..., pp. 120-122, attributes the 1247 invasion of Korea to the Korean failure to submit tribute.

20. Plan de Carpine mentioned that several princes of the Ch'i-tan and the Solanges (= Koreans) were present at the Mongol court at this time. Reference is probably being made to Prince Sun. Cf. Rockhill, The Journey of William ..., p. 20.

21. When the Koryŏ court was in formal session, the King sat facing south. The civil officials lined up according to rank on the east, hence the name tongban 東班 or eastern file; they were also called munban 文班 or literary group. The military officials lined up according to rank on the west, hence their designation sŏban 西班 or western file; they were also called muban 武班 or military group. Collectively, they came to be known as yangban 兩班 and this term took on the meaning of 'aristocracy, upper classes'. The term yangban is still used today, but chiefly as a term of reference meaning simply 'gentleman, gentlemen'. There was one other pan in the Koryŏ system, viz., the namban 南班 or southern file, after their position at court, whose members consisted chiefly of palace functionaries who were as a group restricted to positions up to, but not beyond, the official grade of Eighth Class. The positions of the officials at court are set forth in detail in KS 67. 31b-32a. The yangban as a system was established in the 14th year of the reign of Sŏngjong (r. 982-997), cf. Suematsu Yasukazu, Kôrai no shoki no ryŏban ni tsuite 高麗の初期の兩班について [Concerning the Yangban of the Early Koryŏ Period], TG 36 (1946) 2.

22. Piracy had been endemic in Korean waters since time immemorial. Korean coastal settlements were easy prey and the several thousand (3,000 plus) islands along the Korean coasts made Korean coastal waters especially attractive to freebooters. Who these Sung 'pirates' were I do not know. The powerful Sung pirates Chu Ch'ing 朱清 and Chang Hsüan 張瑄 are known to have had a large fleet operating in Chinese waters. Later, in 1290, after they had deserted to the Mongols, they were commissioned to transport grain from Korea and Manchuria. Cf. Jung-Pang
Lo, 'The Controversy over Grain Conveyance During the Reign of Qubilai Qaqa'n, 1260-1294', *FEQ* 13 (1954) 3, pp. 262-285 and H. F. Schurmann, op. cit., p. 126, note 3. Lo and Schurmann give several examples of Sung pirates who operated along the China coast in the thirteenth century. There were also many Chinese adventurers with the Wakō. Brown, loc. cit., estimates that 20-30% were Chinese. In the seventh month of 1266, a Sung pirate ship was captured by the Koreans; seventy pirates were killed and five prisoners taken in the fighting. Cf. *KS* 26. 8a. For Eastern Jürčen pirates operating along the Korean coast earlier (in the eleventh century), see Ikeuchi Hiroshi, *Mansen-shi kenkyū*, Vol. 2, pp. 265-348.

23. Ch'oe Hang 翔 (d. 1257) was the son of Ch'oe U by a dancing girl. He entered the Buddhist priesthood as a Zen (Kor. Sŏn) priest with the name Manjōn 萬公 and gathered about him a band of rowdy followers who terrorized the areas where he stayed. He was recalled to secular life by Ch'oe U and given the name Hang 翔. He assumed power upon his father's death in 1249, and instituted a purge to secure his own position which extended to the elimination of his stepmother of the Tae clan, her relatives, and supporters. He initially took a girl of (presumably another) Ch'oe cian as a wife but he abandoned her when she became ill and married the daughter of Cho Kyesun 趙季珣, son of Marshal Cho Ch'ung. He had one son, Ûi 翔, as the result of illicit relations while he was a Zen priest. For biographical information see *KS* 129. 41b-52a; also see *CHSL* 4. 29b; and *BTKP* 24. 232.

24. For the various constructions on the island at this time see Yi Pyŏngdo, *Koryŏ Sidae ēi Yŏng'gu*, pp. 275-278.

25. Imamura Tomo 今村朝 in his *Chošen fūzoku shiryō shūsetsu sen, hidarinawa, dakyū, pakachi* 朝鮮風俗資料集說扇左繩 飛騨朝, *Chošen Sotokufu, Keijō* (Seoul), 1937, pp. 278-285, makes some disappointingly desultory comments on polo in Koryŏ and remarks that polo entered Koryŏ from T'ang China via P'ohai and that the first reference appears in 918 in the *Koryŏ-sa*.

26. The Ch'oe fief in Chinyang 晋陽 (mod. Ch'um, Ch'ung in S. Kyŏngsang Province) dates to 1205, when Ch'oe Ch'unghŏn was given an honorary fief of 1 000 households and actual fief of 300 households. For a discussion of the Ch'oe holdings and their growth, see pp. 74-75, Kim Jong-gug (Kim Chongguk) 金鍾國, Kōrai bushin seiken no tokushitsu ni kansuru ichi kōsatsu 朝鮮武士政治の特質に関する一考察 ['Inquiry into the Characteristics of the Military Government of Goryeo'], *CG* 17 (1960), pp. 51-80, which is an excellent study of the military government.
27. In addition to the references cited in the text, I have drawn material for this résumé of the organs of the military government and the Ch'oe clan from the following studies: Kim Sanggi, Koryo muin ch'ongch'i kigu ko

高麗時代の重房及び政房に就いて [Concerning the Chungbang and the Ch'ongbang of the Koryô Period] incorporated in pp. 274-295 of Chosen-shi kenkyû 東洋史研究 (pagination continuous), published by the Tôyôshi kenkyû-kai of Kyoto University (printed in Okayama City 岡山市), 1961; and the accounts contained in Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 527 ff and Han'guk-sa sajôn, passim.

28. Kim Sanggi, 'Koryô muin ...', would divide the period of the military government into three periods, viz., pre-Ch'oe (1170-1196), Ch'oe (1196-1258), and post-Ch'oe (1258-1270). Gim Jong-gug, 'Kôrai bushin ...', has pointed out that the early military overlords made effective use of the pubyŏng 府兵 or militia units in the power struggle. This emphasizes the importance of control of the Military Council in the 'pre-Ch'oe' period. Gim also makes the point that provincial armies such as existed in Japan at the time, did not exist during this period in Koryô and that the house troops, kabyŏng, of these military rulers were of a different character. Gim would place the development of strong house armies in the 'Ch'oe' period as against the general view of an earlier development.

29. There were also a Generals' Council, changgunbang 將軍房, and an Officer's Council, kyowibang 校尉房; presumably they were directly subordinate to the Military Council, but little is known of their function. For a discussion see Kim Sanggi, op. cit., p. 209, and Gim, op. cit., p. 75 ff.

30. There were two 'exceptions', viz., Im Yôn received the appointment from Ch'ang whom he had put on the throne and Im Yumu received the appointment from Chong, the Marquis of Sunan 昔安侯, who had been placed in charge when Wŏnjong went to the Mongol court. Cf. Kim Sanggi, 'Koryô muin ...', p. 217. It should be mentioned that the military rulers from Ch'oe U onward, all received appointments as Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, as well.

31. The term Chôngbang 政房 suggests an analogy with the Japanese man-dokoro 政所, the Central Administrative Bureau under the Kamakura and Muromachi Shogunates; the actual resemblance between the two and possible influences remain to be studied.
32. For the reconstruction of this word see p. 257, P. Pelliot, 'Les mots mongols dans le Korye sa', JA 217 (1930), pp. 251-266.
33. Tomok 都 目 during the Yi dynasty signified the promotion and demotion of officials in the sixth and twelfth month of each year. I am uncertain whether it was so used at this time or whether it included other matters as well.
34. Pön 防 was used in the sense of 'shift, watch' when the tobang or Guard Corps was first organized since they were primarily units whose pön or watches did guard duty on a shift basis. The term pön also came to be used in the sense of 'subordinate unit', e.g., in the reign of King U (= Sinu 今禪, r. 1375-1388), the Three Patrols were referred to in retrospect as "the three units, pön, of our nation's Night Patrol" (KS 81. 26b). The tobang or Guard Corps grew in size until it contained 36 units, pön.
35. Kim Sanggi, 'Koryô muin ...', p. 231, believes that when Ch'oe U took over the military government, he organized his own house troops into the Inner Guard Corps for his own protection and then designated the tobang established by Ch'oe Ch'unghôn as the Outer Guard Corps to do guard duty at the homes of his relatives.
36. Gim Jong-gug, 'Korai bushi ...', has studied the relationship of the munggaek or 'retainers' to the military overlords and has pointed out that the munggaek of the early military rulers were themselves often military men of high rank.
37. Cf. Kim Sanggi, 'Koryô muin ...', p. 238; however, also see Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 532. Kim, op. cit., pp. 237-238, sees Mongol influence here and in the scribes of the Supreme Directorate as well as in Ch'oe U's mounted guard corps, the ma pyŏlch'o 马 別 抄 . Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 529, believes the use of the Mongol term for scribe is reflective of later Mongol influence and not their original designation.
38. Pangho pyŏlgam 防 護别監 or Special Supervisors of Defense, were temporary appointments made anew for each crisis and were in charge of the defense of the various mountain citadels of refuge, sansŏng, and, at times, of the walled-cities, which is made clear in KS 24, 25 and 26.
39. For historical and topographical information on the city of Tŭngju 登州 see TYS 49. 1a ff.
40. 'Imperial Brother' Sung-chu 皇弟松枝. I am uncertain of his identity. However, the informants were correct. In 1258, he led troops into the old Hwaju 和州 area where he established a Governor's Command, tsung-kuan-fu, under two Koryô rebels (KS 24. 38b) and in 1259,
he and Yü-ch'ou-ta (Yesüder) were in Tung-ching where they were visited by the Koryó Crown Prince on his way to the Mongol court (cf. KS 24. 42b-43b). Actual operations were, however, under Prince Yekü (cf. KS 24. 7a-b; YKC 9b; CHSL 4. 31a; YS 3. 5a-b; YS 154. 2b; YS 166. 1a); also see note 41.

41. Prince Yekü 也窟大王子; the name occurs in several orthographic variants including: yeh-k'u 也窟 (KS 24. 6; KS 24. 7; KS 24. 8; CHSL 4. 31a) and yeh-hu 耶虎 (YKC 9b; YS 4. 12a). For the reconstruction of this name see Hambis, Le Chapitre CVII... p. 24, who also lists the variants yeh-k'u 野苦 (YS 3. 2b; YS 3. 5b) and yeh-k'u 也苦 (YS 3. 6b). According to Yanai, Yii-tai ... p. 124 note 2, Yekü was the halfbrother of Tolui, M蒙古's father.

42. Wang Ch'ang 王澄 was the second son of Kojông and Queen Anhye. His former name was Kan 侃. He was first made Marquis of An'gyǒng 安慶侯 and then, shortly before being sent to the Mongol Court in 1253, was advanced to Duke 伯公. He was put on the throne in 1269 when Im Yǒn 子衔 deposed Wǒnjiong 子荣. Ch'ang's elder brother, but was deposed the same year as a result of Mongol pressure. He was posthumously canonized Yǒnjiong 英宗. His son Hyǒn 儉, the Marquis of Hanyang 漢陽, married a daughter of King Ch'ungnyǒl 忠烈王. For biographical information see KS 91. 6a-7a; BTKP carries no entry.

43. For slavery in the Koryó period see Kameda Keiji 亀田敬二 'Kórai no nubi ni tsuite', 高麗の奴婢に就いて [Slavery in Koryó], SG 26 (1936) and 28 (1937); Sudō Yoshikose 周藤吉之, 'Kórai makki yori Chǒsen shoki ni itaru nubi no kenkyū', 朝鮮初期に至る奴婢の研究 [Research on Slavery from the End of the Koryó period to the Beginning of the Yi Dynasty], RGK 9 (1939), Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 4.

44. For a study of the paekchǒng 白丁 in the Koryó period and a critical review of previous studies, see Hatada Takashi 旗田隆, 'Kórai jidai no hakutei 高麗時代の白丁 "Paekchǒng in the Koryó Period", CG 14 (1959), pp. 291-308. For the paekchǒng in general see Imanishi Ryû 尾西龍, Chǒsen hakutei kō 朝鮮白丁考 [A Study of the Korean Paekchǒng], Geibun 藝文 IX, 4 (Kyǒto 1918), pp. 337-363; H. Passin, 'The Paekchǒng of Korea; a brief social history', Monumenta Nipponica XII (1956-1957), pp. 195-240; and H. Passin, 'Untouchability in the Far East', Monumenta Nipponica XI (1955), pp. 247-267. In the latter study, Passin remarks (p. 235, note 18) of the term paekchǒng that "... until the Yi Dynasty, it referred to a subclass of the 'good' people, just as in Japan, that had 'neither government service nor property'. This usually included farmers."
45. Hui, the Count of Yongan 永安伯 (d. 1263), was the son of Wang Soun, the Duke of Yangyang and the nephew of Sinjong 神宗. For biographical information see KS 91. 1a; also see BTKP 115. 1078.

46. The official was termed hu-hua-chi 胡花赤 but I am unsure of the meaning.

47. Yu, op. cit., p. 31, says that Prince Ko was sent to the Mongols as a hostage at this time. He gives no source and I have failed to find that there was even a Prince Ko living at this time. There were two royal princes at this time, namely, Ch'on, the heir-apparent and Ch'ang, his younger brother. I believe that Yu erred due to the confused text of HYS 249. 4b which is the only source I have seen which might have caused him to make such a mistake. In the HYS text there is a mass confusion of several Korean Kings and Prince Ko enters the confusion. This Prince Ko had not yet been born. If Prince Ch'ang is meant, then it is a different story. He did go to the Mongol Court at this time. It was possibly Prince Ch'ang and his party whom Friar William of Rubruck mentions seeing at Möngke's court in 1254, although it could well have been another group since Friar William calls them simply 'envoys'. Cf. Rockhill, The Journey of William . . ., pp. 152-154.

48. According to YS 3. 4a, Prince Yekü was dismissed from command of the forces attacking Koryo in the 1st month of 1253, and Jalairtai was appointed to succeed him. The error in dating has already been pointed out by Yanai, Yüan-tai . . ., p. 124 note 4. YS 3. 5a-b carries the entry dated the 12th month of 1253, that Prince Yekü was commanded to conquer Koryo; this entry is also erroneously dated. YS 3. 5b carries the entry, dated in 1254, that Jalairtai was commanded to subjugate Koryo and shortly thereafter, he appeared in Koryo. YKC 9b dates the appointment of Yekü in 1253 and the appointment of Jalairtai in 1254. The first we hear of Yekü in the Koryo records is in the fourth month of 1253 (KS 24. 6); the last we hear of him in the Koryo records is in the eleventh month of 1253 (KS 24. 11). Therefore, his appointment was in early 1253, and his dismissal and the subsequent appointment of Jalairtai was either in late 1253 or early 1254. As for Prince T'a-la-erh 塔剌兒, I cannot but wonder if the la of this name is not a scribal error, as there was a Prince (of the first rank), Kuo-wang 國王, Tačar 塔察兒, who was the grandson of Temüge-otőigin whose descendants to the fourth generation inherited the former lands of P'u-hsien Wan-nu as an appendage.

49. Jalairtai, the father of Taču, was of the Jalair tribe and served Činggis
(YS 133. 1a-b). From 1254 to 1258, he led the Mongol forces against Koryŏ, accompanied first by Hong Pogwŏn and later by the latter's son Hong Tagu (YKC 9b). There are several orthographic variants of the name. KSC usually renders Ch'e-lo-ta 車羅大. YKC 9b has Cha-la-lai 札剌台 (as does YS 133. 1a-b), Cha-la-ta 劉剌得 and Ch'e-tz'u-ta 車剌大 (for tz'u read la). While the period of time involved was considerable and we do not know his age during the latter period, Mongol generals of seventy years are known to have been with the Mongol forces in Koryŏ (cf. KS 103. 26a).

50. Tongguk 東國 was one of the early designations for Korea. Other names included Solongyos, which Shiratori would trace to Kor. Silla 新羅 plus Ch. kuo 國. Cf. Shiratori Kurakichi, Shiragi no kokugō ni tsuite 新羅の國号に就いて [Concerning the National Designations for Silla], Rekishi chirī, Vol. 8, No. 5, pp. 369-454. There was also an ancient name for Korea in Central Asia and towards the end of the T'ang it was written Mukuri in Sanscrit and Mug-lig in Tibet. Cf. Bagchi, Deux lexiques sanskrit-chinois, rev. ed., 1929, I, 295, cited Pelliot, Notes on Marco Polo, p. 235; also see Shiratori, loc. cit. There is, however, reason to believe that Mug-lig, the Turkish Bükli, transcribes Mo-he 藩號 (Kor. Malgal), cf. G. Clauson, 'À Propos du Manuscrit Pelliot Tibétain 1283*', JA CCXLV (1957), pp. 11-24. The name of Korea was transmitted to the west with the 'Gori' of Giovanni da Empoli (1514). Cf. Pelliot, op. cit., pp. 234-237 who suggests that the 'Gori' of Fra Mauro is probably the same name in which case such knowledge should have reached Europe at least in the middle of the 15th century. For this designation see M.C. Hagenauer, 'Encore la question des Gores', JA CCXXVI (1935), pp. 5-115. There were many other designations for Korea, for which see the chapter "Kukho-ryu" 國號類 in Ch'oe Namson 李南善, Chosŏn sango sik 朝鮮常識: Chiri-p'yŏn 地理篇, Seoul, 1948, pp. 131-162.

51. The dispatch also accused the Korean authorities of executing Korean functionaries who had submitted their cities. A certain Yi Hyŏn 李倪 was one of the persons concerned (KSC 17. 17a) and he had been beheaded in the market-place, his property confiscated, and his relatives exiled to islands (KSC 17. 15a-b). The Korean authorities were able to produce two other deserters whom they displayed to the envoy to allay his suspicions (KSC 17. 17b).

52. Yu Kyŏng 柳嶽 (1212-1289); his style, cha, was Ch'ŏnnyŏn 天年; another style was Changji 藏之. He passed the exams in the reign of Kojong and gradually rose to be Headmaster, taesasonq 大司成, of
the National Academy, *kukchagam*. He worked in the Ch'ongbang or Civil Council while Ch'oe Hang was overlord and was one of the principal leaders in the overthrow of Ch'oe Ùi which ended the rule of the Ch'oe clan. He was later exiled by Im Yŏn, but was subsequently summoned to return. He was later exiled again, and died in 1289 at the age of 79. He was given the posthumous appellation of Munjong. One of his more noteworthy endeavors was that he was in charge of the Historiographical Bureau, *sagwan*, while the Veritable Records, *sillok*, of Sinjong, Huijong, Kangjong, and Kojong were being compiled. He had one son, Sung (1248-1298; *BTKP* 153.1401). For biographical information see KS 105.1a-8a; also see *BTKP* 151.1384.

53. This was not the first time that the Mongols had attempted to coax one of the Ch'oe military rulers to the mainland. In 1232, they had tried, also unsuccessfully, to get Ch'oe U to leave Kanghwa. Cf. KS 23.24b.
Chapter IV

THE INVASION OF JALAIRTAI-QORČI

On September 6, 1254 (jen-hsu 月戌 day of the seventh month), the Northwest Commissioner of Men and Horse reported that Jalairtai had crossed the Yalu at the head of a force of 5,000 men (KS 24. 14b). By September 8 (chia-tzu 先子 day of the same month), 3,000 Mongol advance cavalry soldiers reached Sŏhæ Province (KS 24. 15a). By the time that the main Mongol forces entered the northwest on August 19 (ping-tzu 丙子 day of the eighth month), the advance cavalry had reached Kwangju 广州 (KS 24. 15a).

Ch'ang, the Duke of An'gyŏng, returned with ten Mongol envoys who undoubtedly repeated the Mongol demands (KS 24. 15a) and Koryŏ sent a delegate to Jalairtai's camp with gifts of gold, silver, wine utensils, pelts, and coins for Jalairtai, and the other Mongol commanders as well as for Hong Pogwŏn and Sun, the Duke of Yŏngnyŏng. When this delegate returned he brought news of a new modification of the Mongol demands: when the ministers and people came out to submit, they were to shave their heads 1) (KS 24. 15b).

With no sign of Koryŏ's willingness to submit, Jalairtai's forces swept southward to renew the attack on Ch'ungju but a violent storm caused them to lift the attack almost immediately (KS 24. 16a). As the Mongol forces rode south, dispatches from the Eastern Frontier-District reported many Eastern Jürčen troops crossing the border (KS 24. 15b).

In the next 10th month (Nov. 12 - Dec. 11), a Mongol force attacked the mountain citadel at Sangju 尚州 where their fourth ranking official was shot by a Buddhist monk from Hwangnyŏng Temple 黃嶺寺. The siege was finally lifted after the Mongols had lost an estimated fifty percent of their force (KS 24. 16a).

Koryŏ envoys sent to request the withdrawal of Mongol forces (KS 24. 16) returned with the news that Jalairtai had said, "If Ch'oe Hang [reverently] leads the King out to the mainland, then the troops can be disbanded" (KS 24. 20a; also see CHSL 4. 32a). But it was still to be some time before Koryŏ was to submit completely.

In the first month (Feb. 9 - March 9) of 1255, inhabitants of Taegu 大邱 (= Taegu 大邱 ?) who had been captured and then escaped, reported that
the Emperor had instructed Jalairtai to return speedily with the army and that the Mongol forces garrisoned in the Northern Frontier-District had already crossed the Yalu (KS 24. 20b). Other detachments of Mongols were also riding northward (KS 24. 20b; KS 24. 21a), and Jalairtai himself was then encamped at Kaegyöng (KS 24. 21a) 2). Taking advantage of the situation, Koryŏ immediately sent envoys to present regional products and again beg for the disbanding of the Mongol troops (KS 24. 20b-21a). The situation remained relatively calm until the eighth month (Sept. 3 - Oct. 1) of 1255. The Mongol forces had withdrawn to the northern borders and were then encamped on the borders of Ùiju and Chǒngju from Mt. Hyŏngje 兄弟山 to Taebu-sŏng 3) (KS 24. 22a). There was some pillaging in the north, mostly of farm oxen and horses (KS 24. 22b; KS 24. 23a) and the Eastern Jürcen still raided on the east coast (KS 24. 22b) but there was no major offensive. The Mongol forces appear to have merely withdrawn north of the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River although at least one raiding party came south of the river (KS 24. 23a).

Martial law was lifted on Kanghwa in the second month (March 10 - April 8) of 1255 (KS 24. 21b) and Koryŏ immediately began to repair the damage. Conditions had reached an extreme with the abandonment of the farms. In the third month (April 9 - May 7) those who had sought safety on the islands and in the mountain citadels were ordered to return to the mainland. The removal of the peasants from the land, in many cases by forced evacuation, to the coastal islands and mountain citadels of refuge had the immediate effect of consuming stores and leaving fields idle 4). To which were added the pillaging of the Mongols and natural disaster in the form of a drought which re-occurred through the late 1250's. There was a general famine and the old and the weak died of starvation in great numbers. Other victims were those distant from their native villages, as were the young as infanticide increased (KS 24. 21b): A continuous stream of escapees made their way back and the roads were covered with the skeletons of the dead. Although small doles of rice were distributed to alleviate the suffering, the dead were without number (KS 24. 22a-b). At the end of 1254, an estimated 206,800 persons had been taken prisoner during Jalairtai's invasion, the number of dead was beyond reckoning, and the countryside was reduced to ashes (KS 24. 20a-b; CHSL 4. 32a). We are told that "... those who died of starvation were multitudinous; [the corpses of] the old and weak clogged the ravines and it reached the point where some tied babies in the trees and left" (TT 33. 71). Officials of the fourth rank and above were ordered to present plans for stabilizing the life of the people, and for withstanding the enemy (KS 24. 22b), one outcome of which was the dispatch of a Commissioner for the Encouragement of Agriculture, kwŏnong-sa 勸農使, to each province (KS 24. 22b; KS 78. 4a). Condi-
tions on the mainland naturally affected those on Kanghwa Island. Maritime transportation of grain had been the principal method utilized prior to the removal to Kanghwa and after the transfer of the capital was implemented, grain transport ships would simply stop at the island instead of proceeding up the river to Kaegyŏng. The general shortage of grain led to the suggestion in 1257 that fields be distributed in lieu of official salaries and a Bureau for Distributing Land, kŭpchŏn togam 給田都監, was established 5) to implement the suggestion (KS 78.18b).

In the eighth month (Aug. 4 - Sept. 2) of 1255, reports received of Mongol forces raiding south of the Ch'ŏngch'ŏn River and the appearance of twenty Mongol cavalrmen at Sŭngch'ŏn-pu were sufficient to cause the capital to declare martial law again (KS 24.23a). Korean envoys returned with six Mongol envos the next month to report that the Mongol forces were again moving south 6). Jalairtai and the Duke of Yŏngnyŏng, in command of a great force, had reached the Western Capital and the advance cavalry was already at Kŭmgyo 7) in Sŏhae Province.

Mongol activity in amphibious warfare increased. They built ships and attacked Cho Island 猶島, unsuccessfully however, in late 1255 (KS 24.24a). Then, in the first month (Jan. 29 - Feb. 27) of 1256, word was received that the Mongols were planning to attack the southern islands so a fleet, chusa 8), with 300 men was sent south under General Yi Kwang 李廣 and General Song Kunbi 宋君斐 (fl. 1250-1270) (KS 24.24b). In the engagement which followed, General Song inflicted a defeat on the Mongol forces by a ruse and captured four of their officials (KS 24.25a).

As usual envoys were scurrying back and forth and Jalairtai told one group that if the King came out to welcome his envoys and if the Crown Prince went to the Mongol court, then the Emperor would cause the army to be withdrawn (KS 24.25b) 9).

In mid-1256 the Koryŏ patrols, pyŏlch'o, were again active on the mainland, attacking small Mongol detachments (KS 24.25b-26a). The Mongols themselves were at the same time attacking Ch'ungju again (KS 24.26a). The effectiveness of the Koryŏ sallies, in which even Ch'oe Hang's Guard Corps, tobang 都房, participated (KS 24.25a), is attested when Jalairtai angrily told a Korean envoy who had come to his Naju 10) camp, "If you desire peace and friendship, then why do you kill our soldiers in great numbers?" (KS 24.26a-b).

But as long as Mongol forces were on the peninsula, action against them could be expected. Jalairtai was encamped at Mudŏng Mt. 無等山 at Haeyang 海陽 (mod. S Cholla Province), whence he sent a force of 1 000 south to pillage (KS 24.26b-27a). People were again being evacuated to coastal
islands when Jalairtai, the Duke of Yongnyong, and Hong Pogwôn arrived outside of Kaphwan River 甲患江. They unfurled their flags, pastured their horses in the fields, and climbed Mt. T'ongjin 通津山 to look at Kangdo 江都 (the capital on Kanghwa). Then they withdrew to camp at Suanyón 守安縣 (KS 24. 27a). If an assault on Kanghwa was planned it never materialized, for in the ninth month (Sept. 20 - Oct. 19) of 1256, Kim Sugang 江平 returned from the Mongols with the report that the Emperor had sent an envoy with an order for the army's return. A few days later Jalairtai ordered the army to return northward (KS 24. 27a-b). In the following month, martial law, after having been imposed for fifteen months, was lifted and the soldiers were disbanded (KS 24. 27b).

The respite from the Mongol forces was not to last long, but in the interim there were other diversions. In late 1256, Sungshan 十二, the Governor, tsung-kuan 京關, of T'ung-ching province (lu 路) led his family and a handful of followers to submit to Koryô. When asked his reasons for coming, Sungshan replied: "It is not because the Mongols are perishing while your country is flourishing. I came simply because I have committed three crimes. When Jalairtai entered the southern districts [of Koryô], I [was charged with] garrisoning Úiju and I was unable to defend it; that is the first. Then, they sent me to encourage agriculture, [but] the forage and grains were not abundant and the storehouses were barren; that is the second. When I heard that Koryô soldiers were coming, I sent seventy men to investigate. Not one man returned; that is the third." For his submission, Sungshan was rewarded with grain, implements, textiles, and three slaves (KS 24. 27b-28a).

Conditions were bad both in the countryside and on Kanghwa; thieves entered the òaeja-pu 太子府 or Household Bureau of the Crown Prince and stole a number of items (KS 24. 28a) and we read that: "There was no snow this winter 14; and [through] starvation and disease, the roads were once again covered with corpses. One kín 斯 of silver was worth [only] two kok 斯 of rice" (KS 24. 28a). The regions were in similar condition or worse. One uprising at Wônju 原州 (in mod. Kangwôn Province) in mid-1257 was finally crushed after a battle at the Hûngwôn Granary 興元倉 (KS 24. 28b) which suggests a 'rice riot'. In the intercalar fourth month (May 16 - June 13) of 1257, there was a great famine in the capital (KS 24. 29a). The KS period of spring hunger brought a general tightening of belts in the capital; it also brought out the ravenous Eastern Jürčen in the northeast (KS 24. 29a; KS 24. 29a–b) and renewed Mongol activity in the northwest (KS 24. 29a–b). Koryô made her usual preparations by dispatching Special Supervisors of Defense, pangho pyolgam 強泊警監 to all the strongholds (KS 24. 29b). Envoys were again sent to request the withdrawal of troops as soon as the Mongol advance cavalry
reached Kaegyŏng, and P'u-po-ta 豆波大 told the Koryŏ envoy Yi Ŭng 李凝, "Whether we go or remain is up to Jalairtai" (KS 24. 29b). By the sixth month (July 13 - Aug. 11) of 1257, the main Mongol force had arrived in the Western Capital (KS 24. 29b) and Mongol envoys once again began appearing at Sŏngch'ŏn-pu to be taken to the Chep'o Hostel 桀浦館 at the entry port on Kanghwa and then escorted to see the King in the palace at Chep'o (KS 24. 30a). The familiar demands were made. Jalairtai told one Korean envoy, "If the King comes out in person, I will then withdraw my forces. And, if you order the King's son to enter our Court, eternally, there will be no later grief" (KS 24. 30a). This, of course, was actively debated by the Koryŏ authorities and many strongly favored sending the Crown Prince as hostage in order to secure peace. It was finally decided, "First, to send a royal kinsman to survey the situation and thereafter, they could send [the Crown Prince]. Then, they dispatched Hŭi, the Duke of Yŏngan, to present 100 silver pyŏng-coins, ceremonial gifts (lit. fruit and wine), and other items to Jalairtai!" (KS 24. 30b). 'When he returned from Jalairtai's camp, he said that Jalairtai asked, 'Why have you come?' He answered, 'While Your Excellency has ordered your forces to return southward, you have also prohibited them from destructively trampling [the growing] grain. As our King was greatly pleased, he sent me [Your] Servant, to offer this cup of wine.' Jalairtai said, 'I will withdraw and camp at Pongju on the day the Crown Prince arrives.'" (KS 24. 30b).

A decision to send the Crown Prince to the Mongol Court as a hostage was being actively sought by the Chief Ministers at this time (KS 24. 30b-31a) and this resulted in Kim Sik 金軒 again being sent to Jalairtai's camp to present gifts of ceremonial items (lit. fruit and wine), silver coins, otter pelts, and other articles in order to observe his intentions (KS 24. 31a 15).

The Mongols again tried their hand at amphibious warfare, capturing Sinwi Island 神威島 (KS 24. 31a; KS 121. 22b) and invading Ch'angnin Island 昌麟島 (KS 24. 31b-32a). But in naval matters, Koryŏ with her long maritime tradition completely outclassed them. The Koryŏ fleet also provided transport for forces sent against the Mongols. One instance occurred in the summer of 1256, when, "they sent General Yi One-Thousand 李阡 with a fleet with over 200 men to ward off the Mongols in the southern provinces" (KS 24. 26b). "General Yi One-Thousand fought with the Mongol forces at Onsu-hyon 温水縣 (in mod. S. Ch'ungch'ŏng Province), took several tens of heads and seized over 100 men and women who had been taken captive. [Upon their return] Ch'oe Hang rewarded the soldiers with six kŭn of silver" (KS 24. 26b).

In the tenth month of 1257, Kim Sugang returned from the Mongol Court
where he had once again been successful in obtaining the Emperor's permission to have the Mongol armies in Koryŏ withdrawn (KS 24. 32a) which once more brought a measure of peace to the peninsula. During the months that Kim had been at the Mongol court, Ch'ŏe Hang had died (KS 24. 29a) to be succeeded by his son Ch'ŏe Ŭi 17). Discussions were again held regarding whether or not to dispatch the Heir-Apparent (as a hostage) as well as preparations for resisting the Mongols (KS 24. 32a).

In the beginning of 1258, as the Mongols were busy walling Ŭiju in the northwest (KS 24. 32b), a plot was afoot in the Koryŏ capital which was to result in the overthrow of Ch'ŏe Ŭi and the final fall of the Ch'ŏe clan from the power it had held for over sixty years. Upon his assumption of power in 1257, Ch'ŏe Ŭi had made some rather niggardly doles of rice (KS 129. 52a-b), but through the continued years of poor harvests and famine he had consistently refused to open the granaries and distribute adequate relief which turned the populace against him (KS 105. 1b; KS 129. 53a-b; KSC 17. 34a). And after Ch'ŏe Hang's death, Ch'ŏe Ŭi, it is related, trusted only Ch'ŏe Yangbaek 18) and Yu Nŭng 19) while he grew cool toward the old Ch'ŏe clan retainer Kim Injun 20) who consequently felt insecure (KS 130. 12a; KSC 17. 34a). Then, when he exiled the cruel and sadistic Grand General Song Kiryu 21), a former supporter of Ch'ŏe Hang and Commander, chiyu, of the Night Patrol, he became even further estranged with Yu Kyŏng, Kim Injun, and the latter's sons who had tried to intervene in Song's behalf. Song was exiled and his supporters were reprimanded by Ch'ŏe Ŭi for intervening (KS 122. 28-29; KS 129. 53b; KSC 17. 34a-b).

Then, the Sinŭigun 22) cavalry's commanding officer, toryŏng, Colonel, Pak Hüisil 23) and Commander, chiyu, Colonel, Yi Yŏnso 李延紹 (fl. 1250's), secretly told a group of people which included Yu Kyŏng, Kim Injun, Kim Sungsun (Injun's brother), Acting Colonel Yi Kongju 李公柱 (fl. 1250's), General Pak Songbi 24) Colonel in Charge (of the Night Patrol?) toryŏng nangjang, Im Yŏn 25), Lieutenant, taejŏng 26), Pak Chŏnsik 李承溪 (fl. 1250's), Junior Colonel, pyŏlchang tongjŏng, 別將同正 Ch’a Songu 27), Colonel Kim Hŏngch’wi 28), and Kim Injun’s sons Kim Taejae 金大材, Kim Yongjae 29), and Kim Sikchae 金式材, that Ch'ŏe was friendly only with the specious and the petty, that he believed slander and was full of superstition; and advised the group that the time for action was growing short. Subsequently, they decided to carry out the matter (of killing Ch'ŏe Ŭi) and set a date, the eighth day of the fourth month because of the lantern viewing (KS 129. 53b; KSC 17. 34b). Kim Injun had invited Ch'ŏe On 30), then Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, ch’umirwŏnsa, to discuss the matter with him (KS 99. 7a). It was probably in this way that Senior Colo-

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nel, chunguangjang 31), Yi Chu 李柱 heard of it. Yi, with Ch'oe On's son, the leader of one of the Royal Guard units, Kyŏnyong haengsu 牵龍行首 Ch'oe Munbon 崔文本, Major, sanwŏn 32) Yu T'ae 李泰, Captain, kyowi 33), Pak Sŏn 朴瑄, Lieutenant Yu Po 俞甫, et al., secretly wrote to Ch'oe Úi and communicated the plot to him. Ch'oe Yangbaek, the father-in-law of Kim Taejæ, one of Kim Injun's sons, was apparently warned by the letters 35), for he reported the matter to Ch'oe Úi (KS 129. 54a; KSC 17. 34b). This was on May 1, 1258 (i.e., ping-tzu 丙子 day of the third month. Cf. KS 24. 32b-33a). Ch'oe Úi hurriedly summoned Yu Nŭng to discuss a plan. By that time the sun had already set. Yu Nŭng advised that as it was night, that there was nothing to be done, but he suggested that a letter of instructions be sent to the Night Patrol Commander, chiyu, Han Chonggwe 36), and that they wait until morning and then summon Yi Irhyu 37), et al., to force the soldiers to subjugate Kim Injun; there was, he said, still time. Ch'oe Úi approved it. (KS 129. 54a; KSC 17. 34b-35a).

Kim Taejæ's wife was present and she heard these measures which she reported to her husband. He in turn reported the matter to his father, Kim Injun, advising him that the matter must be speedily carried through and that there was not much time left (KS 129. 54a; KSC 17. 35a). Kim Taejæ had believed that it was Pak Hŭisil who had leaked the affair to Ch'oe Yangbaek (KS 129. 54a; KSC 17. 34b), and it was not until after Ch'oe Úi's death that it was revealed that Ch'oe Munbon had divulged the matter when one of the letters was found (KS 99. 7a). Kim Injun heard his son's report and then led his sons to urge the Sinŭigun cavalry (to act with them). Kim met Pak Hŭisil and Yi Yŏnso and told them that since the matter had leaked out, that they could not go according to their previous plan (but must act speedily). Then he assembled the plotters and Junior Colonel Pak Yŏngjŏng 朴永貞, Lieutenants Sŏ Chŏng 徐捷 and Yi Che 伊切 38), and Im Yŏn (KS 129. 54b; KSC 17. 35a). He had sent Im Yŏn, Commander Cho Munju 趙文柱, and O Susan 吳壽山 to arrest Han Chonggwe and kill him. He also summoned Commander Sŏ Kyunhan 徐均漢 et al., to assemble the Three Patrols, sam pyŏlch'ŏ 39), at the Hall of Archery, sachʾŏng 射廬. They sent men to cry out in the road, "The Yonggong 合公 (= Ch'oe Úi) is dead!" All those who heard this gathered. Yu Kyŏng and Pak Sŏngbi et al., also arrived. Then Kim Injun suggested that an important minister who held the respect of the people be brought in to lead the crowd as a great affair such as they were embarked upon could not be carried out without a leader. Then he summoned Ch'oe On. Kim also met Supreme General of the Ungyang 鷹揚 guards 40) Pak Sŏngja 朴宋甲 41) and discussed the matter (KS 129. 54b; KSC 17. 35a-b). Kim Injun then summoned Ch'oe Yangbaek. Yangbaek had not even entered the
the hall (where they were meeting) when some soldiers of the patrol, pyǒlch’o, [seized him and] pushed burning torches into his mouth; then they beheaded him (KS 129. 54b; KSC 17. 35b). Im Yŏn also went to the home of Yi Irhyu and beheaded him (KSC 17. 35b; KS 129. 54b). Kim Injun, in the meanwhile, had ordered Ch’oe Ùi’s gate guards not to report the situation. He then distributed files of soldiers in an open space; [their] burning pine [torches] made it bright as day. Although there was a great clamor from the crowd there was not one of Ch’oe house soldiers, kabyŏng 家兵, who knew about the situation (KS 129. 54b; KSC 17. 35b). In the early dawn, the Night Patrol smashed down the walls around Ch’oe Ùi’s home and went inside (the grounds). Sŏng Wŏnbal 42, a strong soldier, and the maternal uncle of Ch’oe Ùi, was guarding Ch’oe’s house and hearing the clamor became alarmed. He managed to hold off the soldiers trying to get through the small door, but seeing that he could not succeed by himself, he wanted to shoulder Ch’oe Ùi over the wall, but Ùi was too fat and heavy. Then Sŏng helped Ùi up to his room and blocked the door with his body. O Susan broke in and Sŏng fled, pursued by the soldiers of the Night Patrol who caught him and beheaded him by the river bank. Ch’oe Ùi and Yu Nŭng were also caught and beheaded (KS 129. 55a).

Then, Yu Kyŏng, Kim Injun, and Ch’oe On, et al., went to the palace to return the government to the King (KS 24. 32b-33a; KS 99. 2a; KS 129. 55a). Kim Injun stepped forward while they were conferring with the King and accused Ch’oe Ùi of sitting and watching the people starve to death without aiding them; it was, he said, an act of righteousness that they had executed him (KS 130. 12b). Promotions were apparently made on the spot. Yu Kyŏng was made Deputy Minister of the Right of the Bureau of Military Affairs, ch’umir- 院右副承宣, Pak Songbi was made Grand General, Kim Injun was made General and the others were all awarded rank in accordance with their station (KS 24. 32b-33a). And then, ’On May 4 (chi-mao 已卯 day of the 3rd month), the King honored the Kangan Hall 康安殿 with his presence. All of the officials offered congratulations. It was like a new enthroning ceremony. When it was over and they were coming out, Pak Songbi and Kim Injun used the occasion to lead all the Meritorious Ministers, the Left and Right Patrols, pyǒlch’o, the Sinŭigun cavalry, and the Guard Corps, tobang, into the courtyard of the audience chamber. They knelt around the King and shouted ’manse’ 万歳 (lit. 10,000 years = ’Long live the King’). Then they doled out the household property of Ch’oe Ùi and it was divided and distributed in accordance with the recipient’s station (KS 24. 33a).

The distribution of the Ch’oe clan’s wealth was not so quickly completed nor was it as meagre as the above passage implies. A few other records of
the disposal of their property in 1258-1259 gives a clearer view of their holdings. Ch'oe Úi's grain was doled out and bestowed upon the officials according to the station of the recipient; the Household Bureau of the Crown Prince, t'aeja-pu, received 2000 bushels (sŏk), the princes, chewang, Chief Ministers, chaech'u, the civil and military officials, even the minor functionaries, the soldiers, the government slaves, chorye 皂 隸, and the common people of the city received doles of at least three bushels (KS 129. 55a). Yu Kyŏng, for example, received two hundred bushels (sŏk) of rice, a class-A mansion, and lands (KS 105. 2a). Silks, paek 朴, presumably from the Ch'oe stores, were given the princes, the Chief Ministers and down to the lower ranking civil and military officials, according to the recipient's station (KS 129. 55b). The horses Ch'oe had raised were divided among the civil and military officials of the fourth rank and above (KS 24. 34a; KS 129. 55b). Colonel Pak Sŏnggae 朴承蓋 was sent to Kyŏngsang Province and Palace Attendant, naesi, Chŏn Chong 金琮, was sent to Chōlla Province to confiscate the slaves, the fields and orchards, the silks and silver, and the grains of Ch'oe Úi and his brother, the Buddhist Priest, Manjong (KS 129. 55b). Some 15000 bushels (sŏk) of rice were later taken from Ch'oe Úi's separate storehouse to supplement the salaries of the officials of the fourth rank and below (KS 80. 16a-b) and, in late 1259, three thousand kyoł 44 of Ch'oe Úi's lands were distributed to the princes and the various officials (KS 78. 4b) 45.

Lavish rewards and promotions followed the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan (KS 24. 33a-34a). Of particular interest for the light it throws on the incident are the special awards made to the soldiers of the Night Patrol and the Sinŭignon (KS 24. 33b) 46, and the individuals given the honorific title of Meritorious Guardian of the Altar of the Earth, wisenko 47 衛社功臣. Those especially honored were Yu Kyŏng, Kim Injun, Pak Hŭisil, Yi Yŏnso, Pak Songbi, Kim Sŏngjun, Im Yŏn and Yi Kongju.

Later, as a result of a petition submitted by the Chief Ministers, the sons of Yu Kyŏng and Kim Injun were each given the official grade of Sixth Class, and were presented with 100 kyoł of fields, and 15 slaves each; the sons of Pak Hŭisil, Yi Yŏnso, Kim Sŏngjun, Pak Songbi and Im Yŏn were each given the official grade of Seventh Class and were presented with 50 kyoł of fields, and five slaves each (KS 24. 36b-37a; KS 105. 2a).

If we look back over these events briefly, it becomes clear that there was discontent among the leadership group and general discontent among the populace. The latter attributable to bad harvests due to drought and the pillaging of the Mongols which led to widespread famine; the former due to the personal relationship between Ch'oe Úi and those who had formerly served the Ch'oe clan. Ch'oe Úi not only failed to issue doles in this period of dearth, but even instituted private tax-collectors on Kanghwa Island.
It is also clear that the military units involved were the Night Patrol and the Sinúigun led by Pak Húisil, Yi Yônso and Im Yôn. There were two groups involved in the struggle against Ch’oe Úii. The Confucian-Royalist faction led by Yu Kyông and supported by the aged literatus Ch’oe Cha (now 72), who desired to send the Crown Prince as a hostage to the Mongols in order to bring an end to the fighting (KS 24. 30b; KS 102. 15b-16a). The real power group, however, was the military faction of Kim Injun, whose interests coincided with those of the Confucianists as far as the elimination of the Ch’oe clan was concerned but who had no desire to drastically alter Koryŏ’s policy of continued resistance to the Mongol forces, although they advocated, as future events show, a temporary cessation of the fighting. As a withdrawal of the Mongol forces could only be gained by concessions to the Mongols, they supported these concessions, e.g., sending the Crown Prince as a hostage. But, as later events testify, complete submission to the Mongols was the notion of the Confucian-Royalists, not of the Koryŏ military.

It also appears that the restoration of a measure of power to the monarch was prompted chiefly by Yu Kyông. As later events show, the overthrow of the Ch’oe clan did not mean that the monarch regained complete control of the government at all. The real power in Koryŏ still remained in the hands of the military. With Ch’oe gone, a struggle began among the men who had overthrown him to reconcentrate power in their own hands. An initial casualty was Ch’oe On, Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, who was banished to distant Húksan Island (KS 24. 33a).

In the meantime, the Koryŏ authorities were still concerned with the Mongol forces on the mainland.

Although the Koryŏ authorities had dispatched the Night Patrol against an advance force of one thousand Mongol cavalry (KS 23. 33b) and skirmishes continued on the mainland (KS 24. 34a-b), they now pursued a policy which sought to bring about the withdrawal of Mongol forces. Thus, in the fourth month (May 5 - June 3) of 1258, when the King heard that Jalairtai had sent an envoy to spy on the actual state of the move back to the mainland, all the civil and military officials were sent across the straits to Súngch’ón-pu where repairs were made to the palaces and to the homes of the officials (KS 24. 33b). But such measures did not fool the Mongols and, when Mongol envoys appeared in the sixth month (July 3 - July 31), they conveyed a threat from the Emperor to storm Kanghwa unless the Koryŏ authorities came to the mainland and submitted. The usual demands were again made: if the King and Crown Prince came to the Western Capital and submitted, the troops would be withdrawn. To all of which the King replied that he was much too old and ill to travel far.

Then, Húi, the Duke of Yöngan, was sent to Jalairtai’s camp (KS 24. 34b-35a).
This Koryô delegation returned and informed the King: Yesüder 50) Yü-ch'ou 悠愁 told me, [Your] Servant, 'The Emperor has placed the business of Koryô with me and Jálairtai. Do you know this? Whether I leave or remain rests simply on whether your nation submits or not. Even though your King does not come out in person, if he sends the Crown Prince to welcome [us] and to surrender in front of the army, then on the same day, we will withdraw the army. If you refuse, then we will unleash our forces and enter the southern regions.' I answered simply, 'The Crown Prince will come to present himself' " (KS 24. 35a-b).

Yet, when Yesüder showed up at Sûngch'ôn-pu in the seventh month (Aug. 1 - Aug. 30) of 1258, he was first asked to come with a few cavalymen and see the Crown Prince at Mt. Paengma 白馬山 (near Sûngch'ôn-pu). "Am I to go and see the Crown Prince or is the Crown Prince to come to see me?" Yesüder asked. A few days later he was informed that the Crown Prince was ill and unable to come. After a few days wait, the Mongols, declaring the falsity of Koryô, let their forces loose to pillage (KS 24. 35b-36a).

A second Mongol delegation from Jálairtai's camp received the same answer from the King himself. "The Crown Prince is ill," the King told Mangyudai, "How can he come out?" (KS 24. 37a-b). For the next ten months the Mongol forces rode rampant over the countryside and even remote mountain villages were sacked. The Eastern Jürčen troops were also active in the northeast and in the winter of 1258, "the Eastern Jürčen came with a fleet, surrounded Song Island 松島 of Kosông-hyon 合城縣, and burnt the warships" (KS 24. 38b).

The Mongols had by this time decided to occupy Koryô themselves. They had begun in the northwest by wangling Úiju in early 1258. When the Eastern Jürčen and Mongol troops attacked in the northwest in late 1258, the people of some fifteen chu-administrations including Hwaju, Chângju, Changju 長州, Úiju 宜州, and Munju sought refuge on Chô Island 猴島. Because of the number of people involved, the Northeast Commissioner of Men and Horse, a certain Sin Chipp'yong 慶縫平, forcibly transferred them to Chuk Island 竹島 which was without wells or springs. Grain supplies were requested, and presumably sent, from the capital. At this time, Cho Hwi 51) of Yongjin-hyon 龍津縣, T'ak Chông 卓定 of Chângju, and men of Munju and Tângju, killed Sin Chipp'yong and the Deputy Commissioners of Hwaju and Tângju, and men of the Capital Patrol, kyông pyôlcho 京別抄 planning to bring in the Mongol forces. Then they attacked Kosông 高城, burning dwellings, killing, and plundering. Subsequently, they submitted the area north of Hwaju to the Mongols. The Mongols then established the Ssang-sông 雙城 Governor's Command, tsung-kuan-fu 拯督府, in the Hwaju
area 52). Cho Hwi was made Governor, *tsung-kuan*, a position which was inherited by his son and grandson; T'ak Chông was made Chiliarch, *ch'ien-hu* 53). Cho's men subsequently guided Mongol and Eastern Jürčen troops in attacking other Korean cities (KS 24. 38b; KS 130. 10a-11a; CHSL 4. 34a).

The appearance of permanent installations on the lower part of the western coast begins with the record of a Koryŏ delegation sent to the daru'yāći or resident commissioner in the twelfth month of 1268, where they blamed Koryŏ's past resistance on the military overlords. Since Ch'oe Ŭi was already dead, they said, they wanted to come to the mainland in order to obey the Mongols' commands but they feared the Mongol troops; "[when] the cat guards the mousehole, [the mouse] simply does not dare to come out," they explained (KS 24. 39b). A second delegation, led by Vice-President of the Department of Justice, *hyŏnbu sirang* 정부侍郎, Yi Ŭng, is recorded as having gone to the Western Capital to the camp of Myriarch Wang 54) (KS 24. 40a) who asked them: "Doesn't your Monarch love his people? Why does he listen to the stories of [the deserters] Yun Ch'un 55) and Sungšan [that he should] not come out and submit? If he submits then even the down on the plants will not be molested." At that time, it is related, Myriarch Wang had led an army of ten thousand to reconstruct the old walls at the Western Capital, and to build warships and open military colonies, *t'un-t'ien* 56), as a long-term occupation policy (KS 24. 40b). Thus, Koryŏ lost her northeast area to the Mongols and Mongol forces had occupied both Ûiju and the Western Capital on a permanent basis.

Koryŏ resistance during this period, while stubborn, was weakening. In the first month (Jan. 25 - Feb. 23) of 1259, the Eastern Jürčen raided Kūm-gang-sŏng 金刚城 and a 3 000-man patrol was sent against them (KS 24. 39b). There was a great increase in the number of revolts, especially those led by the local officials themselves (KS 24. 34a; KS 24. 37b) and in many cases the people would simply kill the Supervisor of Defense and surrender rather than fight (e.g., KS 24. 37b; KS 24. 39a). Some measures were taken in an attempt to bolster loyalty and resistance. For example, in the summer of 1258, "... they bestowed upon each District Magistrate, *hojang* 57), and Colonel of all the walled-cities of the Northern Frontier-District, one kūn of white silver and two bolts (p'il) of black silk gauze" (KS 24. 34b; see also KS 24. 40a).

Such measures were predictably too few and too meagre 58). The last entry for the year 1258, makes the point: "This year the grain of all the provinces was exhausted due to the pillaging of the Mongol troops" (KS 24. 39b). Thus pressed Koryŏ yielded to Mongol demands to send the Crown Prince to the Mongol Court as a hostage. They also agreed to remove the capital from
Kanghwa Island back to Kaegyǒng, but it was still to be many years before they kept the latter promise (KS 24. 40b-41a).

With a peace agreement concluded in the third month (March 26 - April 24) of 1259, priority was given to agriculture and "they ordered the Magistrates, suryǒng , of the chu and hyǒn administrations to lead the people who had fled from the disorders back to the mainland to plow and plant [the land]" (KS 24. 41b; duplicate entry KS 79. 8b).
Notes to Chapter IV

1. Rubruck, Pian de Carpine, and others have described the Mongol custom of shaving a square on the top of the head, shaving both temples to the ears, shaving the back of the head, and then wearing the remainder of the hair in long plaits behind the ears. See Rockhill, The Journey of William ... , p. 72 and Dawson, The Mongol Mission, pp. 101-102. In 1278, when Mongol customs and clothing were introduced into Koryö by fiat, this custom was included. Even students were shaved — the only ones who appear to have escaped this tonsorial treatment were the masters of the Court School. Cf. KS 72. 21b.

2. KS 24 and CHSL 4. 32b-33a credit the withdrawal to the diplomatic efforts of Kim Sugang 金守剛 who had accompanied Mongol envoys to Qaraqorum where he pleaded for the withdrawal of the Mongol forces. See note 11 below.

3. CS Vol. 3 No. 4, p. 242 identifies Taebu-sŏng 大府城 as Ta-fu-ying 大府營. As this was near Úiju, Mt. Hyŏngje was probably in the vicinity of Ch'ŏngju. The camps then were located from Úiju northeast along the Yalu River.

4. Attempts were naturally made to alleviate the situation by bringing fields back into production. In early 1254, commissioners had been sent on an inspection tour of the citadels of refuge and sea islands of Ch'ungch'ŏng, Kyŏngsang, and Ch'olla as well as Sŏhae Province, to measure and distribute land (KS 78. 4a). Then, in late 1256, instructions were issued permitting those who were not in excess of one day from their villages to return to cultivate the fields (KS 78. 4a-b). Wastelands along the coast and lands belonging to the royal household, kung 宮, the temples, sa 寺, and the monasteries, wŏn 院, were distributed to supplement the above (KS 78. 4a-b).

5. Perhaps 're-established' would be a better word here, for this bureau certainly existed earlier. Cf. KS 102. 14b ff.

6. YKC 9b merely remarks very succinctly that Koryŏ was attacked in 1256, 1257, and 1258.

7. Kŭngyo 金鄉 was the overland relay station at Úmgang 陰江; it was one of the 16 stations on the Kŭngyo circuit 道 (KS 82. 9).


9. Howorth, p. 212, says "in 1256, the King of Corea went in person to Man-gu's court to do homage." Howorth cites d'Ohsson, ii. 321 (i.e., Baron
d'Ohsson, *Histoire des Mongols depuis Tchingis-Khan jusqu'à Timour Beg ou Tamerlane*, Paris, 1852). The basis for d'Ohsson's statement was undoubtedly *YS* 3. 7a which relates that in the sixth year of the reign of Mongke, the *Kao-li kuo-wang* 高麗國王 and the heads of other nations came to court. Since Kojong, the Koryó monarch at the time, never went to the Mongol court, the passage must be considered erroneous. It may be a reference to prince Sun, as *kuo-wang* referred to a Prince of the first rank in the Mongol system, however, I believe that it is more likely a reference to Wŏnjong's visit to the court of Qubilai in 1264.

10. The city of Naju 羅州 is in the modern S. Chŏlla Province. For topographical and historical information see *TYS* 35. 615a-622a.

11. Kim Sugang 金守剛 (fl. 1232-1250's) passed the exams in the reign of Kojong and was placed in the Historiographical Bureau, *sagwan*, then gradually rose to the post of Attendant Censor, *siösa* 侍御史. He was twice responsible for the withdrawal of Mongol forces. He was first sent to Mongolia on a tribute mission to present regional products and to ask for the withdrawal of Mongol troops in Koryó. He accompanied the Emperor into the walled-city of Qara-qorum, and, when the Emperor declined to order the troops to disband since the Koryó authorities had not returned to the mainland, Sugang made an analogy of the Koryó position. "It is like the game entering the burrows when the hunters pursue; can trapped animals [be expected] to obey and come forth when [the hunters] stand before them grasping bow and arrows? Again, it is like when ice and snow are cruelly cold and the veins of the earth are frozen shut; can the grasses and trees live?" The Emperor assented and told Kim, "You are indeed an envoy who is equal to [the task of] uniting [our] two nations in friendship." Thereupon, he sent one Hsü Chih 徐階 to Koryó to order the troops to disband.

Later, when the Mongol troops returned, Sugang was once more dispatched to request that they be withdrawn. The Emperor at the time was in the field against the Sung and Sugang went to his Mobile Garrison, *hsing-ying* 行營. Once again, the Emperor allowed the troops to be disbanded and sent an envoy to accompany Sugang back to Koryó. For biographical information see *KS* 102. 20b-21a.

12. Sungšan 松山; for the reconstruction of this name see L. Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII* . . ., p. 130.

13. There was a *tsung-kuan* 扯管 or governor in the Yüan *lu* administration. See Ratchnevsky, op. cit., p. 33. There was also a *tsung-kuan* or commander under the myriarch, *wan-hu*. See Ratchnevsky, op.
The entry of the absence of snow is not merely a record of an unusual event but rather has important agricultural significance, specifically concerned with barley and similar crops which are planted prior to the snowfall and which ripen in the spring. Snow insures a good barley crop in the spring.

This entry is paralleled in KS 24. 32a.

One-thousand was a number used in lieu of the given name which was a practice much in vogue at this time. Cf. Yang Lien-sheng, 'The Form of the Paper Note Hui-tzu of the Southern Sung Dynasty', HJAS 16 (1953), pp. 365-373, p. 366 note 6. His real name may have been Yi Kwang, see KS 24. 24b.

Ch'oe Ùi 崔暄 (d. 1258) was the illegitimate son of Ch'oe Hang and, as Ch'oe Hang had no sons by his principal wife, he made Ùi his heir. Ùi was the last of the Ch'oe military rulers; he was killed in early 1258, after having held power for only one year. For biographical information see KS 129. 51-55; also see BTKP 30. 282.

Little is known of Ch'oe Yangbaek 崔良伯 (d. 1258) beyond his participation in the events depicted here. For biographical references see BTKP 31. 289.

Yu Nüng 柳能 (d. 1258) was of Chǒnju 全州. He was the son of Senior Councillor, p'yǒngjangsa, Yu So 柳韶 (d. 1258; BTKP 152. 1396). Little is known of him other than his brief service with Ch'oe Ùi. For biographical information see KS 101. 12b; also see BTKP 151. 1387.

Kim Injun 金仁俊, also known as Kim Chun 金俊 (d. Jan. 24, 1269), was a slave of Ch'oe Ch'unghǒn who rose to power during the rule of Ch'oe Hang. Curbed and held down when Ch'oe Ùi came to power, Kim was one of the principal leaders in the revolt which overthrew the Ch'oe clan. Following the downfall of the Ch'oe clan, Kim attempted to concentrate power in his own hands. In 1260, he was given an honorary fief of 1000 households and an actual fief of 100 households. In 1263, he was appointed Supervisor of the Supreme Directorate, kyojong pyǒlgam 救定別監 (in KS 130. 14b4, read kyo 救 in lieu of kyo 校). In 1265, he was made Marquis of Haeyang 海陽侯. In 1269, he was killed by Im Yǒn who then seized power himself. Kim Injun had three sons: Taejae 大才, Yongjae 用材 (also called Chu 柱), and Sikchae 武材.

For biographical information see KS 130. 12a-20b; also see BTKP 55. 529.

Song Kiryu 宋吉儒 (fl. 1250's), who has the distinction of being one of the two persons classified as 'rapacious functionaries' by the compilors
of the Koryŏ-sa, had served Ch'oe Hang as Commander, chiyu, of the Night Patrol, ya pyŏlch'ŏ. Advanced to Grand General with the post of Special Supervisor of Defense and of Sea Lanes of Kyŏngsang Province, Kyŏngsang-do suro pangho pyŏlgam, he led the Night Patrol there to forcibly evacuate the people to islands, killing those who would not obey the order, burning dwellings and seizing cash, grain, and lands. When a report of his activities was sent up by the Circuit Inspector, anch'al-sa, Kim Injun attempted to intercede in his behalf but Ch'oe Ŭi exiled Song and reprimanded Kim Injun, et al., for their intervention. Song was later recalled following the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan. For biographical information see KS 122. 28a-29a.

22. The Sinŭigun was a cavalry unit formed of men who had escaped and returned from the Mongols. For further details see the section on 'Patrols', pyŏlch'ŏ.

23. Little is known of Pak Hūisil 朴希實 (fl. 1250's). He had been sent as envoy to the Mongol commander in Koryŏ prior to the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan and, following the coup, he was sent again to request that the Mongol forces withdraw so that the Koryŏ authorities could return to the mainland (KS 24. 39b).

24. Pak Songbi 朴松庇 (d. 1278) was of Tŏgwŏn 德原. Due to his role in the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan he was made Grand General (KS 24. 33a) and went on to reach the post of Chamjiŏngsa 参知政事. He had one son, Pak Sŏngdae 朴成大. For biographical information see KS 130. 20b; also see BTKP 94. 885.

25. Im Yŏn 林衍 (d. 1270) had the former name of Sŭngju 承柱. He was uncertain whether Chinju 鑲州 or Ch'uju 靑州 was his ancestral home but later he accepted the former as his real ancestral seat. Physically powerful, it is said that he could knock a man flat or toss him to the rafters with ease. He was kept as a private soldier by a General and later returned to his native village, only to flee when the Mongol forces arrived. Subsequently, he was appointed a Lieutenant, taejŏng 塔正, in the army. At this time, a certain Im Hyohu 林孝侯 had illicit relations with Im Yŏn's wife. Im Yŏn learned of this and seduced Im Hyohu's wife in revenge. Hyohu reported this to the authorities who wanted to charge Im Yŏn. At this point, Kim Injun, aware of Im Yŏn's physical strength, got the charges dropped and got Im Yŏn an appointment as Colonel. Thereafter, Im Yŏn habitually called Kim Injun 'father'. His rank at the time of the revolt against Ch'oe Ŭi is given as toryŏng nangjang or Colonel-in-Charge; it would appear that he was leader of the Night Patrol, ya pyŏlch'ŏ, whose strength he subsequently used to overthrow Kim Injun.

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Im Yŏn's power, as is made clear in his biography, was based upon the units of the Three Patrols, _sam pyŏlch’o_, viz., the Left and Right divisions of the Night Patrol, and the Sinŭigung cavalry. As Im Yŏn's activities are given in some detail in the text, I shall not repeat them at this point. He had five sons: Yugan, Yumu, Yuin, Yugan, and Yuje. For biographical information see _KS_ 130. 20b-27a; also see _YKC_ and _BTKP_ 48. 458.

26. The rank of lieutenant, _taejŏng_ 陳正, also called _taejang_ 陳長, had the official grade of Ninth Class, secondary (Yi, Table 4), an annual stipend of 16 bushels (sŏk) 10 pecks (tu) of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 30 _kyŏl_ of paddy fields and 5 _kyŏl_ of forest lands (Yi, Table 7).

27. Ch’a Songu 車松祐 (d. 1269) ultimately rose to the rank of General. He was a member of Kim Injun's faction and was killed in the power struggle in 1269 when Kim was overthrown. See _KS_ 130. 20б. Little is known of him beyond his brief role in these events. For biographical references see _BTKP_ 20. 188.

28. Little is known of Kim Hongch’wi 金洪就, however, he did rise to the rank of Grand General, and he was exiled in 1269 when Kim Injun was overthrown. See _KS_ 130. 20б; _KSC_ 18. 35а-b.

29. Kim Yongjae 金用材 (d. 1269) had the former name of Chu 柱; he died in the power struggle which overthrew his father, Kim Injun, in 1269. For biographical information see _KS_ 130. 19а-b; _BTKP_ 55. 525.

30. Ch’oe On 崔溫 (d. 1268) of Ch’angwŏn 昌原, passed the exams in the reign of Kojong and gradually rose to be Administrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs. Kim Injun had discussed the plot against Ch’oe Ŭi with him and Ch’oe On’s son, Munbon, secretly wrote to Ch’oe Ŭi and informed him of the plot. After the death of Ch’oe Ŭi, Munbon’s letter was found. Kim Injun and Yu Kyŏng endeavored, on the basis of this, to have Ch’oe On and his son executed but the King would not go along with it and so Ch’oe was banished to an island, as were the rest of the group who had written and informed Ch’oe Ŭi of the plot. Later, Kim Injun had Ch’oe recalled. He went on to hold the post of Senior Councillor, _p’yonjangsa_, in the Royal Chancellory, _munhasŏng_. He had two sons: Munbon and Mullip (~Munip) 文立. For biographical information see _KS_ 99. 7а-8b; also see _BTKP_ 27. 258.

31. The rank of Senior Colonel, _chunghangjang_ 中郎将, had the official grade of Fifth Class (Yi, Table 4), an annual stipend of 120 bushels (sŏk) of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 70 _kyŏl_ of paddy fields and 27 _kyŏl_ of forest lands (Yi, Table 7).

32. The rank of Major, _sanwŏn_ 散員, had the official grade of Eighth
Class, primary (Yi, Table 4), an annual stipend of 33 bushels (sŏk) of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 40 kyŏl of paddy fields and 10 kyŏl of forest lands (Yi, Table 7).

33. The rank of Captain, kyowi 催尉, had the official grade of Eighth Class, secondary, an annual stipend of 23 bushel (sŏk) five pecks (tu) of rice (Yi, Table 6), and an allotment of 35 kyŏl of paddy fields and 8 kyŏl of forest land (Yi, Table 7). In the early days of the dynasty, the title was Subordinate Officer, owi 佐尉 (KS 81. 6a-7a).

34. I have been unable to identify these persons. It is interesting to note that they were mostly lower ranking officers.

35. According to KSC 17. 34b, Kim Taejae had communicated the affair to Ch'oe Nangbaek believing the latter to be one of the plotters.

36. Little is known of Han Chonggwe 한종균 (d. 1258) other than his participation in the events cited here. The importance of his position as Commander, chiyu, of the Night Patrol, stresses the real power of that unit. For biographical references see BTKP 36. 330.

37. Little is known of Yi Irhyu 李易休 (d. 1258) other than his participation in the events cited here. For biographical references see BTKP 134. 1240.

38. Yi Che 李悌 (d. 1269) was one of Kim Injun's faction. He rose to the rank of General and committed suicide when Kim Injun was overthrown in 1269. For biographical references see BTKP 129. 1178.

39. This is the first appearance of the Three Patrols, sam pyŏlch'ŏo, as a unit in the records. The Three Patrols were the Left and Right divisions of the Night Patrol, and the Sinŭigun cavalry. For a further discussion see the section on 'Patrols', pyŏlch'ŏo.

40. The Ungyang 景揚 (lit. 'hawks on the wing') was one of the two 'armies', kun 軍; the other was the yongho 龍虎 (lit. 'dragons and tigers'). Together they had a complement of three thousand men (pseudo-number?). Yi Kibaek 李起白 has already expressed the opinion that they were the King's guards. See p. 132, Yi Kibaek, Koryŏ ch'ogi pyŏngje e kwang-han hudaes chesŏl ŭi komt'o 高麗初期兵制の関係後代,"On the Military Institutions of the Early Ko-ryeok Period", AY 1 (1958) 2, pp. 129-154.

41. Little is known of Pak Sŏngja 朴成柞 (d. 1264) other than his participation in the events cited here. For some biographical references see BTKP 94. 887.

42. Little is known of Sŏng Wŏnbal 崔元柏 (d. 1258) other than the few items mentioned in the text. For biographical references see BTKP 107. 1013; correct the BTKP reference KS 127. 55a to read KS 129. 55a.
43. The text reads Pak Sŭnggæ 朴永益; I believe that kae is an error for ik, and that the individual concerned is Pak Sŭngik 朴永益, a member of Kim Injun's faction who reached the rank of General and who was killed when Im Yŏn overthrew Kim Injun in 1269. See KS 130. 20a; for biographical information on Pak Sŭngik see BTKP 95. 895.

44. There are various theories on the kyŏl, a term which was in usage in Silla times. The most widely accepted version is that given by Yi, Han'-guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 162 ff. One kyŏl was 33 square paces, po 步, or 45.496 sq. meters, 2 kyŏl were 46.66 square paces, etc. A different theory sees the kyŏl as a unit of farmland which produced one hundred pack-boards, chige, of rice; one chige containing 10 sheaves, one sheaf containing 10 handfuls, i.e., the kyŏl as a measure of the value of land as evidenced by its productive capacity. For this theory see Kim Chaejin 金載珍, Chon'gyoiche yon'gu 田結制研究 ["A Study of the Kyŏl System"], Nonmun-chip 論文集 2 (1959), Kyŏngbuk University 興北大學校, Taegu, Korea, pp. 71-115. With regard to the linear measurements mentioned, in the 23rd year of the reign of Munjong (r. 1047-1082), the following measures were adopted:

\[
\begin{align*}
6 \text{ ch'on} &= 1 \text{ pun} \text{ 分} \\
10 \text{ pun} &= 1 \text{ ch'ŏk} \text{ 尺} \\
6 \text{ ch'ŏk} &= 1 \text{ po} \text{ 步}
\end{align*}
\]

45. This was done in the ninth month of 1259, part of what appears to have been a general redistribution of land among the officials in the capital area. Also involved were some 2,000 kyŏl of fields controlled by the government granary 公廵, and the fields of Haŭm-chin 河陰鎮 and Kanghaenyŏng 江海寧.

46. The members of the cavalry units of the Five Armies were also given awards of silver and grain according to their station at this time. Since no mention is made of their participation in the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan, I assume the awards were made to insure their support after the fall of the Ch'oe clan. Members of the Night Patrol and Sinŭigun cavalry were each given three bushels (sŏk) of rice, one kăn of iron, and three bolts (pĭl) of cloth. There appears to have been some discontent in their ranks, for a week prior to this they had crowded the King's carriage in front of the palace, perhaps seeking rewards.

47. The title was awarded in several grades from First Class to Fifth Class, and those so honored were given rice and colored satin, etc., while those among them who had been serving as slaves were, extending to their sons and grandsons, given permission to take the exams for civil service.

48. Ch'oe Cha 崔�示 (1188-1260) was a descendant of the famed Koryŏ Con-

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fucianist Ch'oe Ch'ung崔冲 (d. 1068; *BTKP* 23. 224), and himself one of the more important literati of the Koryo period. His style, cha, was Sudok樹德 and his literary appellation, ho, was Tongsan-su東山寺. He had strongly advocated making a settlement with the Mongols, pointing out the crowded conditions on Kanghwa Island and the shortage of land there. He visited Kim Injun and entertained him, for which people abused him. He died two years after the fall of the Ch'oe clan and was given the posthumous appellation of Munch'ông 文清. His works included the *Kajip家集* in 10 kwôn and the *Sokp'amin-chip繙破閲集* in 2 kwôn. For biographical information see *KS* 102. 14a-16a; also see *BTKP* 21. 205.

49. It is interesting to observe a precedent in Koryo-Chin relations, for it was due principally to the Confucians that Koryo became a vassal of the Chin. Cf. M. Rogers, 'The Regularization of Koryo-Chin Relations (1116-1131)', *CAJ* 6 (1961), p. 62 note 58.

50. Yesüder. The name occurs in several variants including: Yü-ch'ou 余愁 (*KS* 24. 35a-b); Yü-ch'ou-ta 余愁達 (*KS* 25. 3a, etc.); and Yü-su-tu 余速秃 (*KS* 24. 15b; *KSC* 17. 18b). Mr. Gari Ledyard of Berkeley has brought it to my attention that a certain Yesüder is mentioned in the *Ching-shih ta-tien* section on postal relays, jam站, preserved in the *Yung-lo ta-tien* under the date 1262. 4; this is also noted in *CS* Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 308, relating to the *KS* 25. 3a account of an order from Yesüder to Koryo to establish postal relay stations south of the Koryo Western Capital. Cf. *Yung-lo ta-tien*, Chung-hua shu-chü 中華書局 edition, Peking, 1960, 19416.22.11b. I note that there is also a certain Yesüder mentioned in *Yung-lo ta-tien* 19417.22.2b. In both instances the name is written 也速斛兒 and in both instances, the identification remains conjectural. I have followed Shiratori, *Onyaku...*, (1)2. 28a-b in the reconstruction of this name. A certain Yesüder 也速斛兒 is also mentioned in the *YS* 93 section on household taxes, k'o-chai 科差, for which see Schurman, op. cit., p. 99 and p. 105-106 note 11. In 1254, Yesüder 也速秃 and P'u-po-tai 南婆大 arrived in Koryo (*KS* 24. 15b) with cavalry units to reinforce Jalairtai. Following Jalairtai's murder in 1259, Yesüder took charge of affairs in Koryo and was stationed in Tung-ching. According to his conversation with Prince Chôn when the latter arrived in Tung-ching enroute to the Mongol Court in 1259, the Emperor had placed Prince Sung-chi 松吉 in charge of conquering Koryo and an army was already in readiness to begin the assault (*KS* 24. 43a-b); Yesüder, it would seem, was at the time subordinate to Prince Sung-chi.
51. Cho Hwi 趙熙 (fl. 1250-1270's) was originally from Hanyang-**pu** 風陽府 in the Han River Delta, but later went to live in Yongjin-hyön 龍津縣 in the northeast. He rebelled in 1258, and submitted the northeast area to the Mongols who placed him in charge as Governor, tsung-kuan. His post of governor was transmitted to his son Yanggi 陽琪 and to his grandson Kwak 皋播. For biographical information see KS 130. 10a-12a; also see BTKP 7. 71. The BTKP entry "d. 1356-10" is in error; the date Cho died is unknown.

52. In the twelfth month of 1258, the Mongol Prince San-chi (a.w. Sung-chu; Sung-chi) led troops into the old Hwaju area (KS 24. 38b). After consolidating Mongol gains in the Koryŏ northeast by establishing a Governor's command, he withdrew to Tung-ching (KS 24. 38b).

53. Ch'ien-hu 錦 , Chilarch or Chief of One-Thousand. See Aubin, op. cit., p. 502 for references to Ratchnevsky, Un Code ..., concerning this title. The division of the Mongol army into sections of 10, 100, 1,000, and 10,000 was ordered by Činggis in an article of his Yasa and corresponded to the Mongol social organization, for which see G. Vernadsky, 'The Scope and Contents of Chingis Khan's Yasa', HJAS 3 (1938) 1, pp. 337-360.


55. Yun Ch'UN 濁椿 was the Special Supervisor of Defense at Yanggūn-sŏng 陽根城 and he submitted the city to the Mongols in the 1250's. The Mongols selected 600 of the best troops from the city and placed Yun in charge of them. He returned to rejoin Koryŏ, for which he was rewarded by Ch'oe Hang and placed in the army as a general. See KS 130. 31a-b.

56. Tun-ken 屯田 or military colonies, one type of government land under the Yuan. See Schurmann, op. cit., p. 29.

57. The post of hojang 署 or Magistrate was a post in the regional administrative system which dates in usage to the second year of the reign of Sŏngjong 成宗 (r. 982-997). There was a general reorganization in the reign of Hyŏnjong 顯宗 (r. 1010-1031) of the provincial administration which placed eight Magistrates, hojang, and four Deputy Magistrates, pu-hojang, in those chu, pu, kun, and hyŏn districts which had over 1,000 taxable male adults, chaông ; in districts with over 500 taxable male adults there were seven Magistrates and two Deputy Magistrates; districts with over 300 taxable male adults had five Magistrates and two Deputy Magistrates; districts with less than 100 taxable male adults had four Magistrates and one Deputy Magistrate. The number of Magistrates
and Deputy Magistrates assigned to the Frontier-Districts, while it corresponded to the number of male adults in each community, was slightly less than the above. There were, of course, other provincial posts which are set forth in KS 75. 45a-49a, from which the above information has been taken. An excellent study of the subject is Gim Jong-gug (Kim Chong-guk) "On the Provincial Government Officials in the Goryeo Dynasty", CG 25 (1962), pp. 71-122.

With reference to 'taxable male adults', chōng, "[In] the national system, at sixteen years of age, males became adults, chōng, commencing their eligibility for national corvée duty; at sixty years of age they were considered old and were released from corvée duty." The basis for this was the annual census conducted by the functionaries of the chu and hyŏn administrations and registered people were taxed by household; levies for military service, levies-in-kind, and corvée service were based upon the household registers (KS 79. 1a).

58. Koryŏ relief measures taken are outlined in KS 80. 41b-42b; some information is given in KS 79. In the month preceding this: "They doled out 20 kŏn of white silver from the Sinhŭng Treasury, exchanged it for seed-grain and distributed it to the poor" (KS 79. 8a-b).
Chapter V

SUBMISSION AND ALLIANCE

On May 14 (chia-wei 午 day, fourth month), 1259, Chŏn, the Crown Prince, with a retinue of 40 persons, set out for the Mongol Court. A levy of one kŭn of silver was placed on those of the fourth rank and above, and in decreasing amounts on those below the fourth rank to meet the expenses of the journey. Only 300 horses for the National Gifts could be produced from the capital area and as these were considered insufficient, horses were purchased on the road. Therefore, there were few Civil or Military Officials, yangban, who rode (KS 24. 41b-42b; KSC 17. 47b-48a; CHSL 4. 34a) 1).

As the Crown Prince rode toward the Mongol Court, a report from the north came in that Jalairtai had died violently and that the Emperor had sent men who seized three of the Mongol commanders (KS 24. 42b). This placed Mongol affairs in Koryŏ with Yesüder and Prince Sung-chi 松吉 (a.w. Sung-chu; San-chi) whom the Koryŏ Prince met in Tung-ching on his way to the Mongol Court. Troops had already been massed at Tung-ching for another invasion of Koryŏ and it was only after Prince Chŏn had convinced Prince Sung-chi the Koryŏ authorities were carrying out the Mongol demand that the people return to the mainland, and reminded him the Mongols had agreed to disband the troops if the Crown Prince went to the Mongol Court, where the troops actually disbanded (KS 24. 43a-b; KSC 17. 48a-49a).

Included in the peace agreement was the demolition of the fortified walls on Kanghwa and Mongol envoys arrived in the fifth month (May 24 - June 21) to supervise their destruction (KS 24. 42b). The dismantling of the inner fortifications by the militia men, produced great anxiety (KS 24. 42b-43a) but when the Guard Corps, tobang, was ordered to tear down the outer fortifications, the people began to purchase boats and the boat price soared (KS 24. 44a; KSC 17. 49a-b).

At this time, Kojong, after occupying the throne for 47 years, died (on July 21, 1259) at the age of 68 at the home of Yu Kyŏng (KS 24. 42a). With the Crown Prince enroute to the Mongol Court, his younger brother, Ch'ang, the Duke of An'gyŏng, was suggested for the throne by Kim Injun but this was vetoed by the Chief Ministers of the Civil and Military Departments, yangbu,
who cited the ancient precedent of the succession of the eldest son, perhaps with the memory of troubles with Chin in mind (KS 24. 42a-b; KSC 17. 49b-50a) 2). Failing in this, the ambitious Kim Injun was quick to ingratiate himself by supporting the Royal Grandson, Taeson 太孫, Prince Sim 3). who was then formally placed at the head of the government until the Crown Prince returned. Junior Colonel Pak Ch'ŏnsik 天植 was dispatched with a report of the matter to the Mongol Court (KS 25. 1a-b; KSC 17. 49b-50a; CHSL 4. 34b).

The envoys Pak Hŭisil and Cho Munju 趙文柱 (fl. 1250's) 4) previously sent to the Mongols to request the removal of Mongol garrisons from Úiju and the Western Capital, although they had contacted Hsien-tsung (Möngke) who was at the time (3rd month = March 26 - April 23, 1259) leading the expedition against the southern Sung, failed in their objective (KS 25. 2a-3a; KSC 17. 51a). Upon their return, in the eighth month of 1259 (Aug. 20 - Sept. 18) they were accompanied by the Mongol envoy Shih-lo-wen 羅問 bearing a dispatch from Yesüder which, in brief, ordered Koryŏ to establish jamči 5) or overland relay stations, fully equipped with attendants and horses, south of the Western Capital for the use of the Emperor's messengers; the relay stations to the north of the Western Capital — presumably reestablished by the Mongols — were to be used jointly (KS 25. 3a).

While the Koryŏ authorities had, in response to Mongol demands, repeatedly declared they would return to the old capital, they had as yet made no effort to do so. In Yen-tu 彎 鄴, Hong Tagu, the son of Hong Pogwŏn, had told the Emperor that it was not true the Koreans had returned to the mainland. A Korean envoy heard of this and informed Yesüder that it was simply slander. Yesüder promptly sent a Mongol envoy to Koryŏ to inspect the progress being made to return to the mainland. Some action had to be taken and it is clear that it was taken because of the presence of the Mongol envoy who had come to gather first-hand information on the transfer. So, in the eleventh month (Nov. 16 - Dec. 15) of 1259, the Koryŏ authorities began to levy an army of 30 yŏng (i.e., 30,000) to construct palace buildings in the old capital. They also informed the Mongol envoy that the Emperor had allowed them three years due to the necessity of transporting building materials and constructing new palaces, dwellings, and the like in the old capital. Their reluctance to act they said, was because the Crown Prince, who was to ascend the throne upon his return, was still absent (KS 25. 3b-4a; KSC 17. 52a-b).

With the winter, famine set in again in the capital (KS 25. 3b) and forces were secretly sent against Mongol raiding parties on the mainland (KS 25. 3a-b; KS 25. 1b; KS 25. 5a; KSC 17. 52b; KSC 17. 53a). These raiding parties,
many from the Mongol garrisons in the northeast and guided by Koryó deserters (cf. KS 130. 10a-12a), were the real reason the Koreans stayed on the islands. At this time, the Special Supervisor of Resettlement, *ch'ulpae pyol-gam* 出排別監, of Sŏhae Province reported that all the people who had returned to the mainland had been made captive by the Mongol troops, and he requested that the return from the islands to the mainland be stopped (KSC 17. 52b). The severity of the situation is attested by the sharp increase in uprisings and desertions to the Mongols (KS 25. 3a; KS 25. 5b; KS 25. 6a). Even a Recorder of the Palace Guards, *anae tobyŏngma noksa* 衛內都兵馬錄事, shaved his head and submitted to the Mongols (KS 25. 6b). In the winter of 1259, "... there was a great famine in the capital. The officials and the people were searching for food. Those from the southern *chu* districts streamed [back] to the provinces. The Military Council, *chungbang*, [ordered] the Censorate, *ŏsadae*, to prohibit the officials from leaving the palace and there were many officials who starved to death" (KS 25. 3b; also see KSC 17. 52b).

In the meantime, while Prince Chŏn was enroute to present himself, Mŏngke, who was in the field leading an attack against the southern Sung, died in the seventh month (July 22 - Aug. 19) of 1259 7), at Tiao-yū-shan 鉤魚山 (in mod. Szu-ch'uan Province 四川省). At this time, Prince Chŏn was at Liu-p'an-shan 六盤山 (in mod. Kan-su Province 甘肅省). The *Mongol Prince Qubilai who was also in the field against the Sung, was at that time at O-chou 鄂州 (in mod. Hupei Province). Following the death of Mŏngke, Ariy-boge 阿里不哥 (a.w. 阿里孛哥), one of Mŏngke's three brothers 8), hurriedly convened an assembly of princes in Mongolia and was elected Qăn. Hearing the news of Ariy-boge's action, Prince Qubilai made a quick peace with the Sung and hurried north with his forces 9). Enroute he met Koryó Prince Chŏn and learning that the latter had come to offer his submission, Qubilai was greatly pleased. At this meeting in the field, Prince Qubilai is related to have exclaimed: "Koryó, a nation 10 000 li [distant]; T'ang T'ai-tsung himself led an expedition [against them] and was unable to obtain their submission 10]. Now their Heir Apparent himself comes to me. This is the will of Heaven." At this same audience, Chao Lang-pi 11), then Pacification Commissioner, *hsüan-fu-shih* 12), of the Chiang-huai 江淮 provinces, is said to have told Qubilai, "Although Koryó is called a small nation, due to its perilous mountains and seas, our nation has used troops [against them] for over twenty years and they are still not our vassals" (KS 25. 8a-9b; also see KSC 18. 3a-b).

Accompanied by Prince Chŏn, Qubilai continued northward to Ching-chao-fu 京兆府. Here, in the second month (Mar. 14 - Apr. 11) of 1260,
Prince Chôn received news of his father, Kojong's death (KS 25. 6b). He was allowed by Qubilai to leave immediately and Qubilai ordered the daruγaçi or resident commissioner Shu-li-ta 杉里大 and Kang Hwasang 13) to escort Prince Chôn back to Koryô (KS 25. 7a-b; KSC 18. 3a-4a) 14) where they arrived at Kaegyŏng in the following month (KS 25. 7b-8a).

Prince Chôn's absence had given the Koryô authorities an excuse for not leaving Kanghwa while Yesûder had endeavored to have the move coincide with Prince Chôn's return. He even suggested that Kim Injun should lead the officials out to welcome the King at the Western Capital (KS 25. 6b-7a). As a conciliatory move, the Koryô authorities "...ordered the officials great and small, the people, and the Buddhist priests, each to build living quarters in the old capital" (KS 25. 7a).

Several officials were sent to the Western Capital to welcome Prince Chôn but at the time he had already passed the Western Capital with the Mongol escorts (KS 25. 7a-b). As Prince Chôn journeyed south, "the Royal Grandson, desiring to return the metropolis to the old capital, made Grand General Kim Panggyŏng 15) and General Kim Sŭngjun, et al., Special Supervisors of Resettlement, ch'ulbae pyŏlgam. Opening the granary, they distributed 6,420 bushels (kok) of rice, one bushel to every prince and official in order to aid in the expenses of constructing dwellings" (KSC 18. 2b; also see KS 25. 7b). This interesting passage says, in effect, that the total number of officials and princes was 6,420 for the capital or central government and it appears to be correct 16).

At Kaegyŏng, Prince Chôn had accompanied Shu-li-ta to inspect the construction of palaces then underway. From Kaegyŏng they rode south and, reaching the outskirts of Sŭngch'ŏn-pu, Shu-li-ta who had been sent back with Prince Chôn as daruγaçi, decided to test the Prince's intentions and invited him to proceed ahead into Sŭngch'ŏn-pu. When Prince Chôn took him at his word, Shu-li-ta angrily withdrew and camped in a field on the outskirts of the city, expressing his desire to return. Apparently Shu-li-ta was holding the Crown Prince, for not until after a visit by Prince Sim and a present of a parrot (decorated) basin and thirty kŭn of white gold did Shu-li-ta consent to remain. The next day he crossed to Kanghwa in the same boat with Prince Chôn. Due to the insistence of Shu-li-ta to transfer the capital, the Koryô authorities divided the civil and military officials as well as the militia force into three shifts to go and come from Kaegyŏng in order to indicate their intention to transfer the capital (KS 25. 9b-10a; KSC 18. 4a) 17).

Early in the fourth month (May 12 - June 10) of 1260, a Mongol envoy arrived with a letter which declared, "Of all beneath Heaven who have not surrendered, there is only your nation and Sung." Specifically referring to
Kim Injun and mentioning rumors of intrigue and rebellion in Koryŏ, the letter closed with "At the time when the Emperor had not yet ascended the throne, we heard that the King had arrived in the Western Capital and remained there eight or nine days. We suspected there was a calamity therefore we bestow this letter" (KS 25. 10a-12a; KSC 18. 4a-6a; YS 208. 4b). Fortunately for Wŏnjong these suspicions appear to have been unfounded 18).

On June 3 (wu-wu 戊午 day of the fourth month) 1260, Prince Chŏn, or Wŏnjong as he was later canonized, ascended the throne in the Kanghwa Palace on Kanghwa Island (KS 25. 12b; KSC 18. 6a) and, a few days later, a Mongol envoy arrived with an Imperial Edict 19) which in addition to containing specific instructions for Wŏnjong, was at the same time an answer to various requests he had made — apparently prior to returning to Koryŏ. There was to be a transfer of all people back to the mainland from the islands, agriculture was to be encouraged, while Qubilai promised to stop all pillaging by the soldiers, to withdraw the army, and to release all Koreans taken prisoner since the previous spring 20).

A subsequent edict in the sixth month (July 10 - Aug. 8) clarified these points somewhat further: clothing and headdress were to follow the Koryŏ custom 21), the speed of the transfer back to the old capital was to accord with their ability (i.e., no time-limit was set, but they were to move as quickly as their ability permitted); the troops garrisoned on the Koryŏ side of the Yalu River were to be withdrawn in the autumn, while the party of the daru 娑伽 or resident commissioners being sent to Koryŏ (to replace Shu-li-ta) had already been recalled (KS 25. 19a-b; YKC 10a-b; KSC 18. 9a-b). Qubilai fulfilled his pledge and released some 440 households, i.e., 2,200 persons, taken captive (KS 25. 16a; also see KS 25. 12b-13a) and, in the autumn, the withdrawal of Mongol forces began, but even the Emperor could not prevent pillaging as the army withdrew 22) (KS 25. 19b-20a).

One reason for Qubilai's indulgent attitude toward Koryŏ, in addition to his meeting with Prince Chŏn in the field, and his own succession dispute with Ariy-boge 23) was Koryŏ's prompt submission of tribute — a mission was sent to present regional products as soon as Wŏnjong returned (KSC 18. 6a) and the rapid dispatch of Hŭi, the Duke of Yŏngan 24), to present congratulations on Qubilai's accession to the throne (KSC 18. 7a), by which Koryŏ became the first nation to present congratulations (KS 25. 18a-b; KSC 18. 9a; CHSL 4. 36a).

Another reason was the resettlement of the Koryŏ northwest. There had been two mass evacuations of the area north of the Western Capital, viz., once in the period 1231-1232 and a second time in the period 1248-1250. In the tenth month (Oct. 26 - Nov. 23) of 1261, there was a large-scale move-
ment back into the northwest which re-populated the cities of Unju, Pakchu, Kuju, Kwakchu, Maengju, Muju, T'aеju, and Suju 25). 

Internally, Kim Injun, backed by both Wŏnjong and Sim, the latter invested as the Crown Prince in the eighth month (Sept. 7 - Oct. 6) of 1260 (KS 25. 18a), continued to increase his power. In the sixth month he was given the crucial post of Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs (KS 25. 16b) and before the year was out he was given the honorary title of "First Meritorious Protector of the Altars of the Earth", replacing Yu Kyông who was demoted to "Fifth Meritorious Protector ... etc." (KS 25. 16a-b; KS 130. 14a). Yu Kyông's demotion is an interesting event for his actual power had been clipped since the winter of 1258. At that time, only eight months after the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan, Yu had taken over control of the Civil Council but had overreached himself. Im Yŏn and Kim Sŭngjun who hated Yu Kyông had slandered him to Kim Injun, the real strongman. Kim, in turn, had told the King, the aging Kojong, that Yu Kyông wanted to seize the King's power. This apparently was an excuse for Kim to round up Yu Kyông's supporters. Three of them, viz., General U Tūkk'yu, Commander, chiyu, Kim Tūgyong, and Junior Colonel Yang Hwa were imprisoned and later beheaded; another of Yu's backers, Colonel Kyông Wŏllok was exiled 26). Yu Kyông heard of these events and went to the Palace to protest but to no avail, and Yu himself was dismissed from his post as minister, sŏng-sŏn (KSC 17. 43a-44a). Yu, however, was made Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs, a post of considerable power, in the next month (KS 24. 39a), probably due to the support of the aged monarch Kojong who moved into Yu's home early in the following year (KS 24. 41b) where he died within a month (KS 24. 44a-b).

It is also interesting to note that Kim Injun was at least partly responsible for the investiture of Prince Sim as the Crown Prince. Wŏnjong had wanted to invest Prince Sim earlier, but hesitated to do so after the Royal Consort, pi 27), had slandered him. The Royal Consort, the former Kyôngch'ang Princess 28) was the daughter of Chŏn, the Duke of Sinan, and had borne T'ae 29), the Marquis of Siyang; Chong 30), the Duke of Sunan; the Kyongan Princess, and the Hamnyông Princess 31). In slandering Prince Sim by telling Wŏnjong that the Prince had not been pleased to hear of Wŏnjong's return, the Royal Consort was, of course, attempting to promote the interest of her own son. Prince Sim was the eldest son of Wŏnjong by Queen Sun'gyŏng 32), Wŏnjong's first wife who died in 1237. Kim Injun was responsible for dispelling Wŏnjong's doubts of Prince Sim and the investment took place. Prince Sim, incidentally, did not forget the matter. He was later enthroned, viz., King Ch'ungnyŏl (r. 1275-1308),
and in the third year of his reign, he had her tried, and degraded to the status of a commoner (KS 25. 18a; KS 88. 36a-37a; KSC 18. 7a-b; HY 20. 29b).

The year of 1260 saw Wŏnjong secure on the throne, peace restored on the peninsula and, although there were still demands that the capital be moved from Kanghwag, construction work was being completed in Kaegyŏng serving as an excuse for remaining on the island, and Koryŏ had won the pleasure of Qubilai by managing to be the first to present congratulations on his success- 

tion to the throne (KS 25. 18a-b; CHSL 4. 36a). The cost of the various ceremon- 

ial activities connected with the enthroning of Wŏnjong, the investiture of the Crown Prince, the investiture of the Kyŏngch'ang Princess to be Queen 

王妃 (KS 25. 18a), the elevation of the Queen Mother (i.e., Wŏnjong's mother) to be Queen Dowager (KS 25. 17b), the taking of a consort by the Crown Prince, plus the requirements of the other members of the royal family, consumed during the year "... over 1 000 kŭm of gold and silver, over 3 000 sŏk of rice, and cloth beyond calculation" (KS 25. 20b) 33).

There were other diversions in the Koryŏ capital apart from the succes-

sive ceremonial matters. Because of the great drought, the King put aside 

sun parasols and banned the wearing of sun hats by the officials (KS 25. 16b). There were several earthquakes, one violent enough to destroy many houses in the capital (KS 25. 16b) 34). Cheju presented her usual annual tribute and, as had grown customary in these years, "they took the Cheju tribute horses and presented them to the civil and military officials, tongso 東西, of the fourth rank and above" (KS 25. 17a-b).

In the fourth month (May 1 - May 30) of 1261, Koryŏ sent Crown Prince Sim to the Mongol Court to offer congratulations on the pacification of Arity- 

boge with whom Qubilai had been contesting for power. The expenses for the trip were met by the usual levy and we read that "at this time, the Chief Ministers down to those of the fourth rank produced one kŭm of silver; those of the fifth rank produced two bolts (p'il) of white ramie; the sixth rank one bolt; in the seventh, eighth, and ninth ranks, every two men produced one bolt, in order to meet the expenses of the journey" (KS 25. 17a).

During the following years, in addition to coping with the raids of both Chinese (KS 26. 8a) and Japanese freebooters (e.g., KS 25. 29b; KS 25. 31a-b; 

KS 25. 32a; KS 26. 7a-b), the Koryŏ authorities were concerned with passively resisting the establishment of Mongol control on the peninsula as well as at- 

tempts to get the Koryŏ capital transferred back to the mainland. Koryŏ trib- 

ute missions wound their way to the Mongol Court (e.g., KS 25. 23b) and, in 

addition to the spring and autumn tribute, Koryŏ was frequently called upon to fulfill demands for various supplementary items (e.g., KS 25. 24b-25b). In 

the winter of 1262, an edict arrived which reminded Koryŏ of the injunctions

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laid down by Žinggis upon surrendering states that they must send hostages, submit population registers, establish post-stations, raise an army, provide provisions, and support the Mongolian army. "Now, with the exception that a hostage (i.e., Wang Sun) has already been sent, the remaining matters have not yet been carried out" (KS 25. 26a-27b), the edict charged. In the fourth month (May 9 - June 7) of 1263, when Koryŏ envoys brought back word that the Emperor was angry at not receiving a report on Koryŏ's progress in fulfilling the requirements set forth, a tribute mission was dispatched with a memorial outlining the difficulties due to the desolation into which the country had fallen (KS 25. 29b-31a). The following year, Wŏnjong was summoned to the Mongol court where he presented himself in the autumn, ninth month, then returned to Koryŏ in the winter, twelfth month of the same year (KS 26. 5a-b; YKC 11b). One reason for the summons was undoubtedly to try to speed up Koryŏ's response to Mongol demands 35).

In late 1266, the first of several events occurred which was to shatter completely the relative calm which had existed on the peninsula. At the Mongol Court, Cho I 36), a former Korean Buddhist monk who had become an interpreter at Qubilai's court, had interested the Emperor in Japan, and the first Mongol envoys Hei-ti37), a shih-lang 38) in the Department of War, and Yin-hung 39), a shih-lang in the Department of Rites, had been dispatched to Koryŏ, whence they were to be guided to Japan with an Imperial Edict for the rulers of that nation (KS 26. 8b-9a; YKC 11b-12a; KS 130. 27a).

This embassy journeyed south as far as Kôje island 40) with Korean guides, then returned ostensibly due to bad weather which made the crossing impossible. There is, however, good reason to suspect that the envoys were not too anxious to go and that the Koreans encouraged them to turn back, even providing pretexts which included reasons for abandoning the effort to bring Japan within the Mongol sphere (KS 26. 9b-10a; KS 130. 27a-b). These efforts by Koryŏ were to no avail and several embassies were later sent to Japan 41). The first Mongol missive and an accompanying Korean missive was delivered by a Korean, a certain Pan Pu, who was sent to Japan at Qubilai's insistence (KS 130. 27b; KS 26. 10b-12a). Concomitant with those efforts was the construction of ships in Koryŏ, originally begun in 1259 at the Western Capital. In 1268, Koryŏ was ordered to prepare ships, foodstuffs and raise an army to be used in the campaign against the Southern Sung or for an invasion of Japan (KS 26. 15b; KS 26. 18a; see Part II).

As these events occurred, the embers of the power struggle within Koryŏ were slowly being fanned into flame as Kim Injun, the prime mover in the overthrow of the Ch'oe clan, slowly increased his own power. Wŏnjong himself had remarked confidently, "Kim [In]jun serves me. The previous King
(i.e., Kojong) has slain the tyrants and restored the government to the Royal Family" (KS 130. 14b). Such was Wŏnjong's faith in Kim that when he left for the Mongol court in 1264, he placed Kim, who had just been appointed Director of the Supreme Directorate, kyojong pyōlgam, in charge of state affairs (KS 26. 5a; KS 130. 14b). In 1265, Kim, who had previously received an honorary fief of 1 000 households and an actual fief (i.e., households whose taxes he consumed) of 100 households (KS 130. 14b), managed to be enfeoffed as Marquis of Haeyang 海陽侯 (KS 26. 7b; KS 130. 15a; TT 34. 93) and over the next few years grew increasingly arbitrary in his actions.

In late 1267, Ch'ang the Duke of An'gyŏng had been sent to the Mongol Court to report that an envoy had been dispatched to Japan with the Mongol edict. While Duke Ch'ang was at court the next year, Qubilai told him that if Koryŏ had sincerely submitted that they would raise an army and support the Mongolian troops, supply provisions, request the establishment of daruğači, and take a census of their people. The Emperor reminded Duke Ch'ang that the capital had not yet been returned to the mainland and said Kangh Hwasang had reported that there was a decline in the amount of ramie cloth submitted as tribute by Koryŏ and that it was of poor quality. Then he accused Koryŏ of submitting a false memorial concerning Koryŏ's relations with Japan (KS 24. 13a-14a). Shortly after Duke Ch'ang had returned to Koryŏ with a report of this conversation, in the third month (April 3 - May 2) of 1269, a Bureau for Resettlement was established in the old capital of Kaegyŏng (KS 26. 14b), and in the same month, the Mongol Governor, tsung-kuan, of Peiching 京畿(l'region') administration arrived with an edict which outlined Qubilai's conversation with Duke Ch'ang and which once again set fort the requirements for surrendering states established by Činggis.

The Emperor had also instructed Kim, his sons, and his brother to come to the capital. Kim's faction was afraid and schemed to kill the envoy. They also told Wŏnjong that if he didn't go along with their plans they would make Kim Injun King. This was reported to the chief ministers of the civil and military departments by Ŏm Suan 42), but despite their alarm the ministers were afraid to speak out. Ŏm then managed to convince Kim Sŭngjun that it would be a mistake to kill the Mongol envoy. Fearing that the Mongols would accuse him, after learning that General Ch'a Songu had been talking of the scheme to kill the Mongol envoy, Kim did not go to the Mongol Court. This incident also served to increase Kim's determination to resist the Mongols (KS 26. 15b; KS 106. 36b-37a; KS 130. 15b-16a). The result was that Yi Changyong 43) was sent to the Mongol Court with a petition outlining the Koryŏ response to the Mongol demands (KS 26. 16a-b). Beginning in mid-1268, Mongol envoys began arriving to inspect the warships being built in shipyards
around Koryŏ, the army, and departure points for China like Hŭksan Island, T'amma Island, as well as the Japan route (KS 26. 16b; KS 26. 17b-18b).

At this time, what appears to have been the final straw in Kim Injun's arbitrary actions occurred. In the winter of 1268, Kim sent the Night Patrol to seize two ships loaded with (regional) tributary provisions. The stores were brought to Kim's residence where they were divided with the soldiers of the Night Patrol. This brought about a confrontation between Wŏnjong and Kim Injun (KS 130. 16a-b). Shortly thereafter, Wŏnjong supported Im Yŏn, whose power rested in his control of the units of the Three Patrols, and who no longer supported Kim since the latter had attempted to exile his wife (KS 130. 17a-b), in a rapid purge which lasted into early 1269 and which eliminated Kim Injun, his family and his supporters (KS 26. 19a-b; KS 82. 2a; KS 130. 17b-20a). In early 1269, Im Yŏn removed another possible contender in the power struggle by exiling Yu Kyŏng to distant Hŭksan Island (KS 26. 20b; TT 35. 101).

While these moves were backed by Wŏnjong who suspected that Yu Kyŏng's role in the elimination of the Ch'oe clan was a bid for personal power and whose opinion of Kim Injun had changed greatly (KS 130. 21a; TT 35. 101), they also eliminated what was evidently a power balance, although I believe that we may assume Wŏnjong's own motive to have been to regain complete control himself. With the elimination of Kim Injun and Yu Kyŏng, there was little serious opposition to Im Yŏn, who waited only four months before seizing power himself, claiming that he had restored the monarch to power but now the monarch and the eunuch Kim Kyŏng 金陵 (d. 1269; BTKP 61. 589) wanted to kill him (KS 130. 21b) which, in view of the preceding events, may have contained some truth. At any rate, on July 18 (jen-ch'ên 丁辰 day of the sixth month), 1269, "[Im] Yŏn, schemingly and rebelliously desiring to effect the Great Affair (i.e., depose the King) assembled the Ministers to deliberate. Attendant, sijing, Yi Changyong, estimated they could not be stopped and believed abdication to be merely talk 44)." Four days later, "[Im] Yŏn, dressed in armour, led the Three Patrols and six units of the Guard Corps to the residence of Ch'ang, the Duke of An'gyŏng, [where] he assembled all the officials and petitioned Ch'ang to become King. Suddenly the wind and rain violently uprooted trees and sent rooftiles flying. [Im] Yŏn sent men to compel the King to remove to a separate palace" (KS 26. 21a) 45). After deposing Wŏnjong and placing the latter's younger brother Ch'ang, the Duke of An'gyŏng on the throne (KS 130. 22a), Im secured appointment as Director of the Supreme Directorate, kyojŏng pyŏlgam (KS 26. 21a; KS 130. 22b) becoming the new military overlord.

Im promptly celebrated by moving into Kim Injun's former residence (KS
130. 22b) and the following month dispatched an envoy to the Mongol court to inform them of the change. The excuse given the Mongols was that Wönjong's failing health had forced his retirement in favor of his younger brother (KS 26. 21b-22a; TT 35. 102) 46).

Crown Prince Sim, who had gone to the Mongol Court prior to the deposing of Wönjong (KS 26. 20b) 47), was at this time enroute home and had reached P'o-so-fu 府. On the other side of the Yalu twenty-five men of the Night Patrol were waiting at the border to seize him but he was warned of events by a government slave who slipped across the Yalu River. Prince Sim at first hesitated to believe the report. Then, learning that the envoy sent by Im Yon to report the matter to the Mongol Court, a certain Kwak Yōp'il 郭汝弼, had at this time reached the city of Yǒngju 順州 near the Yalu, Prince Sim sent men to seize him and verified the report. After sending a messenger on to the Koryŏ court with instructions that if the King was really ill, Chong, the Marquis of Sunan (Wönjong's third son; Prince Sim's younger half-brother) should be put on the throne, he turned back to the Mongol Court to inform the Emperor. Appraised of events, Qubilai sent *Odos-buqa 幹札思不花 and Li O 李謨 with a letter of inquiry to the Koryŏ court 48). Im Yon countered by sending General Kim Panggyŏng with a second missive which offered the same reasons for Wönjong's abdication (KS 26. 24a-b). Qubilai then sent Hei-ti as envoy to investigate the matter (KS 26. 26a; YKC 16b-17a) and, in the eleventh month (Nov. 25 - Dec. 24) of 1269, he ordered Prince (of the first rank), kuo-wang, T'ou-nien-ke 头蘓哥, of the Tung-ching Mobile Bureau 49) to assemble an army for the subjugation of Im Yon (YKC 17b-18a; KS 26. 26b; KS 130. 23b-25a; YS 159. 16a; YS 208. 10a; TT 35. 103).

Im Yon, already worried by reports of Prince Sim's action (TT 35. 103), had been confronted by the Mongol envoy Hu-ti (KS 26. 26a-b; KS 130. 23b). Thus pressed, Im yielded and in the last of the eleventh month of 1269 he deposed Ch'ang and restored Wönjong (YKC 17b-20b; KS 26. 26b-27b; TT 35. 104-105). Wönjong, accompanied by Hei-ti, whom he secretly rewarded on the journey northward (KS 26. 29a), immediately departed for the Mongol Court in the twelfth month of 1269. He left his third son Chong, the Marquis of Sunan, in charge of state affairs (KS 26. 30a-31a; TT 35. 105). After reaching the Mongol Court Wönjong was to conclude arrangements for the marriage of Prince Sim with a Mongol Princess, for the marriage had already been sanctioned by the emperor (cf. KS 26. 27a) and was no doubt a major factor in his restoration (KS 26. 30a-31a). The restoration of Wönjong did not, however, eliminate Im Yon.

In the tenth month of (Oct. 27 - Nov. 26) 1269, just prior to the restoration of Wönjong, a revolt led by Ch'oe T'an 50) a functionality in the garrison
of the Commissioner of Men and Horse of the Northwest Frontier-District, broke out in Sŏhae Province which used the deposing of Wŏnjong as a rallying call (KS 26. 24b-25a; KS 58. 30b) and which quickly spread through the entire Koryŏ northwest (KS 26. 25b-26a; KS 26. 27a). When Ch'oe T'an and his group submitted to the Mongols, Koryŏ lost her entire northwest territory which they controlled. Ch'oe was made subordinate to the Mongol Court and the northwest portion of the peninsula was later made subordinate to the Western Capital which was redesignated Tongnyŏng-pu 東寧府 (KS 26. 28a-b; KS' 130. 33b-36b; KS 7. 1b; TT 35. 107; also see Part II) 51).

During Wŏnjong's absence, Im Yŏn, although powerless to quell the revolt in the northwest 52), had begun preparations to withstand the Mongol assault which was certain to follow if he attempted to perpetuate his own power. Wŏnjong was just as certainly determined to eliminate him. One of Im's preparations for safeguarding his own head had been to dispatch the Night Patrol to the southern provinces to enforce another mass movement to the coastal islands and mountain citadels of refuge (KS 130. 24b; TT 35. 108).

Assured of Mongol support by Qubilai, Wŏnjong departed Yen-tu with Prince Sim in the second month (Feb. 22 - Mar. 22, 1270) of his eleventh reign year (KS 26. 32b; TT 35. 107) and entered Koryŏ accompanied by T'ou-nien-ke and the latter's forces (KS 26. 30a-31a; KS 26. 32a; KS 130. 25a; YS 7. 2a; TT 35. 107). When they reached the Western Capital on May 27 (sixth day of the fifth month), they sent an envoy ahead and upon his return they learned that Im Yŏn had died on the twenty-fifth day of the second month (= March 19) while they were still enroute (YKC 21b; KS 130. 35a). Power, they learned, had been seized by Im Yumu 林惟茂 (d. 1270; BTKP 49. 460) one of Im Yŏn's sons. Immediately after his father's death, Im Yumu had received the appointment of Director of the Supreme Directorate from Chong, the Marquis of Sunan (KS 26. 32b; KS 130. 25a), since both Wŏnjong and Prince Sim were at the Mongol court. The Guard Corps and the Civil Guard were being used by the Im clan to guard their houses and insure the transfer of power (KS 26. 32b; TT 35. 107).

At this time, the Mongols had already committed themselves to restoring Wŏnjong and had even appointed a daruŋači or resident commissioner for Koryŏ (KS 26. 33a). In addition to the forces under T'ou-nien-ke were some 2,000 Mongol troops commanded by Mŏngketŭ 蒙哥□ which arrived in the Western Capital in the next year as previously requested by Ch'oe T'an (KS 26. 29b; KS 26. 32a; KS 104. 3a-4b). Wŏnjong had sent General Chŏng Chayŏ 鄭子□ (d. 1276; BTKP 13. 122) and Yi Punhŭi 53) on to Kanghwa to make preparations for moving 10,000 bushels of rice to the mainland as supplies for the Mongol forces as well as moving personnel back to the old capi-
tal (KS 26. 33a-b; KS 130. 25a). On June 15 (23rd day of the fifth month) the transfer of all ranks and organizations back to the old capital was ordered by the Ministers on Kanghwa in accordance with Wŏnjong’s instructions (KS 26. 34b). Wŏnjong himself did not reach Kaegyŏng until June 17 (27th day) at which time the Queen and royal concubines left Kanghwa to join him; a great many officials also left Kanghwa for Kaegyŏng to welcome the monarch back (KS 26. 34b; TT 35. 109; YKC 21-22a). Im Yumu disregarded the orders and sent men to prepare the people to resist, thus continuing his father’s plan to resist the Mongols, ignoring the general opposition to his move among the civil ministers (KS 26. 32b; KS 106. 37a-b; KS 130. 25a-b). These efforts were short-lived when Song Songnye 宋松禮 (d. 1289; BTKP 105. 987) and Hong Mun’gye 54), harangued the Three Patrols into action to sweep the Im clan and their supporters from power on June 7 (15th day of the fifth month) 1270. Im Yumu was killed as was Im Yŏn’s son-in-law Ch’oe Chongso 崔宗緝 (a.w. 崔宗緝; d. 1270; BTKP 23. 218); Im Yugon 林惟禑 cut his own throat the next day; the remainder of Im Yŏn’s sons, viz., Im Yugan 林惟幹, Im Yugŏ 林惟矩, and Im Yuje 林惟羯 were sent to the Mongol court. The Civil guards, sŏbang, were disbanded and members of the clan of Im Yŏn’s wife were banished to coastal islands (KS 26. 33b; 26. 34a-b; KS 106. 41a-b; KS 130. 26a-27a; YKC 21b; YS 208. 12a; TT 35. 109). On June 15 (twenty-third day of the fifth month), the transfer of all ranks and organizations back to the old capital was ordered by the Ministers on Kanghwa in accordance with Wŏnjong’s instructions (KS 26. 34b). The transfer of the capital back to Kaegyŏng signified, both in symbol and in fact, the transfer of power from the military government back to the monarch and Koryŏ’s final submission to the Mongols. There was only one obstacle. The powerful Koryŏ military units, the Three Patrols, remained on Kanghwa Island and refused to obey the transfer order (KS 26. 34b-35a; KS 130. 31a; KS 208. 12b).
Notes to Chapter V

1. In the 'Monographs on Food and Money' in the Koryo-sa, a slightly different version is given: "They sent Crown Prince Chön to submit a petition to the Mongols. The civil and military officials of the fourth rank and above each produced one kün of white gold; those of the fifth grade and below produced cloth in accordance with their station in order to meet the expenses" (KS 79. 23a).

2. For the precedent of Chin intervention in a Koryo succession fraud, see Rogers, 'Studies in Korean History', op. cit., passim.

3. Wang Sim 王謙, was born in 1236; he ascended the throne as the twenty-fifth monarch in 1274, died in 1308, and was awarded the posthumous appellation Ch'ungnyŏl 忠烈. He and all the other monarchs of Koryo who followed him, were not allowed a temple name, myoho 帝号, by the Yuan, but were given the honorary title of kuo-wáng 國王 or Prince of the first rank. For biographical information see KS 28 and KS 32; Hambis, "Notes sur l'histoire ...", pp. 178 ff; also see BTKP 34. 318. The BTKP entry b(orn) 1225 is in error (cf. KS 28. 1a).

4. Both Pak and Cho were made myriarchs, wan-hu, by Möngke and given a golden tally as symbol of their authority. KSC 17. 50b.


6. The most serious revolt of the moment was that of Kim Susŏn 金守禪 at Paekchu 自州 who submitted to Yesüder and informed him that Koryo had no intention of returning to the mainland (KS 25. 5b). There were also other revolts and desertions to the Mongols, e.g., revolts on Sŏk Island 座島 (KS 25. 5b) and a revolt at Anbuk 安北 (KS 25. 6a).

7. There are several versions of the cause of the death of Möngke; dysentery is often given as the cause. For the various accounts see Bretschneider, op. cit., p. 158 note 418.

8. Möngke had three brothers: Hülegü who was in Persia, Ariy-boge, and Qubilai. See René Grousset, L'empire des steppes, Paris, 1939, pp. 352-353, pp. 367 ff, and Barthold, "Four Studies ...", pp. 120-124 for the struggles between Qubilai and Ariy-boge which continued until 1264.


10. For this T'ang expedition against the Korean-Manchurian state of Koguryo 高句麗, see W. Bingham, The Founding of the T'ang Dynasty, Bal-
timore, 1941. These speeches look suspiciously like a warning to would-be conquerors inserted in the record by the compilers of the Korean records. H. Franke, 'Could the Mongol Emperor Read and Write Chinese?' Asia Major, New Series 3 (1983), pp. 28-41, has concluded that while Quabilai could possibly read Uiyur, he could not read Chinese.

11. Chao Lang-pi 趙郎弼 was a Jürčen and well-known for his role as envoy to Japan. In 1270 he was first appointed to take charge of the Military Colonies in Koryo which we were making preparations for the Japan invasion. Chao declined the appointment and was then appointed envoy to Japan. For biographical information see YS 165. 9b ff.

12. Hsüan-fu-shih 宣撫使 or Pacification Commissioners, were established in the year 1260-1261 by the Mongols in each lu ('province') administration and the matters they handled included supervision of agriculture, household registers, and household taxes. See Schurmann, op. cit., pp. 43, 50, 57 note 6, and 98; Ratchnevsky, op. cit., p. 213.

13. Kang Hwasang 康和尚 was a Korean of Chinju 晉州 (in mod. S. Kyŏngsang Province) who had been captured by the Mongols and who entered their service. He later changed his name to Suhyŏng 守衡 (KSC 18. 4a) possibly because his former name, Hwasang, was a common term for a member of the Buddhist clergy. He died in 1289, cf. BTKP 51. 482; KS 30. 16b; KSC 21. 12a.

14. According to YS 4. 6a-b, Prince Chŏn remained 3 years; this is a scribal error for 2 years and refers to the fact that he was present for a portion of 1259 and 1260, but he was actually away from Koryo only about one full year.

15. Kim Panggyŏng 金方慶 (1212-1300) one of Koryo's more noted generals, traced his descent to Silla King Kyŏngsun 敬順王. He commanded the Koryo forces which, with Mongol support, quelled the rebellion of the Three Patrols. He also participated in the Japan campaigns. He was evidently inclined toward Buddhism for he dedicated a shrine for the Diamond Sutra at Kimju 金州 prior to embarking on the first Japan expedition (TYS 32. 548a). He was also recognized as a calligrapher of first rank. Following the establishment of tight Mongol control on Koryo he attempted to rebel but was captured and exiled (YKS 27b) For his role in the Japan campaigns he was given the honorary title of Duke of Sangnak 上洛公. For biographical information see KS 104. 1a-24a; also see BTKP 63. 604.

16. Han'guk-sa sajŏn, in a chart appended to the back cover, calculates a total of 4385 civil and military officials during the reign of Koryo Munjong (r. 1047-1082) but the number of officials is unknown for many of the
offices so this should be regarded as a minimum figure. Yi, *Han'guk-sa*, Vol. 2, Chart IV, calculates 4399 officials for the same period with the same qualification applying. These figures represent the government officials two centuries prior to this event. Certainly the government had grown and since many officials from the provinces had fled to Kanghwa, as had assuredly the entire royal clan, this figure is probably correct.

17. The first shift is given as 16 yŏng or 16 000 soldiers. Assuming equal shifts, this would put the Koryŏ troop strength on Kanghwa Island at 48 000 men. The previous reference to 30 yŏng being levied for the reconstruction of Kaegyŏng (KS 25. 3-4) seems to support this figure.

18. There were several delays on the return journey, viz., at Tung-ching where Yesüder held 100 men of Wŏnjong's party — he later released them (KS 25. 12b-13a); at Kaegyŏng to inspect the progress of construction; and another at Sŏngch'ŏn-pu due to a fit of pique on the part of Shu-li-ta, But I have found no mention of a delay at the Western Capital. Howorth, op. cit., pp. 220-221, has an interesting interpretation concerning the massive cited in the text and the return of Wŏnjong: "The turbulent Coreans at first refused to receive him (Wŏnjong, WEH) and were determined to break the Mongol yoke, and it was only when Wangtien (Wŏnjong, WEH) agreed to assist them in this that they would accept him." Howorth cites De Mailla, x 291-294 (i.e., Joseph-Anne Marie de Moyriac de Mailla's translation of the "Tong-Kieng-Kang-Mu", Paris 1779). This is an interesting view, but I have not found any evidence to support it. Wŏnjong himself does not appear to have been popular; how much of the opposition was general and how much was centered in the military is conjectural at this point. The basis for Qubilai's suspicions may have been due to the actions of Yi Êng 始疑, an official of the Koryŏ Department of Justice, hyŏngbu, who accompanied Wŏnjong to the Mongol Court. Yi had told Sun, the Duke of Yŏngnyŏng, that if he aspired to be king, he had only to say the word. Yi was exiled upon their return to Koryŏ (KS 25. 16b).

19. Prince Chŏn had been invested as monarch by Qubilai prior to his departure from Chao-ching-fu (cf. YKC 9b), but a patent of investiture was apparently not conferred until after Prince Chŏn's accession. See note 23 below.

20. See YKC 9a-10b; YS 208. 4b; KSC 18. 6b-7a; KS 25. 23a-b; there is also an account of this in *Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei* 國朝文類 (also known as *Yüan wen-lei*) of Su T'ien-chüeh 蘇天爵 (1294-1352), incorporated in Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an 詩部叢刊 2017-2036, Commercial Press Edition, Shanghai, 1933, in *chüan* 41. 20b-22a, a section bearing the sub-title of 'Con-
quest of) Koryŏ (征伐)高麗. This section consists simply of a short summary which undoubtedly had the same origins as YKC. It adds no new information and I mention it at this point merely to note its existence.

21. This particular pledge, although often referred to by the Koreans as one of the principles underlying Yuan-Koryŏ relations (e.g., cf. the documents dated 1321-1323 in IC 6. 1a-7a) was observed only until 1276 when many Mongol customs and dress were introduced by fiat. Mongol customs and clothing were observed from 1276 until the Hung-wu period (1368-1399) when they were prohibited for the first time. Cf. Sohwa oesa

小華外史 of O Kyŏngwŏn 吳慶元 (Yi Dynasty), kwŏn 1. 1a.

22. The withdrawal of the Mongol forces began in the eighth month when Shu-li-ta departed Kanghwa (KS 25. 19b). These forces apparently withdrew to Tung-ching and the daruçaç Po-lu-ho-fan-erh Pa-tu-lu 萧魯谷反兒拔覲魯 (KSC 18. 9a; YKC 10a) and his party were, as the edict says, recalled. Also released at this time were some 100 Koreans who had been with Wŏnjong's party on his return to Koryŏ and who had been detained by Yesüder at Tung-ching (KSC 18. 6b).

23. There was a general period of inactivity following the death of Mŏngke due largely to the succession dispute. See Grousset, L'empire mongol, Paris, 1941, Vol. I, p. 367 ff.

24. According to YS 208. 4b, Chŏn sent his son Hŭi, the Duke of Yŏng'an, to the Mongol Court. At this time the Emperor bestowed a patent of investiture, the seal of King and the tiger tally. When Duke Hŭi returned, in addition to the edict mentioned, he brought back a tiger tally, seal and seal ribbons of state, a bow and a sword conferred by the Emperor upon Wŏnjong (KSC 18. 9a). Wang Hŭi 王僖 was the son of Sŏ 懿, the Duke of Yangyang 冀陽公 (cf. BTKP 115. 1078); I am uncertain in this case if the entry calling him Wŏnjong's son is a scribal error or simply another Koryŏ ruse.


26. I have been unable to identify these individuals.

27. According to HY 20. 20b, "In the Koryŏ system, the principal wife, chŏk嫡 [of the monarch], was called Queen, wanghu 王后; concubines, ch'ŏp妾, were called Ladies, puin夫人, [and had the grades of] Honored Princess, kwibi 貴妃, Chaste Princess, sukpi 賢妃, Virtuous Princess, tŏkpi 德妃, and Sagacious Princess, hyŏnbi 賢妃. All were of the official grade of First Class primary."

28. In the second month of 1244, the Kyŏngch'ang Princess 慶昌宮主 was made the consort, pi妃, of the Crown Prince because the latter's
first wife had died (KS 23. 37b). In 1260 she was invested as Queen, wang-hu. She was degraded to the status of a commoner in 1277, by her step-son, King Ch'ungnyöl. For biographical information see KS 88. 36-37a.

29. Wang T'ae (d. 1266) was the eldest son of Wönjong's second Queen. He was made Marquis of Siyang in 1263. For biographical information see KS 91. 7a-b; also see BTKP 119. 1116.

30. Wang Chong (a.w. ). In 1263 he was made Marquis of Sunan. He was an active emissary to the Mongol Court, for which he was advanced to the grade of Duke. He was exiled to an island when his mother, the Kyǒngch'ang Princess, was degraded to the status of a commoner in 1277. In 1285, he was summoned to return. For biographical information see KS 91. 7a-9a.

31. Little is known of either the Kyǒngan Princess or the Hamnyǒng Princess beyond the mere fact of their existence.

32. Queen Sun'gyǒng was of the Kim clan of Kyǒngju and the daughter of Yaksǒn, the Duke of Changik. She was first invested as Kyǒngmok hyǒnbì; she became the consort of the Crown Prince in 1235 and bore one son, Prince Sim. She died in 1237. For biographical information see KS 88. 36a-b; for a rather complete list of biographical references see BTKP 109. 1026.

33. This, plus the tribute requirements, was probably behind the suggestion that the silver utensils of the government officials serving outside the capital, which were stored in the Sinhǔng Treasury, be utilized for the national needs. KS 79. 23a.

34. Thirteen earthquakes are recorded for the period 1216-1228, eight of which occurred in the period 1226-1228.

35. The summons ordered Wönjong to practice shih-chien, i.e., to present himself at court on such occasions as the Emperor's birthday, etc.

36. Cho I had the former name of Inyǒ. He was a Buddhist bonze who returned to secular life and submitted to the Mongols. He was made an interpreter due to his proficiency in languages and it was he who originally directed Qubilai's attention to Japan. For biographical information see KS 130. 27a-b; BTKP carries no entry.

37. Hei-ti; in addition to the role he played in the restoration of Wönjong, he was active in Yüan-Japan relations and made one trip to Japan with Korean guides in 1268. In 1274 he was appointed daruyatı for Koryǒ. A few of his activities in Koryǒ are outlined in subsequent pages.

38. There were two shih-lang in the Yüan Board of War; the title had
the official grade of Fourth Class primary, cf. Ratchnevsky, op. cit., p. 130.

39. Yin-Hung 顏弘 was, with Hei-ti, active in Yüan-Japan affairs and a few of his activities are outlined in YS 208 Jih-pen chuan. It is interesting to note that his name reverses the taboo name of Sung T'ai-tsu, Hung-Yin 顏弘.

40. Kóje Island, a large island off the coast of the present South Kyŏngsang Province, gained attention as a POW camp during the recent war in Korea. For topographical and historical information see TYS 32. 562b-566a.

41. My concern in the present study is limited to Koryŏ’s preparations for the Japan invasions and not with the invasions themselves nor the several envosys sent to Japan, although I do mention these en passant. There are several studies of various aspects of the Mongol invasions of Japan, the majority of them in Japanese. The best work I have seen in any language is Ikeuchi Hiroshi’s Genkō . . . , which covers all events in detail. In his second volume, Ikeuchi has plates of the illustrated Ōyano-hon 大矢野本, a contemporary account of the invasions by the Ōyano brothers. For the latter also see Frieda Fischer-Wieruszowski, ‘Kriegerischer Einfall der Mongolen in Japan’, Ostantasiatische Zeitschrift, 1935, pp. 121-124. Howorth, op. cit., pp. 238-239 contains a translation of the first missive sent to Japan. Yoshi S. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Mainland, 2 vols., Berkeley, 1937 and 1940, contains a translation of the first missive in Vol. 1, Appendix 16, p. 245, and the second missive carried by Chao Lang-pi in 1271 in Vol. 1, Appendix 17. An account of the Mongol invasions of Japan is also contained in general histories of Japan of which Sansom’s recent two volume work, A History of Japan . . . , is probably the best in a western language. The best account in Korean is probably that in Yi Pyŏngdo’s Han’guk-sa, Vol. 2.

42. Ōm Suan 嚴守安 (d. 1298) was of Yöngwŏl 寧越. He passed the exams in the reign of Wŏnjong and was appointed Military Recorder to-byŏngma noks 都兵馬錄事 . He was active in the elimination of the Kim clan and in the suppression of the rebellion of the Three Patrols. For biographical information see KS 106. 26b-28a; also see BTKP 89. 832.

43. Yi Changyong 李藏用 (1202-1272) was a descendant in the sixth generation of Yi Chayŏn 李千淵 (fl. 1024-1058; BTKP 127. 1177). His style, cha, was Hyŏnbŏ 显甫 and he had the former name of In’gi 仁祺. His father Kyŏng was good at judiciary matters and rose to be Coadministrator of the Bureau of Military Affairs. Changyong passed the exams in the reign of Kojong and subsequently held many government posts. He was one of the few who advised compliance with the Mongol de-
mand that the Koryo monarch appear in court in 1264, and he accompanied Wŏnjong on the journey. At the Mongol court he was confronted by Sun, the Duke of Yŏngnyŏng who had said that Koryo had a military force of thirty-eight thousand men which, Duke Sun, ventured, he could lead back for the use of the Court. Summoned to the Yüan Secretariat, chung-shu-sheng, Yi countered that due to the wars, each yōng or unit of 1,000, was such in name only, and analogous with the Yüan Myriarch or Chief of Ten Thousand who did not necessarily command 10,000. Then he won the argument with a bold stroke, suggesting that they go to Koryo and inspect the army. "If what [Duke] Sun says is correct, behead me; if what I say is correct, behead Sun." Questioned as to the population of Koryo, Yi replied that he didn't know. When asked why he didn't know since he was a chief minister, Yi managed to dodge the obvious attempt to obtain a basic figure for taxation and corvée purposes by pointing to the window sill and asking the minister of the Secretariat how many there were of them (in the nation). When the minister replied that he didn't know, Yi offered that it was difficult to know all things, even for a chief minister. While in the Yüan capital Yi also met the well-known literatus Wang O who entertained him in his home and admired Yi's knowledge of the rules of ryhming despite the fact that Yi spoke no Chinese. Wang O, incidentally, appears to have had some connection with Koryo affairs at this time, for I note that he authored the edict accompanying the presentation of a calendar to Koryo in 1264, which is preserved in Kuo-ch'ao wen-lei, chüan 9. 3b.

Qubilai himself, when he learned that Yi had prepared the petition brought by the mission coined an interesting name for Yi, A-man miek-erh-li kan 阿蠻滅兒里于 (? ? Amen-Mary Qăn). Yi's brilliant performance at Qubilai's court saved Koryo, at least temporarily, from the staggering military and fiscal demands the Mongols were soon to impose. For this feat Yi was enfeoffed as Kyŏngwŏn-kun or Distinguished Earl of Kyŏngwŏn-kun. (The honorary prefix kaeguk was a title of respect bestowed for extraordinary merit to the nation; for some brief remarks see Han'guk-sa sajŏn, p. 40). Yi was given the honorary fief of 1,000 households and the actual fief of 100 households (whose taxes he consumed). Yi later endeavored to convince the Mongols to abandon the idea of bringing Japan within their sphere. He also supported moving back to the old capital over the opposition of the faction of Kim Injun. In 1270, he was tried for his role in the deposing incident and dismissed from office. Two years later he died at the age of seventy-two. None of his works are known to have survived. In 1275, after Wŏnjong's
death, he was given the posthumous appellation of Munjin 文瑾. For biographical information see KS 102. 23a-29a; also see BTKP 126. 1172.

44. In the account of the deposing of Wŏnjong given in HY 4. 28a we read: "[In] the sixth month of 1269, Yi Changyong and Im Yŏn deposed the King and confined him." The following gloss points out that here Yi Changyong is regarded as the chief plotter. Yi's role is difficult to assess. He was a powerful and popular statesman who did his utmost to resist Mongol demands upon Koryŏ. Wŏnjong hated him for his involvement in the deposing incident for which he was later tried by the Mongols (KS 102. 8a-b). It would appear from the KS 26. 21a account that Yi played a passive role but in KS 130. 22a he is said to have favored abdication.

Some years later, one Yi Punhŭi 李舜禧 (d. 1278; BTKP 140. 1288) was accused of involvement with Im Yŏn in the elimination of Kim Injun and in the deposing of Wŏnjong. See the lengthy argument in KSC 20. 16b-18b; KS 123. 11a-14b; also see KS 123. 7a and KS 106. 41a-b; the last cited proves Yi innocent of the charge.

45. For further details on the deposing also see CHSL 4. 37a; HTC III, 6724. 2.20 and 6724. 25-26; YKC 17b-18b; YKC 20b; KS 102. 28a-b; KS 104. 3a-b; KS 123. 7a-b; KS 123. 11a-14b; KS 130. 21b-22a; KS 130. 33b; and TK 11. B 239-240, TT 35. 101-102. The deposing of Wŏnjong has been excellently summarized by Hambis, 'Notes sur l'histoire . . .', pp. 176-178 and studied in detail by Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Genkō . . ., passim.

46. For the precedent of fraudulent fraternal succession see Rogers, 'Studies . . .', passim.

47. YKC 16 and YS 208 give the fourth and sixth month of 1269 respectively for Prince Sim's journey to the Mongol Court. Hambis, 'Notes sur l'histoire . . .', p. 175 has discussed this discrepancy and believes that the fourth month is more likely the correct date.

48. Cf. KS 26. 21a-b; KS 26. 23a-24a; KS 106. 11a; KS 104. 3a; KS 107. 10b-11a; KS 130. 22b-23a; YKC 16b-17a; YS 208. 9b-10a; YS 208. 12b; TT 35. 103; IC sŏlchŏn 說前 2. 7b-8a. Also see Hambis, 'Notes sur l'histoire . . .', p. 176 ff for a summary of these events as well as for the reconstruction of the Mongolian name given here.

49. I have followed Schurmann, op. cit., passim in rendering hsing-sheng 行省, an abbreviation of hsing-chung-shu-sheng 行中書省, as 'mobile bureau'. The Mobile Bureaus were the provincial governments and were copied on the model of the central government. See Ratcliff, op. cit., p. 22. Also see Part II. The Yüan Eastern Capital, Tung-ching, refers to Liaoyang.

50. Ch'oe T'an 崔坦 was a scribe in the military headquarters of the Nor-
thern Frontier District and following his revolt against Koryŏ, he submitted the Koryŏ northwest to the Mongols. He was attached to the Court in 1270, presented with a golden plaque, chin-p'ai 金牌, as symbol of his authority and appointed as Administrator, tsung-kuan, of the Koryŏ northwest which was redesignated Tongnyŏng-pu.

51. For a detailed study of the subject see Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Kôrai Gensô-cho no hairitsu jiken to Môko no Kôrai seinôkumen senryô [The Deposing-Enthroning Incident in the Court of Koryŏ Wŏnjong and the Mongol Seizure of Northwest Koryŏ], Tôyôshi ronsô 東洋史論叢 (Asiatic Studies in Honor of Dr. K. Shiratori on the Occasion of his 60th Birthday), Tôkyô, 1925, pp. 133-156. This study is also incorporated in Ikeuchi, Genkô, ..., Vol. 1, pp. 49-70. While Ch'oe used the deposing incident as a pretext to revolt, there was a real attempt to restore Wŏnjong by some army officers who attempted to overthrow Im at this time, but the plot failed (KS 130. 23a-24a).

52. The revolt was at this time still limited to Sŏhae Province. Hyŏn Munhyŏk玄文驃, the Civil Governor of the Northern Frontier-District, was given only 150 men to subdue the rebellion and an envoy was sent to the Mongol Court notifying them of the revolt (KS 26. 25a-b). The units of the Three Patrols were sent to several of the islands along the coast of Sŏhae Province to attempt to quell the revolt which encompassed the islands (KS 104. 4a) which had been the military and administrative center for the Koryŏ northwest since the evacuation of the Western Capital. Following his restoration, Wŏnjong also petitioned the Mongol authorities for the suppression of Ch'oe T'an and the return of the territory (KS 26. 31a-32a). Koryŏ finally managed to regain a small section of Sŏhae Province, but not until 1290 was the entire area administratively restored to Koryŏ.

53. Yi Punhŭi 李完禧 (d. 1278) of Yŏmjuk塩州 was the son of Grand General Yi Song 李松, a retainer, mun'gaek, of Ch'oe U. Punhŭi and his younger brother Sŭp both served Kim Injun. He was appointed General and found favor with Wŏnjong. Following the elimination of the Kim clan, Punhŭi was appointed Grand General and then rose to the rank of Supreme General. He was active in the overthrow of the Im clan and the suppression of a slave revolt in Kyŏngsang Province. For biographical information see KS 123. 11a-14a; also see BTKP 140. 1288.

54. Hong Mun'gye 洪文系 (d. 1316) of Namyang 南陽 later changed his name to Kyu奎. He was the husband of the elder sister of Im Yumu who discussed all matters with him. Hong and Song Songnye were alarmed over the King's return from the Yüan court which Im Yumu wanted to re-
sist and there was general consternation over Im's plans. The King sent General Chŏng Ch'ŏn and Yi Punhŭi ahead to Kanghwa and Yi secretly urged Hong to act against Im Yumu which resulted in the overthrow of the Im clan. Hong was given the posthumous appellation of Kwangjŏng 匡定. He had one son Yung 戬 and one daughter who became Queen dowager Myŏngdŏk 明德太后 (1298-1380; BTKP 84. 793). For biographical information see KS 106. 41a-43a; also see BTKP 40. 369.
Chapter VI

THE REBELLION OF THE THREE PATROLS,
SAM PYŏLCH’O

The elimination of the Im clan was accomplished by members of the Royalist faction who succeeded in convincing the Three Patrols, the strongest Koryŏ military force, to overthrow Im Yumu. It would appear that the military were willing to accept restoration of full power to Wŏnjong, but that they were unaware that Wŏnjong had completely submitted to the Mongols 1).

When Wŏnjong, backed by a strong Mongol army, learned that the Three Patrols had refused to obey the order to return to the old capital, he acted swiftly. On June 20th, 1270 (1270.5.29), he "sent General Kim Chijŏ 2) 金之本 to Kanghwa to disband the Three Patrols. [General Kim] seized the register of their names and returned. The Three Patrols were fearful lest the register of their names be made known to the Mongols which increased the opposition they harbored" (KS 130. 37b; also see KS 26. 34b; TT 35. 109). General Kim took the register of their names back to Kaegyŏng on the following day and on this same day, General Pae Chungson 3) and Commander, chiyu, Yŏ Yonghŭi 庸永禧 (a.w. No 永禧) rose to take the leadership of the Three Patrols and led them in open rebellion (KS 130. 38a) 4).

The chaos which the rebellion brought to Kanghwa is detailed in the biography of Pae Chungson where we read: 'Men were sent to cry out in the streets, saying, 'The Mongol soldiers are arriving in great numbers and are massacring the people. All those desiring to help the nation meet at the ball field, kujŏng 招庭.' In a short while, the people gathered in great numbers. Some scattered in the four directions, fighting for boats to cross the river and many were drowned. The Three Patrols prohibited people from entering or leaving [the island] and patrolled the river, calling in loud voices, 'All Civil and Military Officials, yangban, who do not leave the boats, know that you will be killed.' All hearing this were afraid and left the boats 4a).

'Others, desiring to go to Kaegyŏng, launched boats. The rebels boarded skiffs and pursued, shooting arrows at them. No one dared move. In the city, the people were terrified and scattered to hide in the forests and marshes. The wailing of women and children filled the streets.

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"The rebels doled out stores from the Kūmgang Warehouse 金剛庫 distributing weapons among the soldiers and closed the city for defense. [Pae] Chungson and [Yō] Yonghū led the Three Patrols to meet at the city wall [where] they compelled On, the Marquis of Sūnghwa 5), to become King. They established offices with General Yu Chonhyŏk 尹存冕 and Secretary of State of the Left, sansŏ chwasŭng 6) 尚書左丞, Yi Sinson 李信孫 as the Left and Right Ministers of State, sŏngson 7) 永宣 [respectively]" (KS 130. 38a-b; also see KS 26. 34b; KS 90. 7a; TT 35. 109).

There are some indications of advance planning for we read that "previously, when the rebels first plotted to rebel, General Yi Paekki 李自起 didn't go along with it. At this point (i.e., when they met at the wall), they beheaded [Yi] Paekki as well as the Moslems, hui-hui 8) 回回 , whom the Mongols had sent, in the street" (KS 130. 38b). A further indication of advanced planning is seen in the behavior of Chief of the Bureau of Diviners, pan-paesaguk-sa 9) 判大史局事, An Pangyŏl 10) 安邦悦. "When [An] was about to return to the capital (i.e., following the transfer order), he asked an omen of the image of T'aejo in Pong'ŭn Temple and obtained the prophecy 'Half alive; half dead'. Based upon this, he said the omen [meant] the dead portion had come to the mainland and the living portion had followed the Three Patrols out to sea. Then, he accompanied the rebels south and tried to persuade them saying, 'The descendants of the Dragon are exhausted at twelve. Go south and found the capital of the empire and the prophecy is fulfilled.' Consequently, he became the rebels' chief plotter" (KS 130. 39b).

An took his prognostic at the temple prior to June 17 (1270.5.26) when the image of T'aejo was removed (KS 26. 34b), and thus, several days before the actual outbreak of the rebellion on June 21st. It should, however, be noted that the rebels of the Three Patrols had already broken into the warehouses at this time (KS 26. 34b). While it is difficult to assess the value of the prophecy as a stimulus in their move south, there is little doubt that it encouraged the men of the Three Patrols as well as justifying the rebellion as preordained.

Following their seizure of Kanghwa, the Three Patrols prepared to evacuate the island and move south. On June 23rd (1270.6.3), "the rebels, estimating they were unable to defend [Kanghwa] collected ships and all loaded public and private property, the children and wives [of the officials] and went south. Their ships extended, stem to stern, from Kup'o 仇浦 to the Hangp'a River 廉破江 without end; there were over 1 000 ships.

"At that time, all the officials had gone to welcome the King [home from the Mongol court]. [When they learned] their wives and children had all been seized by the rebels, the sound of their bitter weeping rent heaven and earth" (KS 130. 38b-39a).
The primary reason for the flight south was fear of the Mongol forces. When a force of slaves was collected to attack the rebel rear at the time of their flight south, "the rebels saw the glittering weapons [of the slave force] near the sea and were nervous and fearful believing the Mongol troops had already arrived" (KS 130. 39). It will be recalled that the fortifications on Kanghwa Island had been dismantled as one of the conditions of the peace negotiations of 1259 (KS 24. 43b-44a). It will also be recalled that the Mongols had increased their activity in amphibious warfare and now had large numbers of Koreans on their side, i.e., Ch'oe T'an, et al., and thus had no lack of either trained seamen or vessels.

The flight south began on June 23; on this same day General Hyŏn Mun-hyŏk 11) had escaped from the island and informed the capital of the revolt. Two days later, T'ou-nien-ke sent To-la-tai 탕라아 who entered Kanghwa with two thousand men on June 25 (1270. 6.5) (KS 26. 35a).

Then, on July 3 (1270. 6.13), General Kim Panggyŏng as Rebel Suppression Commissioner, Յողォ朝鲜 with sixty men, and Myriarch Sung with one thousand men, set out in pursuit of the rebels and reaching the sea they sighted the rebel ships at anchor at Yŏnghŭng Island 12) (KS 104. 5a).

On August 2 (1270. 7.13), T'ou-nien-ke sent Commander, tsung-kuan, Hong Tagu 13) to patrol Chŏlla and Kyŏngsang Provinces, and the Eastern Frontier-District (KS 26. 35b). On August 9 (1270. 7.20), the Mongol Marshal Aqaí 14) was appointed Pacification Commissioner, anmusa, and given a force of 1,500 men (YKC 22a; KS 26). Then, on August 19 (1270. 8.1), Crown Prince Sim was sent to the Mongol Court as Birthday Felicitation Envoy, hajŏrilsa 祝節日使 with a memorial on the rebellion of the Three Patrols (YS 7. 5a; KS 26. 35b; TT 35. 110).

Sailing south, the Three Patrols had raided various coastal islands, circumspectly avoiding the Mongol-Koryŏ forces on the mainland, and they entered Chin Island 15) on September 6 (1270. 8.19), pillaging the chu and kun districts (KS 26. 36b; TT 35. 110). After their entry into Chin Island, they erected a walled-city, Yongjang-sŏng 16) and then began to build halls and other buildings. Following their establishment on Chin Island, they began to raid the coastal districts (KS 26. 36b-37a), and beginning with Ch'angsŏn Island 17), they were able to bring some thirty islands, including Kŏje Island and T'amna under their control (KS 27. 12b; KS 27. 10b-11a).

In the interim, the Deputy Minister of State, ch'amjijŏngsa 参知政事, Sin Sajŏn 18) who had been dispatched as Chŏlla Province Rebel Suppression Commissioner, heard that the rebels had crossed over to the mainland and, on September 19 (1270. 9.2), he fled back to the capital and safety
(KS 26. 36b; KS 104. 5a; TT 35. 110). However, General Yang Tongmu and General Ko Yŏrim 19 took a fleet, chusa, to attack Chin Island on September 21 (1270. 9. 4) (KS 26. 37a), but on the same day the main force of the Three Patrols had crossed to the mainland where they raided the Changyŏ-pu administration 20 kidnapping the commander, toryŏng, Yun Man-jang and pillaging the area (KS 26. 37a; TT 35. 111).

After returning to the capital, Sin Sajŏn was replaced by General Kim Panggyŏng and on September 24 (1270. 9. 7), General Kim, as Cholla Province Rebel Suppression Commander, together with Marshal Aqai left the capital with one thousand men to attack Chin Island (KS 26. 37a; KS 104. 5b). At this time, the Three Patrols had attacked both Nazu and Chŏnju. Hearing of the situation, General Kim divided his force as soon as he entered the area, sending one unit toward Chŏnju while he advanced toward Nazu where the fighting had been going on for seven days and nights (KS 103. 40a-b; TYS 35. 620a). The rebels, hearing the rumor that General Kim was backed by ten thousand men, lifted the attack and withdrew (KS 104. 5b-6a; TT 35. 111).

Next, the rebels turned their attention to T'amna, seizing the city of Cheju on December 19 (1270. 11. 4) (KS 26. 37b; TT 35. 111). Previously, the Circuit Inspector, anch'al-sa, Kwŏn Tan 21, dispatched the Vice-Commissioner of Yŏngam, Kim Su 22, with two hundred men to defend Cheju; he was joined by General Ko Yŏrim with seventy men 23. Both Kim Su and Ko Yŏrim were later killed in the battle for Cheju (KS 103. 41a; TT 35. 111).

Following the withdrawal of the rebels from Chŏnju and Nazu, General Kim Panggyŏng and Aqai proceeded to Samgyŏngwŏn 24 opposite Chin Island and garrisoned there (KS 104. 6a; TT 35. 111). At this time, two men who had escaped from the rebels, Hong Ch'ān and Hong Ki slandered Kim Panggyŏng, accusing him of being secretly in league with the rebels. Aqai arrested them and informed the daru'yach'i 25 of the matter and the daru'yach'i ordered Kim Panggyŏng to return to the capital with his accusers to face trial. Aqai then manacled General Kim and sent him to the capital with an escort of fifty guards (KS 104. 6a-b; TT 35. 111). General Kim was quickly absolved by the daru'yach'i and, at Wŏnjong's request, on February 3, 1271 (1270. 11. 19), the daru'yach'i again appointed General Kim to subdue the rebels (KS 104. 6b). In this same month, Myriarch Kao-i-ma (?Kharma) was also dispatched with two hundred men to patrol the southern coastal areas against the raids of the Three Patrols (KS 82. 6b; KS 26. 37b).

And so the first year of the rebellion came to an end with General Kim garrisoned opposite Chin Island preventing an incursion into the mainland at that point, while the rebels continued to raid the coastal area.

During the eleventh month of the eleventh year of the reign of Wŏnjong 176
(Dec. 17, 1270 - Jan. 15, 1271), the Yuan Secretariat, chung-shu-sheng, had memorialized Qubilai, the Yuan Emperor, requesting the establishment of a Military Colony Supervisory Bureau, tunjon'gyöngnyaka 屯田經略司 (KS 27. 2b) which was to result in the dispatch of Hindu 26) to Koryo. Aqai was relieved of his command by Hindu and, on March 19 (1271.1.5), Aqai returned to Kaegyong 27). The first attempt to negotiate with the Three Patrols was made at this time. On March 20 (1271.1.6), the Auxiliary Secretary, wonoe- ganzang 28) 員外郎, Pak Ch'onju 朴天溓 arrived at Chin Island carrying two edicts: one edict was directed to the rebels by Wŏnjong and the second was an edict from the Yuan Emperor to Wŏnjong which the latter wished them to see, hoping that it might influence them to submit 29) (KS 26. 40b; TT 35. 112). The rebels met Pak and while they entertained him at Pyŏkp'ajŏng 碧波亭 on Chin Island, they quietly dispatched twenty ships and attacked the Mongol-Koryo forces on the mainland, killing ninety men and capturing one ship (KS 27. 1a-b; TT 36. 114). Pak returned from Chin Island on April 5 (1271.1.22), with the rebels' answer. They had told him, "This edict is not directed to us. We do not dare receive the answer to a state letter" (KS 27. 4b). On the 25th day of the first month, Pak was sent to the Yuan court to report on the rebels' activities (KS 27. 5a; TT 36. 114).

When Hindu arrived in Koryo in the spring of 1271, he carried an imperial edict from Qubilai directed to the Three Patrols. On April 23 (1271.2.10), this edict was carried to the rebel leader Pae Chungson by Hu-tu-ta-erh 忽都答兒. It would appear that this edict offered the Three Patrols Cholla Province and direct subordination to the Yuan court 30). The Three Patrols continuously postponed accepting the Mongol terms and made additional demands, e.g., the withdrawal of Mongol-Koryo army garrisons in the south. This was, of course, unacceptable to the Mongols and Qubilai was informed of these delaying tactics. The Yuan reaction was to order the subjugation of Chin Island (YS 7. 10a).

Following their departure from Kanghwa, the Three Patrols had looted and plundered the southern coastal areas. They were especially active in 1271, raiding from Changhŭng-pu in Cholla Province (KS 27. 6b; TT 36. 115), eastward to Happ'o 31) (KS 27. 9a), Tongnae 32) (KS 27. 9b), and Kimju 33) (KS 27. 11b) in Kyŏngsang Province. As their successes against the Mongol-Koryo forces continued, their fame spread and this in turn stimulated others to revolt and join them 34), and so their strength increased still more 35). And, as their strength increased, so did the range and extent of their incursions. Attacking Kimju on the eighth day of the fourth month of 1271, they not only raided the city but also, with the use of fire, successfully attacked the Defense Commander, pangwi 防衛, General Pak Po 朴保 who had taken
his forces into the citadel of refuge overlooking the city (KS 27. 11b; TT 36. 115; 35. 116).

On June 25 (1271. 4. 14), following the refusal of Pae Chungson to submit to the terms offered, Hindu requested that he be allowed to divide Cholla Province with Gurimchi (36) and Wang Kuo-ch'ang (37) and attack the rebels (YS 7. 10a; KS 27. 12a; KS 27. 11b). On June 30 (1271. 4. 19), Hui and Ong (38), two of the sons of Sun, the Duke of Yongnyong, were ordered to proceed south from Liaotung with four hundred troops to aid Hindu in the attack on Chin Island (KS 27. 12a; KS 90. 7a-b; TT 36. 116). On July 1 (1271. 4. 20), a Mongol envoy arrived with an edict to suppress the rebels on Chin Island before the hot weather and the rains set in (KS 27. 12a-b; TT 36. 116). This advice was a bit late, for we read in an entry dated the fifth month of 1271, in YKC:

'Previously, Hindu, Shih Shu 史樞, and Hong Tagu went to attack Chin Island. The rebels marshalled warships along the northern coast of the island. [Shih] Shu said, 'The murderers are now running rampant and we do not yet have the strength to engage them. Moreover, the summer heat is now blazing and the steam rises from the sea. The power of the bows is retarded and the soldiers find them difficult to use because of the season. [Let us] divide the army into three groups and use many unfurled flags and banners as troops to decoy the enemy. I, and all the armies, will conceal units who will come out and directly blunt the vanguard [of the rebel force] in order [that we may] press on to Chin Island and destroy them.

'They sent a messenger to make [their plans] known [to the Emperor] and also to beg for 'flame-throwers' huo-ch'iang and fire-bombs huo-p'ao, as well as all implements of assault' (YKC 24b-25a).

And so, on July 11 (1271. 5. 1) the long postponed offensive was begun when Hong Tagu attacked Chin Island (KS 27. 14a). On July 20 (1271. 5. 10), a fleet of three hundred ships under General Pyon Yang 留陽 and General Yi Susim 李守深 attacked Chin Island (KS 27. 14a). Then, on July 25 (1271. 5. 14), an all-out attack was begun.

'[Kim] Panggyong and Hindu commanding the Army of the Center, entered [Chin Island] at Pyokp'ajong. Hui and Ong, the sons of the Duke of Yongnyong, as well as Hong Tagu, commanded the Army of the Left and entered at Changhang 楙項. General Kim Sok 金錫 and Myriarch Kao-ima commanded the Army of the Right and went in from the east in command of over 100 ships 39).

'The rebels gathered at Pyokp'ajong with the intention of repelling the Army of the Center. Tagu advanced ahead, let fly with fire 40), and attacked the flank. The rebels were alarmed and scattered. They advanced the Army of the Right [but] the Army of the Right was afraid and wanted to support the
Army of the Center. The rebels seized two ships and they killed them all.

"Prior to this, the government army had battled the rebels a number of times without a victory [so] the rebels were contemptuous of them and did not make preparations. [Therefore], when the government forces launched a heavy attack, the rebels all abandoned the wives and children [being held as hostages] and fled. The people and treasures which they had taken from Kangdo, as well as the people living on Chin Island, were all captured by the Mongols.

"Panggyŏng saw the rebels scattering and pursued them. Over 10,000 men and women and several tens of warships were captured. The remaining rebels went to T'amna. Panggyŏng entered Chin Island and captured 4,000 bushels (sŏk) of rice, treasures, and military paraphernalia; all were transported to the capital. All 'freemen', yangmin 良民, of those who had submitted to the rebels were ordered to return to their occupation" (KS 104. 7b-8a).

Marquis On was killed 41) and Pae Chungson apparently fell in battle. The rebels who escaped were led by Kim Tongjong 42) to the island of T'amna which the rebels held (KS 27. 15a). Hearing of the rebel defeat on Chin Island, their General Yu Chonhyŏk, who was based in Namhae-hyon 南海縣 raiding the coastal areas, gathered his force of eighty ships and sailed to join them (KS 130. 39a-40a; TT 36. 116). While a major defeat had been sustained (KS 104. 7b-8a; YS 7. 12a; TK 11B 258-259; TT 36. 116), the rebel strength was still to be a source of concern to the Mongol-Koryŏ forces, for from their base at Cheju 43) they again turned to raiding the coastal areas (KS 104. 8a) and they still controlled the southern waters (TT 36. 118).

On May 10, 1272 (1272. 3. 9), Kûm Hun 琴重 was appointed Bearer of Instructions to the Cheju Rebels, Cheju yŏkchŏk ch'oyu-sa 招諭使 (KS 27. 27b) and he was proceeding to Cheju to negotiate with the rebels when he was captured and detained on the Ch'u'ja Islands 44) by the rebels. They killed his attendants, seized his ship, put him in a small boat, returned the edict, and sent him on his way back (KS 27. 30a; TYS 38. 664). He reached the capital on July 8 (1272. 5. 9), after being held on the island over a month. On July 19, he was dispatched to the Yüan court with a detailed memorial on the rebels' activities (KS 27. 30a-31a; YS 7. 11a).

On August 26 (1272. 6. 29), General Na Yu 45) with fifteen hundred men went to Chŏlla Province to suppress the rebels. Perhaps it was against this threat that the Three Patrols began to construct an outer and an inner fortified wall at Cheju (KS 27. 33b; KS 104. 8a; KS 130. 40a). The advance of General Na Yu into Chŏlla Province did not seem to suppress the spirit of the rebels, for on October 8 (1272. 8. 7) they seized eight hundred bushels (sŏk) of Chŏlla Province's tribute rice, provisioning themselves for the winter (KS 27. 24a; TT 36. 119-120).
Then, they turned to destroying the ships which were being constructed primarily for the invasion of Japan, but which obviously could be used in an expedition to Cheju. On November 7 (1272.9.13), they raided Koran Island, burned six warhips, killed the shipwrights and took the Commissioner of Ship Construction, chosŏngwŏn 造船官, captive (KS 27.34b; TT 36.120).

During the eleventh month, the rebels: raided the Southern Defense Command taking as captives the District Commissioner, pusa 府使, Kong Yu 46, and his wife (KS 27.35a; TT 36.120); raided Happ'o burning twenty warships and taking four Mongol fire-beacon soldiers captive (KS 27.35a); they also raided Kŏje-hyon 巨濟縣 where they burned three warships and took the Hyŏn Magistrate, hyŏllyŏng 縣領, captive. Then they sailed back around the peninsula and north to anchor at Yonghŭng Island. From there they proceeded to overrun the neighboring areas (KS 27.35a-b; TT 36.120).

In the spring their raids commenced again with ten rebel ships raiding Nagan-kun 47 樂安郡. They raided Happ'o again on March 21, 1273, the last day of the first month of Wŏnjong’s fourteenth reign year, burning thirty-two warships and killing ten Mongol soldiers (KS 27.36b; TT 36.120). The Three Patrols were still a threat and Wŏnjong himself had even asked Hindu for fifty cavalry men to guard the palace as a precaution against their raids (TT 36.120). In five months they had destroyed over sixty ships 48.

Following the recommencement of the raids of the Three Patrols from T'amna, another attempt was made to negotiate with them rather than expend troops in a campaign against the island; this was in the eighth month of Wŏnjong’s thirteenth reign year. Hong Tagu went to Naju where at the same time that he supervised the construction of ships for the Japan expedition, he bestowed kindnesses on several of Kim T'ongjong’s relatives 49 and then dispatched them to Cheju with a missive for the rebels (KS 27.34a; KS 130.40a; YKC 26b).

This failing, Hong went to the Yūn court to report the situation, returning in the second month of Wŏnjong’s fourteenth reign year (KS 27.36b). The repeated negotiations with the Three Patrols are testimony to the disruptive effect that their raids had on preparations for the Japan expedition. Their raids intensified an already precarious situation; Koryŏ was no longer capable of supplying Mongol logistical demands and at this time the situation was so bad that the Mongols were forced to ship in 20,000 bushels (sŏk) of rice from Tung-ch'ing to relieve the widespread famine (YS 7.17b) and to begin the T'amna campaign, for Koryŏ had been unable to fulfill the Mongol order issued in early 1272 to prepare ships and supplies for the campaign (YS 7.
were sailed together. TT City
were gathered successfully and
Riding but hundred
hy6n
Ky6ngsang 8b;
sunk,
sailed south with a portion of the fleet (KS 27. 36b-37a). Then, on
April 11 (1273-2. 20), Kim Panggyông, who at this time held the rank of Mar-
shal of Men and Horse of the Mobile Garrison of the Army of the Center 51),
set out from the capital with Hindu, leading eight hundred picked cavalrymen
(KS 27. 37a; KS 104. 8b; TT 36. 120).
The month preceding the campaign against T'amna concealed other diffi-
culties. First, on April 29 (1273. 3. 8), many warships of Sôhae Province sunk,
for which the Circuit Inspector U Ch'ônsôk 天錫 was imprisoned 52).
And, on May 17 (1273. 3. 26), a storm sank twenty ships of Sôhae Province
which had rendezvoused at Kayaso Island 伽耶召 drowning one hundred
and fifteen men; the same storm also sank twenty-seven of the warships of
Kyôngsang Province (KS 27. 38a; TT 36. 120).

After leaving the capital, Hong Tagu and Hindu had garrisoned at Pónnam-
hyôn 潘南縣 52) whence they dispatched the ill-fated warships (KS 104.
8b; TT 36. 121). In a second effort with Kim Panggyông, they assembled one
hundred and sixty ships of Chôlla Province (KS 27. 39a) and raised an army
recorded as having from nine to twelve thousand men — Mongols, North Chi-
nese, and Koryô troops 54) — including three thousand seamen 55).

They set out for T'amna, only to encounter a storm off the Ch'uja Islands.
Riding the storm through the night, they found themselves off T'amna at dawn
but due to rough breakers caused by the wind, they were unable to effect a
landing immediately. General Kim, we are told, then appealed to the heavens
and the wind ceased — at any rate, a landing was made. The Army of the
Center landed at Hamdôkp'o 咸德浦 where the rebels had concealed
their men among the rocks. General Kim, with shouts of encouragement,
gathered his forces and advanced, and the rebels were repulsed. General Na
Yu led the point of the army with picked troops and continued his advance
successfully (KS 27. 39a; KS 104. 8b-9a; TYS 38. 664a-b; TT 36. 121).
The army of the left with thirty warships, landed to the west of Cheju
City at Piyang Island 57) 飛揚島 and the two armies attacked the walls
together. The rebels yielded the outer wall and retired to the inner wall. The
Mongol-Koryô army then scaled the outer wall. Four volleys of fire arrows
were fired, smoke rose from the city and the rebels submitted (KS 104. 9a;
TT 36. 121).

Six of the captured leaders including Kim Wônyun 金元允, were
executed while thirty-five relatives of the leaders (later executed at Naju -
TT 36. 121) and thirteen hundred prisoners were taken captive, loaded aboard
ships and returned to the mainland (KS 27. 39a; KS 104. 9a-b; TT 36. 121). Those who were originally inhabitants of T'amna were settled to live peacefully as before. With this, the rebels were all pacified. They ordered General Song Poyŏn 宋甫演 and others to remain in garrison on the island and they returned. For garrison troops, Hindu left five hundred Mongol soldiers and General Kim left one thousand men: eight hundred men of the Capital Army, kyŏnggun 京軍 and two hundred men of the regional patrols, oe-pyŏlch'o 外別抄 (KS 27. 39a; KS 104. 9b; TT 36. 121) 58).

The rebel leader Kim T'ongjŏng escaped into the wilds of Mt. Halla 漢山 with a small group of seventy followers after the fall of Cheju (KS 104. 9a; KS 130. 40a; TT 36. 121). Two months later on the sixth day of the intercalary sixth month it was reported that Kim T'ongjŏng was rumored dead but that the seventy men who had escaped with him had been captured and sent to Hong Tagu on the mainland who had them all put to death (KS 27. 40b; KS 130. 40a; TT 36. 121).

On the twenty-fourth day of the fifth month, the King in Kaegyŏng received the report that the Three Patrols had been subdued (KS 27. 39b) and, on the first day of the sixth month (July 19, 1273), this report was sent to the Yüan court. Thus, the rebellion of the Three Patrols came to an end (KS 27. 39b-40b; KS 104. 9b).

Measured against the scale of the rebellions which often swept through Koryŏ's continental neighbors, the rebellion of the Three Patrols was a very limited action. The philosophy of the rebels, the simple values of the soldiers was, of course, mingled with the ambitions and fears of their leaders, which could be well described with an adaption from Gibbon's well-known remark about the Byzantine General Beslarius (505?-565) — their vices were a contagion of the times, their virtues were their own — or as the Korean historian Yi Pyŏngdo has put it, "in coming to fight to the end against the Mongols ... perhaps we can say that they manifested the spirit traditional of the Koryŏ military men" 59).

Yet the rebellion did have some important consequences 60). First, the men who rose to lead the rebellion were formerly supporters of Im Yŏn, the military strongman who had deposed Wŏnjong, and Wŏnjong's desire to escape from their control led him to readily accept Mongol backing 61). The reciprocal of this — the knowledge of Wŏnjong's hatred for them — was, of course, an important factor in initiating the rebellion. In continuing the struggle against the Mongols they gained considerable support 62). The Mongol reaction to the rebellion was to tighten control on Koryŏ and there were complementary factors in the establishment of Mongol offices in Koryŏ. The rebellion disastrously delayed launching the Japan expedition which proceeded the
next year, although Wŏnjong himself was to die in the interim. With the rebellion, ended an episode in Korean history for it marked the close of the period of military government.

In 1274, the formal marriage of Crown Prince Sim, which had provided a solution for Wŏnjong's dilemma, took place. While the marriage enabled Wŏnjong to recover his independence from the military government, it was indeed, as Hambis points out "... (une) solution précaire, car en fait ce fut la princesse mongole qui régnait".

The marriage between the two families put relations on an entirely different basis. From King Ch'ungnyŏl (r. 1275-1308) through King Kongmin (r. 1352-1374), a period of almost a century, seven Mongol Princesses were married into the Koryŏ Royal family. The offspring of three of these marriages held the throne. King Ch'ungnyŏl himself pursued a policy which sought to restore Koryŏ sovereignty over her former territory and which succeeded to a surprising degree, but his efforts were reversed by his immediate descendants. His son Wŏn (C. Yüan homophonous with Yüan 元) departed for Yen-tu, the Yüan capital in the same year he ascended the throne, where he remained. He was King Ch'ungsŏn 忠宣王 (r. 1309-1313). He abdicated in the fifth year of his reign for his son (also by a Mongol Princess) T'o (i.e., King Ch'ungsuk 忠肃王, r. 1314-1330 and r. 1331-1339) who was invested as Prince, kuo-wang, of Koryŏ while Wŏn himself received investment as Prince of Shen, Shen-wang 㝬王, although he was usually referred to in Koryŏ as Sangwang 上王 or the Higher King. In the tenth year of his reign (1323), King Ch'ungsuk petitioned the Yüan Emperor to incorporate the country into the Yüan Empire as a province. The failure was itself a turning point in Korean history but the incident is illustrative of the effect of the marriage alliance and adds weight to Hambis' observations.

In the year 1274, Wŏnjong, the last Koryŏ monarch to be granted a temple name, myoho لطه, died. The period of resistance had ended and the period of alliance had begun — the Japan invasion fleet scattered in a dozen harbors neared completion and the main body of the Mongol expeditionary force had already crossed the Yalu.
Notes to Chapter VI

1. In all works giving accounts of the rebellion it is invariably linked to Im Yŏn and his son Im Yumu. In YS 7.3a, Pae Chungson, the leader of the rebellion, is described as one of Im Yŏn's faction. The rebellion is linked to Im Yumu in IC sŏlchŏn 2.8, IC 9 A 11a-b, TMP 109.6a-b, KS 26.23a-b. Representative is YKC 25a-b which remarks that "the Heir Apparent of Koryŏ, Wang Sim, states that the rash group which enabled Im Yŏn to assume power, are using the Left and Right [patrols] as well as the Sinŭigun cavalry, that is, the Three Patrols." However, in YKC 22a, we read that "Sik (i.e., Wŏnjong) has sent a man to report that one 'wing-army' [袤 銜] which had previously escaped from the Court of Heaven (i.e., Mongols) and Koryŏ's two 'wing-armies' have rebelled. Now Sik's relative, the Duke of Sunghwa is using the rebellion of the Three Patrols."

There is, however, no evidence to support the Duke of Sunghwa as a leader of the rebellion. In fact, the KS repeatedly states that he was compelled to become King; HY 20.25b maintains the same. It is clear that the Duke was being used. Also active in the power struggle were Yi Ŭngnyŏl and Song Kunbi. Im Yumu's KS 130 biography relates that he was going to step down in favor of them due to his age. Yi, Han'gak-sa, p. 592, believes they were the real leaders of the military faction, but their role in the rebellion is unknown.

2. I have been unable to identify Kim Chijŏ.

3. Pae Chungson 裴仲孫 has a 'biography' in KS 130.37a-40a, but it is simply an account of the rebellion and gives us little information on Pae himself other than to mention that he "accumulated rank in the court of Wŏnjong until he became General".

4. Under an entry in the 4th month of Chih-yüan 7th year (1271) in YS 7.3a, there is a brief 'summary' of events from the death of Im Yŏn to the entry of the Three Patrols into Chin Island. The Kai-ming ed. of YS (YS 7.2b) reads the same. This account would place all of these events much earlier than the outbreak of the rebellion and is obviously garbled and incorrectly dated. A fuller version found between entries dated the fourth and sixth months of 1270, is seen in YS 208.12a. These passages are erroneous in that they present a résumé of events which occurred from the 2nd to the 8th month of 1270, viz., the death of Im Yŏn in the 2nd month until the entry into Chin Island in the 8th month. Since these events are dealt with in the text, a recounting would be superfluous here; suffice it to say that to accept the passages in question so dated would be to ignore the remaining YKC, YS, KS and other accounts which otherwise agree.
I have previously mentioned a few other passages of YS which are also erroneous and this undoubtedly reflects the haste with which the Yuan history was compiled, concerning which Yang remarks "...the primary goal seems to have been a quick finish, and this was achieved." Cf. Yang Lien-sheng, 'The Organization of Chinese Official Historiography', in Historians of China and Japan, London, 1961, p. 48.

4a Among the many who managed to escape from the island was An Hyang 玉疡 (1242-1306) the founder of neo-Confucianism in Koryo. Cf. Doo Hun Kim (Kim Tuhun), 'The Rise of Neo-Confucianism Against Buddhism in Late Koryo', Bulletin 12 (1960), pp. 11-29, of The Korean Research Center, Seoul.

5. For a brief biography of Wang On 王温, the Marquis of Sungșa 水化侯 see KS 90. 7a-b. He was the brother of Wang Sun and was killed in the Chin Island battle in the fifth month of 1271.

6. There were two Ministers, sung 水, in the Koryo Secretariat, sangsŏ 토성 尚書都省, one of the Left and one of the Right. The title had the official grade of Third Class, secondary (Yi, Table 4) which carried an annual stipend of 233 bushels (sŏk) 5 pecks (tu) of rice (Yi, Table 6).

7. These 'appointments' had the token value of elevating Yi by one rank and General Yu by two ranks and transferred them both to the Bureau of Military Affairs. The title sunglasses 水宣 had the official grade of Third Class, primary (Yi, Table 4) and carried an annual stipend of from 240 to 300 bushels (sŏk) of rice (Yi, Table 6) in the Koryo system. With the establishment of these offices, the rebels had the full regalia of government and with their 'king' of royal blood, they now had all the prerequisites to claim recognition.

8. Cf. KS 130. 38b. This occurred on the 3rd day of the 6th month (June 23), cf. TT 35. 109. References to Muslims in Koryo at this time are few, although there are many a bit later. There were large Muslim communities in China, of course, and a Muslim Bureau, Hui-hui-ssu 惠惠စစ် was established just after this by the Mongols. Cf. YS 7. 11b. Schurmann, op. cit., p. 214 says, "Much of the commerce of North China unquestionably was in the hands of the ortaq merchants, who were, for the most part Muslim Uiyurs ..." It is quite possible that they played some commercial role in Koryo. For some reference to Muslims in Koryo see Ko Pyŏngik 高柄翊 'Korea's Contacts with "The Western Regions" in Pre-Modern Times', SK 2 (1958), pp. 55-73.

9. P'ansa 判事 or Chief of the T'aesaguk 太史局 was the highest position in that bureau and carried the official grade of Third Class, primary (Yi, Table 4) and an annual stipend of 240 bushels (sŏk) of rice (Yi, Table 6).
His actions reflect his position, for the T'aesaguk and the Sach'ondae were in charge of astrology, numerology, yin-yang and feng-sui studies. Cf. Yi, Han'gwak-sa, vol. 2, p. 242.

10. An Pang'yŏl 安邦悦 fl. 1270-1273. He managed to escape following the defeat of the rebels on Chin Island and was about to visit Kim Pang-gyŏng when some soldiers killed him. KS 130. 39. Little else is known of him.

11. There is no biography for Hyŏn in the KS but there is a brief 'biography' for his wife, for which see KS 121. 23a. BTKP 44. 417 reads Hyŏn Mun-jŏk; I read Hyŏn Munhyŏk and note that the name is rendered Hyŏn Munhyŏk 玄義赫 in IC sŏlchŏn 2. 8b.

12. Yonghŭng Island 靈興島 is located off Kyŏnggi Province and was at that time administratively attached to Namyang 南陽. Cf. TYS 9. 159a.

13. Hong Tagu 共茶卒 (fl. 1258-1281) was the son of the Koryŏ rebel Hong Pogwŏn who had allied himself with the Mongols during the invasion of Sartaq. For biographical information see YS 154; for some information on his activities in Koryŏ see KS 29 and KS 130. Also see BTKP 41. 379.

14. *Aqai A-hae 阿海. For the reconstruction of this name see Hambis, Le chapitre CVII ... , p. 20 note 10, and p. 22; also see Pelliot, Notes sur le 'Turkestan' ... , TP XXVII (1930) p. 49.

Aqai relieved Mŏngketŭ 蒙哥帖古 who had previously been appointed Koryŏ Pacification Commissioner (YS 7. 1b). It is a frequently encountered name. Schurmann, op. cit., p. 25 mentions a certain Aqai who was a Myriarch and who confiscated civilian lands for the establishment of military colonies. Ùyer's second son was named A-hae (YS 120. 15a); YS 133. 2a also mentions a certain A-hae.

15. Chin Island 珍島 is off the coast of the present South Cholla Province and was at that time administratively attached to Naju. For topographical and historical information see TYS 37. 651b-654a. Located offshore of 'Korea's granary', the island was distant from the political and military center of activities to the north.

16. Yongjang-sŏng 龍藏城, a stone construction, was not intended merely as a temporary refuge but rather as a fortified capital, and great efforts were expended in the construction of buildings, probably with the example of Kanghwa in mind. Cf. TYS 37. 653b.

17. I find no mention of this island in TYS, yet the numerous offshore islands, groups of which were often made kun 郡 or hyŏn 縣 were under the control of the nearest chu 州 administration and such was undoubtedly the case here.
18. Sin Sajôn 申思俊 d. 1289. For biographical references see BTKP 101. 948.
19. Ko Yörim 高汝霖 died in the intercalary tenth month of 1271, defending T'amna; he was, at one time, a Commander, chiyu, of the Night Patrol (cf. TT 34. 100) which points out the divided loyalties in the complicated background struggle involving the Three Patrols. For biographical references see BTKP 72. 700.
20. Changyŏ-pu 長興府 was located in the present South Chólla Province. For topographical and historical information see TYS 37.
21. Kwŏn Tan 權坦 was born in 1228 and died in 1312. For biographical references see BTKP 78. 739.
22. Kim Su 金弼 d. 1270. For biographical references see BTKP 65. 63.
23. According to TK 11B 253, General Ko followed with 1000 men. Upon reaching T'amna, he erected a stone fortification, changsŏng, whose circumference is given as 300 li 里, in preparation against the rebels. Cf. TYS 38. 668b.
24. The location of Samgyŏnwŏn is uncertain, however, TK 11B remarks that there was a "...Samgiwŏn 三岐院 located 60 li west of the present (i.e., Yi Dynasty) Haenam-hyŏn 海南縣 and I suspect this is it." This hyŏn 海南 is currently a kun in Chólla Province.
25. The darušači at this time was *Toqto'a 脫朵兒 and the Vice-Darušači was Chiao T'ien-i 焦天翼, both of whom arrived in 1270. Cf. YS 7. 2a-b; TT 36. 108.
26. Hindu hsin-tu 忽敦. For the reconstruction of this name see F. W. Cleaves, 'The Sino-Mongolian Inscription of 1362 in Memory of Prince Hindu', HJAS 12 (1949) 3 & 4, p. 93 note 4. Only the names are the same, not the persons involved. From 1274 Hindu used the name Hu-tun 忽敦. As Commissioner of the Military Colony Supervisory Bureau, Hindu's mission was, together with Shih Shu and Kim Panggyŏng, to make preparations for the expedition to Japan which included the construction of warships. See KS 7. 6a; KS 27. 8; KS 104. 7b; YKC 22a-b; TT 36. 113; TK 11B 257.
27. Aqai was recalled to the Yūn court in the 1st month of Wŏnjong's 12th reign year (KS 27. 1a; TK 11B 255; TT 36. 113; TT 36. 115). The reasons for his removal were his cowardice in battle in the first attempts by the Mongol-Koryŏ forces to take Chin Island. Cf. KS 104. 6b-7a; YS 7. 7a. This was probably also the reason behind the release of Kim Panggyŏng.
28. From one to two Auxiliary Secretaries were assigned to each Board; the Board of War, pyŏngbu, for example, had two Auxiliary Secretaries assigned. The title carried the official grade of Sixth Class, primary (Yi,
Table 4) and an annual stipend of 86 bushels (sök) 10 pecks (tu) of rice (Yi, Table 6).

29. The repeated attempts made to negotiate with the rebels is an indication of their relative strength; their continued refusal also supports this. For the generally weak condition of the Mongol-Koryo forces see YKC 24b-25a.

30. The initial offer was presumably made at this time although the text, YS 7, 8b, merely relates that "... Hu-tu-erh was sent to carry an edict to Pae Chungson." The offer is implied in the report of the rebel reaction made to Qubilai by a minister of the Imperial Secretariat who said, "I, [Your] Servant, say that the Koryo rebel Pae Chungson begs that all armies withdraw their garrisons and that thereafter they be attached [directly] to the Court. However, Hindu has not complied with their request." (YS 7, 9a-b)

31. Also see TT 36, 115. Happ'o 合浦 is the present Masan 马山 located in the modern S. Kyongsang Province. For topographical and historical information see TYS 33, 557a-558a under the entry Ch'angwŏn 昌源, the name by which it was known in the Yi Dynasty.

32. Tongnae 東莱 is located about five miles inland from the modern city of Pusan and was at the time the chief administrative center in the area. For topographical and historical information see TYS 23, 287a-390a.

33. Kimju 金州 is the present Kimhae 金海 located on the delta of the Naktong River 落東江 in South Kyongsang Province. Formerly known as Imhae 临海 its name was changed to Kimju during the reign of Koryo Sŏngjong (r. 982-997). For topographical and historical information see TYS 32, 548b-557b.

34. The establishment of military colonies and the increased demands for supplies and manpower necessary to pacify the rebels and to make preparations for the Japan expedition, following some thirty years of Mongol depredations, had beggared the country. "... as a result of which the people are in reality eating grass and [the bark of] trees" (TT 36, 118). These conditions undoubtedly stimulated uprisings, especially in the southern provinces. See TYS 32, 548b; TYS 32, 556a, and TYS 26, 449b-450a.

35. See TYS 32, 556a; TK 11B 258. Many uprisings were stimulated by the rebellion of the Three Patrols, occurring at Milsŏng 城 in South Kyongsang Province (KS 27, 4b-5a), and also in the capital where the government slaves under the leadership of the slave Sunggyŏm 江亦 (d. 1271.2; BTKP 109, 1023) plotted to kill the daruyacı and then join the rebels on Chin Island (KS 27, 5a-b); this abortive uprising stimulated the people of Taebu Island 大部島 to turn on a group.

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of Mongol soldiers who had gone to pillage the island, kill six of them, and revolt (KS 27. 6a). For the popular appeal of the Three Patrols, also see the biography of Kim ŭngdŏk 金應德 in KS 103.

36. Hu-lin-ch'ih 惢林赤 = Qurimči. While it also occurs as a title, it appears here as a name. For the reconstruction of the name see K. Shiratori, Kŏrai-shi ni mietaru Moko-go no kaishaku 高麗史に 見える蒙古語の解譯 [An Interpretation of Mongolian Words Seen in the Koryŏ-sa], TG 18 (1929) 2, and the comments by P. Pelliot, 'Les mots mongols . . .', p. 261. Qurimči had been sent in command of forces to garrison at Happ'o (HY 28. 20a), the departure point for Japan.

37. Wang Kuo-ch'ang 王國昌 was from Chiao-chou 輪州 where he served as Chiliarch. In 1268 he was sent to Koryŏ to inspect Hŭksan Island for use as a departure point for the Sung. He subsequently participated in the joint Mongol-Koryŏ subjugation of the rebellion of the Three Patrols. He died in Koryŏ in the tenth month of 1271. He had one son T'ung 特. For biographical information see YS 167. 12b-13a. For his activities as envoy to Japan see Ikeyuki, Genkō . . ., and Aoyama Koryŏ 青山公亮, Nigen-kan no Kŏrai 日元間の高麗, SZ 32 (1921) 8, pp. 575-586 and 9, pp. 645-658.

38. Wang Sun had six sons: Im 琳, Hwa 和, Che 從, Hŭi 熙, and Ong 蹈. YS 166 carries biographies for both Hŭi and Ong as well as a son listed under the Mongol name of Wu-ai 元愛. The former two later took the Mongol names of Kŏkō Temûr 闊闊帖木兒 and Tu-li Temûr 闊里帖木兒, respectively (YS 166. 1a). The name Kŏkō Temûr was also the name of a well-known Mongol general, however, two different persons are involved. Ong drowned in the Japan expedition and Wu-ai went on to a rather successful career as a soldier. For biographical information see YS 166. 1b-2a.

39. All those above the Fourth rank were required to furnish one slave from their home to be used as seamen. Cf. TT 36. 116.

40. Since Kim Sanggi, 'Sam pyŏlch'o wa . . .', p. 191, and p. 203 note 87, has suggested that firearms were used at this time, the passage KS 104. 7b7-8, is worth considering, and reads 茶丘先登縱火挾攻 "Tagu advanced ahead, let fly with fire, and attacked the flank." The 1958 North Korean edition of the KS III 104. 222b and the Kokusho kankō-kai edition of 1909. III 104. 222b, read the same. CS Vol. 3, No. 4, p. 435, renders the passage in heavy statacco style: Saku, sentō-(shī) hi wo hana-chite kyokō-su 茶丘(シ)火ヲ放フ挾攻ス. YC 14. 268. 13 (Japanese edition) reads: Saku wa furui noborite hi wo.
The minor variations are less important for the purpose in hand than the general concordance in the use of the term *chonghua* ‘to let fly with fire’, which occurs in the *KS* as early as the reign of Munjong (r. 1047-1082) see *KS* 9. 8a8, and refers to the use of various and sundry incendiary weapons. Kim, loc. cit., uses the *YKC* 24b-25a mention of *huo-ch’iang* 火槍 and *huo-p’ao* 火砲, which I have given in the text, to support his thesis, suggesting that the *huo-p’ao* might be a reference to something like the *hui-hui-p’ao* 回回炮 of I-ssu-ma-yin 伊斯馬音 (Ismael), a Persian engineer who arrived in China in 1271, for which see the latter’s biography in *YS* 130. The *huo-p’ao* were bombs cast by catapults in use as early as the 10th century while the *huo-ch’iang* was a sort of flamethrower which did not fire a missile; both are distinct from the assault mortar *hui-hui-p’ao*. A good discussion of these weapons is contained on pp. 500-501 of Jung-pang Lo, 'The Emergence of China as a Sea Power During the Late Sung and Early Yuan Periods', *FEQ* 14 (1954) 1, pp. 489-503. Also see L.C.Goodrich and Feng Chia-sheng, 'The Early Development of Firearms in China', *Isis* 36 (1946) 2 and Wang Ling, 'On the Invention and Use of Gunpowder and Firearms in China', *Isis* 37 (1947) 3 & 4; regrettably neither of the last two mentioned articles are available to me.

If firearms were used, which is indeed conjectural, then they were certainly supplied by the Mongol forces. The manufacture of firearms by Koreans began in the reign of King U (r. 1375-1388) when General Ch’oe Musŏn 崔茂宣 manufactured *hwat’ong* 火壺 and *hwap’o* 火炮 which he used to sink a large number of the ships of Japanese freebooters, *wakō*, attacking Chip’o 鏡浦 at the mouth of the Kŭm River. See *Han’guk-sa* sajŏn, 371; also see *Nihon chiri taikei* 日本地理大系, published in 12 vols., Tōkyō, 1935, Vol. 12, p. 400.

41. Wang On was the brother of Wang Sun and when the latter sent his two sons south with the army, he "... ordered [them] to capture On and spare him but Hong Tagu entered first and beheaded On" (*HY* 20. 26a). This was an action of revenge because Wang Sun had been responsible for the death of Hong Pogwŏn, Hong Tagu’s father (see *KS* 130. 3-5). For the grudge see *CHSL* 4. 33b.

42. *BTKP* 67. 652 gives some source locations for Kim T'ongjŏng’s activities although not much is known of him. The entry in *BTKP* died 1173-61 is an obvious typographical error for 1273-6'. I note that there was a Kim Hyŏkch’ŏng 金赫精 who was a Commander, *chiyu*, of the Night Patrol (*KS* 26. 12a) who may have been a brother or a cousin.
43. When they fled to Cheju from Chin Island, the Three Patrols constructed an inner and outer fortified wall (KS 104. 8a; KS 130. 40a). Probably in anticipation of the coming attack, they also constructed the following additional fortifications: Hanp'adu-sŏng 縣波頭城 located 40 li west of Cheju city; Aewŏlmok-sŏng 涯月木城 located 42 li west of Cheju city; and an earthen-work, t'osŏng 土城, located 36 li south-west of Cheju city. Cf. TYS 38. 668b-669a. Kim Ponghyŏn, op. cit., pp. 115-124, deals with the rebellion and its connections with Cheju, but his work is more valuable for its general observations on the extant ruins of the constructions built at this time.

44. The Ch'uja Islands 楂子島 are a small group of islands between T'amna and the mainland which contains both a Large Ch'uja Island and a Small Ch'uja Island. Which particular island is meant is unknown. For topographical and other information see TYS 38. 668a-b.

45. General Na Yu 那裕 d. 1292. For biographical information see KS 104. 39a-41b; also see BTKP 85. 799.

46. Kong Yu 孔愉 had previously made the Chin Island expedition and had almost been beheaded by General Kim Panggyŏng for his temerity. The next year Wŏnjong shifted him to another post (KS 104. 7b). The Southern Defense Command of which he was Vice-Commissioner, was in the present Chŏlla Province. Cf. TYS 33. 576a. KS lists this raid in the 11th month and TT lists it in the 9th month. I believe KS is correct.

47. Cf. KS 27. 36b. Nagan-kun 樂安郡 was in Chŏlla Province. For topographical and historical information see TYS 40. 703b-705b.

48. The raids of the Three Patrols were numerous but aside from one or two feints northward (e.g., KS 27. 31a-b; TT 36. 119), their activities were restricted to the southern islands and the two southern provinces of Chŏlla and Kyŏngsang where the pattern of their incursions followed that of the Japanese freebooters, wakō. Some of their other raids during this period are listed in Part II in the section on Shipbuilding.

49. The number of persons involved is uncertain for the sources KS 27. 34a; KS 130. 40a, HY 68. 12, TT 36. 119, all differ. At any rate, Kim T'ong-jŏng left Kim Chan 金贊 alive and killed the others. Parenthetically, I note that there was a Kim Chan involved in some of the Yüan-Koryŏ-Japan relations but it does not appear to be the same person.

49a Koryŏ was also required to provide such support as she was able. As Kyŏngsang Province had already contributed two years' taxes in advance toward the expense of subduing the rebels, they levied from Chŏlla Province for the T'amma campaign (KS 27. 38b).

50. Li I 李益 arrived in Koryŏ in the fourth month of the thirteenth year of
the reign of Wŏnjong (1272), following the death of the previous daruγaçi
Toqto’a. Cf. KS 27. 28a; KS 27. 23a; TT 36. 119.

51. The title of Marshal of Men and Horse of the Mobile Garrison, haengyŏng pyŏngma wŏnsu 行營兵马元帅, was established in 1047, the
first year of the reign of Munjong. Cf. KS 77.

52. Cf. KS 27. 37b. The details are not given and the text merely states that
"Li imprisoned Circuit Inspector U Ch’ŏnsŏk because many of the Sŏhae
Province warships sunk" which suggests inferior construction.

53. Pŏnnam-hyŏn 潘南縣 was located some 40 li south of Naju, the ad-
ministrative center to which it was attached, in Chŏlla Province. Cf. TYS
35. 615b.

54. The Mongol troops were designated by the term tunjŏn’gŭn 屯田軍; the North Chinese by the term han’gŭn 漢軍. For a discussion of the
latter and parallel terms see F. W. Cleaves, ‘Qabqunas ~ Qamqanas’,
HJAS 19 (1956) 3 & 4, p. 405 note 119; F. W. Cleaves, ‘The Biography of
Bayan ...’, op. cit., p. 218 note 139; and Schurmann, op. cit., p. 105.

55. The actual size of the force which made the expedition and its com-
position are unclear for various figures are given, viz., TT 36. 120. 4 gives
10 000 without a breakdown; KS 27. 35b and TT 36. 120. 5-6 relate that
in the 11th month of the 13th year of the reign of Wŏnjong "The Yūan or-
dered the King to send an army of 6 000 and 3 000 seamen to suppress the
Three Patrols"; prior to this Koryŏ had reported to the Yūan that there
were between five and six thousand troops facing Chin Island (TT 36. 118)
and at this time we see that 3 000 seamen were levied for the Chin Island
attack; yet the figure of 10 000 composed of soldiers and seamen is also
given in KS 27. 39a and KS 104. 8b. Still, YS 7. 19b-20a gives a total of
12 000 which it breaks down as follows: troops of the military colonies,
2 000; North Chinese, 2 000; Koryŏ troops, 6 000; and 2 000 of those
troops of the Muwigun 武衛軍 which were formerly used. The latter
probably refers to those troops under Hong Tagu and the two sons of
Wang Sun.

Then, following the battle on Cheju, 500 Mongol troops and 1 000 Koryŏ
troops were left on the island. The YS account may contain a duplication
in that the 2 000 troops of the Muwigun were probably already counted in
the figure given for the Koryŏ troops.

56. Hamdŏkp’o 咸德浦 was located 32 li to the east of Cheju city. Cf.
TYS 38. 664b.

57. Piyang Island 飛揚島 is a small island — circumference 10 li —
located 80 li west of Cheju city. Cf. TYS 38. 664b.

58. Following the suppression of the rebellion, T’amna was turned into a
pasturage and the Yüan established a dariyači 'command' pu府 on the
island. See Part II, section on Mongol Military-Administration.


60. Nakakoji says that the rebellion also temporarily stopped the repatriation
of Koryŏ prisoners held by the Japanese, presumably meaning Koreans
taken captive by the Japanese freebooters. Cf. Nakakoji Akira 仲小
路彰, Genkō 元寇 [The Mongol Invasions], Tōkyō, 1937, p. 173.

61. Also see the remarks by Hambis, 'Notes sur l'histoire ...', pp. 177-178
concerning the Koryŏ dilemma and the resort to a solution by marriage.
For the Yüan it offered the stabilization of the country while for the rulers
of Koryŏ it offered powerful backing for retention of their position against
any future attempts of a revival of the military government.

62. An indication of this is seen in KS 103. 41a where we read, "The Three
Patrols had rebelled and were based on Chin Island. [Their forces] were
extremely numerous and [the people of] the chu and kun districts watched
the wind (i.e., looked for an opportunity) to welcome them and surrender
to them; some went to Chin Island to visit them."

63. It is difficult to resist the temptation to compare the Koryŏ military gov-
ernment with Japan's Kamakura Bakufu. There are numerous analogies,
i.e., the figurehead monarchs, the retention of the civil offices in the
court and the shifting of actual functions to the military headquarters with
the consequent emergence of new offices and a new administrative struc-
ture. While the analogy and temporal coincidence are interesting, the
dissimilarities are all too apparent. The retention of the monarch by each
is an example. The Koryŏ military regents did not eliminate the monarch
because they feared the intervention of the reigning dynasty in China. A
precedent had already been established when the Chin intervened in a
succession fraud by the military regents. Cf. Rogers, 'Studies in Korean
History', passim. The Japanese military retained the monarch also but it
was certainly not due to fear of Chinese intervention.

64. Cf. Hambis, 'Notes sur l'histoire ...', p. 178. Hambis, loc. cit., is the
definitive work on the Koryŏ royal family. The various works of M. Ro-
gers supplement this to some extent. Also see Yu, loc. cit., andYS 108.
2 which gives the Mongols princesses married into the Koryŏ royal family.

64a I note that Ratchnevsky, op. cit., p. 432, lists a fan-wang 贵王 which
he describes as "prince royal gouvernant un pays".

65. For some of the posthumous honorary appellations conferred upon Koryŏ
rulers and their queens by the Yüan see Kuo-chʻ ao wen-lei 11. 17a-19b
and 12. 1a-2b.
1. The Instructions for Surrendering States

Mongol demands upon Koryŏ followed the instructions laid down by Činggis as one of the articles of his Yasa 1) or ordinances which were to apply to all surrendering states. These requirements were first stated to Koryŏ in 1232, the text of which has been translated previously. Clear reference is made to "... the laws and statues of [Our] Great Nation" which Koryŏ is charged with violating. The specific charges laid down cite Koryŏ with failure to: assist the Mongolian forces, present household registers, bring forth an army, and have the monarch present himself at court. These instructions, among which submission of annual tribute was also cited, were frequently repeated. In 1262, they were outlined by Qubilai in a decree to Koryŏ:

"[Our] ancestors have already established the principle that all newly attached states, near and far, must send hostages, submit population registers, establish post-stations, and then raise an army, provide provisions, and support the [Mongolian] army" (KS 25. 26a-27b).

In 1268, they were reiterated with the additional mention of the establishment of daru‘ači or resident commissioners 2).

Clearly, Činggis' instructions for surrendering states acted as the fundamental plan used by the Mongols in the economic exploitation of Koryŏ. To be sure, Mongol methods of extracting wealth from conquered nations changed and were often modified 3), and these modifications and changes are themselves useful indicators of changes in Mongol concepts. Yet, Mongol demands were to a surprising degree based upon the simple blueprint laid down by Činggis as is evidenced by the remarkably few changes in the instructions cited above, which are repeatedly referred to as principles laid down by Činggis (e.g., YKC 8a, 9a), which remained basically constant in content over half a century, and to which only minor modifications appear to have been made. All of which point to the existence of a codified version which was probably incorporated in the only body of legal statutes known to have been ordered drawn up by Činggis, the Yasa.

Consideration of these requirements and the extension of the Mongol
military-administration into Koryō during the period 1219-1270, form the subject of the pages which follow.

2. Mongol Military-Administration in Koryō

During the period 1219-1224, Koryō was apparently considered to be an appanage of Temüge-otčigin, for he sent envoys to collect tribute in the years 1219 (YKC 2a), 1220 (YKC 2b), and 1224 (YKC 2b). In all probability, the other Mongol embassies which arrived in Koryō at that time were also sent by him since, as mentioned earlier, until the ill-fated envoy of 1224, all embassies came via the territory of P’u-hsien Wan-nu to avoid the Chin garrisons in South Manchuria. And, as previously mentioned, Temüge-otčigin was given the lands of P’u-hsien Wan-nu as an appanage and his direct descendants, viz., his son Jibügen, his grandson Täčar, and his great-grandson *Ajul, all held the title of Prince of the first rank, kuo-wang. When his great-great-grandson Nayan revolted against Qubilai and was killed in 1287, these titles were taken away. However, Nayan’s brother To[q]to was permitted to keep his title as Prince of Liao and this title was transmitted to his son Yanaširi 4).

It is not surprising in view of the repeated invasions to find that until 1270, Mongol administration in Koryō was largely what could be described as ‘government in the saddle’ 5). When the Mongol forces launched an offensive against Koryō, the first wave consisted of a large advance cavalry force, hou-ch’i 6) 騎軍. Travelling at a more leisurely pace behind them was the main force which included the Mobile Garrison, hsing-ying, or headquarters of the Mongol field commander 7). The major administrative function of the Mobile Garrison, as far as I have been able to discern, was the handling of communication, and the tallying of war-booty and tribute. In brief, foraging in the widest sense and demands for goods represented the initial Mongol methods of extracting wealth from Koryō, and its ‘administration’ was lodged in the Mobile Garrison; Sartaq, for example, had 16 officials, kuan-jen 官人, beneath him (KS 23. 12a).

The first effort at a more systematic exploitation of Koryō was the abortive attempt to establish darujači in the northwest in 1232. This was the first attempt by the Mongols to build an intermediate administrative structure between Korean society and the ruling class of Mongols — the imperial family and the nobility 8).

Permanent occupation of Koryō commenced in early 1258, when the Mongols walled the city of Üiju on the Yalu River. Later that year, with the aid of the Korean deserters Cho Hwi and T’ak Chông, they occupied the Koryō north-east, i.e., the area northward from Ch’õi-kwan. This area was subsequently
lost to Koryŏ for almost a century until, with the cooperation of a Jürčen chieftain, the Ssangsŏng area was retaken by force in 1356.

The overthrow of the Ch'oe clan which also occurred in 1258, led to a peace settlement and the center of Mongol influence in Koryŏ then shifted south to the Western Capital which was reconstructed in the same year to serve as a Mongol center, although Mongol forces were withdrawn from the Western Capital two years later in 1260. As relations warmed, there was a general acceleration in meeting Mongol demands. And, in 1269, the next major turning point was reached. From the deposing of Wŏnjong stemmed a series of events:

1) Koryŏ was forced to relinquish her northwest territory when the Koryŏ rebel Ch'oe T'ăn et al., seized the area and submitted to the Yüan in 1270. In that year "[By] an Edict, the Western Capital was made subordinate to the Court, nei-shu 内属, [its designation] changed to Tongnyŏng-pu 東寧府, and its boundary [with Koryŏ] set at Chabi Pass 9) 萨比坡 " (KS 208. 11a; also see KS 26. 28a-b; KS 26. 31a-32a; KS 130. 36b). Ch'oe T'ăn was placed in charge as Governor, tsung-kuan (KS 130. 36b), although he evidently was demoted for he appears in the records in 1284 with the rank of Chiliarch (KSC 30. 1a). The Mongol representative there was Mŏngketū 忙哥都 who had originally been sent at Ch'oe T'ăn's request to garrison the Western Capital in 1269 and who was later appointed Civil Administrator of the new district (YSCSPM 3. 13). In 1275, it was redesignated Tongnyŏng-no (C. .lu). It should be noted that the border cities of Ŭiju, Chŏngju 静州, Inju, and Wiwŏn-chin 威遠鎭 were subordinate to P'o-so-fu until 1276 (YS 59. 3b-4a). In 1283, P'o-so-fu was abolished when Tung-ching was made Liaoyang-lu (YS 59. 1a-2a) and I assume that these cities were then subordinate to the latter. In 1283, the tsung-kuan or Governor of Tongnyŏng-pu was Hong Chunghŭi 洪重懐, the eldest son of Hong Tagu (KS 29. 47b) while Ch'oe T'ăn had evidently been demoted, for in the next year his title was Chiliarch (KS 30. 1a). Some cities were returned in 1285 (KS 30. 4), and in 1290, following a petition by King Ch'ung-nyŏl, Tongnyŏng-no was abolished and administratively returned to Koryŏ (KS 130. 37a). The abolishment of Tongnyŏng-no did not immediately put the entire area back into Korean hands. Korean designations and control were re-established over the following cities in the years indicated: 1354, the cities of Ŭiju, Muju, and Maengju; 1371, the cities of Tŏkchu, Kwakchu, Pakchu, and Unju; 1382, the city of Wiju 9a). The major problem following the fall of the Yüan was not so much regaining the territory, along the frontier especially, from the Mongols as it was a problem of retaking it from the Jürčen.

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2) In order to break the Koryŏ military government which had deposed him, Wŏnjong submitted Koryŏ to the Mongols on a basis of full alliance and cooperation, as a result of which:
  a) the Koryŏ and Yüan Imperial families were linked in marriage 11),
  b) the forces of the Koryŏ military government, the Three Patrols, revolted.
Thus, from 1270 onward, Koryŏ became a full-fledged participant in the Mongol adventure of conquest and Mongol daru'yaci 12) were appointed for the whole of Koryŏ. The following simplified chart shows the daru'yaci stationed in Koryŏ during the period 1258-1278 13):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Daru'yaci</th>
<th>Vice-Daru'yaci</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1258.12</td>
<td>72 individuals; unidentified</td>
<td></td>
<td>KS 24. 39b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1260</td>
<td>Shu-li-ta</td>
<td></td>
<td>KS 25. 7b-10a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1260-1270</td>
<td>- vacant -</td>
<td>- vacant -</td>
<td>KS 26. 33a; also see YKC 10a-b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from 1270.5 to 1271.10</td>
<td>Toqto'a 14)</td>
<td>Chiao T'ien-i 15)</td>
<td>YS 7. 2a-b; YKC 21a-b; TT 36.108</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from 1271.10 to 1272.4</td>
<td>- vacant -</td>
<td>Chiao T'ien-i</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from 1272.4 to 1273.9</td>
<td>Li I 李益</td>
<td>Chiao T'ien-i 15)</td>
<td>YKC 26a; KS 27. 28a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from 1273.12 to 1274.12</td>
<td>Li I 李益</td>
<td>Chou Shih-ch'ang 周世昌</td>
<td>YKC 26b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from 1274.12 to 1275.2</td>
<td>Hei-ti 黑的</td>
<td>Chou Shih-ch'ang 周世昌</td>
<td>YKC 27a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from 1275.2 to 1275.7</td>
<td>- vacant -</td>
<td>(d. 1275.2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from 1275.7 to 1275.11</td>
<td>- vacant -</td>
<td>- vacant -</td>
<td>YKC 27a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>from 1275.11 to 1278.8</td>
<td>Chang Kuo-kang 張國綱</td>
<td>Shih-mo T'ien-ch'ü 名抹天衢</td>
<td>YKC 27a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In late 1278, King Ch'ungnyŏl requested that the daru'yaci be withdrawn since they had fulfilled their duties and his request was granted (YKC 27b; KS 26. 32a), but by that time Yüan control over Koryŏ was so complete that the absence of the daru'yaci did not matter much.
A daru'yaci command had also been set up on T'amna in 1273 following the suppression of the rebellion of the Three Patrols, although it appears that
T'amna remained chiefly a military garrison until the daruyâčî, Sun-t'ān
was appointed in the sixth month of 1275 (YS 208) 16). The island was
subsequently turned into a pasturage 17). Upon the occasion of the accession
of Ch'eng-tsung (i.e., Temür Öljeitü, r. 1295-1307), King Ch'ungnyöl
petitioned the new Emperor to return T'amna to Koryô and this was done 18).
Again, the 'return' of T'amna was done in name only; a Myriarch Command
remained on the island and Koryô did not regain control of it until the reign of
King Kongmin. In addition to the Myriarch Command on T'amna, there were
other Myriarch Commands in Koryô, for example, at Happ'o, in the Western
Capital, one in Ch'olla Province and there was even a mobile army, sun'gun 19)
巡軍 . One of the major concerns of Yüan officials in Koryô in the 1270's
was ship construction and the provision of military supplies for the first inva-
sion of Japan. In 1280, after the failure of the first Japan expedition of 1274,
a Yüan Mobile Bureau for the Subjugation of Japan, cheng-jih-pen hsing-sheng
征日本行省, was established in Koryô; in fact this particular Mobile
Bureau was established and abolished several times, reflecting the on-again
off-again decision to attempt further Japan expeditions. This bureau acted as
the supreme Yüan administrative organ in Koryô and even gave civil service
exams 19a). When the Mongols launched their invasion of Annam a third Japan
expedition was given up 20) temporarily and the Mobile Bureau for the Subju-
gation of Japan which had been re-established in 1283, was abolished in the
first month of 1284. It was re-established in 1299; abolished in 1300 and re-
established in 1321 21); it lingered on, more in form than in substance, until
1365 (KSC 21. 36a; YSCSPM 3. 13; YS 208. 7a-b; YS 28. 5a).

A consequence of the failures of the Japan campaigns was the swarm of
Japanese freebooters, wakō, which descended upon Koryô during the late 13th
and early 14th centuries. The favorite targets of these raiders were Kimju,
located some miles up the Nakdong River in the fertile Nakdong delta region,
and the seaport of Happ'o located on the coast to the south. Happ'o had been
the Korean departure point for both Japan expeditions. In order to combat the
Japanese freebooters, the Yüan established a Coast Guard Myriarch Com-
mand, chen-pien wan-hu-fu 鎮邊萬戶府, at Kimju in the tenth month
of 1281 (KSC 20. 36b). The following year Tu-li Temür 霸里帖木
was stationed there with 500 troops (YSCSPM 3. 13).

In the eleventh month of 1275, Koryô was ordered to change the designa-
tions of all officials to correspond to the Yüan system (KSC 76. 1b; YKC 27a)
and the Koryô administrative structure was changed accordingly, with the ap-
pointment of Myriarch and Chiliarch, etc. to fill provincial posts (e.g., KSC 21.
34a-b). In 1278, Koryô began to follow even Mongol customs in clothing (KSC
72. 21b).
After decades of relation by marriages with the Yuan imperial family, an interesting phenomenon occurred. When Koryo King Ch’ungsŏn abdicated in 1313, he was invested as Shen-wang or Prince of Shen, by the Yuan. He was still nominally over his son who ascended the throne in Koryo, viz., King Ch’ungsuk, while he himself was held at the Mongol Court. He was later exiled to Tibet in 1320, but this did not cut short the line of Princes of Shen who continued to be invested with the title and presented, as symbols of their authority, with a golden seal with animal design (cf. YS 107. 6a) 22).

In summary it can be said that initial Mongol attempts to govern Koryo through the establishment of administrative organs in the country were unsuccessful until 1269; prior to that time they controlled only what they could hold by force, although the services of Koryo rebels were of considerable aid. But from that turning point which we can pinpoint to the deposing of Wŏnjong, Koryo came under the Yuan mantle willingly and the active establishment of the Yuan military-administrative structure in Koryo was carried out. The failure of the first Mongol attempt to control Koryo in 1232, however, had the interesting result of building a large and long-lasting Korean community in the Liaoyang area which was in desolation at the end of the Chin due to the repeated wars in the area. After the settlement of Hong Pogwŏn and his 1,500 households in the area between Liaoyang and Shenyang, Pogwŏn was placed in charge of all Koreans who submitted to the Mongols with the position of Myriarch of the Army and Peoples of Koryo, Kao-li ch’ün-min wan-hu (KS 59. 5a). In 1261, three years after Pogwŏn’s death, the Yuan established a Governor’s Command for the Administration of the Army and People of Koryo, An-fu Kao-li ch’ün-min tsung-kuan-fu (YS 59. 5a). In 1263, Wang Sun was given control of some 2,000 households and the administration of Shen-chou (= Shenyang) and made Governor of the People and Forces of Koryo. In 1296, the population of the Korean community in this area around Liaoyang exceeded 5,000 households; in the chih-shun era, 1330-1333, it was 5,183 households or roughly 25,915 persons (YS 59. 5a-b). Although Hong Pogwŏn was disgraced and killed in 1258, his son Hong Tagu was called up in 1260, and appointed Commander, tsung-kuan — a military position under the Myriarch — when the succession fight broke out between Qubilai and Ari’ (Boge) Tagu, with the Korean army of Liaoyang, also helped to crush the revolt of Prince Nayan in 1287. In 1270, a Mobile Bureau, hsing-sheng 23) was established at Liaoyang and in 1288 Hong Tagu was appointed Minister of the Right, yu-ch’eng , of the Mobile Bureau. When he died in 1291, his younger brother Hong Kunsang 23a) was given his position as Minister of the Right of the Liaoyang Mobile Bureau; he was later replaced by Hong Tagu’s eldest son, Hong Chunghŭi.
The descendants of Wang Sun also flourished in Liaoyang. Wang’s second son Kŏkŏ Temūr (Korean name Hŭi) was also given his father’s position as tsang-kuan or governor while Wang’s son Wu-ai who later aided in the suppression of the revolt of Prince Nayan was, in 1283, made Grand General, ta-chiang-chiūn.

3. **Tribute, Levies and Gifts**

Mongol demands upon Koryŏ for products took the form of the scheduled annual tribute and unscheduled levies. To this must be added gifts both solicited and unsolicited. Levies of provisions for the Mongolian army are of a different nature and have been discussed separately.

In the formal trade pattern of North Asia reciprocity and control were by-words and this aspect of Yūan-Koryŏ relations is not lacking. When an envoy arrived he brought gifts which were presented with his missive; he was then entertained and prior to departing given gifts which, in more normal times, could be expected to be about equal in value to the gifts he presented — which was probably one reason they were given after he made his presentation. While the Mongol envoys reduced their gifts to a token, the symbol of reciprocity was retained.

The few itemized accounts which we have of the demands and of the articles supplied cannot be expected to tell us much but they do reveal some interesting points. Highly prized by the Mongols were Koryŏ otter and marmot pelts and they were constantly demanded both by the throne and by the commanders in the field.

The majority of articles supplied by Koryŏ fall into a few general categories: **textiles, precious metals, pelts, and paper.** On the basis of the quantities of various items recorded as having been presented by Koryŏ (not all of which are detailed here) up until the year 1264, some approximate but interesting ratios are obtainable:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Ratio</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>silver to gold (excluding coins)</td>
<td>35 to 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gold products to unworked gold</td>
<td>2.5 to 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>silver products to unworked silver</td>
<td>6 to 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ramie to silk</td>
<td>7 to 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The high ratio of worked silver to raw silver is interesting for it indicates not only a large silver-craft industry in Koryŏ but also a preference for silver in the form of articles rather than in the form of bullion. The variety of textiles and of paper is particularly noticeable.

The period under consideration falls, for the most part, in what might be called the period of the unorganized exploitation of wealth by the Mongols; not until after the accession of Qubilai in 1260 was the Chinese bureaucratic ma-
chinery fully utilized for taxation purposes and, in Koryŏ, full exploitation was not begun until the accession of Wŏnjong, while full Koryŏ cooperation dates from 1270. Nothing emphasizes this so much as the fact that during the 31 years of the chih-yiian period, 1264-1294, Koryŏ submitted tribute 36 times (YS 208. 7b). It should be mentioned that it would be hazardous to attempt to draw other than the most tentative of conclusions from such meagre data despite their obvious value as an indicator of productivity and preference values.

Detailed lists of the articles submitted as tribute are lacking but a general idea is conveyed by the demands presented by Temüge-otčigin in 1221 and the tribute and gifts given by Koryŏ as a result of the peace negotiations in 1231. The demands of 1221 were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Article</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>otter pelts</td>
<td>10 000 yǒng (skins)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fine silk, hsi-ch'ou</td>
<td>3 000 p'il or bolts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fine ramie, hsi-chu</td>
<td>2 000 p'il</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>silk quilting, min-tzu</td>
<td>10 000 kok or bushels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lung-t'uan ink</td>
<td>1 000 chōng or sticks/cakes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>writing brushes</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>paper</td>
<td>100 000 chang or sheets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>groomwell, tzu-ts'ao 24)</td>
<td>5 kok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>safflower, hung-hua 25)</td>
<td>50 kok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>indigo shoots, lan-sun 26)</td>
<td>50 kok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cinnabar red, chu-hung</td>
<td>50 kok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>orpiment 27), tz'u-huang</td>
<td>10 kok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bright lacquer 28), kuang-ch'i</td>
<td>10 kok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tung oil, tung-yu 29)</td>
<td>10 kok</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Mongol gifts presented by the envoys who conveyed these demands were, the Koryŏ records inform us, cloth which had been given by Koryŏ the previous year and were merely symbols of the reciprocity implied in such exchanges. These same envoys also presented demands from the Mongol field commanders requesting unspecified amounts of otter pelts, silks, and silk quilting, and other items (KS 22. 19b-20b).

Of particular interest are the demands for such large quantities of ink, writing brushes, and paper. Parenthetically, it should be noted that cotton was not among these demands, the opinion of Martin notwithstanding 29). All exchanges stopped when Chu-ku-yū, the chief of this delegation was slain in early 1225.
The submission of tribute recommenced with the opening of the peace negotiations which took place in the winter of 1231. As compensation for the slaying of the Mongol envoy Chu-ku-yü, the Mongols demanded many hostages, 20,000 otter pelts, 10,000 horses and 10,000 ponies and clothing for an army of one million men! (KS 23. 5a-7b). Koryô sent gifts to the Mongol field commanders preceding the visit of Chöng, the Duke of Hoean, who himself took some local products to Sartaq. The gifts sent were: a pair of small gold wine bowls, a pair of large gold wine bowls, silver pyông coins, otter pelts, clothing,/lic, silk, and ramie cloth, chu-pu 靑 (KS 23. 5b). Some days later Koryô sent gifts to the camp of Tanqut, Ti-chü, and Sartaq's son to present: 5 kün of silver, 10 p'il of ramie cloth, 2000 p'il of coarse cloth,ts'u-ju 魚, saddle trappings, and bridle tassels (KS 23. 5b). The next Mongol envoy bore a dispatch which demanded enormous amounts of goods (KS 23. 5b-6b). Gifts were first sent to the camp of Tanqut consisting of: a wine-cup with fully engraved phoenix cover and stand, two p'il of fine ramie cloth, one bay horse, a silver-trimmed and gold-adorned saddle, and full embroidered saddle trappings.

Following the flurry of gifts outlined above, a substantial submission of tribute took place.

(a) A Mongol envoy was presented with the National Gifts consisting of:

- 70 kün of yellow gold
- 1300 kün of white gold
- 1000 jackets,ju-ju i 30) 燕衣, and, 
- 170 horses.

(b) Then, Koryô sent:

1. as gifts for Sartaq himself:

- 12 kün 2 yang 雨 of yellow gold
- 7 kün by weight of numerous wine utensils of gold
- 29 kün of white silver
- 437 kün by weight of numerous drinking and eating utensils of silver
- 116 silver pyông coins (each weighing one kün)
- 16 pieces of clothing (made of chiffon,sha 尙, silk gauze,lo 罷, silk brocade, chin 靈, and embroidered materials, hsin)
- 2 robes, ao 被, of purple chiffon
- 2000 jackets of silk cloth
- 75 marmot pelts, l'a-p'ı 無足
- 1 horse equipped with a saddle ornamented with gold
- 150 horses of varying types and, 

2. for distribution to Sartaq's son and wife, and for the commanders and officials under his command:

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49 kūn 5 yang of gold
341 kūn of silver
1 780 kūn by weight of silver wine utensils
120 silver pyong coins
300 p'il of fine ramie cloth
164 marmot pelts
jackets of damask, ling and chiffon; and saddle-horses.

(KS 23. 7b-8a)

In the fourth month of 1232, gifts were again presented to the Mongol field commanders including 10 p'il of silk gauze; pongee, chilun; damask; silk; and a variety of gold and silver wine utensils, decorated saddle trappings, and painted fans. A letter presented at this time also mentions that of 1,000 otter pelts demanded previously, some 977 pelts were being presented (KS 23. 12a).

Following the peace negotiations, tribute missions were again sent but no enumeration of products is given. In general, it can be said that during the periods of respite, tribute was given which was also true during most of the periods while negotiations were going on even though the fighting continued on the mainland, while during all major engagements tribute stopped 31). The same is true of gifts to Mongol commanders in the field.

In the winter of 1253, negotiations had reopened, and in addition to missions from the Mongol commander Yekü, one of his officials presented demands for gold, silver, ramie cloth, and other products (KS 23. 11a). The Koryŏ answer to this letter is particularly pertinent:

"The necessary gold and silver have since ancient times not been produced in our small state; as regards their being presented as tribute, this is not easily managed. As for otter pelts and ramie cloth, since the beginning of the war, the people have all fled in alarm, so that it is difficult to provide [these things]. Now we have roughly prepared some [gifts] as proof of our good faith as set out in a separate list" (KS 24. 11b).

The general Korean bankruptcy is borne out by other accounts where we read that "because of the presentations as well as gifts sent to the Mongol officials, the Duke of Yŏngyŏng, his consort, and his consort’s mother, Hong Pogwŏn, et al., the gold, silver, and cloth [consumed] were incalculable and the treasuries and storehouses were all exhausted. [Therefore] they ordered the civil and military officials of the fourth grade in official rank and above to produce one kūn of white silver; officials of the fifth grade, 4 p'il of ramie cloth; officials of the sixth and seventh grades, kwŏnsam (~ kwŏnch'am) , 3 p'il [of ramie cloth]; the officials of the eighth grade, one p'il (of ramie cloth) in order to meet the expenses" (KS 79. 22b-23a). Levies of 20 sŏng of white ramie cloth were made on the people of the southern pro-
vinces which caused much dissension; one p'il of cloth cost one kūn of white silver while orders to confiscate the people's horses led many to kill the horses rather than give them up (KS 24. 12a).

While a mere listing of all records of gifts, levies, and tribute presented by Koryŏ would be of minor value since quantities are rarely mentioned, a few of these records deserve attention.

As mentioned, otter and marmot pelts were particularly sought, to which we may add paper. The following presentations of paper are mentioned in the period 1262-1263: 540 sheets of paper (KS 25. 27a-28b); 100 sheets of yellow paper and 100 sheets of white paper (KS 25. 24b-25a); 500 sheets of piao 表 paper and 1000 sheets of tsou 贴 paper (KS 25. 29b-31a).

A variety of hunting birds were also solicited from Koryŏ including: sparrow hawks, yao 32) 鷹, goshawks, ying 33) 鷹, and peregrine falcons, ku 34) 鷹 (KS 25. 24b; KS 25. 31b). In 1262, Koryŏ was ordered to present hunting birds to the throne each year and this led to the establishment of a Falconry Office, ūngbang 35) 鷹班 . The Falconry Office was headed by an Administrator, tsung-kuan 捕官 and was supported by the taxes of 250 households (YS 101. 19a) 36).

Textiles presented included varieties of chiffon, silk gauze, silk brocade, embroidered materials, damask, pongee, and ramie cloth which attest to the existence of a skilled textile industry in Koryŏ 37).

There are only two records of possible ceramic items being presented, one of which has been mentioned; the other is a record of parrot (decorated) cups presented to a Mongol field commander in 1260 (KS 25. 8a), The kilns which produced the famed Koryŏ celadon ware for the court were located near Kangjin in the extreme south 38), an area to which the Mongols in their invasions did not penetrate. It was however, precisely in this area that the rebellion of the Three Patrols centered. When it is also noted that the Mongols took all artisans they could capture, the general decline of the 'classical' Koryŏ celadon industry is explained 39).

Another item of interest was a Mongol levy made in 1262, which demanded 20,000 kūn of brass, hao-t'ung 鉛錠. Some 612 kūn were raised by a levy on officials down to the sixth grade but in a missive accompanying the brass, the Koryŏ authorities pointed out that "This product is not produced within [Our] insignificant state's Yalu River[borders]. That which we have presented, we purchased in North China" (KS 25. 24b-25b).

A few other items, more curiosities than anything else, like hats (KS 25. 27a) and scabbards (inlaid with) tortoise shell (KS 25. 27a) are also recorded as having been presented.

By far the strangest request made by the Mongols for a product arrived

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by special messenger in the autumn of 1267. Skins, of which 17 were produced, of the a-chi-erh ho-meng-ko 阿吉兒合蒙合 (?ajir-γamong-γa) which a gloss explains as "the name of a fish which resembles a cow" (sea-cow??). They were to be used to make shoes for the Emperor as it was said that they would relieve his swollen feet when he stood up (KS 26. 12b).

There is no mention of either demands for or presentations of ginsaeng, insam 人参, which was (and still is) highly prized by the Chinese and was often included in tribute given to Sung (e.g., Sung-shih 147. 17b).

The large amounts of silver given as tribute by Koryô are interesting when it is noted that during the preceding two centuries there had been a shortage of silver in the Muslim world resulting in a near cessation of the issuance of silver coins. Then, in 1260, vast quantities of silver suddenly re-appeared 40).

It should also be mentioned that there was a brief interlude of trade. In the tenth month of 1261, the Mongol Court sent two envoys with an Imperial Edict to open monopoly markets, chio-ch'ang (YKC 10b) which has to lead to the establishment of markets on the Yalu 41). This was apparently short-lived, for "in the first month of the third year of the reign (of Qubilai = 1262), foreign trade, hu-shih, was abolished. Prince Ta-cha-erh 塔察兒 (Tā-čar) suggested that an iron smelter be established and this was carried out. It was suggested that foreign trade be set up but this was not allowed" (YS 208. 6b). The absence of such markets made a place on the tribute missions valuable and we have at least one example of two men who made large profits on such a mission, for which they were fined and exiled (KS 25. 33a-b).

4. Mongol Military Colonies in Koryô

The establishment of military colonies t'un-t'ien, one type of government land under the Yüan 42), in Koryô is well attested in both Yüan and Koryô records. And, if there is one thing upon which both agree, it is that there were no relations between the Mongols and Koryô during the period 1225-1231. It comes then as somewhat of a surprise to find the following passage in the 'Monograph on Food and Money' in the Koryô-sa dated the third month of 1226:

"The princes as well as the ministers great and small and the people were all ordered to bring forth beans according to their station in order to support the Yüan military colonies with cattle feed" (KS 79. 22b).

The passage is, of course, erroneously dated and refers to an event which occurred after 1259 or, more probably, after 1270. A similar levy was made again in 1277 (KS 79. 16) and perhaps this is simply an erroneously dated duplication.
Each time military colonies were established in Koryŏ, it was to accomplish a specific task. The first military colonies were opened in the Western Capital area in the second month of 1259, for the distinct purpose of reconstructing the city and building warships (KS 24. 40b); in 1260 they seem to have been abolished (KS 26. 13b).

Military colonies were established on a somewhat broader scale in 1270. In the eleventh month of that year, the Yüan Imperial Secretariat, chung-shu-sheng, suggested that a Military Colony Supervisory Bureau, t'un-t'ien ching-lüeh-ssu 行 省 督 略 司, be established in Koryŏ (YKC 22a), "Subsequently, they established military colonies in ten places [including] the capital, Tongnyŏng-pu, and Pongju 蓬州 with 2000 men of the households under the supervision of Wang Sun and Hong Tagu as well as 2000 men of the guard army, wei-chün 衛軍, and 1000 men from P'o-so-fu 婆娑府 and Hsien-p'ing-fu 咸平府. They set up a Supervisory Bureau, ching-lüeh-ssu, in order to manage their affairs. Each military colony had 500 soldiers" (YS 100. 19). The same source also gives the reason for their establishment: to prepare for the Japan expedition. Hindu 阿刺帖木兒 (Ala[q] Temür) was made Coadministrator, while the forces under Aqai were disbanded. Hong Tagu was placed in command of the 2000 men he and Wang Sun had raised (YKC 22a-b; YS 208. 12b). Other sources add that military colonies were also established at Kimju 金州 and Hwangju 黃州 at this time (YS 7. 6a; YS 208. 12b-13a; KS 27. 2b; CHSL 4. 41a; TK 11. 258; TT 36. 115). Earlier events confirm military colonies at the Western Capital (KS 24. 40b) and later events indicate that Naju 羅州 was probably another location (KS 27. 38b).

Koryŏ, of course, lost no time in requesting that they be abolished (KS 27. 7a-b) but this was not to be. In the fourth month of 1271, "Special Supervisors of Agriculture were separately sent to all the provinces to hasten the delivery of farm oxen and farming implements to Hwangju and Pongju in order to prepare for the needs of the Yüan military colonies" (KS 79. 8b). In the eighth month of the same year, Qurimchi arrived in Koryŏ and proceeded to garrison at Happ'o (YKC 25a). And, in 1272, inspectors were sent out to select arable land to produce provisions for the army (KS 82. 37a). In this same year Koryŏ established a chŏnham pyŏngnyang togam 戰艦兵糧都監 or Supervisory Bureau [for the Construction of] Warships [and the Provision of] Army Supplies (KS 77. 27a).

As the military colonies began their preparations for the Japan campaign, military operations against the Three Patrols then on Chin Island also required support. Some five to six thousand cattle were sent from the Pongju
military colony to the Yüan-Koryó forces which numbered 6,000 men and 18,000 horses (TT 31.118; CHSL 4.42a). The large number of horses proved difficult to feed and frequent complaints that the horses were starving (TT 36.115; TT 36.118) led the Yüan to send an envoy to order more diligence in agriculture and sericulture in order to provide provisions for the army. Hong Tagu was ordered to supervise agricultural affairs (KS 79.8b).

These were the military colonies which supported the T'ämna campaign which ended the rebellion of the Three Patrols in 1273, and which supported the first Japan campaign the next year. They were apparently abolished in 1274, when the attack on Japan was made; following the failure of the expedition they were evidently not revived.

5. Ship Construction

Ship construction in Koryó was originally intended for use against the Southern Sung. The first reference to actual ship construction is in 1259 when military colonies were established at the Western Capital charged with the dual task of reconstructing the city and building warships (KS 24.40b) 44. In 1268, an edict was issued instructing Wŏnjong to prepare ships and foodstuffs to be used for the campaign against the Southern Sung 45. Then, after the missions to Japan repeatedly returned empty-handed, thought was given to using them to enforce Mongol demands on Japan (cf. KS 26.18a1-15).

The original demand was for Koryó to prepare 1,000 ships of 3 to 4,000 bushel (sŏk) capacity capable of crossing a great sea (YKC 13b-15a; YS 208.8b-9a). Koryó had reported that she was building 1,000 ships and raising an army of 10,000 men and the Mongols dispatched Toqto'a, T'o-to-erh, to inspect the army and supervise the construction of warships (YS 208.9a). Reaching Koryó, he made journeys to inspect Hüksan Island 㖆, the departure point for the China trade, and the Japan route — the latter probably referring to the Kimju area (YKC 15a-16a). Hüksan Island had since ancient times been a way-station for vessels going to China and a hostel and Buddhist temple were maintained there for travellers, many of them members of the Buddhist clergy, going to China. Sung ships sailing from Ming-chou 㕣 可 could reach Hüksan Island in five days with a favorable wind; from Hüksan Island they would proceed past the many coastal islands to Yesŏng River which wound past the Koryó capital at Kaegyŏng (see Sung-shih 487). The possibility of using T'amna as a departure point against either Japan or the Southern Sung was first raised in the first month of 1269, and Toqto'a was sent back to inspect T'amna (YKC 15a-b; YS 208.9b) 46.

The rebellion of the Three Patrols who seized T'amna Island interrupted this plan temporarily and evidently Qubilai intended to go ahead with the Japan
invasion after chasing the rebels from Chin Island to their final stronghold on T'amna. This must have caused some concern, for we find the ministers of both the Yüan Imperial Secretariat and the Bureau of Military Affairs suggesting that T'amna be taken first and then the Japan campaign looked into (YS 208. 19b).

This same rebellion aids in detecting sites where ships were being assembled. Since the same ships were to be used for the T'amna campaign against the rebels, the latter naturally raided these sites and burnt the ships. While ships and stores were being accumulated in Kimju as early as the winter of 1270 (YKC 24a), raids on the shipyards did not commence until the period 1272-1273. A report sent to the Yüan Court at this time mentions 20 ships destroyed, 12 men killed, and 8200 bushels (sŏk) of rice captured (KS 27. 31b) Subsequent rebel raids in 1272-1273 included:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Ships Destroyed</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Taep'o</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>KS 27. 29b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haenyŏng-kun</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>KS 27. 34b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koran Island</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>KS 27. 34b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happ'o</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>KS 27. 35a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kŏje-hyon</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>KS 27. 35a-b</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Happ'o</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>KS 27. 36b</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To the shipbuilders woes were added natural disasters. A storm sunk 20 ships of Sŏhae Province and 27 ships of Kyŏngsang Province being rendezvoused for the T'amna campaign in 1273 (KS 27. 38b). The Japanese, who were then actively engaged in voyages to the Southern Sung, described the ships used by the first Mongol envoys to Japan as 'large ships' 47, and perhaps their size led to faulty construction. An indication of this is seen when, in 1273, the daruçoči Li I imprisoned Circuit Inspector U Ch'ŏnsŏk because many of the Sŏhae Province warships sunk (KS 27. 37b). During 1272-1273 there was a loss of 132 ships, 85 due to the raids of the Three Patrols and 47 sunk by storms. For the T'amna campaign in 1273, the Yüan-Koryŏ forces were to use 160 ships from Chŏlla Province (KS 27. 39a).

With the rebellion in Koryŏ subdued, the invasion of Japan could begin. Probably the most reliable estimate of the ships involved in the Japan expeditions is that of Ikeuchi Hiroshi 48 who estimates 770 ships for the first invasion. Although these were constructed under the control of the Supervisory Bureau [for the Construction of] Warships [and the Provision of] Army Supplies established in 1272 (KS 77. 27a), preparations for the second invasion of Japan which was launched in 1281, were under the control of the Mobile Bureau for the Subjugation of Japan. Undoubtedly the construction sites for the estimated 900 ships constructed in Koryŏ were the same 49).
The disastrous failure of the two Japan expeditions did not deter the Mongol Emperor who planned a third invasion. The former pirates Chu Ch'ing and Chang Hsüan were to transport one million piculs of rice to Happ'o by the spring of 1286 to support the invasion scheduled for September of that year. The third invasion of Japan was cancelled when the invasion of Annam was undertaken 50). Following a request by King Ch'ungnyö1, the special bureaus for ship construction were abolished in 1295 (KSC 21. 36a) although the idea of conquering Japan lingered on as is evidenced by the repeated re-establishment of the Bureau for the Conquest of Japan.

6. Post-Stations

At the beginning of the Mongol invasions Koryo had a well-established network of post-stations. A total of 525 stations were divided into 22 to 33 or lines, the administration of which was under the Board of War (KS 82). The extent to which this system survived the invasions is unknown but some suggestion of their state is seen in a Mongol order of the 8th month of 1259, which ordered Koryo to establish fully equipped and manned relay stations south of the Western Capital; the relay stations to the north of the Western Capital (presumably established by the Mongols) were to be used jointly (KS 25. 3a). In 1272, officials were sent to each province to check the post-stations (KS 82. 18a) and the following year levies of horses for the post-stations were made on all Koryo officials (KS 82. 18a). In 1279, a sweeping change in the Koryo system remodelled it on the Yüan system in which groups of households were made responsible for the support of the post-stations and drawn on to man the stations for periods of five years (KS 82. 18b-19b). Apparently it was not until the next year that the stations were operative (VSCSPM 3. 12). To what extent this system was modified or changed thereafter is unknown.

I believe we may assume that the horses from the various pasturages were used for the postal system. Koryo herself had long had a system of pasturages (KS 82. 24a-27a) and under the Yüan, T'amna Island became the most important pasturage. Levies of horses seem to have been chiefly for the army (cf. KS 82. 26a; KS 88. 27) rather than for the post-stations.

In brief, the Mongols had Koryo refurbish the existing network of post-stations which were then incorporated into the Yüan network with provisions for their support along Yüan lines 50a).

7. Military Support

In spite of the repeated Mongol demands that Koryo render military assistance, it is clear that not until 1270, that is, until after the restoration of Wônjong, was the support demanded forthcoming. From this point Koryo-Yüan
military operations flow together and Koryó furnished both men and supplies freely. The two Japan campaigns and the suppression of the revolt of Prince Nayan are examples of this cooperation. At the same time, Mongol forces were largely responsible for the suppression of the rebellion of the Three Patrols and supplied both troops and supplies to that end. Ship construction and supplies for the military colonies have been treated separately and will not be duplicated here. The actual assistance rendered is perhaps best illustrated with a few examples.

In late 1270, levies were made on members of the royal household and the officials for silk and pongee in order to supply army clothing (KS 79. 23b) and, a month later, levies of rice for army provisions were made (KS 82. 37a). Early the following year, 1,000 bushels (sōk) of rice, 500 bushels of other grains, and 100 bushels of salt were supplied to the Mongol forces at the Western Capital from the Sōk Island Granary 燕山。At this same time, there were demands from the Mongol forces in the Western Capital for summer clothing and tents (KS 26. 32a-b). Upon his return from the Yüan Court in 1270, Wŏnjong ordered 10,000 bushels of rice be transported by ship from the Sihŭng Granary in order to supply the Mongolian army with provisions (KS 26. 33a-b). In 1277, there was a general levy of rice on everyone from Ministers to the common people for provisions for Hong Tagu's army (KS 82. 37b) and the following year the tax rice of Sŏhae Province for the preceding year was also used for this purpose (KS 82. 37b).

In 1272, a famine in Koryó resulted in 20,000 bushels (sōk) of rice being shipped in from Tung-ching as a relief measure (YS 7. 17b). Some years later, in 1289, Koryó reciprocated by supplying 100,000 bushels of rice to relieve a famine in Liaotung (KS 79. 25b). Then, three years later, 100,000 bushels of rice were again sent into Koryó to relieve the famine there (YSCSPM 3. 13).

For their joint military undertakings during this period, Koryó raised 6,000 men for the Chin Island assault (YKC 24a), seamen for the T’amna campaign (TT 36. 116), an estimated 5,000 men for the first Japan expedition; and 10,000 men for the second Japan invasion.

These few examples, I believe, make the point; after 1270, the Yüan authorities were able to freely levy supplies and men from Koryó in the same manner as any other area under their control, with the assurance that every effort would be expended to meet the demands.

8. Hostages

The Mongol demands for hostages from Koryó reflect an ancient practice in North Asia. In China, "A fourth century tradition dates the institution as
far back as the Warring States" 51). The institution of hostages in China is well-known and needs no further elaboration here, except perhaps to point out that its guiding principle was to hold the closest male descendant(s) of the monarch or chieftain (external hostages) or provincial overlord (internal hostages) as pledges for their conduct. The system was well-known to Korea who had sent hostages to T'ang in Silla times and who in the Koryŏ period had also maintained a system of internal hostages called *kiin* 52).

While the Mongols had followed the practice of requiring hostages since the days of Činggis, their demands for hostages also had distinctions of their own apart from the traditionally stated Chinese practices. The essence of these distinctions were that they made a stated formal institution of an ancient, unwritten practice in North Asia. The hostage institution of the Mongols may be seen to incorporate and blend Chinese influence on the one hand and Muslim influence on the other 53) with other distinctions which were either their own or which they shared with the other nomadic peoples of Central and North Asia. The contrasts reflect the differences of sedentary and nomadic societies.

When the Mongols captured a city they regarded everything and everyone in it as their absolute chattels, an idea which appears to be closer associated with the Muslim East than with China 54). When they conquered a nation, the same principle applied.

On the Mongol side, the demands for hostages from Koryŏ fall into the following categories:

I. Non-service hostages
   a. Royal male relatives
   b. Relatives of high officials

II. Service hostages
   a. Male hostages utilized in the Mongol Military and Administrative system
   b. Women
   c. Male and female children
   d. Artisans

The latter three types of hostages were equivalent to the provision of slaves although they were usually not taken from the slave strata of Koryŏ society.

On the Koryŏ side we can make the distinction of 'voluntary' hostages or those Koryŏ produced, and 'involuntary' hostages or those whom the Mongols captured. By this it can be seen that the distinctions between hostage and captive are not simply blurred but rather blend together because, as pointed out previously, captured or conquered peoples were regarded as absolute chattels.

If a distinction can be made at all here, we could perhaps say that those
listed under I were 'true' hostages, while those listed under II were 'hostages' as a result of being captured or of being given in the manner of a levy. Thus, I have classified those under I as non-service hostages since their main function was to act as a pledge for the conduct of others; the performance of service was the function of the second group.

I. Non-Service Hostages

In addition to goods demanded as compensation for the slaying of the Mongol envoy Chu-kü-yü in the 12th month of 1231, the Mongols demanded 1 000 young male relatives of the royal family, 1 000 young male relatives of the families of the high officials, and 1 000 young female relatives of the above families, to be presented to the Emperor (KS 23. 5a-7b).

The Koryŏ response to these demands was negative and a Koryŏ delegation sent to the Mongol camp conveyed a letter in which they said that they could not supply the young boys or the young girls requested; nor could they supply the artisans or the seamstresses the Mongols had demanded (KS 23. 12a; TYSC 28. 7b-9a). The first non-service hostages were produced by Koryŏ in 1241 when Sun, the Duke of Yŏngnyong and 10 others were sent to the Mongol Court as hostages (KS 23. 35a-b; YS 120. 15a). Then, in early 1259, Wang Chŏn, the Crown Prince, was sent to the Mongol Court as a hostage (KS 24. 41b-42b) 55). In 1271, the Heir Apparent, Wang Sim and 18 members of the royal family were sent to the Yuan Court as hostages (YS 208; IC 9A13a). In mid-1275, a system was instituted to encourage the sons of high officials to come forward as hostages. Those selected as hostages were promoted three grades in rank. This apparently had results for six months later Wang Ching, Duke of Taebang 帶方公, escorted the sons of 10 high officials, recruited in this manner to the Yuan Court as hostages. They were declared unacceptable by the Yuan and they sent the group back in the third month of the following year; probably because of their age — some were not yet twenty 56). In early 1277, Wang Ching, again escorted 25 sons of high officials who had also been recruited by offering promotions, to the Yuan Court as hostages (KSC 20. 19b). Then, in 1283, Wang Ching himself was sent to the Yuan Court as a hostage (KS 29. 47b). Thereafter, there are few records of hostages of this type being sent 57). Hostages were apparently no longer required by the Yuan due to the joining of the royal families in marriage, which meant that they would be holding their own relatives as hostages. The large number of Mongol forces and officials in Koryŏ, and the fact that they could and did, force Korean rulers off the throne and into exile 58) were also reasons why the hostage requirements of this category were dropped.

II. Service Hostages

Involuntary hostages or captives taken by the Mongols were kept as
slaves, utilized in the Mongol military-administration 59), and formed into hostage-armies 60). Artisans, women and children were usually taken captive upon the fall of a city while the rest of the population was quite often slaughtered 61). In the city of Yangsan 横山城 which fell after a fierce Mongol attack using catapults and fire-arrows, all males over the age of ten years were killed. The women and children were then divided among the soldiers. Some 4700 are related to have died in the city (KS 101. 23b-24a). After capturing the mountain citadel of refuge of Tongju 東州, the Mongols killed all the officials and took all women and young boys away as captives (KS 101. 24a). The number of prisoners taken by the Mongols at the end of 1254 was estimated at 206,000 persons (KS 24. 20a-b). This often resulted in some horrible incidents. At the time of the fall of a stronghold in Tanch'ang-hyon 端城, the Koryŏ officials in charge put all the women and children in the government storehouse which they burnt and then killed themselves to evade capture. It is interesting to note that not until 1273 were Mongol soldiers in Koryŏ ordered to stop taking girls of 'free' families as slaves (KS 27. 37a).

The Yüan demands for artisans and women to do embroidery work dates to 1232, but the Koryŏ response to such demands, especially in the presentation of women to the Yüan throne, did not begin until 1275. In that year, 10 maidens were presented to the throne and this practice continued until 1353 or the second year of the reign of King Kongmin (r. 1352-1374).

These girls probably gave rise to the legend of the beautiful Qulan, Korean bride of Činggis, who rode with him into battle.

The story appears in the 17th century work, found in 1926, known as the Altan tobciof bLo-bzan bstan'jīn and has been translated by Bawden; the pertinent passage opens with the remark that Činggis gave his daughter Altan-yurultai to Arin, the King of Koryŏ and continues that "When the Holy Lord (Činggis) went making an expedition against the country of Solongyud (Korea) ... Buγa Çağan Qaγan of the Solongyud furtively offered his own daughter, by name Qulan, and brought her by boat ..., with tiger(skin) houses" 62). Činggis is said to have remained in Korea three years. Then it is related when Činggis went on a campaign against the Muslims, he took Qulan on the campaign 63).

Like most legends of its type it combines truth with half-truth and fiction. Činggis had a wife named Qulan 蕲 intentions (cf. YS 106. 1b) who was renowned for her beauty. There is, however, little doubt that she was of the Merkit, namely, the daughter of Dayir-Üsün, the ruler of the Uhaz-Merkit 64). The identification of Qulan with Korea undoubtedly stems in large part from the intermarriage between the Yüan and Koryŏ royal families and from the Koryŏ tribute girls. As far as is known, Činggis himself never set foot in Korea, never gave any of his daughters to a Korean ruler, nor were any of his Empresses Korean.

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Certainly no legend was the daughter of Ki Ch'ao by far the most important of all the girls sent to the imperial harem. She entered the harem of Emperor Shun 順帝 (r. 1333-1368), the last emperor of the Yüan, and in 1341 became his second Empress. Her family in Koryo naturally benefited from her position. Her brother Ki Ch'ol 奇孝 (d. 1356; BTKP 52.491) became, almost over-night, a real power in the land and leader of the strong pro-Mongol faction which included men like Kwŏn Kyŏm 權謙 (d. 1356; BTKP 77.731) and No Ch'aek 李葢 (d. 1356; BTKP 86.806) who also had daughters in the imperial harem. Empress Ki soon attempted to have the Emperor replace the Koryo ruler King Kongmin with one of her relatives. In the ensuing revolt led by the King against the Yüan in 1356, Ki Ch'ol, Kwŏn Kyŏm, and No Ch'aek were killed. A Mongol force of 10,000 sent to put down the revolt was practically annihilated; only seventeen escaped. This marked the beginning of the end of Mongol power in Koryo.
Notes to Part II

1. Yasa meaning 'ordinance' or 'law', from the Persian or Turkish (Mo. jasaq), began with recordings by scribes of the instructions of Činggis who, as is well known, was himself illiterate. Vernadsky suggests that these instructions were probably codified at the Quriltau of 1206, with a revision completed in 1225, and he says (p. 338) that "There can ... be no doubt that the Yasa as a written document actually existed". Cf. Vernadsky, 'The Scope and Contents ...', p. 338. This conclusion was also reached by Riasanovsky who would place publication around 1218, Riasanovsky, V.A. Fundamental Principles of Mongol Law, Tientsin, 1937, p. 199. Vernadsky op. cit., p. 360, maintains that "... the Yasa seems to have had as its main objective not to codify customary law but to supplement it in accordance with the needs of the empire superimposed on the former tribal state." This, however, is in direct contrast to the views of Riasanovsky who holds the traditional legal position that law is an outgrowth of custom and that the Yasa is merely Mongolian customary law which was codified and which applied only to the Mongols and other nomadic peoples under their control but not to sedentary societies like Russia or China which were of a different and higher cultural level. Riasanovsky has defined his limits quite narrowly, i.e., the law of Mongolia, although he has a good point. Yet he appears to be grinding an axe, viz., that Mongol influence on Russian law and other features of Russian life was negligible. Vernadsky has taken a somewhat broader view and in referring to the Yasa here I refer to the interpretation of Vernadsky. Under Riasanovsky's interpretation the instructions for surrendering states would not be included in either the Yasa of Činggis nor in his bilig or 'maxims' but would be merely supplementary edicts.

Perhaps the standardization of the instructions for surrendering states which I believe were incorporated in the Yasa was influenced by Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai 耶律楚材, principal adviser to Činggis and later to his son Ögödei, since he played a primary role in the moulding of Mongol administration.

✓ 2. The pertinent YKC 13a-b passage has been translated by Lien-sheng Yang, 'Hostages in Chinese History'; this passage is also found in YS 208. 8a-b where daru'yači is rendered chang-kuan 將官.

3. For some Mongol methods of extracting wealth from conquered nations also see Schurmann, Economic Structure ..., op. cit., and Barthold, Turkestan ..., op. cit., passim.

1A-B the appanage of Temüge-otčigin was by the Kerulen River and he held the title of Liao-wang. Yanai, Yüan-Tai ..., p. 70, would place the appanage of Temüge-otčigin east of Hsing-an-ling. Marco Polo related that Prince Nayan held the territories of Manchuria, Koryŏ, Barscal, and Sinkintinju. Palladius earlier expressed the view that Polo's reference may have been to the Koryŏ northwest, i.e., Tongnyŏng-pu, but that even that was doubtful. See Pelliot, Notes on Marco Polo, pp. 343 and 387.

5. A similar remark is often attributed to Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, but originates with Lu Chia (3-2c. BC), cf. Shih-chi 97. 7b, see p. 6 and note 74, D.R. Jonker, unpublished doctoraal scriptie, Het leven van Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts'ai, Sinological Institute, Leiden.

6. These are the praecursores of Pian de Carpine who says of them, "... (they) take nothing with them save their felts, horses, and weapons. They plunder nothing, burn no houses, kill no animals; they wound people, kill them or at least drive them to flight, but they do the first far more willingly than the last." See W. Barthold, Turkestan ..., p. 423.

7. Koreans often referred to the hsing-ying in notations on official correspondence as the military headquarters, mo-fu (TYSC 28. 1) or mo-fu (TYSC 28. 7a).


9. It is interesting to note that this was precisely the area that General Cho Wiyong offered to submit to the Chin a century earlier. See Chin-shih 7. 7b. The mountain ranges of Korea have long provided natural geographic boundaries and the selection of Chabi Pass as the southern boundary of Tongnyŏng-pu is an example of this. For discussion of the physical basis for the internal boundaries of Korean provinces which clarifies this point, see S. McCune, 'Physical Basis for Korean Boundaries', FEQ 4 (1946) 3, pp. 272-288.


10. The sources for this map included Nihon chiri taikei, p. 398.

11. An excellent study of this exists in L. Hambis, 'Notes sur l'histoire ...', pp. 151-294, esp. pp. 178 ff. Hambis has reconstructed the names of all the Mongolian Princesses involved and his study carries a detailed genealogical chart showing the Yüan-Koryŏ marriages, i.e., those of the royal families.

12. According to Nihon chiri taikei, p. 399, a Mobile Bureau was established in Koryŏ at this time and the chief of this Mobile Bureau was T'ou-nien-ke.
This appears to be in error. In 1270.2, T'ou-nien-ke was ordered to escort Wônjông back to Koryô and to garrison at the Western Capital (YKC 21a-b) and a few months later in 1270.11 he was appointed head of the Mobile Bureau (YKC 22b). The Mobile Bureau referred to is the Liao-yang Mobile Bureau.

13. The basis for this chart was Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Kôrai ni chûzai shîta Gen no tatsurokaseki ni tsuite 高麗に駐在した元の速報花録 について [Concerning the Yuan Daru'aca Stationed in Koryô], TG 18 (1929) 1, pp. 277-283, to which I have added supplemental information.

14. To[q]to'a was appointed in 1270.2.16, arrived in Koryô in 1270.5, and died in 1271.10 (YKC 25; KS 27. 23a-24b). A descendant of Temûge-otči-gin had a similar name.

15. Chiao returned to the Yuan court in 1273 (YKC 26b) and his post remained vacant until the arrival of Chou Shih-ch'ang in the twelfth month of 1273.

16. Cf. Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Gen Seiso to Tanra 元世祖と耽羅 [Yuan Shih-tsû and T'ama Island], TG 16 (1926), pp. 136-142. Ikeuchi is convinced that the original reference to the establishment of a Daru'aca command on T'ama was not carried out until later and that initially it existed as a van-hu-fu since no Daru'aca was appointed until 1275.

17. The Mongols were not, in this respect, setting a precedent so much as following one. Chejû, i.e., the chu-administration on T'ama had presented horses as regional tribute for years (CHSL 4. 35a). The island was not used for the raising of horses alone but also for camels, mules, and sheep. Cf. Yi Tökpong 李德鳳, Han'guk saengmurhak úi sajôk koch'al [Biological Study of the History of the Korean Archipelago], AY 2 (1959) 2, pp. 65-105. For the Yuan utilization of T'ama as a pastureage see Ta-Yüan ma-chêng [The Administration of the Yuan Dynasty], YK 20 (1932-33), pp. 301-350.

18. See Ikeuchi, 'Yüan Shih-tsû ...', p. 141. Upon the accession of Emperor Ch'eng-tsung in 1294, King Ch'ungnyông went to the Mongol Court for the ceremony and at that time requested the return of T'ama and the release of Koryô captives held by the Yuan and it was granted. KSC 21. 36.

19a See Cho Chwaho 曹佐鎬, Yôdae úi kwagô chedo, YH 10 (1958) p.143
22. See H. Okada, 関旧党派, Gen no Shinô to Ryôyô Kôsho 関の
23. For the Mobile Bureau see Ch. V, note 46. The position of the Tung-ching Mobile Bureau and its relation to Korea is clarified by the study of the Mobile Bureaus and their officials by Wu T'ing-hsiieh 萬廷燮 Yuan hsing-sheng ch'eng-hsiang p'ing-chang cheng-shih nien-piao 元行省丞相平等政事年表, incorporated in Vol. 6, pp. 8253-8295 of the Erh-shih-wu-shih pu-p'ien. Also see HYS 32-33. Ko Pyŏngik, in his excellent and detailed study, Yŏdae chŏngdong haengsŏng ūi yŏn'gu 麗代征東行省口研究, Part I in YH 14 and Part II in YH 19, points out that the higher positions in this bureau were usually Mongols or Chinese appointed by the Yuan, while Koreans were given the lower ranking positions.

23a Hong Kunsang was also in charge of Koreans digging a canal at T'ung-chou 通州. See YS 154.


25. hung-hua 紅花. Both safflower (Carthamus tinctorius) and saffron (Crocus sativus) were styled hung-hua 紅花, cf. B. Laufer, Sino-Iranica, 1919, p. 310, nevertheless, both Laufer, p. 324 note 4 and Schafer and Wallacker op. cit., p. 218, render it as safflower. It is used in cosmetics and dyeing. Also see ts'ao-mu 草木 3. 22b of the San-ts'ai t'u-hui 三才圖會.

26. Lan is identified by Laufer, op. cit., p. 325 as indigofera.


28. ch'i 漆 (more commonly written ch'i 漆), identified by Schafer and Wallacker, op. cit., p. 220 as from Rhus vernicifera. I am uncertain of the implication of kung 光 which could seem to mean clear lacquer or bright/sparkling lacquer.

29. See H.D. Martin, op. cit., p. 217. It is generally said that cotton was not grown in Korea until cotton seeds were secretly brought back from the Yuan by Mun Ikhŏm 文益漸 in 1363. Hong Wŏn 弘願 who returned from India at this time was familiar with methods of cultivation and usage and within a decade cultivation had spread throughout the peninsula, Cf. Han'guk-sa sajŏn, pp. 117-118. P. Pelliot, Notes to Marco Polo, p. 456, says "... it seems highly doubtful that ... cotton cloth should have been generally used in Corea and Japan in the first quarter of the 13th century."

30. These were met on the Koryŏ side by a levy. In the 12th month of 1231,
"[They] ordered all the officials to bring forth clothing, i.e., according to their station in order to support the national gifts. Each [to produce] one suit, yŏng 응, [as follows]: princes and ministers rolled silk brocade and silk damask clothing of 2 colors; the third rank and fourth rank, silk damask clothing of 2 colors; the fifth rank and the sixth and seventh ranks, kwŏnsam (~ kwŏnch'amu) 欽善 greenish-black bombycine, t'i-ch'ou 烏紗. " (KS 79. 22b).

31. There is some difficulty in differentiating between tribute and gifts to the Mongol field commanders due to the vague wording which merely says that envoys were sent 'to the Mongols', ju meng-ku 如蒙古. This means that the movement of the envoys must be checked to see whether they actually went to the Mongol court (directly or via the camp of the commanders in the field) or whether they went only to the local commander. The various subtleties are too lengthy to pursue here; suffice it to say that I have verified the following tribute missions to the Mongol court in addition to those already listed. Enumeration of products is not given; 1239, 12th month (YKC 6b6-7); 1240, 3rd month (YKC 6b7-8); 1240, 12th month (YKC 8a3-4); 1243, 1st month (KS 23. 36a); 1255, 1st month (KS 24. 20b); 1260, 4th month (KS 25. 12b); 1262, 4th month (KS 25. 23b); 1265, 1st month (KS 26. 6a-b). As mentioned in the text, during the period 1264-1294, Koryŏ presented tribute 36 times.

32. yao 鳥 identified as a sparrowhawk (Accipiter nisus/A. virgatus) by Schafer and Wallacker, op. cit., p. 226.


34. ku 黥 identified by Schafer and Wallacker, op. cit., p. 244 as Falco peregrinus.

35. See S.Naitō, Chūsen-shi kenkyū, pp. 308-333, for a lengthy study of the Falconry Office in the Koryŏ period.

36. The text has 捕手, lit. 'seized the households' which I understand as meaning 'seized (the taxes of) the households'.

37. Some localities known to have been producing textiles which they presented as regional tribute during this period were Ch'ŏngju which produced snowy silk quilting 雪縫子; Andong 水東 which produced silk thread (?); Tongsan-pu 東山布 which produced yellow hempen cloth 黄麻布; and Haeyang 海陽 which produced white ramie 白絹 (KSC 16. 39b). I find the term 真絲 a bit strange and I am uncertain of the meaning; perhaps chinsa 真紗, a type of 'summer silk'?

38. See G.St.G.M.Gompertz, 'A Royal Pavillion Roofed with Celadon Tiles',
Oriental Art, New Series, 3 (1957), pp. 104-106. Other kilns were located in Tanjong-ni in Cholla Province, near Mokp'o, and on Kanghwa Island. See E. McCune, The Arts of Korea, Tōkyō, 1962, p. 175.

39. G. St. G. M. Gompertz, 'Korean Art', Oriental Art, New Series 7 (1961) 1, pp. 13-22, 7 (1961) 3, pp. 119-125 remarks in the latter, pp. 120-121, that the Koryo celadon industry was ruined in the Mongol period. The Koryo ceramics industry revived however and Gompertz notes a "sudden popularity of celadons painted with designs ... which reached its height during the reign of Gensō (AD 1260-1274) and Chūretsu (AD 1275-1308) and continued thereafter into the early Yi period." By 'celadon' in the latter case, the green 'classical' Koryo celadon is not meant; Gensō = Wönjong, and Chūretsu = Ch'ünghnyol Wang. See G. St. G. M. Gompertz, 'Black Koryo Ware', Oriental Arts, New Series 3 (1957) 2, pp. 61-66. Also see E. McCune, op. cit., p. 182; G. Henderson's valuable articles on Koryo celadon are unavailable to me.


41. Schurmann, op. cit., p. 223. Markets on the Yalu did not begin with the Yüan but were a relatively old establishment. Chŏng Yagyong, Chŏng Tasan chŏn-chip, chip 1, kwŏn 15. 9a-b, has also noticed this in his résumé of Korean trade relations and mentions that the markets were to be set up on the west bank of the Yalu River.

42. Cf. Schurmann, op. cit., p. 29. Koryo had, of course, used the system herself, chiefly to provide troop provisions and to transport grain to government granaries. Cf. KS 82. 36b-43b.

43. The wei-chjin or guard-army might possibly refer to a hostages army commonly called turja1-chjin (曹對). In Mongolian turja1 means 'guards'. Yet they probably refer to the 2000 troops under Môngketŭ which had been stationed in the Koryo Western Capital in 1270.

44. In a Koryo mission sent to the Mongols in 1232, the Koreans gave as one reason for their transfer of the capital to Kanghwa Island that they were informed that a Mongol envoy had arrived at Úijū and ordered the construction of 1000 large ships (KS 23). Perhaps the Mongols had realized the possibility of using Koryo as a departure point against the Sung at that time; it is also possible that in this way the Koreans themselves stimulated the idea. At any rate, Qubilai's first thoughts of Japan were due to the Korean Cho I who, in 1261, stirred his interest in Japan (VSY 208. 20b).

45. Cf. HTC II 67. 2. 18-19. Although we arrived at the conclusion indepen-
dently, Lo was the first to note this and cites (p. 490 note 5) YS 6. 11 and YS 167. 9. According to Lo's calculations (p. 491), in 1237, the navy of the Southern Sung was composed of 20 squadrons with a total complement of 52,000 men based principally at Hsü-p'u 瀟浦 guarding the entrance to the Yangtze, and in the Chusan Island group protecting the capital at Hang-chou. See Jung-Pang Lo, 'The Emergence of China as a Sea Power During the Late Sung and Early Yüan Periods', FEQ 14 (1954) 1, pp. 489-503. Ikeuchi, Genkō ..., p. 46, points out that the Mongols wanted ships to attack Hsiang-yang-ch'eng 陽城 and that Mongol forces were facing Sung forces along the Han River. Liu Cheng 劉曾 had submitted a plan for attacking the Sung in 1267. 11. The five lu ('province') administrations of Shen-hsi and the Szu-ch'uan Mobile Bureau were ordered to build 500 ships to be given to Liu. The attack failed and Liu returned with plans to build 5,000 ships. In 1270. 3 an attack by water was again contemplated. For Liu's activities see his YS 161 biography; also see Ikeuchi, loc. cit.

46. Ikeuchi, 'Yüan Shih-tsu and T'amna Island', believes that duplication is involved here and that T'o-to-erh made only the one trip in 1269. Ikeuchi's point is that it is improbable that the same person made essentially the same trip in such a short period of time. But I am not so sure, therefore I am leaving it as it is.

47. Cf. 2. 946, Azuma kagami (Vol. 4, p. 946). The short passage, which simply states that Mongol and Korean envoys arrived in three large ships, is dated the fifth month of the sixth year of Bunei 文永 (= 1266). At this time, the Western Capital was the only place where ships are known to be under construction. The Western Capital was located on the Taedong River 大同江 and supervised both the military colonies later established at Hwangju and the ship construction in Sohae Province whence came the ill-fated ships whose sinking led to the imprisonment of Circuit Inspector U. Qubilai's order to build ships of 3 to 4 thousand bushel (sōk) capacity may have led to the construction of ships which were larger than usual and possibly, as a result, technically of inferior construction. The size of the early Ming ships has been estimated at 500 tons. Cf. Jung-Pang Lo, op. cit., p. 493 note 18. Undoubtedly with all the shipbuilding done in the reign of Qubilai, techniques improved but the program of large transports was only begun in Korea at this time and the loss of two large groups of ships in storms plus the imprisoning of the Circuit Inspector leads me to suspect faulty construction.

48. Cf. Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Genkō ..., p. 127. Sansom estimates the involvement of 7,000 Korean seamen, 8,000 Korean troops, 300 large vessels and 3 to
4 hundred small craft, for the first invasion. See G. Sansom, *A History of Japan to 1334* (vol. 1 of a 2 vol. history of Japan), London, 1958, p. 442. Jung-Pang Lo, op. cit., p. 493, note 17, remarks that of the ships for the Japan invasions, 1/3 were large transport ships, 1/3 were combat vessels and landing-craft, while 1/3 were tenders. Lo cites Takeuchi Eiki 竹内荣喜, *Genkō no kenkyū*, Tōkyō, 1931, pp. 30 and 129. Lo also mentions that while the Mongols became a seapower by taking over the navies of Korea and the Southern Sung, they also embarked on a large shipbuilding program of their own for their invasions of Japan (1274 & 1281), Champa and Tongking (1283-1288), and Java (1293), ordering 1500 ships in 1279, 3000 in 1281, and 4000 in 1283 to be built in shipyards from Canton to Korea with lumber from T'amma and Jehol while captured Sung naval officers were assigned to the shipyards in both China and Korea. Cf. Lo, op. cit., pp. 492-493.

49. Although the two Mongol invasions of Japan are detailed in other works and need not be repeated here, perhaps mention should be made of the Korean force involved. For the first invasion, Ikeuchi, *Genkō* ..., p. 126-127, estimates the Mongol-Chinese forces to have numbered about 20000 (the Korean records say 25000) and the Korean force at about 5300 (the Korean records say 8000). Of the ships, apparently all constructed in Koryō, there were 126 large ships. Koryō also furnished the seamen for the expedition. The Korean forces in the first expedition were commanded by Kim Panggyŏng who was Supreme Commander of the Koryō forces, Kim Sŏn 金侖 (drowned 1274.10.3; *BTKP* 65.628) who was Commander of the Korean Army of the Left, and Kim Munbi 金文庇 who was Commander of the Korean Army of the Right. It should be noted that a Korean, Hong Tagu, was Marshal of the Army of the Right of the Mongol-Chinese Army. For the second invasion of 1281, it is estimated that Koryō furnished some 10 000 men and 900 ships. These activities are detailed in Ikeuchi, loc. cit., and Yi, *Han'guk-sa*, Vol. 2, p. 603 ff.


52. See Kim Sŏngjun 金成俊, *Ki-in ū sónggyŏk e tae-han koch'al*, 其人與性格에 대한考察 ["Studies on Ki-in"], *YH* 10 (1958), pp. 197-220. The Korean institution of internal hostages also dates to the Silla period. Cf. *Han'guk-sa sajŏn*, 66B. The term *kiin* is defined in
CHSL 4. 32b, "Formerly, the nation selected the male relatives, chaie 子弟, of the provincial officials, hyangni 郡吏, in the capital and called them kiin 其人." This system is also outlined in KS 76. 1b.

53. For examples of the Central Asian states keeping hostage rulers see Barthold, Turkestan ..., p. 430.

54. See Barthold, Turkestan ..., p. 461, for the practices of the Muslim states of Central Asia and the idea of people as absolute chattels. For the practice among the nomadic peoples of the steppes, see Schurmann, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

55. Ch'ang, the Duke of An'gyông, had been sent to the Mongol camp in the 12th month of 1257 (KS 24. 32b); he went again and returned in the 9th month of 1258 (KS 24. 28). It is not stated that he went as a hostage, but the sending of a royal kinsman - he was Wônjong's younger brother - even in the capacity of chief of a delegation, probably was interpreted as willingness to submit a hostage. Normally a royal kinsman played the role of mission chief during the many negotiations with the Mongols. For a poem on Wang Sun's departure as a hostage, see TYSC hujip 後集 10. 4a-b.


57. Yu Hongnyol, op. cit., p. 32, says hostages were not sent after 1283. This is incorrect. During the reign of King Ch'ungsón (r. 1309-1313) Kim Munyôn 金文衍 (d. 1314; BTKP 62. 596) led a group of hostages to the Yuan, cf. KS 103. 20b-21a.

58. The exiled monarch was King Ch'ungsón (r. 1309-1313); for pleas requesting his return see IC 6. 1a-3b; 6. 3b-5a, and 6. 5a-7a.

59. For example, Kang Hwasang 康和尚 who was captured as a boy and later returned in Mongol service (KS 25. 7a-b).


61. Barthold, Turkestan ..., p. 417, mentions similar Mongol practices in Central Asia. At the fall of the Turkish garrison of Banakath, the artisans and a body of youths were carried off for siege works.

62. This remark of tiger-skin houses is quite interesting. In 1876, a Korean mission was sent to Japan and the chief of the delegation was carried on "a platform covered with tiger skins", see Sohn Pow-key, 'The Opening of Korea ...', p. 101.

63. See C.R. Bawden, The Mongol Chronicle Allan Tobci, Göttinger Asiatische Forschungen, Bd. 5, Wiesbaden, 1955, pp. 132, 133, and 136 note 84. Bawden suggests (pp. 9-10) that the text was compiled ca. 1604-1634.
One text with a foreword by F.W. Cleaves and an introduction by Rev. A. Mostaert has been published as *Scripta Mongolica* I, by the Harvard-Yenching Institute, Cambridge, 1952, pp. XVI (text 46:12-50:13) and XVII (text 25:7-13) pertaining to the subject in hand. This work has also been discussed at some length by C.Ž. Zamcarano, whose comments have been translated by R. Loewenthal, *The Mongol Chronicles of the Seventeenth Century*, Bd. 3, Göttinger Asiatische Forschungen, Wiesbaden, 1955, pp. 55-88 and esp. p. 75. W. Heissig, *Bolur Erike*, published as Vol. X of *Monumenta Serica*, Peking, 1946, also discusses this at length, see pp. 36-37 esp.

64. Juvaini (Boyle, I. 180 note 4). Also see B. Vladimirtsov, *Gengis-Khan*, translated by M. Carsow, Paris, 1948; Bawden, op. cit., p. 133 note 2; Heissig, op. cit., p. 35 and p. 37 note 13; Poucha, op. cit., p. 158; and Hambis, *Le Chapitre CVII* ..., pp. 53, 124-126. This identification of Qulan as Korean is also found in other works including the *Meng-ku yüan-liu chien-cheng* (the *Meng-ku yüan-liu* being a translation of Sayang-secen's *Erdeni-yin tobci*), annotated by Shen Tseng-chih 聖曾植 (1850-1922), published in 2 pen by the Chung-kuo shu-tien ching-shou 中國書店經售, Peking, 1962, in chüan 3. 14a. The error in the *Meng-ku yüan-liu* was pointed out in a gloss by Wang Kuo-wei in 45b of the *Sheng-wu chin-cheng-lu chiao-chu* 聖武親征錄校注 incorporated in *Hai-nìng Wang Chung-ch'iao kung yi-shu* 海寧王忠愷公遺書, [The Collected Works of Wang Kuo-wei 國王維], Kuan-t'ang i-shu kan-hsing-hui 見堂遺書刊行會 edition, 1927; parenthetically, it might be noted that 66a, 68a-b, 69a, and 70b of this work contain passages which support, but do not supplement, *YKC*.

65. Her machinations and the revolt they engendered in Koryŏ are outlined in *YS* 104. 10b-13a, the longest biography given an Empress in the *Yüan shih*. Also of interest is *YS* 91. 3b ff, the biography of Pak Buqa 朴不花, a Korean in the service of the Yuan who came from the same village as Empress Ki. Also see *Nihon chiri taikei*, p. 400.

1. The origins of the Three Patrols, Sam pyolch’o, and the Horse Patrol, Ma pyolch’o.

The 'Military Monographs' of the Koryo-sa give the following account of the origin and composition of the Three Patrols:

"Formerly, Ch'oe U, concerned by numerous bandits in the nation, assembled valiant soldiers [who] patrolled nightly restricting violence. For this reason they were called Ya pyolch’o or Night Patrol. When bandits arose in the provinces he separately sent pyolch’o or patrols to apprehend them. This force became very numerous and, consequently, it was divided into the Left and Right and, in addition they took men who had escaped and returned from the Mongols, whose designation was Sin-aigun, to be one part; this is the Sam pyolch’o, or Three Patrols" (KS 81. 15b).

This is certainly a simple and straightforward account, however, some controversy has arisen due to a somewhat different version which is given as a gloss in the Yŏgong p‘aesol of Yi Chehyŏn (1287-1367) which relates:

"The powerful officials levied brave and skillful soldiers whom they raised for their own protection. They were the Sin-aigun, the Ma pyolch’o and the Ya pyolch’o who were called the Sam pyolch’o" (IC sŏlchŏn 2. 8b2-3).

This discrepancy is accentuated by a paucity of information on the Ma pyolch’o to which I have found only a few references:

(1) In the 10th month of 1229, i.e., the 16th year of the reign of Kojong, the Ma pyolch’o appear with the Tobang or Guards playing polo, tossing spears, and practicing mounted archery for the entertainment of Ch'oe U and his guests (KS 129. 35b; TT 31. 41).

(2) In the 11th month of 1239, 'Ch'oe U inspected the saddle horses, clothing, bows, swords, and armor of his house army the Tobang and the Ma pyolch’o" (KS 129. 35b; TT 31. 41).

(3) In the 3rd month of 1254, the Ma pyolch’o appear playing polo for the amusement of Ch'oe Hang and his guests, the chief ministers (KS 129. 49b; TT 32. 69).
The apparent contradiction is resolved if it is assumed that the Ma pyŏlch’o were incorporated into the ranks of the Sin’āigun or the Ya pyŏlch’o prior to the formation of the Sam pyŏlch’o, which is the view of Ikeuchi Hiroshi 2). Such a conclusion is suggested by negative circumstances, viz., the disappearance of the Ma pyŏlch’o from the records just prior to both the appearance of the Sin’āigun and the division of the Ya pyŏlch’o, which in turn coincides directly with the formation of the Sam pyŏlch’o.

An alternative is that the gloss is in error, which is the view of Kim Sanggi 3), who points out that there is a clear reference to the Ma pyŏlch’o as part of the house army of Ch’oe U while the Sam pyŏlch’o were a government rather than a private army, although some argument could be made here since the Ch’oe clan controlled the government.

It should be admitted at this point that nothing in the few records of the existence of the Ma pyŏlch’o indicates that they influenced events in the least, while their connection with polo may well be their most important contribution by allowing us an insight into the military athletic events of the times as well as the personalities of the Ch’oe clan who sponsored them.

Parenthetically, it might also be mentioned that Kwŏn Munhae 權文 (d. 1591) in his Taedong Unbu Kunok 大東韻府郡王 [Korean Rhyming Dictionary] lists both the Sam pyŏlch’o (16. 32a6-9) and its origins and the Sin’āigun (4. 31a.7-9) — both accounts following KS 81 — yet no mention is made of the Ma pyŏlch’o.

Although the evidence is circumstantial, it warrants, I feel, acceptance of the Koryŏ-sa account in this instance, as far as the composition of the Three Patrols is concerned. The final disposition of the Ma pyŏlch’o is, like the Tobang with whom they are associated, unknown; the records pass over them in silence.

2. Patrols, pyŏlch’o 別抄.

The account of the origin of Ch’oe U’s Ya pyŏlch’o in the ‘Military Monographs’ clarifies their original function as a night patrol to suppress banditry, yet Ya pyŏlch’o existed in the provinces long before Ch’oe organized his Ya pyŏlch’o and are, in turn, connected with development of the various pyŏlch’o.

The first appearance of a pyŏlch’o per se in the records occurs in 1174, the 4th year of the reign of Myŏngjong (1171-1197), when a pyŏlch’o was used to suppress the rebellion of Cho Wich’ong (KS 129. 1a7-8). This record is also contained on the grave inscription 4) of Ch’oe Ch’unghŏn where it remarks that, at the time of the rebellion, they selected the brave who thought little of life and formed them into a chŏnbong pyŏlch’o 戰鋒別抄 in order to suppress the bandits to 盜 who had arisen at the Western Capital. It should
be observed that if we read Ch'oe Ch'ung-ho'n in lieu of Ch'oe U in the KS 81 account then the latter accords with the first appearance of a pyolch'o in the records.

During the reign of Myeongjong it was suggested that shock troops be selected from each army and this was done; 300 men were selected from each 1000 to serve as shock troops (KS 81. 7) 5). It seems more than coincidence to note that the first pyolch'o appear in the records precisely at this time.

In 1216 when a Koryo army was battling Ch'i-tan invaders in the northwest, we read that "... the three armies each dispatched a 100-man pyolch'o and a 40-man sin'gi 高瞻 ..." (KS103. 8b3; TT 30. 18). In a record of this same encounter in Yi Chehyon's nan'go 6. 8b1-2, which is dated the 22nd day of the 8th month of 1216, we read that "... the three armies each selected a ch'ongye 精銳 to ward them (i.e., the Ch'i-tan) off" and it continues with the account of the battle mentioning the singi or cavalry units repeatedly.

Pyolch'o, 'those who were especially selected', was initially merely another designation for the various 'shock troops' or 'dare-death squads' which arose from the Koryo military structure and appeared briefly under such names as ch'ongjol 精卒, yejol 鉤卒 (KS 25. 3a-b), ch'ongye, etc. The term ch'ongjol is undoubtedly a Koryo counterpart of ch'ongbyong (C. ch'eng-ping) 精兵 a term which appears in Shih-chih 史記 110. 11b10. It is not surprising to see the similarity in these units, for such elite groups are probably as old as the organization of military units themselves; nor is it particularly astonishing to find new appellations applied to old forms, a process of similar antiquity.

Two pertinent components of the Koryo garrisons along the Northern Frontier-District were the sin'gi and the ch'ongyong 精勇; other units included regular infantry, crossbowmen, etc. While both of these units are lacking in the Eastern Frontier-District garrisons, the ch'ongyong are also found as units of the provincial military and both types of units were included in the capital garrisons. The parallel of the singi or cavalry and the pyolch'o or select infantry groups is especially interesting and the ch'ongyong may indeed have been renamed pyolch'o. It would be easy to speculate on which of the various units of the Koryo military, if any, emerged as pyolch'o but this would require a deeper study of the Koryo military than is my intention here. It should be pointed out that the ch'ogun 抄軍 or selected army was one of the mainstays of the regional forces (KS 83. 10-25) and that the term ch'ojôngyong 抄勇 or 'selected valiants' is seen used in lieu of ch'ogun (cf. KS 83. 12a) while again the term ch'ongyong often appears alone. These are especially suggestive terms, more so since they appear with frequency prior to the reign of Kojong and then tend to disappear from the rec-
ords temporarily to emerge later in the Yi Dynasty Period; in the later Yi period, the guard unit of the Sŏnggyun'gwan (Confucian Academy) in Seoul was called pyŏlch'ogan 別抄ṭṭ. A general survey of the appearance of the pyŏlch'o shows that they were organized by individual military commands or administrative centers throughout the peninsula to cope with invasions and internal disorders; units which disappear from the records when the crisis is past simply because they are inactive.

In the winter of 1216, a force of Ch'ī-tan rebels swept into northern Koryŏ and ranging south, menaced the capital. At this time pyŏlch'o began to appear in the northern frontier garrisons in action against the Ch'ī-tan (KS 103. 8b; TT 30. 18). Pyŏlch'o were also sent against the Eastern Jūrŏn (KS 23. 29b-30a; KS 23. 41a) and there was a widespread rise of pyŏlch'o with the beginning of the Mongol invasions (KS 103. 27a). Following this pyŏlch'o appear with frequency in the records. They disappear following the submission to the Mongols in 1273. We also find that a Korean force used in the first Japan invasion is referred to as the sŏnbon g pyŏlch'o (KS 28. 1b). There were no major uprisings or invasions until the Qadān 琵丹 rebels swarmed into the peninsula in the spring of the 16th year of the reign of King Ch'ungnyŏl (r. 1275-1308) at which time the pyŏlch'o reappear in the Wŏnju 原州 pyŏlch'o (KS 30. 24a8-9; KS 104. 42b7) and the Ssangsŏng chinsu pyŏlch'o 雙城鎮守 別抄 (KS 82. 38b6).

In addition to regional pyŏlch'o identified by geographic designation, there are many references to units identified merely as pyŏlch'o (KS 24, TT 32, TT 33), e.g., in the 4th month of 1256, "The Northwest Commissioner of Men and Horse sŏbuk pyŏngmasa 西北兵馬使 sent a 300-man pyŏlch'o to attack 1 000 Mongol troops at Úiju 义州." (KS 24. 25b-26a). The majority of these unidentified pyŏlch'o were undoubtedly regional pyŏlch'o. Ikeuchi has suggested that when the character kyŏn 遣 'send' is used then the pyŏlch'o involved were the Ya pyŏlch'o or the Sam pyŏlch'o, while the character sa 使 'send' indicates that a regional pyŏlch'o is involved; the theory is interesting but not totally convincing.

A consideration of the activities of the pyŏlch'o not only confirms their origins from an existing regional military structure but further indicates they were often spontaneously and hastily organized groups, many of which developed into highly professional military units and which became a permanent part of the military system fighting extremely effective, though limited, actions against numerous invaders throughout the peninsula. Again, many of the pyŏlch'o were clearly temporary drafts of men which disbanded when the emergency passed.
The records of pyolch'ö activities are too voluminous to adumbrate in their entirety and, a few examples of their activities will, I believe, suffice to show their characteristics.

(1) In late 1236, Chŏn Kon'gyŏl 全公烈, a graduate physician of the Punyŏng 扶寧 (in mod. Ch'ŏlla Province) pyolch'ö placed troops in ambush in Koran 高麗 guarding the mountain road. They intercepted and attacked twenty Mongol cavalymen killing two of them. The soldiers' weapons as well as twenty horses seized were awarded to Kon'gyŏl and he was allowed to enter government service in his original profession (TT 32. 54).

(2) In the spring of 1237, Kim Kyŏngson was in Naju for the purpose of suppressing a local uprising. When the rebel group heard of Kim's arrival, they surrounded the city. When the people of the city were hesitant to take action against the numerous rebel band, Kim told them: "Although the rebels are numerous, they are only straw-sandaled villagers." Then he raised over 30 men who were able to be pyolch'ö (KS 103. 28a).

(3) In the eighth month of 1253, 'Captain, kyowi, Tae Kumch'wi 大金就 led the 30-man Ubong 牛峰 pyolch'ö to fight the Mongol soldiers between Kumgyo and Hungui. They took several heads and captured horses, bows and arrows, felt and fur garments, and other items" (KS 24. 7a).

(4) In late 1253 "the Kyodong 高桐 pyolch'ö (an island off Hwanghae Province) hid soldiers outside the walled city of P'yŏngju 平州 and entered the Mongol camp at night killing many of them. Captain, kyowi, Chang Cha-bang 張子邦 grasped a short sword in his hand and killed, [including] the Chief of the Encampment, over twenty men" (TT 32. 68).

(5) In the 8th month of 1254, "Mongol soldiers and cavalry camped at Koeju 梨州. Major, sanwŏn, Chang Chabang led a pyolch'ö which routed and crushed them" (TT 33. 70).

(6) In early 1255, "Mongol troops camped at Ch'ollyphŏng 鉄嶺. The T'ongju pyolch'ö attacked them from both sides and destroyed them" (TT 33. 71).

As an effective organized force based in the regional administrative centers, the pyolch'ö were also used in quelling small local uprisings. They were the one means to maintain order available to the regional authorities who appear, for the most part, to have been left to shift for themselves as a result of the Koryŏ defense policy of seeking refuge in the mountain citadels and coastal islands.

This policy, originated by Ch'oe U, was implemented upon the transfer of the capital to Kanghwa in 1232, the year following the first Mongol invasions (TT 31. 48-49). The Ya pyolch'ö were also used to enforce this evacuation when it was periodically carried out, occasionally with great violence (KS 122.
28a-b). The evacuation policy had one terrible consequence: the food shortage which followed when the peasants left the land. The great dearth of food undoubtedly further encouraged the numerous slave revolts and swelled the ranks of bandit groups or rebel factions like the Sam pyŏlch’o following their rebellion. And these were the conditions, the 'Military Monographs' of the Koryŏ-sa tell us, which led Ch'oe U to form his pyŏlch’o which, because it patrolled at night came to be called the Ya pyŏlch’o or Night Patrol.

3. The Ya pyŏlch’o

In the 5th year of the reign of Sinjong (r. 1198-1204), some twenty-six years after the appearance of the first pyŏlch’o we see the first mention of a Ya pyŏlch’o in the rebellion of the Kyŏngju pyŏlch’o (KS 21. 14; TT 29. 5) which are referred to in the 'Monographs on Geography' of the Koryŏ-sa as the 'Ya pyŏlch’o of the Eastern Capital' (= Kyŏngju) (KS 57. 2b 6).

One other reference to a regional Ya pyŏlch’o occurs in the eighth month of 1254, when Kyŏngsang and Cholla Provinces each sent an 80-man Ya pyŏlch’o to serve as guards at the capital on Kanghwa Island (KS 24. 15a).

These records clearly show that Ya pyŏlch’o were organized in the regional administrative centers long before Ch’oe U assumed power and that they continued in the regions even after the organization of a Ya pyŏlch’o by Ch’oe U.

The first reference to the organization of a Ya pyŏlch’o by Ch’oe U occurs in the previously cited account from the 'Military Monographs'. The first dated reference occurs in 1232, the year following the first Mongol invasions, when Ch’oe U called the officials together to tell them of his intention of transferring the capital from Kaegyŏng to Kanghwa Island (TT 31. 48-49).

From this, it would appear that the Ya pyŏlch’o were organized sometime between Ch’oe U’s assumption of power in 1219 and the first mention of them on Kanghwa in 1232, in which case the Ya pyŏlch’o referred to earlier in the records would then appear to have been regional Ya pyŏlch’o.

One of the major points raised in each of the studies preceding this, is the question of whether the Ya pyŏlch’o and Sam pyŏlch’o in turn, were public or private in character. That is, were they the private army of the Ch’oe clan or were they government forces. The question has arisen because the activities of the Ya pyŏlch’o appear to be chiefly linked with the Ch’oe clan who are credited with establishing them. Naitō argues that they were essentially a private force while Kim Sanggi argues forcefully that they were government forces. It is my own belief that the Ya pyŏlch’o and the Sam pyŏlch’o in turn, were the forces of the military government, not of the Court. As
such, they were used by the Ch'oe clan and by the other military governors for their own ends, while they also acted in the capacity of 'government forces' since the military government was the de facto power of the land.

Their involvement in the power struggle is revealed in the following passage: "The powerful officials regarded [the Sam Pyŏlch'o] as their servants and were generous with their emoluments or else granted them personal benefits. Moreover, they confiscated the property of criminals and doled it out 7). Consequently, the powerful officials ordered them about freely. In their struggle for power, Kim Chun killed Ch'oe Ui, Im Yŏn killed Kim Chun, [Song] Songnye killed [Im] Yumu; they all relied on the power [of the Sam pyŏlch'o]" (KS 81. 15b-16a).

4. The Sinŭigun

The first mention of the Sinŭigun occurs in early 1257, when the Sinŭigun, the Ya pyŏlch'o, three units of the Civil Guards, and thirty-six units of the Guard Corps were assembled to insure the transfer of power to Ch'oe Ui upon the death of Ch'oe Hang (KS 129. 52a; TT 33. 74). They appear again in the third month of 1258, and this time the units seen together are the Left and Right pyŏlch'o, the Sinŭigun, and the Guard Corps (TT 33. 77), and it is at this time that the first mention is made of the Sam pyŏlch'o (TT 33. 77).

The actual organization of the Sam pyŏlch'o may reasonably be conjectured to have taken place prior to this since these individual units retained their identity from 1258 until the rebellion in 1270. In the fourth month of 1258, for instance, the Sinŭigun and the Ya pyŏlch'o are seen together without reference to the division of the Ya pyŏlch'o or the organization of the Sam pyŏlch'o (TT 33. 78).

A reference to the Sinŭigun as a 'wing army' 한국출현 (i.e., subordinate unit) which had escaped from the Mongols (YKC 22a) provides a valuable point d'appui for considering their origins as it links them with the Sin'gi 출현, a general term used by the Koryo army for cavalry units. Excluding the capital garrisons, the Koryo cavalry units or Sin'gi were concentrated along the Northern Frontier; not one such unit is listed for the Eastern Frontier or for the provincial garrisons (cf. KS 83. 10a-25a). These were the small cavalry units which the Mongol armies overran on each of their invasions. It seems logical to conclude that remnants of these units were reorganized into the Sinŭigun.

5. Kyŏng pyŏlch'o and Kyŏngoe pyŏlch'o

The designations Kyŏng pyŏlch'o 老別抄, Kyŏngoe pyŏlch'o 老外抄, and Oe pyŏlch'o 外抄 also warrant brief consideration.
Both Ikeuchi and Kim Sanggi have arrived at the same conclusion, and in Kim's words, "The pyŏlch'o of the chu and hyŏn [districts], i.e., the regional pyŏlch'o, were called Kyŏngoe pyŏlch'o or Oe pyŏlch'o and this is in contradistinction to the designation Kyŏng pyŏlch'o (the Sam pyŏlch'o)" (8).

This conclusion appears to be justified by several instances where the units of the Sam pyŏlch'o are found in the same area at the same time that the Kyŏng pyŏlch'o appear. For example, when Ch'oe T'an revolted in 1269, the Sam pyŏlch'o were dispatched to deal with him; the Ya pyŏlch'o garrisoned at Hwangju and the Sinŭigan garrisoned on Ch'ŏ Island (KS 104. 4a). This was because the officials of the Western Capital had fled to these islands from the Mongols (KS 130. 33b). At this time, Ch'oe T'an and his followers entered Ch'ŏ Island at night and killed several officials and men of the Kyŏng pyŏlch'o (KS 25. 24b-25a).

The Kyŏngoe pyŏlch'o is significant in that it further indicates the rise of the pyŏlch'o from the regional military structure. In an entry dated the 3rd month of 1189 in the 'Monographs on Food and Money' of the Koryŏ-sa, we read, "[In] the subordinate (i.e., regional) structure, all the chu and hyŏn have Kyŏngoe yangban armies (KS 78. 14b).

The development of the regional pyŏlch'o from this structure is suggested by the example of Ch'ungju:

1. In 1232, a Yangban pyŏlch'o, a Slave Army, and a Chamnyu pyŏlch'o made their appearance at Ch'ungju (TT 31. 46).

2. During a Mongol attack on Ch'ungju in 1254, men in the city were formed into a chŏngye to attack the Mongols (KS 24. 23b).

3. In 1255, Ch'ungju again sent out a chŏngye against the Mongols (KS 24. 23b).

4. In 1258, a Ch'ungju pyŏlch'o appeared in action against the Mongols (TT 33. 81).

The regional pyŏlch'o beginning in the reign of Kojong, were often called Kyŏngoe pyŏlch'o, probably to distinguish them from the Ya pyŏlch'o and later the Sam pyŏlch'o, who were often referred to as the Kyŏng pyŏlch'o. In this is also suggested a reversion to terminologies previously used, i.e., Kyŏngoe yangban armies, etc. That the regional pyŏlch'o not only continued to survive, but were institutionalized is seen in the 'Monographs on Penal Law' in the Koryŏ-sa, when, in a reorganization of the regional corvée system, the pyŏlch'o of each hyŏn were ordered to standardize the corvée, which occurs as late as the reign of the boy monarch King Ch'ungmok (r. 1345-1348) (KS 85. 19a).

Thus, the pyŏlch'o, destined to play an important role in the military structure throughout the Koryŏ period (cf. KS 82. 7a-b), provide, in a limited

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sense, an excellent illustration of an often overlooked phenomenon: the institutionalization of the non-institutional.

Notes to the Appendix

1. Three lengthy studies of the controversial pyŏlch'ŏ have preceded this, viz., Ikeuchi Hiroshi, Kŏrai no sambesshŏ ni tsuite [On the Sam pyŏlch'ŏ of Koryŏ], SZ 37 (1926) 9, pp. 809-846; Naitō Shumpo, Kŏrai heisei kanken 高麗兵制営見 [A Survey of the Koryŏ Military System], SG 15 (1934), pp. 69-94, and corrections to this article which appeared in Kŏrai heisei kanken hoi 高麗兵制営見補遺 [Supplement to 'A Survey of the Koryŏ Military System'], SG 18 (1934), pp. 105-111; and finally, Kim Sanggi, Sam pyŏlch'ŏ wa ... , loc. cit. The subject is also treated at length in Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, passim. It might also be mentioned that the Sam pyŏlch'ŏ or Three Patrols and their rebellion occupy a somewhat romantic place in Korean history. Fictionalized treatments include Pak Yonggu's 朴容九 lengthy 'Sam pyŏlch'ŏ' incorporated in Vol. 29 of Han'guk munhak chŏnjip 韓國文學全集, published in 36 vols., by Minjung sŏ-gwan 民衆書館, Seoul, 1959-1961.

2. Cf. Ikeuchi, Kŏrai no sambesshŏ ..., loc. cit.; the 'standard' interpretation is that Ch'oe U modelled his house force, the ma pyŏlch'ŏ after the existing pyŏlch'ŏ forces. See Tŏyŏ reikishi daijiten, Vol. 3, p. 413.1.


4. Ch'oe Ch'ung'hŏn's grave inscription is contained in the Chŏsen kinseki sŏran 朝鮮金石總覧 [General Survey of Korean Inscriptions on Stone and Metal], Vol. 1, p. 442, cited Kim Sanggi, op. cit., p. 92; similar information is given in a gloss in CHSL 4.16b which, incidentally, provides an idea of the value of CHSL.

5. Naitō, op. cit., p. 80, discusses the selection of 200 men in each of the yugwi 六衛 or Six Guard Units to be sŏnjŏng'gun 先戰軍 in the year Munjong ascended the throne; the selection of 300 men from each 1000 to be shock troops in the first year of the reign of Munjong, and the record of sŏnjŏng mabyŏng 先戰馬兵 in Munjong's 40th reign year. I do not quite understand this, and suspect it contains some error. Munjong's 40th reign year, for example, is impossible since the monarch in question reigned only 37 years (cf. KS 9.37a), while the selection of 200 men from each of the Six Guard Units to be a sŏnjŏng'gun occurred in 1046, i.e., in the last year of the reign of Chŏngjong 朝宗 (r. 1035-1046) or a year earlier than Naitō says.
6. Yi, Han'guk-sa, Vol. 2, p. 535 note 1, also notes this; in his reference read packkwan-ji 白官志 in lieu of chiri-ji 地理志.

7. The role of the military in connection with law enforcement and in bringing criminals to trial in the Koryo period is outside the scope of this study, however, the inclusion of such duties in the activities of the Sam pyōlch'o or Three Patrols, affords an interesting view of the Koryo penal system. It appears that they were not only charged with arresting criminals, but may also have been involved to some extent in their detention, trial, and punishment. An example of this is seen when, a few days after Kim Susón 金守禑 had gone to the Mongol Commander Yesüder and informed him that Koryo did not really intend to transfer the capital back to its former site on the mainland as the Mongols desired (KS 25.5b). Due to this, the Kanghwa authorities, "imprisoned the Deputy Commissioner of the Western Capital Kim Sik 金軾, the father of the traitor Kim Susón, in the Ya pyōlch'o 'station', so ǒj" (KS 25.6a; also see KS 122.28a-b). The combination of military and judicial matters has ancient precedent in China. This, Hulsewé points out, led Pan Ku, one of the compilers of the Han shu, to combine his survey of penal rules with a history of military organization (Han Shu 23); "... Pan Ku in this case was not so much attempting to create a new precedent as that he followed an ancient association of ideas", A. F. P. Hulsewé, Remnants of Han Law, Vol. 1, Leiden, 1955, p. 314.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY, SYMBOLS, AND ABBREVIATIONS

a. w. also written
b. born
colq. colloquial
d. died
fl. flourished
mod. modern
prob. probably
r. reigned
C. Chinese
J. Japanese
Kor. Korean
Mo. Mongolian
* indicates a tentative reconstruction

+ preceding the title of a work indicates that I have been unable to see the work in question but have mentioned it en passant.

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AY Asea yōn'gu ('The Journal of Asiatic Studies') issued by Koryō University, Seoul, since 1959.

BMFEA Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities

BTKP Biographical Tables of the Koryo Period, Pow-key Sohn (Son Pogi) compiler, Berkeley, California, 1958; must be used with caution as no list of errata is included; reviewed by E. Wagner, HJAS 22 (1959), pp. 316-319.

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**HJAS**


**HTC**

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**HY**

*Hwích' an yŏsa* by Hong Yōha (1620-1674) in 48 kwŏn; 18th century edition in the École Nationale des Langues Orientales Vivantes, Paris. This is an abridgement of Hong's *Mokchaes kaksuk hwích' an yŏsa* (*Mokchaes* is Hong's *ho* or literary appellation) compiled in the 17th century.


**HYS**

*Hsin Yii'an Shih* by K'o Shao-min (1850-1933), 257 ch'ítian, issued as a dynastic history in 1921-1922.

**IC**

*Ilchae-chip*, containing the surviving works of Yi Chehyŏn (1287-1367) in 14 kwŏn, incorporated in the *Yogye myŏnghyŏn-chip*, Sŏnggyun'gwan Taehak-kyo, Seoul, 1959, and consisting of: (1) *Ilchae nan'go* in 10 kwŏn, containing his poetry and, in kwŏn 9, historical eulogies on various Koryŏ monarchs, and records of important events. Collected by his son Yi Changno and grandson Yi Porim, the work garnered the title of *nan'go* or scattered papers. (2) *Yŏngong p'aesŏl* or The Petty Reports of the Old Man of the Chestnut Grove, in 4 kwŏn, which contains a collection of writings on a variety of topics: tales of valour, unusual occurrences, discourses and criticisms, some poetry, and bits of a chronological history of the Koryŏ period to his own time. At the end, collected remnants, subyu, grave records, *myojo*, and a genealogy, *yŏndo*, have been attached. The Sŏnggyun'gwan text is a photolithographic copy of the 1814 edition.

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